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
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JAPAN AND JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS

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JAPAN AND JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS

CLARK UNIVERSITY ADDRESSES

EDITED BY
GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE
Professor of History, Clark University

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INTRODUCTION

Japan and the United States are at present the two foremost powers of the Pacific, and their international relations form one of the most vital factors in the diplomacy of that ocean. Other nations may later challenge this paramount position. China, if successfully reorganized, will do so in the near future; Australia, New Zealand and British Columbia may, after some decades, make the British Empire as powerful in the Pacific as it is now in the Atlantic and the Indian oceans; while Russia may eventually develop Siberia and extend its conquests in the Far East until it will rival the leaders of today. At present, however, the supremacy of Japan and the United States can hardly be questioned. They are the Pacific powers not because of distant conquests in that ocean, which in time, as Asia develops in strength, must be abandoned, but because their own territory, inhabited by their own people, is situated there. The home land of both is on the Pacific.

Both are young powers in the modern sense. A little over a half century ago the United States did not possess a single foot of undisputed territory on the Pacific Ocean; today it has a greater coastline than any other nation. Less than a half century ago Japan was a weak, feudalized state with a civilization much resembling that of Europe in the middle ages. Its recent progress, the accomplishment in fifty years of the advance which it took Europe five hundred years to make, is probably the most remarkable national achievement in history. So well did Japan learn its lessons in ~~western civilization~~ that today, in proportion to its resources, it has probably the most efficient governmental organization in the world.

The relations between these two great Pacific powers has always been intimate and, in the main, one of almost romantic friendship. In all Japan there is but one monument to a foreigner, and that is to an American. It marks the

spot where Commodore Perry first landed, the place, to use the language of the Japanese dedication, "on which the modern civilization of our Japanese Empire had its beginning." In the years immediately following this opening of the country, Americans were the ones who exerted the most powerful influence in helping to develop a new civilization in accord with the standards of western nations. Americans, more than others, brought modern schools, modern medicine and the ideals of Christianity; they were themselves the first modern school teachers and physicians. A large proportion of the leaders of present-day Japan studied under them; while hundreds of other Japanese students completed their education in the schools and universities of the United States.

In more recent times mutual international courtesies have been marked. The United States led the way in the movement to abolish extraterritorial jurisdiction in Japan, and to admit the Empire as a real equal into the family of nations. Probably no people gave Japan a stronger or more enthusiastic moral support during its war with Russia. On the other hand, Japan removed the causes of friction over the immigration question by itself forbidding its laborers to enter the United States; and when the American government negotiated the compulsory arbitration treaty with Great Britain, modified the terms of its alliance with that country to obviate even the suspicion of danger that Great Britain might be involved in war with the United States on account of its connection with Japan.

In material respects, also, such as trade, the relations have been close. Japan has bought much from the United States, especially equipment for its new railroads. The value of these American imports into Japan is still increasing rapidly; the United States is now selling nearly 100 per cent more than it did even two or three years ago. This country, too, is Japan's best customer, and buys from it more than any other, more even than the entire continent of Europe. Further, the export of silk is regarded by many as the foundation of Japan's foreign trade; and of this, over one-half is purchased by the United States.

Commercial intercourse will be increased still further by the opening of the Panama Canal, which will not only bring Japan into direct communication with the Atlantic and Gulf sections of this country, but will make Japanese harbors the ports of call for all American ships passing through the canal in trade with China.

Notwithstanding these intimate ties of friendship and of commerce there arose, soon after the close of the Russian war, a spirit of suspicion and even hostility between certain elements in the population of both the United States and Japan. The immigration question was perhaps the occasion of it; but it was increased by opposition in this country to Japan's policy and administration in Manchuria and Korea. The fundamental cause was very probably the sudden awakening of the United States to the fact that Japan was no longer a mere picturesque land of Orientals which it could patronize at will; but was a powerful, proud nation, jealous of its rights and of its new-found position as a world power.

This period of friction, which might easily have passed without any serious result, was continued by the efforts of the jingo elements in both lands. The United States was the chief offender; a section of the press, together with certain politicians, insisted that Japan was secretly planning to wage war against this country. Some of the American papers published no news from the Far East unless it reflected in some way upon the Japanese government or people, and definitely instructed their reporters to send only accounts unfriendly to Japan. War scares appeared at periods suspiciously convenient for the advocates of an increased American army and navy. So evident were these attempts to arouse mutual suspicion that President Taft declared: "When one considers the real feelings of the two peoples as a whole, when one considers the situation from the standpoint of sanity and real patriotism in each country, it is difficult to characterize in polite or moderate language the conduct of those who are attempting to promote misunderstanding and ill-feeling between the two countries."

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This anti-Japanese propaganda has without doubt done a certain amount of harm, although it has failed to turn the thinking part of America from its feeling of friendship and admiration for the people of Japan.

Especially in view of the danger from such campaigns of international slander as this, it is absolutely necessary for the various countries to correctly understand each other. To bring this about, no agency is better fitted than the university, whose purpose in every field of knowledge is, first, to search for the real truth with an impartial mind; and, second, to do its part in disseminating this truth in the community at large. This has been one of the principal aims of Clark University in founding its annual conference upon international problems, and in publishing its *Journal of Race Development*. Subjects connected with Japan were presented at the conference of a year ago, where twenty-eight experts, twenty-one Americans and seven Japanese, gave addresses or papers on almost every aspect of Japan's national life and of the relations between Japan and the United States. Nearly all of these articles have already appeared in the *Journal of Race Development*, but, in response to an urgent request, the University is now republishing them in book form. Each of the present chapters deals with a distinct topic; together they cover progressively the field of what is both most interesting and most vital in the present national and international situation of Japan.

In bringing together these various papers, the Department wishes to express to each of the authors its grateful appreciation of his kind coöperation. It is, however, under an especial obligation to Dr. M. Honda, the Editor of the *Oriental Review*, for constant assistance in arranging the program of the conference upon Japan.

It is our sincere wish that this volume may be of service in making the acts and motives of the Japanese government, as well as the Japanese people themselves, somewhat better understood in this country. There is nothing mysterious about them. Their conduct is perfectly intelligible; it is much what our own would be under similar circumstances. That both nations will always take the same view of every

international question, is hardly to be expected; yet an essential preliminary for a peaceful adjustment, when difficulties do arise, and a necessity for the continuance of mutual friendship, is—just as between individuals—a correct and sympathetic appreciation of each other's standpoint and of the best in each other's character.

G. H. BLAKESLEE.

*Clark University,
Worcester, Mass.,
December 20, 1912.*

RELATIONS OF JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

By David Starr Jordan, LL.D., President of Stanford University

It is now nearly sixty years since the modern history of Japan began. The arrival of Commodore Perry at Kurihama, the downfall of the Shogun and the restoration of the Mikado mark the point of transition from feudal Japan to the Japan of today.

In all this period, the Japanese nation has been the subject of intense interest to the cultivated people of America and a warm sympathy has arisen between those people of each nation who have come to understand the character and the ideals of the other. This sympathy has been kept alive by the influence of Japanese students in America on the one hand, and on the other by the interest of those who have gone as missionaries, as teachers or advisors in the affairs of Japan.

In Asia, there has existed for many years, a division of the non-Japanese into two sharply defined parties or one may say, attitudes of mind, the pro-Japanese and the anti-Japanese. The disputes of these two types of people have not come to our notice until very lately. Till within the last decade, American influence was almost wholly ranged with the pro-Japanese. Contributory to this fact was our general tendency toward sympathetic interest in a nation which rose to constitutional government through influences from within. The Shimonoseki incident, the visit of General Grant, the aid of the United States in setting aside the obnoxious consular jurisdiction in the treaty ports, all these became expressions of the friendly attitude of America.

The Japanese question, as it is now called, first rose to the horizon in 1899, the year of the abrogation of consular jurisdiction.

The need of cheap labor on the sugar plantations of Hawaii was great and constant. Kalakaua, the king, had

tried to meet this need by "blackbirding" expeditions among the islands of Polynesia. The steamship companies followed by strenuous efforts among the laborers in the rice fields of the region about the inland Sea of Japan, the districts of Okayama, Hiroshima and Yamaguchi. By their insistence and by offers of real wages their emigration agencies brought to Hawaii many men from the lowest stratum in Japanese life, next to the criminal and the out-cast—the unskilled and homeless laborers in the rice fields. These have been called coolies, but their position in Japan was quite different from that of the coolies or half slaves of the continent of Asia.

These laborers were treated essentially as slaves in Hawaii. They carried with them none of the culture of Japan, they received none in their new homes. They did not go as colonists. The Japanese with homes do not willingly leave these homes where "their own customs fit them like a garment," to form new ones in another region. The Japanese are not spontaneously colonists. They will go to other lands for study or for trade or for higher wages. But they go with the hope to return. The coolies went to Hawaii solely under the incentive of higher wages.

When Hawaii was annexed to the United States, the shackles of their slavery were thrown off, and the same impulse of higher wages carried them on to San Francisco, Seattle and Vancouver.

In 1899, Mr. W. W. Scott of Honolulu, a former resident of Japan, warned the Japanese authorities of the dangers involved in this movement of Japanese laborers to California. Their lower standard of living and of wages would make them exploitable. This would bring them in conflict with labor unions. Economic clash would beget race prejudice, and Japan could not afford to be judged by her least attractive and least efficient representatives. Influenced by these and similar considerations the Japanese government in 1899, refused passports to all unskilled laborers, and since that time none have come from Japan direct to the Pacific States.

But in response to the continuous demand of Hawaii

they were for a time allowed to go there. Japanese people already constituted the great majority of the population of these islands. Even after passports were refused to laborers going to Hawaii, the immigration of coolies from Hawaii to San Francisco still continued.

There was and is a very great demand for Japanese help among the orchardists of California. No other labor has been adequate and available and it is not easy to see what the fruit interests are to do without Japanese help. In this work, the European laborer has scarcely entered into competition and the prices paid the Japanese are not less than the wages of American labor in the same lines. The demand for Japanese workers in household service and in canning establishments has also been great and unsatisfied.

From the fisheries which the Japanese have almost monopolized in British Columbia and in Hawaii, they have been virtually excluded by statutes limiting the fisheries of California, Oregon and Washington to citizens of these States. Unless born in the United States the Japanese cannot become citizens.

A large portion of the Japanese laborers avoided the orchards and established themselves in the cities where, as laundrymen, restaurant keepers, draymen, carpenters and the like, they entered thus into competition with the American laborers, the most of whom in San Francisco were recent immigrants from Europe.

Their lower scale of living and their peculiarities in other ways soon brought them under the condemnation of the trade unions. Anti-Japanese societies were formed and much effort was spent to the end of the exclusion of Japanese and Korean laborers as the Chinese had already been excluded. The personal violence which accompanied the anti-Chinese campaign of twenty years before was practically absent from this. The Japanese were better able to take care of themselves and also, in spite of much reckless talk and exaggeration of language, there was very little real enmity toward the Japanese with any class of their opponents. Most of the unfriendly talk was for political purposes and the main cause of opposition was economic.

An exclusion act like that directed against the Chinese could not be considered by our government. It would be a needless affront to a friendly nation, and a nation willing to do anything we may desire, provided it could be done with dignity. The Chinese exclusion act finds its excuse perhaps in the fact that China is not yet a nation. No absolute monarchy can be a nation, in the proper sense. When China finds herself at last, this exclusion act must wholly change its form.

In this condition of affairs, a definite agreement was made with the Katsura ministry of Japan, that no passports for America were to be issued to Japanese laborers, that the responsibility for discrimination should rest with Japan, and that all holders of Japanese passports should be admitted without question. This agreement has been loyally and rigidly kept by Japan. A bit too rigidly perhaps, for it is growing increasingly difficult for Japanese students to come to America. The diffusion among our American universities of Japanese students, eager, devoted and persistent has been one of the most important factors in maintaining the mutual good will and good understanding of the two nations. For everywhere these Japanese graduates of American universities give a good account of themselves standing high in the estimation of their people at home, while retaining a keen interest and intelligent sympathy in all American affairs.

The present settlement of the immigration question is the very best possible, so long as restriction of any sort is regarded as necessary. It is in the interest of both nations and of all concerned, and the occasional efforts to supersede it by a general "oriental exclusion" bill are prompted by no consideration of the public welfare.

7 To be grouped with the inchoate nations of Asia as "orientals" is particularly offensive to the proud, self-governing Japanese. In their thoughts and ambitions, in their attitude towards peace and justice and toward modern civilization the Japanese are in full harmony with the nations of Europe. It is their mission to bring modern civilization to Asia. This they are literally doing in Korea

one of the most interesting experiments in the reclamation of a dying nation undertaken in modern times, comparable to our sanitation of the Canal Zone of Panama. At the same time, the hold of Japan on Korea, like our hold on Panama, rests on an act of arbitrary seizure.

The main justification of the exclusion of Japanese unskilled laborers must be found in the economic conditions on the two sides of the Pacific. It is our theory in America that there should be no permanent class of unskilled laborers. and that it is each man's duty as well as his right to rise to his highest possibility.

In most other nations, a permanent lowest class which must work for the lowest wages and do the menial service of society is taken for granted. This theory is affirmed in the Chinese proverb. "Big fish eat little fish, little fish eat shrimp: shrimp eat mud." It is no part of our policy that shrimps should remain shrimps forever. Cheap labor is exploitable to the injury of labor of a higher grade. There is then justice in the contention for the exclusion of the cheapest and most exploitable type of laborers whatever their race or the country from which they come.

There is also legitimate ground for fear that a wide open door from Asia would crowd our Pacific coast before the natural population of America has found its way there. Such a condition would add to the economic wealth of the coast at the expense of social and political confusion.

Many honest men fear the advent of large numbers of Japanese as likely to provoke racial troubles similar to those which exist in the South. I do not share this opinion. No race is more readily at home in our civilization than the cultivated Japanese. That the rice-field coolie does not assimilate is mainly because of his crude mentality and his lack of any training either Japanese or American. This is broadly true, though among these people are many of fine instincts and marked capacity. The condition of mutual help and mutual tolerance in Hawaii shows that men of a dozen races can get along together if they try to do so. The problem of the South is the problem of slavery; the problem of the half-white, the man with the diverging

instincts of two races, this status changed in an instant, by force, from the position of a chattel to that of a citizen. It is the problem of the half-white man given political equality when social equality is as far away as ever. No bar sinister of this sort nor of any other kind separates the European from the Japanese.

Social reasons for exclusion have a certain value. The Japanese are the most lovable of people, which fact makes them the most clannish. They have the faults of their virtues, and the uneducated Japanese sometime show these faults in unpleasant fashion.

There are still more urgent reasons why the Japanese themselves should insist on exclusion of their coolie laborers from Canada and the United States. The nation cannot afford to have America know it by its least creditable examples. A hundred Japanese rice-field hands are seen in America, to one Japanese gentleman. Thousands of men who never knew a Japanese merchant or artist or scholar have come in contact with Japanese draymen or laundrymen. They have not always found these good neighbors. The present conditions are not permanent, perhaps, but as matters are today it is to the interest of Japan, even more than to the interest of California that the present agreements should be maintained.

Just after the Russian war, when America's sympathy was almost wholly on the side of Japan because the attitude of Russia was believed to be that of wanton aggression, a series of anti-Japanese articles were published in various American newspapers. Who wrote these articles and who paid for them I do not know, but their various half-truths and falsehoods had an unfavorable effect on American public opinion.

The school affair in San Francisco was also unfortunate, although in itself of no significance whatever. In the great fire of 1906, the Chinatown of San Francisco was entirely destroyed. After the fire a temporary school house was established in the neighborhood. There were no Chinese children in this school and the teacher, perhaps fearing loss of position, asked the school board to send the Japanese children

in the neighboring region to her. The school board apparently ignorant of possible international results formed of this an "Oriental School." There were no Chinese children concerned nor is it clear that Japanese children would have suffered even had such been present.

Under our treaty with Japan our schools as every other privilege were open to Japanese subjects on the basis of "the most favored nation." To send Japanese children to an "Oriental School" was probably a violation of this clause of the treaty. It is not certain that this was a violation but it appears as such on the surface. So far as I know, there has been no judicial decision involving this point. In any case, the remedy lay apparently in an injunction suit, and in a quiet determination of the point at issue. It was a mistake, I believe, to make it a matter of international diplomacy. Neither the nation nor the State of California has the slightest control over the schools of San Francisco, unless an action of the school board shall traverse a national or State law or violate a treaty. A treaty has precedence over all local statutes. But the meaning of a treaty can be demonstrated only through judicial process.

The extravagance of the press in both nations stirred up all the latest partisanship in both races involved. On the one hand the injuries to the Japanese children were grossly exaggerated. On the other hand, gratuitous slanders were invented to justify the action of the school board. This action was finally rescinded at the request of the President of the United States who uttered at the same time a sharp reprimand to the people of California. This again was resented by the State, as only five of its citizens were responsible for the act in question, and the people of the State as a whole had no part whatever in anti-Japanese agitation nor any sympathy with the men temporarily in control of affairs in San Francisco. The net result of the whole affair was to alienate sympathy from Japan. This again was unfair for the Japanese nation as a whole had no responsibility for what, at the worst, was an error of judgment on the part of a few of its immigrants.

Since this affair was settled I have not heard a word as to the relation of the Japanese to the schools of San Francisco, and, I presume, that this difficulty, like most others has disappeared with time and patience and mutual consideration. It is not likely to be heard from again.

Only a word need be said of other matters which have vexed the international air. War scares are heard the world over. The world over they are set going by wicked men for evil purposes. In general the design of purveyors of international slanders is to promote orders for guns, powder and warships. There are other mischief makers, who hope to fish in troubled waters.

A few years ago it was suggested in America that the Manchurian railways, built on Chinese territory, by the governments of Russia and Japan should be sold to China. To this end China should borrow the money of an international syndicate under whose authority the railways should be managed. This line of action was for various reasons impossible to China. The suggestion itself was very unwelcome to the Japan authorities as well as to the Japanese people to whom the leased land between Port Arthur and Mukden is hallowed ground, holding the graves of a hundred and thirty thousand of the young men of Japan. The suggestion itself was personal only. It was never acted upon, never approved by the American people and no official action was ever based upon it, and it should not be a subject of worry to either Russia or Japan.

The fur seal question has been under discussion for more than twenty years, ever since the wanton killing of females at sea first threatened the destruction of the Bering Sea herds. By the pelagic sealing of Canada the number of breeding seals in the Pribilof herd was reduced from about 1,000,000 to about 180,000. The entrance of Japan into Bering Sea, disregarding the regulations of the Paris tribunal for the protection of the herd, inadequate as these were, soon reduced these numbers to about 30,000. Last year, a treaty was concluded, Russia, Japan, Canada and the United States being parties to it, by which the matter was honorably and justly settled and the continuance and restoration of the

three herds, American, Russian, and Japanese finally assured. There is not now a single cloud above the official horizon as between the United States and Japan. There have never been any real difficulties and the apparent ones are no greater than must appear wherever great nations border on each other. As the Japanese are fond of saying: The Pacific Ocean unites our nations. It does not separate.

War talk on either side is foolish and criminal. Japan recognizes the United States as her nearest neighbor among western nations, her best customer and most steadfast friend. Her own ambitions and interests lie in the restoration of Korea, the safeguarding of her investments in Manchuria and in the part she must play in the unforetold future of China. For her own affairs she needs every yen she can raise by any means for the next half century. For the future greatness of Japan depends on the return of "the old peace with velvet sandalled feet," which made her the nation she is today.

War and war demands have made her, for the time being, relatively weak, she who once was strong in her spirit of progress, her freedom from debt and in the high ambition of her people. Thirteen hundred millions of dollars in war debt is a burden not lightly carried. Through peace and through peace alone Japan will regain her strength, and none know this better than the men of the wise and patriotic group who now control Japan.

JAPAN REVISITED AFTER THIRTY YEARS

*By Thomas C. Mendenhall, Sc.D., LL.D., late President of
Worcester Polytechnic Institute, formerly Professor
in the Imperial University, Tokyo*

In 1881 I left Japan after having enjoyed several delightful years of residence there, under conditions favorable to the acquisition of a fairly good knowledge of the character, disposition and spirit of the Japanese people. While at that time nearly all foreigners, including missionaries as well as those engaged in trade or commerce, were restricted as to their residence to localities set apart for them by the government, exception was made in favor of foreign professors employed in the University who were practically free to live and travel where they liked.

In 1911 I returned to Japan for a stay of nearly three months, during every hour of which I was busy in the discovery of evidences of the wonderful transformation that these thirty years have wrought.

Curiously, yet naturally it was not the tall chimneys, the extensive manufacturing establishments, or the big steamships carrying the flag of Japan that first attracted attention and drew forth exclamations of surprise. One was prepared for that sort of thing, by personal knowledge of small beginnings long ago, by uninterrupted correspondence with Japanese friends, and by any one of the scores of books about Japan that have been printed in the past decade, many of the authors of which have, apparently, seen little else. It was the comparatively trivial, especially the things *not* seen, that caused wonder on first going ashore at Nagasaki. What had become of the "queue," the "top-knot" or small tuft of tied-up hair that partially covered the shaven top of every Japanese head? Gone, absolutely! Not one was to be seen in Nagasaki, Osaka, Kyoto, Tokyo or other city, except on the head of an actor and then it was soon dis-

covered to be part of a wig. In the country one or two were found, the insignia of ultra-conservatism! The absence of the queue was made up for by the presence of the *hat* on the head of nearly every man and boy, where formerly the habit of hat-wearing was so rare that hats were constantly being found where last deposited by the owners, who had gone off without ever "missing" them. Shoes of the western model have become nearly as necessary a part of a man's dress as the western hat and the number of men who clothe themselves completely after the western fashion is now so great that they have long since ceased to attract special attention.

Few things in Japan have been so fixed and unalterable as the fashion in woman's dress. While the material of which it is composed may range from the poor and cheap to the rich, costly and exquisitely beautiful, the "model" has been practically the same for centuries. But even in this a very considerable change has somehow been brought about and it is especially noticeable in the style of hair dressing now all but universal among Japanese ladies. The new style is vastly less complicated and difficult, and hence less costly than the old. It is not very unlike some of the fashions recently in vogue among the western people and to the general European taste is more artistic and beautiful than the elaborate coiffure which so long prevailed. There are many indications of a tendency to change other long established features of the costume of Japanese women and it does not seem rash to predict the abolition of the *Obi*, the tremendously large, heavy and often very expensive girdle, with its enormous "bow" in the back with which a Japanese lady encircles her waist and which, in the eyes of most foreigners detracts so much from the grace of her movements. To abandon this classic feature of woman's dress at once would be little short of a revolution, but already it has disappeared from the authorized and generally prescribed outfit of young women and girls at school who now dress in a very attractive style, uniform in model with charming variations in color according to the taste of the wearer. Twenty-five and thirty years ago there was a pronounced leaning towards European models of dress among Japanese ladies which now, happily,

seems to have quite disappeared. At present this fashion is so rare among them that while a man may travel about the country in European dress without causing the slightest remark, a woman clothed as she would be in Europe or America is immediately surrounded by a horde of the curious of both sexes and all ages, to whom her dress is a great novelty.

In contrast with the condition of thirty years ago the quantity and variety of foreign goods of all kinds offered for sale in the shops have enormously increased. "Made in Germany" is to be read on countless articles in every Japanese city and town and the market for even some of the widely known specialties of Japan has been invaded at home by foreign competitors, and this in spite of the very high import duty that prevails. In porcelain for ordinary use the German combination of cheapness and fairly good quality has led to pretty large importations. One may search in vain in the shops of today for many articles of domestic use and ornament which a generation ago might be found everywhere but which have now disappeared, in many instances because in these things the skilful hand and artistic eye can no longer compete with machinery in the production of articles perhaps less beautiful, but really more useful and satisfactory. Occasionally one discovers that a once highly valued and profitable business or profession has been completely wiped out. Thirty years ago the beautiful metallic mirrors then universally in use among the Japanese could be bought on every street. Mirror casting, grinding and polishing was an art demanding much skill and mirror making was a business that had descended from father to son for many generations. But the superiority of the silvered glass mirror was immediately recognized and now one may search in vain in all the great cities for a shop in which metallic mirrors are offered for sale and the guild of mirror makers is extinct. The metal mirror is one of the "Sacred treasures" of Japan and is always to be found in a place of distinction in Shinto and also in many Buddhist temples. When I asked where were the men who repolished these temple mirrors and supplied new ones when required,

the completeness of the extinction of the profession of mirror making was impressed upon me by the reply that what little there was to be done in that line in these days had been relegated to the umbrella menders!

Attention was soon drawn to the increase in the consumption of foreign foodstuffs or rather of foods that were entirely foreign to the Japanese *menu* of thirty years ago, such as milk, butter, beef, and even cheese. European forms of cakes and confectionery are imitated and, although much sought after, not a single example of the Japanese *Compato*, a favorite confection of former years, could be found.

Such examples of changes in social customs or domestic habits might be multiplied indefinitely, though to many they will appear of minor importance and perhaps too much space has already been given them. By the thoughtful student of the evolution of the Japanese, however, they will not seem to be trivial for they point clearly to that most remarkable characteristic of the people, a facility for readjustment of both external and internal relations, whenever a better adaptation to their environment is secured thereby. What nation in all the history of the world has shown a larger wisdom in the treatment of important domestic affairs than have the Japanese in their management of the perplexing problems of national costume? Immediately after the wars of the restoration the superior advantages of the modern uniform for soldiers was recognized and it was promptly adopted by the new régime. As soon as the educated men of the nation began to engage in various professional and business occupations the great advantage of western costume over the old for such occupations became evident and its use is rapidly becoming universal. On the other hand the unhealthfulness, the costly fickleness and (a Japanese would add) the indecency of modern European dress for women, has been proved by observation and experiment and it is practically rejected by all save the few whose attendance at court or residence abroad makes them unwilling victims. It will be generally conceded that the dress worn by women in Japan is infinitely more "becoming" to them than the models of Paris; it is infinitely less harmful to the health of the wearer

and from an economic standpoint has the enormous advantage of a practically invariable style. Every garment may be worn until it has done full service and yet there is ample room for display of taste and individual preference through variation in color and character or quality of the material used.

Of the bigger and greater transformations in Japan and especially in Japanese cities so much has been said and written that it is not worth while in this place to attempt any catalogue or detailed description of them though it ought to be said that only those who are familiar with former conditions can appreciate their magnitude. In the large cities and particularly in the capital, much has been done to modernize and adapt the streets and principal buildings to the requirements of the new life. Thousands of houses have been bought or confiscated and destroyed to make beautifully straight and well graded streets from sixty to one hundred feet in width, with twenty or thirty-foot sidewalks, where, before, two narrow carts might have difficulty in passing, and sidewalks for foot passengers were absolutely unknown.

Electric tramways go in all directions and (I am speaking of the capital) some of the tracks are elevated above the street as in many American cities. These modern methods of transportation have been well-nigh fatal to the picturesque jinrikisha with its swift and graceful runner, for in spite of the very considerable increase in the population along with an enormous increase in the business activity of Tokyo, the number of jinrikisha men is only ten to twenty per cent of that of the early days, and the cost of employing them is correspondingly greater.

Much money and great engineering skill have been devoted to the improvement in water supply, to the establishment of drainage and the sanitary condition of cities has been greatly improved. The Japanese have demonstrated in many ways that they are quite abreast of the times in all matters relating to sanitation, hygiene and the control of epidemic or contagious diseases. Most of the streets are well lighted at night, the more important being quite bril-

liant with a display of electric lighting and electric advertising. There are several fine, new theatres where, until the curtain goes up, one might easily imagine oneself in Paris or Berlin, though behind the curtain, in most cases, all is still Japanese. Many innovations, however, have been made in the theatre in the last thirty years, one of the most interesting being the introduction of female actors upon the Japanese stage. Western plays are now frequently put on and during one week of my stay in Tokyo there was a decided "run" on the box office of the leading play house, Hamlet, translated into Japanese, being the attraction.

Few things were more astonishing than the growth during the past forty years of a taste for "foreign" music. In no other respect did the civilization of Japan differ from that of Europe so much as in its music which, through centuries of assiduous cultivation, has become a highly developed and complete system, oriental in its general character, yet distinctly national. It seemed at first that there could be no possible way of bridging over the chasm that yawned between Japanese and European music, the difference being everywhere so great as to make them mutually exclusive. But the remarkable flexibility of the Japanese mind is illustrated by the fact that while few, very few Europeans, even those of long residence, ever *understand* Japanese music well enough to become really fond of it, hundreds of thousands of Japanese find great pleasure in the works of Beethoven, Handel and Wagner. It must not be assumed that this is due to the innate superiority of western music. Their own still holds first place in the hearts of all the music loving people and some of them who are capable of thoroughly understanding and enjoying both systems, sturdily maintain that it possesses certain qualities and characteristics of such excellence that it will have a large contributory influence in the evolution of the "music of the future" and must be reckoned with accordingly. Not only is the music of the great composers listened to with pleasure by the Japanese, but it is reproduced, often in an almost faultless manner. A special "school of music" is supported by the government, managed by competent European direc-

tors and employing skilful foreign teachers. In the recitals given by this school, as well as by others not connected with it, one may hear really fine orchestral performances with excellent chorus singing and occasional violin or piano solos that would be a credit to any concert stage in America.

Time will not allow more than the mere mention of the more noticeable, and to the casual observer the more impressive evidences of the extraordinary advances made by this wonderful people during the past thirty years;—their merchant fleet which carries the flag of the Rising Sun to all quarters of the globe; their great commercial and manufacturing activities; their shipbuilding; their cotton spinning; their big establishments for the manufacture of electric appliances; their mines and mining; their fine system of railways, extending from one end of the country to the other and many other things all of which were unknown in the earlier day.

In Osaka I spent a number of pleasant hours in examining one of the most recently built cotton mills in which about twelve hundred people are employed. Attached to it is a hospital with several professional nurses and a physician in constant attendance. All of the employees had at least one meal each day in the establishment for which purpose there was provided a large and comfortable dining room where a thousand or more might be served at once, the food, of excellent quality, being prepared by a competent chef with his corps of assistants. For many who spent practically all of their time inside of the gates there was provided a large amusement room and lecture hall in which a great variety of entertainments were given from time to time. Indeed I do not believe the most advanced of American or English cotton mills go further than this in the exercise of care for the health, comfort and pleasure of their employees. This mill was one of a recently formed "trust" or "merger" of ten of about the same size and character. Corporations and combinations are quite as well known in Japan as elsewhere and even the "big department store" is found in large cities.

Of advances in educational matters it is hardly necessary to speak at length. The intelligent public has already been enlightened on that subject through the interesting addresses recently given in America and in England by Baron Kikuchi, formerly Minister of Education and now President of the Imperial University at Kyoto and by the exhaustive treatise on "Education in Japan" which he has recently published.

The one institution of University rank has multiplied into four "Imperial Universities" and the demand for higher education is so great that there is a large overflow of students into well organized and well managed colleges maintained by private endowment. In the Imperial Universities the standards of admission and graduation are as high as in any other part of the world, the most rigorous tests of scholarship being applied. Nearly all the more important work in the various professions and in the civil life of the country is done by graduates of these institutions. In a few years the exceptions will be very rare and I doubt if there is another country in the world in which the University plays so large a part. Professors in these great schools, in addition to their regular work as teachers, are, for the most part, actively engaged in original research along the principal lines of scientific investigation. An Active National Academy exists, scientific publications are numerous and the work of men of science in Japan has long ago commanded the respect and admiration of the world. Primary and secondary schools have made fully as much progress as those of higher rank; teachers are trained in excellent normal schools; the most improved methods of instruction are used and the substantially built, comfortable and admirably planned school buildings were a delightful surprise.

Newspapers have greatly increased both in number and in influence. Many of them have very large circulations and are well edited, though some of them are by no means free from the vices so glaringly evident and so profoundly regrettable in the great majority of American and European journals. There are several excellent daily newspapers printed in the English language, some of which are managed and edited entirely by Japanese.

One of the most interesting changes noted, of which there was much evidence everywhere, and one not quite easy to account for was what seemed to be a sort of revival or recrudescence of Buddhism. In many of the old temples there were marked evidences of prosperity; repairs, restorations, improvements and additions were common. And there were new temples, some of them larger and more costly than ever before erected. Millions of dollars had been expended in the construction of one magnificent shrine in Kyoto, of immense size and great beauty, satisfactory proof of the fact that the skill and artistic taste for which the old builders were famous has not been lost. These newer structures were the result of voluntary contributions from members of a sect which might be said to represent a more liberal and enlightened Buddhism which seems to have become extremely popular in recent years. In considering the religious faith of the Japanese it is necessary to remember that Buddhism is a religion of many sects, differing from each other as widely as the various sects of Christianity. The Buddhism of Ceylon, of Burmah or of China is not the Buddhism of Japan, nor is the Buddhism of five hundred years ago that of today, any more than the Christianity of the Middle Ages is that of today. More than one of the most noted European and American scholars who have lived long in Japan have publically espoused Buddhism.

At every hand are seen evidences of the general prosperity of the Japanese at the present time. A visitor, returning after thirty years is struck by the absence of *beggars* from highways, public places, and many localities about which, in former times, they literally swarmed. This is probably not to be attributed to the entire absence of poverty but in large degree to the energetic measures of the government for the suppression of the vice, along with enlarged and improved public charities. One is tempted to start an inquiry concerning this prosperity, as to whether the individual as well as the nation is enjoying it;—for taxes are extremely high, the “cost of living” has more than doubled and the tariff on imported goods is in many cases so heavy as to seem pro-

hibitory, all of which is a natural and necessary result of the two great wars in which Japan has been engaged within the past fifteen years. Yet in not a single instance did I hear what could justly be called a *complaint* against the excessive taxation though it is evidently a heavy burden upon all classes.

Much has been said and written about the *patriotism* of the Japanese and, indeed, this element of their character is so highly developed that the word seems to take on a new meaning when applied to them. Their loyalty to their ruler is a universally accepted religion. Nothing is left undone to cultivate this sentiment and to create a pride in their country's achievements. Even the hasty traveller must be impressed by the display in all quarters of relics of the victorious engagements of the army and navy in the recent war with Russia. In almost every public place in town or country, in temples, schoolhouses and grounds, in the University, public museum, palaces and parks, there may be seen immense cannon, parts of captured ships, steam boilers, locomotives, small arms of all kinds, each with an inscription relating the story of its capture. One is forcibly reminded of the practice of the Roman Republic in displaying the beaks of captured ships upon its first great rostrum, thus decorating and naming it forever. One of the most curious and interesting of the relics of the war is a huge ship taken from the Russians, now anchored in the Bay of Yedo and enjoying considerable vogue as a restaurant and place of popular resort.

Of the unselfish devotion of the Japanese soldiers and sailors, their courage and prowess nothing need be said. Against heavy odds they have proved them to the satisfaction of a not too credulous world. And it is important to note that there was no field of Rugby or Eton on which these victories were won. The Japanese are not an athletic people in the usual American or English meaning of the world. Students in the Imperial Universities *do not play foot-ball*, considering it not quite in harmony with the dignity and serious nature of the work in which they are engaged. It

would, indeed, be near the truth to say that the victories of Japan were won *in* the school and university but *not* on the play ground. They were victories of brain rather than brawn.

In spite of all one sees and hears no careful and disinterested observer can consider the Japanese a war-like people. As individuals they are most peaceful in disposition. In no other country in the world have I seen so little "physical conflict" among men. Even when under the influence of *sake* their quarrels are generally light, harmless and evanescent.

But when war is forced upon them, as they believe it to have been in their most recent conflict, in the defence of their emperor, their country or the honor of their nation, they fight as few fight in these modern days.

Within the past few years there has been much wild and foolish talk among Americans in which it is declared or assumed that the Japanese, both Government and people, are anxious to go to war with the United States. Much of this has originated, it is said, among a class whose professional advancement can only be greatly accelerated by inducing their own country to engage in battle with another. In my judgment nothing could easily be further from the truth. It might almost be said that it is the one thing above all others that they wish to avoid. That they have more than one good reason for feeling that the "square deal" has not always been accorded them by us, cannot be denied. Nor can it be denied that they have treated each delicate situation as it arose with infinite patience and tact; there has been no bluff, bluster or arrogance but at every turn they have shown their earnest desire to maintain friendly relations with us, even when considerable sacrifices have been necessary. Unfortunately as a people we are too busily engaged in the activities of trade and commerce to give much consideration to questions that do not immediately affect those activities, forgetting today what we said and did yesterday and giving no thought to what we shall say or do tomorrow. We accept the false and reject the true with equal readiness

and are thus always in danger of being led into situations from which it will be difficult to extricate ourselves. In view of our rapidly growing interests in the East it is important for us to realize that there is no nation in the world whose feeling for us today is more *genuinely friendly* than that of Japan. It will be an everlasting disgrace if we strain that friendly feeling beyond its elastic limit by yielding to the senseless clamor of a very small minority of our own people who are either ignorant or corrupt. ?

THE JAPANESE IN AMERICA

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The first Japanese who ever came to America, as far as is known, was Manjiro Nakahama, a fourteen year old lad, who was picked up by the captain of an American fishing vessel, in 1841, twelve years before the coming of Commodore Perry to Japan. Nakahama with four companions had sailed out into the ocean on a fishing expedition; their boat had been wrecked by a storm, and they were finally washed ashore on a desert island in the northern Pacific. Three months of dire privation were passed on the island before the little party was rescued by the American vessel. The other Japanese were left in Hawaii, while Nakahama, who became a favorite of the captain, was brought to the United States, and placed in school. When Commodore Perry came to Japan, Nakahama acted as interpreter in the negotiations carried on between the American envoy and the Japanese government, represented by the feudal officials.

Historically speaking, the fact that the first Japanese who came to America was a student is a mere accident of circumstance; but when one reflects upon the past and present attitude of the Japanese, both at home and in America, toward this country, this incident has a deep significance in that the Japanese are always desirous of coming to America as students—to learn something, and to find something that seems worth the learning. The Japanese who are eager to come to America are in the main students; the Japanese who are in America, whatever work they may be doing here, are students at heart. They are conscious of their good fortune in being in touch with Western civilization, and are determined to understand it and to

introduce it into their own country. It was so in the past, and it is so now.

When Commodore Perry first came to Japan, most Japanese believed that all foreigners were barbarians, and they believed it simply because they did not comprehend what Western civilization was. But some of the intelligent class of Japanese did recognize that the foreigners with their awe-inspiring warships,—“blackships” as they were called by the Japanese at the time—had something which the Japanese did not possess. Young men, eager to learn, eager to do some service for their country, wanted to go to Occidental countries, though their going was prohibited by the government of the time under penalty of death. Some of these ambitious young men failed, but some succeeded in evading the strict surveillance of the government, and as stowaways reached foreign shores. The late Prince Ito, the greatest statesman of modern Japan, who went to England during the tumultuous times of the opening of Japan to foreign countries, was one. The late Jo Niisima, founder of the Doshisha Christian College, who worked his passage to America on a tramp steamer, and got a Christian education here, was another. Later on, when Western learning was encouraged in Japan, many bright young men found their way to American colleges, and these men are today among the foremost leaders of the country. The late Marquis Komura, who represented Japan at the Portsmouth Peace Conference concluding the Russo-Japanese War, was a graduate of Harvard; Viscount Chinda, the new ambassador to the United States, is also a graduate of an American university. Dr. Hatoyama who died last month, and who was a prominent political leader, was a graduate of Yale. Princess Oyama, wife of the commander of the Japanese forces in the Russian War, is a Vassar graduate. The wife of Viscount Uchida, recently Ambassador to America, is a graduate of Bryn Mawr. President Yamakawa of the newly organized Imperial University of Kyushu studied at Yale. Leaders in religious and educational circles who have been educated in America are literally innumerable. These young men and women who

were educated in America a generation ago or later came to be the guiding spirits of modern Japan. They represented ability, culture, enlightenment, and all that higher education means in the making of a man or woman. They were an object lesson of Western civilization. They told the young men of Japan of the land of liberty and justice, the land of Washington and Lincoln, the land of Longfellow, Irving, Hawthorne and Mark Twain. These names have thrilled all Japanese who desire to come to America, and thrilled them because they are students. New Haven and Cambridge are names even more familiar to the Japanese than New York and Chicago. Some of these young men may have means. When they have, they come to America as regular college students. Some may not be so fortunate; these work here for their education.

Herein lies the decided difference between the Japanese and European immigrants. The European immigrants are in the main attracted here by the stories of huge fortunes made and to be made in America. The jingle of the dollar is in their ears all the way across the Atlantic. The Japanese do not know much about American millionaires. Their dreams are not of money but of books and colleges. There are Japanese farmers in the West and Japanese domestic servants in the East. One complaint we always hear about these Japanese servants is that they demand time to attend night schools or similar institutions. We also hear of Japanese butlers being discovered in kitchen corners, writing a poem or an essay. The American employer wonders why these Japanese cannot devote their attention to their work or other profitable business, instead of reading books and talking of colleges. Their wonder is quite natural, in view of the fact that the European immigrant throws himself heart and soul into the work that his employer may give him—if only it pays. It requires a long time for the Japanese young men to lose their ambition to get an American education, if they ever lose it.

A few years ago, when the Japanese government prohibited, at the request of the American authorities, the

coming of the Japanese laborers to America, a vital blow was dealt to the young men who were not rich enough to come to America as regular college students, but who still wanted to come, not really to work, but to learn. The flow of immigration from Japan to America has not only been stopped, but reversed. The excess of the Japanese departures from the United States over arrivals has been about 2,500 a year since 1908. The forced diminution of the Japanese population in the West had a disastrous effect on Japanese mercantile houses catering to their needs. Not a few banks and stores were forced to close, and those left are trying to remodel their business so as to cater to the general public, instead of to Japanese customers only. These attempts happily have in most cases been successful.

The charge that the Japanese are an undesirable element in the population of America is not sustained by fact. As already stated, the Japanese coming to America are mostly aspiring students and have had the benefit of a good education at home. Often we see graduates of the Japanese colleges working as ordinary farm-hands in the West and as butlers in the East. They have the peculiar characteristics that education alone can impart to a man. They have a sense of honor, of duty and of pride. They may have weaknesses, too, but I do not hesitate to assert upon their behalf, that when they become citizens of America they will be worthy citizens. The fact that the Japanese in San Francisco, though small in number, readily subscribed the sum of \$50,000 to the fund of the coming Panama-Pacific Exposition certainly does not show that they are indifferent to what is going on around them.

A decided characteristic of the Japanese in this country is their remarkable assimilation of American manners and customs. There is in no Occidental city a Japantown as there is a Chinatown. Though there are two thousand Japanese in New York, they are scattered all over the city, and so thoroughly merged in the population that they never form an element apart. The allegation that the Japanese are unassimilable is a totally mistaken one. The

Japanese in California last summer begged that some representative Japanese from home might visit them and study their conditions. Dr. Nitobe, the first exchange professor between the United States and Japan, and Representative Saburo Shimada, who had taken up the mission of visiting California, both came, expecting to hear many and various complaints from the Japanese in the Western States in view of the great number of anti-Japanese problems originating there. The surprise of the visitors was all the greater when they discovered for instance that the Japanese in California had really invited them that they might observe the prosperous condition in which they were living. They were evidently liked and respected by their American neighbors; were perfectly satisfied with the treatment they received from the American authorities. They declared that the so-called anti-Japanese feeling was a political fiction only, and had nothing to do with the actualities of life. They were materially prosperous, and with prosperity, there has come a universal desire to marry. To accomplish this, they have evolved a plan of finding wives through the exchange of photographs with young women at home, the result being that each steamer arriving in San Francisco brings a bevy of blushing brides from the country of the cherry and chrysanthemum. So these Asiatics settle on America's soil, aspiring to bring up a generation of worthy citizens of this great republic.

In California the Japanese are mostly engaged in agriculture. The land cultivated by them amounts to about 200,000 acres, yielding \$6,000,000 worth of various products each year. Professor Takahashi of Tokyo University not long ago upon a visit to Fresno, California, said: "Twelve years ago there were only four Japanese graves in Fresno. Now there are 1,200. During these years, 10,000 Japanese came to Fresno to pick grapes, the Caucasian laborer being unable to do the work in a squatting position as the Japanese do it. The temperature at the grape-gathering season is about 140° Fahrenheit, and the heat of the gravel scorches the pickers' feet even through the specially-made leather shoe soles about an inch thick.

Maddened with thirst, they eat the grapes, drink polluted water, and die of typhoid fever, the disease which is responsible for the death of one in every eight of them. These men fought a twelve years' war in the California vineyards, and fell on the field at a rate such as is seldom seen on even the most destructive of battlefields. So was the fruit industry in California brought to the condition in which it is today; and the exclusion of Japanese labor will be impossible without revolutionizing the conditions of the growing of fruits and their marketing, a result neither possible nor desirable as pointed out in an official report of the Labor Commissioner of California.

"The California fruit growers have, in the absence of the Japanese, imported Hindoo laborers, and found them very unsatisfactory. The fact that the Japanese are necessary for the development of America, is undeniable, and any attempt to conceal or misrepresent this fact, is unjust, unwarranted, unmoral and unfriendly."

The Commissioner of the Labor Bureau of California after an exhaustive investigation into Japanese labor reported that this labor or its equivalent was essential to the development and carrying on of some specialized agricultural industries, such, for example, as fruits and sugar beets. It is now admitted that the anti-Japanese agitation in California was all due to the machinations of local political organs. Where such influence is not exercised, for instance at Seattle, the utmost cordiality exists between the Japanese and the Americans in whatever circumstances they may meet.

You who live in the United States do not know the magic of the word America as the Japanese young men do. There are even at the present moment thousands of Japanese longing for the chance to cross the Pacific, but because they must work in America to live, they are barred from seeing the land of their hopes and aspirations. If they did come, you may be sure that they would contribute their full share as their forerunners have done, to the progress of that wonderful civilization that is American.

Is not the Japanese laboring class doing its work well in

America? And on the intellectual side, also, are not the Japanese doing creditable work, particularly when the smallness of their number here is considered?

About the year 1886 the newspapers in Japan made it a point to urge the desirability of Japanese students proceeding to America, and in consequence, San Francisco soon came to harbor many of them. The first thing they did upon their arrival was to publish a weekly magazine, styled *New Japan*, printing it by mimeograph. It advocated extreme radicalism, a radicalism that was characterized more by courage than by discretion. Its distribution in Japan was frequently prohibited, and it had to change its name from time to time, until it was compelled finally to suspend publication about 1892. At present there are three newspapers published in San Francisco. They are the *New World*, established fifteen years ago, the *Nichi-bei* (Japan and America), established ten years ago, and the *San Francisco News*, established ten years ago. They are all published in Japanese. In fact there are one or more Japanese newspapers in every town where live a sufficient number of Japanese. Such is the case with Los Angeles, Sacramento, Seattle, Portland, Salt Lake, Denver, and New York. In New York, there are two Japanese weekly newspapers, the *Japanese American Commercial Weekly* and the *New York Shimpō*; and the Oriental Information Agency is publishing in English a monthly, called *The Oriental Review*, which seeks to promote a better understanding of Oriental affairs by the American public.

There are also many individuals working in the line of intellectual advancement in America. Kakuzo Okakura, Curator of the Japanese Department of the Boston Museum, has brought the collection of Japanese art objects there to a plane rarely seen even in Japan itself. Dr. Iyenaga, professorial lecturer of the Chicago University, Dr. Asakawa, assistant professor of Yale University, Mr. Kinnosuke Adachi and Mr. Masuji Miyagawa, contributors to magazines and newspapers, are all making valuable contributions to Western knowledge of the East in speech or writing. There are also Japanese medical authorities work-

ing independently or with various American institutions, whose discoveries in medicine have already won world-wide recognition.

It is often asserted that the Japanese are indifferent to religion. I do not know that any of the Western nations are so particularly interested in religion that they can claim to be more religious than the Japanese. If there are any people who have more interest in religion than others, they are those whose most distinctive character is religious. Mohamedans, Mormons, and believers in a few other such religions may be such. The Japanese are not so fanatical. They are Buddhists and Shintoists at the same time; they believe in the precepts of Confucius, and some of them are Christians. The Honganji, which is the Buddhist Vatican in Japan, has no less than fifteen temples in America, including one in Vancouver. These temples may be found in San Francisco, Sacramento, Oakland, Stockton, San José, Fresno, Los Angeles, Portland, Seattle, and other places on the Pacific coast. The Buddhist Japanese in America are also organized into various associations which, like the Y. M. C. A., have their own library, music corps, and recreation departments. They are publishing Buddhist magazines, such as *American Buddhism*, *Teaching of Buddha*, *Los Angeles Buddhism*, and others, either in Japanese or English. There are also Japanese Christian churches of different denominations both on the Pacific coast and in the Eastern States, though most Japanese Christians are inclined to attend American churches of their own denomination.

There are a number of Japanese in America like Kanae Nagasawa of Sonoma County and Kinji Ushijima of San Francisco whose work in industrial or agricultural lines has already been crowned with success. Both of these men came to America as students, and seeing the vast opportunities that America offered to any man of industrial ability, plunged into business earnestly. Nagasawa was a student in England at the time Japan was passing through the stirring period of the restoration of the imperial régime. Money ceased to come from home, and Nagasawa was

brought to America by Townsend Harris and worked on his plantation. Afterwards he started a farm of his own, and now owns 2,000 acres of vineyards and makes more than \$1,000,000 worth of wine every year. Ushijima of San Francisco is called a "potato king." Before success crowned his business—success due to Spanish-American War he had failed and failed until he was reduced to such a condition that he was forced to live on flour and salt. Another Japanese millionaire of California almost monopolizes the supply of flowers for San Francisco.

Wherever there is sufficient number of Japanese there are Japanese restaurants, hotels, laundries, and stores. The customers are Japanese farmers working on their own farms or on leased land, or those employed by American farmers. According to the report of the Labor Commissioner of California, the Japanese furnish 87 per cent of the strawberry, 67 per cent of the beet, 50 per cent of the grape, and more than 50 per cent of such other agricultural products as require some productive skill, that are raised in California. This shows to what extent the Japanese have become necessary in the carrying on of agriculture in California.

The Japanese scattered in other parts of the United States are not pursuing so uniform a trade as those in California. In Washington there are about 10,000 Japanese, principally working as domestic servants, in sawmills and railroad building, or on farms. In the Eastern States, a great number of Japanese are doing housework. Some of them, however, are earning their living as acrobats, or as owners of rolling ball establishments in summer resorts and fairs.

By far the most important branch of the Japanese community in the United States is that engaged in the Japanese-American trade. Last year the trade between Japan and America amounted to \$100,000,000, the exports from America to Japan being \$28,000,000 and exports from Japan to America \$72,000,000. The main currents of the trade are in the buying of cotton and machinery from America by Japan, and in the buying of silk, tea, and porcelain by America from Japan. The greater portion of these lines

of business is carried on by the Japanese. The Japanese buyers of cotton are backed by Japanese capital and have their offices in New York and in the cotton-producing centers. The buyers of machinery are also on the spot. Mitsui, Okura, Takata, and Iida, are names that represent huge wealth in Japan. Their companies have offices in New York and are supplying American machinery to Japanese railways, mines, and factories. In the sale of Japanese goods to America, again, New York has become a principal center of distribution. Mitsui and Morimura are doing a large business.

Morimura and Company, New York, is the largest store in the world dealing in Japanese porcelain, and is largely responsible for the building up of the Japanese porcelain trade in the United States. The firm has modelled its factories at home so as to make its porcelain suit the American tastes.

The Japanese in the various American cities have their clubs, but the most important of these is the Nippon Club, of New York, with its dainty Japanese drawing room, and a membership of 130. It has a few American members, General Stewart L. Woodford being one. There is also the Japan Society of New York, established with a view to promoting friendly relations between Japan and America. This society is also seeking to make Americans understand the Japanese through the medium of exhibitions, lectures and dinners. Its membership includes the most prominent figures both American and Japanese, in the financial and social circles of New York.

As I have said before, the immigration of laborers from Japan to the United States has ceased since the present arrangement between the two nations was agreed to, but the relations of the two countries are becoming closer and closer because of the increasing interest shown by America in the Far East, and by the Japanese in American affairs. The day, I hope, is not far distant when the peoples of these two lands on the Pacific's shores will understand and appreciate one another thoroughly and well, to the everlasting good not only to themselves but of all the children of men.

THE FAMILY OF NATIONS IDEA AND JAPAN

By George Grafton Wilson, Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of International Law in Harvard University

From the late years of the sixteenth century the idea of a family of nations frequently appeared. The Grand Design of Henry IV in 1603 set forth a plan "to divide proportionately the whole of Europe between a certain number of Powers, which would have nothing to envy one another for on the ground of equality, and nothing to fear on the ground of the balance of power" (VI, *Memoires du Duc de Sully*, 129). The number of states was to be fifteen, divided into three classes, (1) six hereditary monarchies: France, Spain, Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden and Lombardy; (2) five elective monarchies: the Empire, the Papacy, Poland, Hungary and Bohemia; and (3) four republics: Venice, the Republic of Italy, Switzerland and the Belgian Republic.

Other propositions looking toward the formation of a "society of states" followed. In 1693 William Penn set forth a plan in an "Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe by the Establishment of an European Dyet, Parliament, or Estates." This, like other plans, aimed particularly to secure peace among the nations. That was the plan of Abbé Saint Pierre a few years later, of von Gentz a hundred years later, and of many of our own day.

There was developing at the same time with these early plans a theoretical basis for a family of nations resting not on the desire for peace but on the current conception of the nature of the state as founded in natural law. Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), a learned Spanish theologian writing in 1612, refers to the unity of the human race, saying that every state, republic or kingdom forms a member of this general body. He further says, "None of these states is sufficient for itself; all have need of reciprocal support, association, and mutual relations to ameliorate their situa-

ation" (*Tractatus de Legibus ac de Deo Legislatore*, II, 19, 9). Grotius, the greatest contributor to the science of international law writing in 1625, finds a similar basis for many obligations. Wolf, writing in the middle of the eighteenth century after presenting the duties of nations toward one another, says, "Finally as the nations are like the citizens of a great civil society, they ought to live in harmony with one another and consequently they ought to avoid with care all discord and all that leads thereto" (*Institutiones*, XCXXIV). Vattel, whose systematic work influenced thought after the middle of the eighteenth century, particularly in England and America, wrote in 1758, "Nations being composed of men naturally free and independent, and who, before the establishment of civil societies, live together in a state of nature, nations, or sovereign states, are to be considered as so many free persons, living together in the state of nature." These nations Vattel says later "are obliged to cultivate toward one another the intercourse of humanity" which results in the establishment of the society of nations (*Droit des Gens, Preliminaries*, secs. 4, 11). Many later writers and practical statesmen follow the doctrine of natural law as a basis for the unity known as the family of nations.

Whatever the theoretical basis of the idea of the family of nations, historically the treaty of Westphalia of 1648 established a European family of nations which assumed to determine what other political unities should be received to membership on terms of equality. Practical considerations often furnished support for the theoretical arguments already mentioned as supported by text-writers.

Prior to the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, there were relations among *de facto* states. Many of these states had been accustomed to send and to receive ambassadors or other representatives. The long and ardent discussions preceding the signing of the treaty of 1648 certainly brought about a realization of the necessity for a greater agreement upon the methods of interstate negotiation. The assembling of the representatives of so many states was in itself significant of the realization of the community of interests among

European states. The development of the custom of sending by one state of diplomatic representatives to reside permanently near the sovereign of another state, while sometimes accompanied by infelicitous jealousies, was nevertheless steady. The idea of unity of interest among European states became an accepted principle of European policy. The intercourse of European states, for many years intermittent, became a settled practice. The collapse of the idea of one imperial power dominating all others made it necessary that something be found to take its place if stability in European conditions was to be maintained. The idea that the states of Europe formed a family came to be prevalent. The reference on the part of these states to common standards gave the idea sufficient support.

The states participating in the negotiations which led to the treaty of Westphalia were considered as members of the family of nations, and their standing in the family was determined as being that recognized by the treaty. Careful investigation into the history of the acquisition of this standing was not thought expedient. Facts were accepted as they were.

This European family did not include all the states which have subsequently become parts of the European system. Russia was among those not directly represented in the negotiations preceding 1648. Russia under Peter the Great looked toward Europe rather than toward Asia, and was gradually admitted to the European councils, and even was granted a share in the partition of one of the formerly recognized states when Poland was divided.

Changes of territory and readjustment of power brought new states within the European family or caused the disappearance of old states. The idea that the international family was made up exclusively of members from western Europe disappeared, and a broader conception took its place.

Naturally membership in the family of nations must be limited to states which are willing to recognize the principles of law upon which the international society is based. These principles were regarded as European, and prevailed

among states having what was called a Christian civilization and a degree of common interests, yet not all European states were regarded as members of the international society. Only those states which had acquired a standard satisfactory to the self-constituted judges were considered as within the family.

With the recognition of the United States the circle of the family of nations was somewhat enlarged. The United States was, however, an expansion of Europe, but as Hamilton said in speaking of the United States, "Ever since we have been an independent nation, we have appealed to and acted upon the modern law of nations as understood in Europe. Various resolutions of Congress during our Revolution, the correspondence of executive officers, the decisions of our courts of admiralty, all recognize this standard" (*Letters to Camillus*, No. 20). It was understood also that the United States would not become involved in European affairs. As Washington said in his farewell address in 1796, "Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation."

France had favored the recognition of the United States as a means to bring pressure upon England. Spain early realized that this course would make it more difficult for her to maintain her colonies in the New World. The policy of England was favorable to the recognition of the statehood of the revolting Spanish colonies in the early nineteenth century.

The policy of the continental states in the early years of the nineteenth century gave rise to an American doctrine which makes the states of the western hemisphere a family for certain purposes. President Roosevelt, in his message of December 3, 1901, announced that "The Monroe Doctrine should be the cardinal feature of the foreign policy of all the nations of the two Americas as it is of the United States." As in earlier days, writers had produced treaties upon "European International Law," so in these later days appear such treatises as "Le Droit International Américain" (1910) of Dr. Alexandre Alvarez.

While there may be certain phases of the principles of

interstate negotiation which apply particularly to a given continent as to Europe or America, the doctrine of the family of nations would seem to support the contention that certain fundamental principles should prevail among all states members of the international circle.

While the states of North and South America were less frequently in relations with other states than were the continental states, yet they claimed all the privileges and immunities of the oldest and most powerful members of the international society. Their claims were sometimes disregarded, as is evident in the extension of the principle of the exercise of the right of asylum in many South and Central American states.

Turkey, while its system of government and its religion was unlike the European systems, was in 1856 formally admitted to "the participation in the advantages of European public law and concert."

The other states admitted to the family had been constituted out of peoples who had extended the European civilization to other lands. Turkey was admitted to the family without the qualifications formerly thought to be necessary for membership. Wherein her *legal system* did not conform to the European system, it was necessary for Turkey to allow to foreigners special exemptions which they had previously enjoyed, and in many respects the admission was rather nominal than real, and the Turkish position in Europe has been the subject of the play of European politics.

Sir William Scott, Lord Stowell, in 1801, speaking of the Turkish dominions, said "The inhabitants of those countries are not professors of exactly the same law of nations with ourselves. In consideration of the peculiarities of their situation and character, the court has repeatedly expressed a disposition not to hold them bound to the utmost rigor of that system of public laws on which European states have so long acted in their intercourse with one another" (*The Madonna de-l Burso*, 4 C., Rob. 169).

Other states, particularly in Asia, had for many years granted special privileges and protection to citizens of

states which were members of the family of nations under the form of extraterritoriality. Europeans had in these states the right to be tried by their own courts, while similar privileges were not extended to foreigners in European states. These states not members of the family of nations were not invited to participate in the conferences of European powers save in such general conferences as, for example, those assembled at The Hague in 1899 and 1907.

Till 1854 Japan had been generally closed to foreigners. The treaty of March 31, 1854, provided for peace, commerce and navigation between the United States and Japan. British, Russian, French, Portuguese and German treaties soon followed. The treaty of 1858 with the United States was more extended in scope, but the Japanese treaties before the last decade of the nineteenth century usually contained clauses like that in Article 6 of the treaty of 1858 with the United States, which says, "Americans committing offences against Japanese shall be tried in American consular courts, and when guilty shall be punished according to American law."

Special quarters had been set aside in cities for the use of foreigners, and special exemptions were extended to these quarters. Certain of these privileges gave to the foreigners advantages not possessed by the Japanese. The treaty between the United States and Japan, which was signed November 22, 1894, and whose important clauses became operative July 17, 1899, provided in Article I that,

"The citizens or subjects of each of the two High Contracting Parties . . . shall have free access to the Courts of Justice in pursuit and defense of their rights; they shall be at liberty equally with native citizens or subjects to choose and employ lawyers, advocates and representatives to pursue and defend their rights before such Courts, and in all other matters connected with the administration of justice they shall enjoy all the rights and privileges enjoyed by native citizens or subjects."

Article XVII of the same treaty provides that "The several Foreign Settlements in Japan shall, from the date this treaty comes into force, be incorporated with the respec-

tive Japanese Communes, and shall thenceforth form part of the general municipal system in Japan. The competent Japanese authorities shall thereupon assume all municipal obligations and duties in respect thereof, and the common funds and property, if any, belonging to such settlements shall at the same time be transferred to the said Japanese Authorities."

The Japanese fully realized that by these new agreements with the members of the family of nations, the new Island Empire had been fully received into the international society in the most formal and deliberate manner. The work of the special embassy which Japan had sent to the west in 1871 had gradually become effective. Great Britain offered a revised treaty in 1884. Ten years later the treaties with most of the great states were revised, and in 1899, after forty-five years from the coming of Commodore Perry to the closed doors of Japan, the Empire was received into full fellowship of the international family.

Marquis Yamagata, the minister president of state, in an official notification, said on July 1, 1899:

"The revision of the treaties in the sense of placing on a footing of equality the intercourse of this country with foreign States, was the basis of the great liberal policy adopted at the time of the restoration, and that such a course conduces to enhance the prestige of the Empire and to promote the prosperity of the people, is a proposition not requiring demonstration. But if there should be anything defective in the methods adopted for giving effect to the treaties, not merely will the object of revision be sacrificed, but also the country's relations with friendly powers will be impaired and its prestige may be lowered. It is of course beyond question that any rights and privileges accruing to us as a result of treaty revision should be duly asserted. But there devolves upon the Government of this Empire the responsibility, and upon the people of this realm, the duty of protecting the rights and privileges of foreigners, and of sparing no effort that they may one and all be enabled to reside in the country confidently and contentedly. It behooves all officials to clearly apprehend the august intentions, and to pay profound attention to these points" (United States Foreign Relations, 1899, p. 470).

The obligations assumed by Japan were as fully realized as the privileges gained. The chief officials of the departments of government issued instructions to the officials under

them showing this realization of obligation. The instructions of Viscount Katsura, minister of war, breathes the spirit of restraint which was evident in all.

"The successful revision of treaties has placed the country on a footing equal with western powers, but it must not be forgotten that at the same time grave responsibilities thereby devolve upon it. On the morrow of the operation of revised treaties foreigners will come and go as they like, will freely fix their abodes or pursue business in the interior, and in consequence the people will have far greater occasions than before of coming into contact with foreigners. Now, history, both Japanese and foreign, shows that international troubles have had their origin very frequently in the daily intercourse between the people of a land and aliens, consequently the people of this Empire, now that the system of mixed residence will be inaugurated, must act with discretion and magnanimity toward foreign neighbors, so that the reality of being a civilized power may be manifested in the eyes of foreign nations, and that any accident involving trouble with foreign countries may be efficiently guarded against. The reputation of our soldiers as sincere and loyal subjects of His Majesty, faithful in the discharge of the public duties, and, as the flower of the nation, imbued with the spirit of manly valor, is acknowledged alike at home and abroad. Suppose the soldiers crowned with such renown and praise be betrayed into committing indiscreet acts toward foreigners. The consequence will not only result in affecting the dignity of the troops, but may even invite ignominy upon the nation and involve the imperial court in difficulty. Bearing all these points in mind the troops must strictly be on their guard against all indiscreet actions (United States Foreign Relations, 1899, p. 474).

These instructions all reflected the spirit of His August Majesty, the Emperor, whose rescript of June 30, 1899, said:

"Governing our realm by the abiding aid of our ancestors' achievements, which have enabled us to secure the prosperity of our people at home and to establish relations of close amity with the nations abroad, it is a source of heartfelt gratification to us that, in the sequel of exhaustive planning and repeated negotiations, an agreement has been come to with the powers, and the revision of the treaties, our long-cherished aim, is today on the eve of becoming an accomplished fact; a result which, while it adds materially to the responsibilities of our Empire, will greatly strengthen the basis of our friendship with foreign countries.

"It is our earnest wish that our subjects, whose devoted loyalty in the discharge of their duties is conspicuous, should enter earnestly into our sentiments in this matter and, in compliance with the great policy of opening the country, should all unite with one

heart to associate cordially with the peoples from afar, thus maintaining the character of the nation and enhancing the prestige of the Empire.

"In view of the responsibilities that devolve upon us in giving effect to the new treaties, it is our will that our ministers of state, acting on our behalf, should instruct our officials of all classes to observe the utmost circumspection in the management of affairs, to the end that subjects and strangers alike may enjoy equal privileges and advantages and that, every source of dissatisfaction being avoided, relations of peace and amity with all nations may be strengthened and consolidated in perpetuity" (United States Foreign Relations, 1899, p. 469).

Of the operation of the new treaties there has been the highest commendation. President McKinley, in his message of December 5, 1899, said,

"The treaty of commerce and navigation between the United States and Japan on November 22, 1894, took effect in accordance with the terms of its XIXth Article on the 17th of July last, simultaneously with the enforcement of like treaties with the other powers, except France, whose convention did not go into operation until August 4, the United States being, however, granted up to that date all the privileges and rights accorded to French citizens under the old French treaty. By this notable conventional reform Japan's position as a fully independent sovereign power is assured, control being gained of taxation, customs revenues, judicial administration, coasting trade, and all other domestic functions of government, and foreign extra-territorial rights being renounced.

"Comprehensive codes of civil and criminal procedure according to western methods, public instruction, patents and copyrights, municipal administration, including jurisdiction over the former foreign settlements, customs tariffs and procedure, public health, and other administrative measures have been proclaimed. The working of the new system has given rise to no material complaints on the part of the American citizens or interests, a circumstance which attests the ripe consideration with which the change has been prepared" (United States Foreign Relations, 1899, p. XXIV).

When early in 1902 there was announced an agreement cementing an alliance between Great Britain, hitherto proud of her traditional "splendid isolation," and Japan only recently admitted to the international circle, many of those best informed upon international relations were amazed. Time has seemed to show the wisdom of the British policy, but most significant and hopeful, for those who look forward to the days when peace shall prevail, is this agreement as

an evidence that in this newer age the family of nations will be based not upon the independence but upon the interdependence of its members.

The act of admission of Japan to the family of nations marks a stage in the development of the idea of international society. The membership in the family of nations is no longer confined to European nations or to nations possessing European civilization or to states bound closely with the European system, but regardless of historical origins, religious preferences, or narrow views of international policies is extended to a state able to maintain an efficient and stable political organization. Thus, not as the result of war, not by the sundering of political relations which had bound colony to mother country, not as the compromise thrown to appease international jealousy, nor even as a matter of political expediency, was the Empire of Japan admitted to the international circle, but as the recognition that a state separated far from western nations in latitude, language, and customs had won its place by the development of a worthy civilization as an equal among equals in the family of nations.

GEOGRAPHICAL ENVIRONMENT AND JAPANESE CHARACTER

*By Ellsworth Huntington, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of
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Individuals may determine the details of history, but its great movements depend upon the character of races. In no country is this truer than in Japan. She has not risen to the position of a world-power through the exertions of any single individual, but because her people possess a character comparable to that of the nations of Europe. In order to understand Japan's history and the present position of the island empire it is necessary to investigate the causes which have produced a character different from that of any other Asiatic nation. The problem is essentially biological and must be treated like other biological problems. External influences such as the Buddhist religion, Chinese ideals in art, literature and social life, European methods in commerce, war and government are doubtless highly important, but back of them and long antedating them, lie the mental traits which have made the Japanese able so quickly and effectively to assimilate and improve upon foreign ideas. These mental traits cannot be dismissed merely as unexplained racial characteristics. They must have arisen in accordance with the fixed laws of nature; and only by discovering these laws can the Japanese or any other race hope to accelerate the development of good qualities and to eliminate those that are detrimental.

From the biological, that is the evolutionary point of view, only three theories seem to offer any adequate explanation of the origin of racial characteristics. In the first place such characteristics may have arisen from spontaneous variations, secondly from the intermixture of races, and thirdly from the stimulation and selective action of geographic environment.

The first theory, that of spontaneous variations, finds frequent expression in biological writings. According to it offspring vary from parents for no assignable causes, but simply because of some innate, organic characteristic. In certain species or at certain periods in the history of each species such variations become especially abundant and new varieties or even new species arise. For instance, at the present time the experiments of DeVries and others show that the evening primrose is highly variable and is constantly giving off sports. It is a matter of every-day observation that variations of this kind occur in the human race. Sons differ from fathers and daughters from mothers. Under ordinary circumstances, where the environment remains constant, such variations tend to counteract one another and thus are eliminated in the course of a few generations. It is possible, nevertheless, that they sometimes keep on in a definite direction without reference to whether the environment is favorable or unfavorable. Thus a new species may perhaps be evolved without the aid of external conditions. How frequently this has taken place, or how important it may be, we cannot tell, for we are dealing here with inferences and not with facts of actual observation. On the other hand we know positively that after variations have once arisen environment picks out certain ones for preservation. No one can question that, other things being equal, a Korean tiger which is not sensitive to dampness or low temperature is more likely to be strong and to reproduce his kind than is one which is forced to seek retreat in a warm cave whenever heavy rain falls or the temperature is low. Similarly one of the chief reasons why the domestic sheep is among the most gregarious and timorous of animals is that for ages the adventurous individuals who were prone to stray from the flock have been killed by wild animals and have left no progeny. Hence, even though variations in a species may arise from some unknown, internal cause, their preservation is almost entirely a matter of environment. Moreover it is quite possible that the supposed spontaneous variations are due to some external cause. For example, in the case of the primrose with its abnormally high variability,

there is no evidence, so far as our present knowledge goes, that the changes may not be instigated by external stimuli such as peculiar conditions of sunshine, temperature or barometric pressure at critical times in the development of the seed. Or again minute changes in the chemical composition of the sap, as MacDougal has shown, may produce revolutionary changes in the succeeding generation. So commonplace an accident as the dying of a worm among the roots at a critical time may, for all that we know, alter the composition of the sap sufficiently to cause occasional ovules to develop into seeds and plants possessing qualities notably different from those of the parents. Hence even in their origin the so-called spontaneous variations of living beings may be the result of environment, and their preservation is certainly such a result.

Coming now to the second theory, the vast majority of students agree that the immense importance and far-reaching results of the intermixture of races cannot be gainsaid. In general, according to the observations of biologists, the interbreeding of diverse types produces two results. In the first place a race different from either of its ancestors is the immediate and obvious product. In the second place, the individuals of the new race tend to vary widely from the mean. In the case of animals we notice great variations in size, speed, and other physical attributes. In the case of man, since the brain is his most sensitive as well as most important organ, the most notable variations are mental; and a mixed race appears to be characterized not only by individuals of uncommon intellectual brilliancy, but also by an undue proportion of feeble-minded. In spite of the importance of the intermixture of races, however, there are certain facts which tend to show that its importance is much reduced by the operation of environment. In the first place hybridization between closely allied races such as the English and Germans cannot be expected to produce any very striking results since the original characteristics of the two races are closely similar. The most marked effects of crossing are found where diverse races intermingle, but here another factor steps in. Not only are hybrids

relatively infertile, but also they tend to be weak in other respects, both physically and morally. Hence they die out rapidly, as the Eurasians, the progeny of European fathers and Asiatic mothers, are doing in India. This principle would seem to apply directly to the Japanese. Various Mongoloid elements might well mingle and produce an enduring race just as the races of Europe appear to be able to mix freely. When it comes to the possibility of an important infusion of Malay blood, or still more of an Aryan admixture, the general principles of biology are distinctly counter to the probability that the progeny of these invaders of highly diverse races would persist for any great length of time.

Thesecond fact which militatesagainstthetheorythatintermixture of races is the primary factor in the present character of the Japanese depends upon another biological principle. When an alien race invades a new habitat there is not one chance in a hundred that its adaptation to that particular environment will be equal to the adaptation of the original race. In rare cases the newcomers may be better adapted; usually they are at a disadvantage. How important this matter of adaptation is may be judged from the way in which the negro race tends to die off in our northern States in spite of constant immigration from the south. In the same way Scandinavians as a race cannot thrive in the drier, more sunny parts of America. They may succeed for a while, but statistics show that they tend to contract various diseases, especially of the nerves and skin. In the rainy regions on the coast of Oregon and Washington, on the contrary, where the environment resembles that of Scandinavia, they prosper greatly, both in body and estate. In the case of a mixture of races not only the invaders themselves, as a general rule, but also the hybrids which tend toward the type of the newcomers, are distinctly at a disadvantage. So long as they remain a ruling class with unusual opportunities to protect and care for themselves, they may persist, but gradual mixture with other elements of the population is bound to take place, and the type less adapted to the country slowly disappears. It was thus apparently with the energetic fair-haired invaders who are supposed to

have come into Greece and Italy in ancient days from the north. For a while they seem to have been the dominating element and to have been one of the chief causes of the great achievements of the early Greeks and Romans. Today, however, their inability to withstand the dry climate and the ravages of malaria has almost eliminated them in favor of the present less energetic brunette races. In Japan the same process of selection must have gone on during the long period since the supposed Malays or Aryans reached the islands. Possibly the differences of feature and physique which are oftensaid to exist between the upper and lower classes in Japan may preserve the record of an admixture of races ages long ago, but this does not explain why the Japanese, not only of one class but of all, are characterized by a degree of mental alertness much in excess of that of most of the people of Asia including the Chinese.

We come now to the third and last of the reasons for thinking that intermixture of races is not the chief cause of Japan's present advanced position. The variability of mixed races, whether among plants, animals, or man, is greatest immediately after the two parent types come together. Thereafter, not only does the new hybrid race tend, as we have just seen, to revert toward the type best fitted to the environment, but there is a constant tendency for the offspring to vary less and less from the ultimate type which gradually becomes established as the standard. Hence in any race such as the Japanese exceptional mental brilliancy, so far as it is due to racial intermixture, is more frequent immediately after the amalgamation of the races. The Japanese are generally conceded to be remarkable for a high general average of mental development rather than for individuals of exceptional brilliancy. This is what would be expected. However great the amount of mixture of races may have been in Japan, most of it occurred two thousand or more years ago, and it was practically completed twelve hundred years ago. Since then forty generations have elapsed, a length of time sufficient to allow much progress toward the extinction of extreme variability and its accompanying intellectual brilliancy, and also toward approxima-

tion to the type normal to the country. Yet the Japanese show no indications of being less alert now than formerly. It must be borne in mind that the tendency to eliminate characteristics incompatible with physical surroundings is extremely strong. Every one knows how plants which have been produced by careful cross-breeding quickly return to the original type when left to themselves. Similarly among animals the best varieties of cattle or horses quickly revert to a primitive type when allowed to run wild for a few generations. Inasmuch, then, as the Japanese have been without the infusion of new blood for a long time, it would seem from the point of view of the biologist and evolutionist that the race, no matter whether it is much or little mixed, has had a good opportunity to approximate to the type demanded by Japanese environment.

The fact that the Japanese or any other race is mixed and is at the same time brilliant does not by any means prove that the brilliancy is due to the mixture. The Koreans appear to be as mixed as the Japanese; the Chinese of the north with their admixture of Tartar and Manchu blood are more mixed; the Persians and the people of northern India contain as many elements as the Chinese and perhaps more; and probably no race under Heaven is so diverse in its origin as the so-called Turk with his infusion of Tartar, Kurdish, Armenian, Greek and Circasian blood; yet these mixed peoples do not stand particularly high in civilization. Against them may be put the English, Germans, Russians and Americans, all of whom are much mixed; but only the American is as mixed as the Turk. In the case of these last two the mixture has taken place comparatively recently and hence ought now to be producing its maximum effect. Yet the results in America and in Turkey are as diverse as can well be imagined. The Turkish mind is sluggish, while the American mind, whatever its other faults, can certainly not be accused of lack of alertness.

We have seen that whether variations in a species arise from spontaneous variations or from the mixture of races their preservation and the consequent evolution of new types is largely, although indirectly a matter of environment.

Following still the same line of thought, let us examine the position of biologists as to the direct action of environment upon evolution, the third of the theories advanced in explanations of the origin of races. Darwin and his immediate successors thought that physical circumstances were competent directly to stimulate organic changes which would adapt the individual to its peculiar circumstances. Later this view was disproved and the pendulum swung far into the opposite extreme. Now, as usual, opinion is settling to a compromise. No one doubts the importance of the influence of physical environment, especially climate, in weeding out certain characteristics and encouraging others. The horses of Arabia are slender, fleet and able to endure the lack of water because animals not possessing these traits have gradually been killed off by the harsh conditions of the desert. The horses of the Shetland Islands, on the contrary, are short, stout and hairy because this particular type does not suffer injury from the cool damp climate. In this case we have no reason to suppose that the effect of climate extends beyond the selection of the type best fitted for preservation. The colts that were not slender and fleet died in the desert and those that were not plump and hairy died in the islands. Beyond this, however, lies a deeper question. Can a change of environment induce a direct change in bodily form and functions? And if so, does that change become permanently heritable? Recent research seems to answer these questions in the affirmative. Exact observations, indeed, are not numerous, but some of them are convincing, at least so far as plants and animals are concerned.

One of the best examples of a permanent and heritable change due to changed climatic environment is found in a species of *Capsella* or shepherd's purse growing in Asia Minor. In the relatively moist lowlands close to the coast the plant has broad leaves, whitish flowers and stems 10 or 12 inches high. A highway leads from these regions to a plateau at an altitude of 6000 feet or more. Up this the seeds of the plant were apparently long ago carried by man and his animals; and now in the elevated habitat the plant has taken on certain alpine characteristics, including elongated roots, xerophytic

leaves, stems only one or two inches high, reddish flowers and a general increase of hairiness throughout the entire plant. When seeds are taken from the lowland and planted in the upland, as Zedbauer has found, the first generation of young plants possesses all of these new qualities. This is not surprising, for it is a matter of common observation that plants vary greatly according to the soil and still more the climatic conditions in which they are placed. The important point appears when the seeds of the plants which have been long in the upland environment are taken to other places, such as Vienna, where the climate is not at all alpine. There the new plants continue to show the characteristics of the upland environment. Slight changes indeed occur; the stems become an inch or so longer; the roots change to an equal extent; but the flowers and leaves retain practically all of the alpine characteristics. When the plants were cultivated for four successive generations in Vienna no further change was apparent. In this case therefore, it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that a change of climate induced pronouncedly new characteristics which another change of climate was not able to eradicate. That more such changes have not been observed seems to be due chiefly to lack of accurate observations upon species which have long been subject to a new environment.

Among animals similar phenomena have been observed. For instance Sumner found that mice reared in a warm room differ considerably from those reared in a cold room in the mean length of the tail, foot, and ear; and these differences were transmitted to the next generation. These facts have an additional importance because the differences were exactly those which distinguish northern and southern races of many animals. Further examples of a similar kind might be given, but enough has been said to point out the general trend of some of the most interesting of recent biological experiments. Among man it is probable that similar results follow upon changes of environment. For instance statistics show that the descendants of English colonists in Australia average taller than the English in general, and that they are slighter in proportion to their height, a difference

closely analogous to that between the slender desert horses of Arabia and the plump ponies of Shetland. In America still more surprising results have been found. Boas has recently made measurements upon the American-born children of Jews from central Russia and Italians from Sicily. In the case of the Italians, who are long-headed, the children appear to be shorter-headed than their parents, while among the Jews, who are notably broad-headed, the children have longer heads than their parents. In other words, under the changed environment both alien types seem to take on new characteristics and to approach a type normal to the new environment. The results are so at variance with all the established conceptions of ethnologists that they have been received with much scepticism. Nevertheless there is no more reason for doubting that flowers can take on a pink tint in alpine surroundings, or that mice can have longer tails in hot countries than in cold, than for doubting that the bodily form of the human race can change. And if the bodily form can change, there is equally great probability that the mental character can alter.

Before leaving the subject of the evolution of new characteristics and new races by means of changes in physical environment, it may be well to sum up the matter in accordance with the conclusions of MacDougal in an article upon "Organic Response," published in the *American Naturalist* for January, 1911. It seems to be proved that morphological and physiological changes in both plants and animals can be occasioned by changes in geographical environment. So far as outward manifestations of form are concerned these changes take place quickly; that is, they appear in the first generation which grows up in the new environment, and do not vary greatly thereafter. Among animals the change may be somewhat slower, and it is also possible that internal variations in functions may take more than one generation for adjustment to the new conditions. The changes whether in form or function are not necessarily useful. They may indeed be distinctly injurious and may lead to the extinction of the species. Changes of the kinds here considered have been proved to be transmissible from parents to off-

spring, and herein lies the most important feature of the whole matter. It appears, however, that the new environment must have an opportunity to work upon the species for several or perhaps many generations before the new characteristics become permanently heritable and the transplanted forms can be considered as capable of forming a new race.

In this discussion of biological principles we seem to have wandered far from the Japanese, but this is by no means the case. In so far as man is the crowning product of biological evolution he must be subject to the same laws as are plants and animals. So far as physiological processes are concerned we accept this conclusion absolutely. No intelligent person hesitates to allow the vaccine of a cow to be placed on his arm and to spread through his blood. We believe that the experiments made upon guinea pigs have a direct bearing upon problems of human physiology: and we talk calmly of the possibility of grafting the eye of a rabbit into the socket of a human being. In all these things we proclaim in the most positive fashion our faith that the biological laws governing animals and man are the same. When it comes to the brain we acknowledge the same thing, although not quite so readily. Doubtless the human brain has capacities far beyond those of any other terrestrial creature, but even when we make this claim, we talk to a dog and are convinced that he remembers certain words and attaches to them the meaning that we do.

If we accept the conclusions set forth above we are led to the following conclusion in regard to the Japanese. The mental alertness of the Japanese, the quality wherein they differ from most of the rest of Asia and approach most nearly to the people of Europe and of North America north of Mexico, must have arisen from one of the three causes mentioned at the beginning of this paper, that is from spontaneous variations, from the mixture of races, or from the direct action of geographical and especially climatic environment; but however it may have arisen, its preservation is owing to the presence of favorable geographic environment. I know that this statement is sweeping, but it should be understood

that I do not advance it as something already proved but merely as the tentative conclusion to which we are led if we adopt the hypothesis that man's brain as well as his body is subject to the laws of biological evolution, and if, in addition, we accept some of the latest, but as yet not universally accepted biological conclusions.

With the understanding then that we are merely testing an hypothesis and not pretending to deal with proved facts, let us see whether there are any features of the geographic environment of Japan which lend support to our theory. The most important geographical characteristics of Japan are first its insular character and its position off the populous east coast of Asia; second, its mountainous topography and limited area of arable land; and third, its moist, variable climate. A score of other minor factors might be added, but I pass them by for lack of time.

The insularity of Japan can here be discussed but briefly. Many authors have dwelt upon it, and its importance is universally recognized. Because of their constant and intimate contact with the sea the Japanese are skillful sailors, and in the future are likely to play a prominent rôle in the world's naval history. Moreover the surrounding seas render Japan comparatively safe from hostile attack, and thus free it from the necessity of constant watchfulness; and great armies like those of France, Germany, and Russia are unnecessary. The seas have thus done for Japan essentially what they have done for England, save that Japan, coming late into the comity of nations, has not been able to secure vast tracts of unoccupied colonial territory. Important as this is, I believe that there is another respect in which the service of the embracing ocean to Japan has been even greater. However the energetic quality of the Japanese mind may have originated, there can be little doubt that its preservation has been facilitated by the separation of the island from the mainland. China has suffered again and again from being overrun in the northern parts by Tartars of various tribes and by Manchus or other people from the unproductive lands of the north and west. Korea in the same way has been subject to a constant influx of Chinese

while in the other countries of Asia from Turkey to India the coming in of alien races has been on so large a scale as to be the dominant element in their history. Such migrations have produced two noteworthy effects. In the first place the wars and misery attendant upon them have often not merely checked the progress of civilization for long periods, but have actually caused retrogression as in Persia. In the second place, where no such evil results have followed, there has nevertheless often been a great change in the direction of progress, a fact well illustrated by the consequences of the great Teutonic migrations in Europe. Suppose that Japan had been exposed for two thousand years to the unchecked invasion of the races from the neighboring parts of Asia. What would have been the result? Her people today would not be the race that we now know, but a composite mixture, probably more akin to the Chinese than to the present Japanese. The chances are that, unless physical environment is responsible for character, the race would possess the relatively inert, and highly conservative qualities of the continentals rather than the alertness of the islanders. By shielding the Japanese ever since the time when their present characteristics first became evident the insularity of the country has been of the highest service. It has allowed essential traits to be preserved unmixed and to develop until now they are a permanent acquisition. The course of history seems to show that races develop marked and peculiar characteristics and bring them to perfection and fruition only in relative seclusion where they are free to evolve their own ideas and character without constant hindrances from without. It was so with the early Greeks: the Hebrews of Judea, to whose later dissemination we owe practically all that the Jews have contributed to history, dwelt in a seclusion sharply in contrast with the cosmopolitan life of their kinsmen in Samaria and the rest of Palestine, and were preserved for century after century by the inaccessible character of their plateau: and the English have been able to make so marked an impression upon history in large measure because of their long isolation in their tight little island. Thus it has been with Japan: Chinese have come into the

country and so have Koreans, especially in the period from the fourth to the seventh centuries, but never in such numbers as seriously to alter the racial composition of the people of the islands. To be sure the Japanese adopted Chinese methods in the seventh century as they have adopted those of Europe in the nineteenth, but in neither case did this mean an appreciable alteration in race, or a change in fundamental character. Thus for two thousand years the insularity of the country has permitted it to pursue its way almost without respect to the rest of the world; the original racial characteristics which were in harmony with physical environment have been preserved and fostered, while others have been eliminated by the inexorable process of natural selection, until today the Japanese as a people are probably adapted to their environment more perfectly than is any other leading race.

The topography of Japan is almost if not quite as important as its insularity. Used in the broad sense this includes not only the relief of the mountains, plains and valleys, but also the character of the coasts and their indentations, and a large number of other features. From among the many qualities of the Japanese race which have been preserved and fostered by the conditions of physiographic environment constant and almost tireless industry stands out as one of the most widespread. By reason of the highly mountainous character of the country only from one-sixth to one-eighth of its area is now considered fit for cultivation. A thousand years ago a far smaller area appeared capable of utilization. When the growing number of the Japanese race at some early date seemed to threaten over-population several courses were open to the people, although they themselves were quite unconscious of the matter. One possibility was emigration, but this seems to have been resorted to very rarely because, until the advent of modern means of communication, the insularity of the country was as effective in keeping people in as in keeping others out. Another possibility open to the increasing numbers of the Japanese was the method or lack of method characteristic of India. There the population goes on increasing at a rapid rate until famine, pesti-

lence, or war arises and sweeps off the surplus swarm of human beings like flies in autumn. Before the coming of the English, a hundred famines and pestilences never, so far as we can tell, stirred the native population to any new exertions or to the invention of new methods. A condition of mental apathy seems to have prevented or stifled all initiative. In Japan, as also in China, quite a different mental attitude prevailed, and a third and highly rational method was unconsciously adopted in order to meet the dangers of over-population. As the means of supporting life decreased relatively to the number of people, industry and economy increased. Among the people of India few or none seem to have possessed the mental qualities which incited them to struggle against the ills of increasing poverty and scarcity of food, or at least few struggled with success. In China and Japan the number who thus struggled was large, and their success was great. Thus the Chinese and Japanese acquired the admirable qualities of industry and economy or rather those members of the community who possessed them were able to rear strong healthy children who inherited the parental tendencies while the children of the idle and extravagant grew up weak in body and were gradually eliminated.

Thus far the conditions of Japan and China appear to be alike. Now, however, we come to the influence of topography which together with climate seems to have been against the Chinese. The people of that sturdy race, in spite of their hard work and sparing lives have never been able to overcome the great natural disasters to which their country is subject. Throughout a large portion of China the winters are practically rainless and the crops depend upon the monsoon rains which normally begin at some time from April to June according to the latitude. Often the rains are delayed so that the crops of the great body of farmers who do not depend upon irrigation are ruined. Then when the rains finally come they fall with extreme violence, just as they do with us after a long drought, but even more severely because of the height of the mountains which border China on the west. The steepness of the mountains sheds the water at once causing enormous floods of a magnitude

which it is hard for us to understand. When the waters reach the lowlands another physiographic feature, the vast level expanse of plain, causes the rivers to spread over thousands of square miles as has happened in recent years in both the Yangtze and Hoangho basins. The crops of millions of farmers who dwell in the great flat plains and use the water of the rivers for irrigation are thus ruined. The inevitable consequence of the combined droughts and floods is famine involving tens of millions of people. This not only works terrible havoc in the districts immediately affected, but bears severely upon all the surrounding areas. Hundreds of thousands of people, homeless and penniless for the nonce, wander hither and thither over the face of the land, begging where they can, stealing and plundering when begging fails to afford a living. The result is that initiative and individual progressiveness are discouraged. A man's ability in improving his conditions has little to do with the chances which he runs of falling into trouble. No one man, nor even a whole village, however energetic it may be, can do much to avert a famine which directly affects 20,000,000 people. Thus there is very little selective action. The man who is industrious is assuredly better off than his neighbor in ordinary years, but the man of a progressive turn of mind, the one who introduces improvement and by long labor carries them to fruition is no better off than his neighbor when the time of distress arrives. If the rain does not fall to replenish the brooks no amount of ditching and terracing will furnish the children with bread; and if hordes of starving refugees pour into a region, they are more apt to rob the prosperous than the poverty-stricken. Thus the very size of the Chinese mountains, rivers and plains, and the vastness of the disasters to which the land is subject have been a factor in promoting the inertia which is so prominent a trait of Chinese character, and which is the danger of every race unless there is some strong means of counteracting it.

In Japan conditions are quite different. Industry and economy are at a premium just as in China, but energy in reclaiming new land or in adopting new methods is also at a premium. Japan is of course subject to great disasters

in the shape of famine, flood, fire, and storm, but these are never on the Chinese scale. The form of the land and its position prevent this. The rivers are all small and the area that can be flooded by any one of them is strictly limited. Similarly, disastrous droughts occur, but are never so devastating as in China. Japan, by reason of its mountains and of its position off the coast gets heavy rains, and these may be much diminished in dry years, but never so that the crops are absolutely ruined. There is never that completeness of failure which is so sad in China. Trouble and distress may come, but they are always accompanied by a ray of hope. A man who reclaims an acre of land on the side of the mountain knows that even in the worst years he will reap a crop of some sort from it. Occasionally, during past days of misrule, he may have suffered loss from the people of a neighboring district who were wandering abroad by reason of distress at home, but this fear does not hang over him with a tithe as much force as in China. In a word, not only do the qualities of industry and economy reap as great a reward in Japan as in China, but because of the small scale of the country and its topographic diversity energy and initiative are fostered, and the children of alert-minded parents have a better start than those who are sluggish.

I have reserved climate, the most important of geographic factors until the last. Already, to be sure we have been led into the discussion of the subject in connection with floods and droughts. Beyond this, however, lies a more interesting and more debatable field of research. Buckle has been laughed at and discredited because of his sweeping generalizations in respect to the influence of climate upon history and character. Doubtless he made absurd blunders, as every man with a great idea is bound to do. Yet if he were alive today and could weigh the new evidence which is continually being brought to light, I believe that his main contention would still seem to him true, and in the end I think it will be accepted by the world as a whole. In a nutshell his theory was that physical environment determines the character and achievements of all the races of the world, and that climate is the most important of all the elements of

physical environment. Such a theory, whether right or wrong, well deserves consideration. To dismiss it after the fashion of some writers, as a "blanket theory" unworthy of further study is as unscientific as to accept it without proof. In the remainder of this article I propose to present two lines of evidence which seem to show that the climatic conditions of a country have far more to do with the mental condition of the inhabitants than is generally recognized. This is far from meaning that climate is the only factor. No one would claim for a moment that any climatic conditions, no matter how extreme, could overcome the influence of the inheritance derived from thousands of generations of ancestors. The most that is assumed in the present hypothesis is that climatic conditions can and do slightly modify inherited characteristics, just as we know to be the case in plants and animals, and that in course of time the conditions of any particular environment will pick out such variations either for preservation or extinction.

The general relation of climate to the energy and ability of races is too well recognized to require much consideration. Of the 50,000,000 square miles of the earth's surface which consist of land lying outside the limits of the polar circles approximately half lies within 30 degrees of the equator. Yet, as Ireland has pointed out, from the races which are indigenous to this vast area or which have dwelt in it long enough to have been much modified by it there has never arisen any man except Mohammed who has the least claim to a place among the world's leaders. Gautama, the founder of Buddhism, although a native of India, was born and reared among the Himalayas almost exactly 30 degrees north of the equator. The great men of ancient Egypt, Ramses and his countrymen, lived for the most part in the Nile delta, which lies north of 30 degrees. Even Thebes, at the southernmost limit of the important portion of ancient Egypt lies only 4 degrees farther south. Similarly in America, Diaz, the only Latin-American with a world-wide reputation is in reality a product of Spain, not of Mexico.

Clear as the relation of climate and human achievement may be when the temperate and equatorial regions are

compared, it becomes much more complex when comparisons are instituted between the various countries of the temperate zone. Let us limit ourselves to the northern hemisphere, since the amount of land in the southern is small and the people there are largely recent immigrants. We may divide the north temperate zone into two belts, one extending from latitude 30 to 45 and the other from 45 degrees to the Arctic circle. In the more southern of the two belts we find countries occupying most diverse positions in the scale of civilization. On one side of the Pacific stands our own country in the forefront of progress, while on the other Japan faces us on equal terms and in some respects beating us at our own game. Half way back to America as one continues around the globe, lies Italy, one of the world's great powers, but noteworthy for the marked difference between the energetic, capable people of the northern parts and the unstable, mercurial inhabitants of the south around Naples and in Sicily.

None of the other countries in the belt between 30 degrees and 45 degrees have any claim to a place among the world's leaders. Spain, Greece, and Turkey are second rate powers whose limited modern achievements suffer sadly by comparison with the past. Servia, Bulgaria, and Roumania deserve praise for what they are accomplishing, but in comparison with countries of similar size such as Switzerland, Belgium or Holland, they are far below the first rank. From European Turkey and the vicinity of the Aegean Sea south-eastward the condition of the Turkish Empire becomes steadily more hopeless, not so much because of more war and misrule than in the Balkans but because the people are more apathetic. Persia, which lies for the most part between latitudes 30 and 40 resembles Turkey very closely in this respect and in many others, but its general condition is decidedly lower. Morocco and Tripoli are, if anything, worse off than Persia, and this low level is maintained in Afghanistan and Tibet. I omit Algiers, Tunis, and Egypt, because their present prosperity is due entirely to France and England. Finally we come to China where conditions again improve over those in Central Asia, and are in many

respects about as advanced as in Turkey. In the face of such a congeries of nations it is manifest that latitude and mean temperature have practically nothing to do with a country's position in the scale of civilization. The countries in the belt under consideration stand decidedly higher than those of equatorial regions; and in this we can probably see the influence of lower temperature, and of greater variations from the mean temperature. The constant recurrence of winter with the accompanying necessity for forethought and industry in order to have means of subsistence was probably one of the chief factors in originally advancing the temperate zone faster than the tropics.


Turning now to the most northerly belt of nations we find that on the whole they stand much higher than those to the south of them, but here, too, there are great divergencies. Canada, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, Germany, Switzerland and Austria all stand in the front rank. So, also, does Russia in many respects. Finland, the Baltic provinces, and the northwestern part of the country in general doubtless deserve a position well up among the nations. Southeastward, however, toward the Caspian Sea and in the Asiatic provinces of Turkestan there is a great falling off. The indigenous inhabitants of those regions occupy a position not far removed from that which prevails in the better parts of Turkey. East of the Urals in Siberia a similar phenomenon prevails. The western part of the country is fairly progressive and is filling up with Russian colonists after the fashion of the western plains of the United States and Canada. In the vast eastern half stagnation prevails. The native races are inert and unprogressive, Russian influence is able to penetrate but slowly, and we have no assurance that much progress is ever to be possible.

The attempt to find some common factor or factors which should explain the predominance of certain nations and the differences between nations living as close to one another as Japan and China or Austria and Turkey has hitherto met with little success. The facts in regard to Japan seem to make it evident that these differences are not a matter of

religion: only by a series of unproved though interesting hypotheses can they be ascribed to the presence of any particular race: and conditions of temperature and rainfall, or the succession of the seasons,—that is the features of climate, as ordinarily understood,—furnish equally unsatisfactory explanations. A few writers have thought that one of the chief factors in explaining racial differences might perhaps be found in the degree of variability of the climate in the respective countries. They point to the fact that in general mankind is most progressive in places where there is not only a marked difference between summer and winter, but also where there are frequent variations from day to day. The writer has pointed out that one reason for the difference between the sluggish character of the people of western and central Asia and of countries like the United States may be the number of storms. All through the summer months in large portions of Asia rain is practically unknown; and even in the autumn, storms come so slowly that there is no sudden change. In the United States the farmer and everyone whose work is out of doors is forced to be constantly on the watch to guard against the exigencies of the weather. If the hay is down the farmer must be ready to work furiously in order to get it in before a threatened storm arrives: in the fall the prospect of a frost often urges him to work at a rate which he would never think of otherwise. Thus for generations, not only in America, but in western Europe where conditions are similar, the farmers or other out-of-door workers who were not alert and were not so constituted that they could and would make strenuous exertions, have been at a great disadvantage. They have tended to grow poorer and poorer and gradually to sink into the lower stratum of society where the children are ill-nourished and die for the most part before reaching maturity. In the almost stormless lands of Asia, on the contrary, no such stimulation and selection take place. The harvest is finished during a period when the farmer is practically certain that no storms will come up to injure it. In the fall the cold weather approaches slowly and gradually, and there are long warnings before the breaking of the first harmful storms. Hence the

man who works deliberately is quite as well off as the one who is alert and active.

In spite of hypotheses like the one just given, the relation of changes in the weather to the advancement of civilization has till now been a hazy matter. It remained for Professor C. J. Kullmer of Syracuse University to formulate a brilliant hypothesis which at a single stroke opens a place for hundreds



of hitherto unrelated facts. The reasonable nature of the hypothesis is so obvious when once pointed out, that it scarcely seems credible that the world should have so long been blind to it. The accompanying figure shows a map of the northern hemisphere with the north pole in the center. Upon it has been plotted the frequency of cyclonic storms. The term cyclonic storm in the vocabulary of the meteorologist does not mean something severe like a tornado, but

merely the ordinary type of storm prevalent in the United States and Europe. The storm consists essentially of an area of low pressure which may be a thousand miles in diameter, and which moves across the country with a general easterly trend. Winds from all sides blow obliquely toward the center. On the east side, or in front of such a storm east winds prevail, while behind it the movement of the air is from the west. In the central parts of the cyclonic area the air is rising because of the low pressure, clouds are formed, and rain falls. Storms of this type, as everyone knows, are our main source of rainfall throughout the year. In other parts of the world, for instance in the tropics or in the monsoon regions of northern India and most of China the rainfall does not come from cyclonic storms but from brief showers often accompanied by thunder, but not characterised by large areas of low pressure. During the course of a thunder-shower or of the other showers which produce rain in such regions the barometer may fluctuate rapidly for a few hours, but in general it remains steady.

The cyclonic storms of temperate regions move in well-defined tracks which are observed and mapped by the various weather bureaus. From the data thus furnished it is a simple matter to insert on a map the average number of storms whose centers each year pass through a given area. In the present case the unit is a rectangle five degrees long on each side. The number ten on the map means that on an average, during the years for which the data have been examined by Dunwoody, the centers of ten storms passed over all points on the line, while the edges of many more storms passed that way. Inside the line the number of storms increases, while outside the number decreases.

Examination of the map, as Kullmer points out, shows at once that the area included within the line of ten storms embraces all the leading countries of the world. North America possesses the area of maximum storm frequency with its center in southern Canada, while the region of abundant storminess extends over all of the United States except the far south and southwest. In Europe the chief countries all come within the line of ten storms, Great Britain, France,

the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Italy except for the southern part, and finally the northern and western portions of Russia. Most significant of all, Japan, the one country of Asia which rises to the European level of achievement, is the only Asiatic country subject to frequent cyclonic storms.

The remarkable case of Japan has been seized upon by Kullmer as the strongest possible reason for believing that the storm track hypothesis offers an adequate explanation of the peculiar distribution of intellectual attainments among the nations. It may be that the Chinese, as many authorities hold, are possessed of as great mental ability as the Japanese or any other race. Kullmer's hypothesis does not attempt to settle the matter. It merely postulates that the occurrence of storms is a mental stimulant, and that this stimulant does not now apply to China. Those who have most faith in the Chinese often say that that race is the equal of any in the world, but they are forced to add that this is not now apparent because the Chinese have not yet waked up. Perhaps contact with other races will wake them up, but of this we are not sure. Once they were awake, two thousand years ago. That was when the Greeks were awake and the Jews and other people of the ancient empires. In those days, apparently, storms were more frequent than now in the countries which have gone to sleep. I cannot here go into the matter of changes of climate, but years of work in Asia and recent investigations of ruins and lakes and of the rate of growth of ancient trees in America have convinced me that pronounced changes of climate have taken place both in the eastern and western hemispheres. The changes thus inferred are of exactly the kind which would increase the storminess of the parts of the world where civilization has decayed.

An hypothesis such as this of the relation of the storm track to civilization needs severe testing. Kullmer has begun to test it by comparing bank deposits and other evidences of thrift and energy in various parts of America, on the one hand, with the number of storms on the other hand. Another method lies in measuring the direct effect of cyclonic

storms. As yet only a beginning has been made along this line. Lehmann in Copenhagen made measurements of the strength of three individuals for over a year and reached some interesting results. He found that during the half year from the end of November to May, as he puts it, or from October to May, as his curves show, muscular strength increases with a rising barometer and decreases when the barometer falls. During the other half of the year he detected no direct relation, possibly because his observations were interrupted by a journey, possibly because of the method used in averaging the work, and possibly because there is no direct relation at that time. An examination of his curves, however, shows frequent cases of a direct relationship at all seasons. The fact probably is, that the relation exists at all times, but in the summer and autumn when barometric changes are less marked than in winter and spring, changes in the strength of human beings because of that cause are masked by other variations due to temperature and the incidental matters of occupation and health which are continually influencing mankind. Strangely enough Lehmann's work seems to show conclusively that although the small barometric changes connected with cyclonic storms produce a direct effect upon the strength of the human body, large changes such as those involved in a change of residence from sea level to an altitude of two or three thousand feet produce no corresponding effect. The bodily functions become adjusted so quickly, especially in the case of an ascent that no disarrangement or diminution of strength occurs unless the altitude becomes sufficient to interfere with breathing. Lehmann made a short series of tests to determine the relation of mental as well as physical activity to the barometer. His methods were not accurate enough to give positive results but he concluded that in general the condition of the mind varies with that of the body, and hence that the brain is stimulated by a rise of pressure.

I have had the good fortune to be able to test this matter further and by means more accurate than those employed by Lehmann. Professor J. McK. Cattell of Columbia University made a series of tests upon three children daily

for an entire year, and thereafter weekly for another year. Each child wrote out on the typewriter the first stanza of Spenser's "Faerie Queen" each day, and then copied a new page from the same poem. The length of time for each operation and the number of errors in copying the stanza that was repeated daily were recorded. Thus in three ways, speed, accuracy, and memory, it is possible to test the children's state of mind. Professor Cattell's purpose was the determination of the rate and manner in which skill in the use of the typewriter increases. His figures, however, are equally useful for the purpose of comparison with the changes of weather, and to this end he has kindly put them at my disposal. The results are unmistakable even in the present incomplete state of the calculations. In spite of the hundred and one accidents which might influence the children's minds, the effect of the barometer is clearly apparent. In one case an individual curve for more than a month runs almost absolutely parallel to the fluctuations of the barometer. In other cases a seeming disagreement turns out on closer examination to be a striking agreement. For instance in one instance the combined curve of all the children, that is the average of all, falls for a week, showing that sickness or colds or some other undefined cause was at work slowing them up. The barometric curve keeps on in its usual sinuous course and at the first glance seems quite unrelated to the ability of the children to write rapidly and accurately. Nevertheless the relationship is there. The children's ability decreased, as has been said, but not steadily. Each time that the barometer rose, the fall in the children's ability was checked, so that the line for that day slopes only very slightly, while on other days when the barometer was falling the children's line drops rapidly. On the whole the agreement between mental activity, including speed, accuracy, and power of memory is so close as to be beyond question. For generations we have been talking about the weather and its influence, and now it appears that we can actually measure the amount of additional work which a man can do because of the passing of a storm. Other elements, such as temperature, humidity, and sunshine play

an important part, but the dominating influence appears to be changes in the barometer. Why this is so we can only guess. The fact remains that in the only cases where it has been tested it is true, and the more rapid the succession of storms the greater is their influence.

Probably the relation between mental work and atmospheric pressure is analogous to that between the growth of plants and temperature. Each species of plant has a certain optimum, or temperature most favorable for growth. Nevertheless a plant is not helped by being kept permanently at that temperature. It will grow far better if the air is sometimes cooler and sometimes warmer than the optimum. Repeated fluctuations back and forth from day to day or between day and night are the most stimulating conditions, provided the average temperature is not far from the optimum and the departures from that point are not too great. Apparently something similar takes place in the human brain. Day by day the brain, especially in childhood it would seem, is alternately stimulated and checked. The checks give rest, the stimulus creates or encourages the habit and capacity for strenuous exertion. Some brains are doubtless more and others less sensitive to such barometric stimuli. In a country of uniform conditions and slow changes like Central Asia or the tropics neither type would have any special advantage. In a country like Japan characterized by frequent changes the brains susceptible to the stimuli would work actively and certain individuals by means of greater power of thought and action would succeed while those who were not subject to the stimuli would be worsted. Thus, it would seem that in Japan a certain type of mind has been selected and preserved by reason of the stormy climate. The type is the same as that which prevails in western Europe and North America, and quite different from that of the rest of Asia. If this is so, it is most fortunate for Japan. For China and for many other nations it may seem unfortunate, but perhaps the future is not so dark as would appear. The knowledge of a disease is the first step toward the remedy. If the mind needs a stimulus, science must invent one.

SOME OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF FEUDAL JAPAN TO THE NEW JAPAN¹

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Feudalism as the ruling political machinery of Japan received its first imperial sanction about 1185. The long period from this date down to the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1868—an interval of nearly seven centuries—is popularly known as the feudal ages of Japanese history. This period may be divided into two, with the battle of Sekigahara fought in 1600 as the dividing point. The first part, about 1185 to 1600, witnessed a succession of civil wars, which occurred at first at long intervals, but, after the fourteenth century, continually and in growing intensity; the second part, 1600 to 1868, constituting a long reign of peace, coincides with the rule of the Tokugawa "Shōguns," or suzerains, at Edo.

It is evident that so long a period of feudal rule could not pass away without making deep impressions on the national life and character of the Japanese. It is equally evident that the study of so colossal a subject as the contributions from feudal Japan to New Japan could not be compassed by any one student; and that even a very partial and cursory survey, such as I venture to present in this paper, of so vast a theme, could hardly be attempted without making serious omissions and without recourse to glaring generalizations.

To enumerate a few *political* contributions. It was under the feudal régime, that, late in the thirteenth century, Japan

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repelled the Mongol invasions, and thereby saved herself from a possible foreign conquest; and that, in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, she prevented dangers to her safety as a sovereign state that, it was feared, might come from the so-called "colonizing" nations of southern Europe, the Portuguese and the Spanish, by prohibiting their activity in Japan either in trade or in religious propagation. It was also under the feudal rule that, at the end of the twelfth century, Japan definitively reduced the two extreme northern provinces of the main island, Mutsu and Dewa, to submission to the central authorities; and that, four centuries later, she extended her suzerainty over the northern island of Yezo and the southern archipelago of Ryūkyū (Loo-choo). In short, feudalism created for Japan military forces such as the earlier bureaucratic régime had failed to give her, and, by this means, she was enabled to preserve her territory intact and to greatly extend it.

In matters of *culture*, also, the feudal ages made important contributions to Japan which a non-military society could hardly have made, in the form, among other things, of the Zen Buddhism with its extensive, subtle and profound influence upon national character and culture. It is true that the extremely rigorous methods of Zen were cultivated only by a chosen few who were capable of an intense and sustained application of the mind, and attracted even less followers in the peaceful period after 1600 than during the preceding epoch of civil strife. If the tenets of Zen were not popular, however, the spirit of Zen pervaded all classes of people, and directly or indirectly influenced all forms of Japanese culture. It was the spirit of reserve, collected force, and not primitive but deeply studied simplicity; it was a spirit which sought to compress the deepest meaning into the simplest form, and to put the most concentrated energy under the most perfect control. Zen both vitalized and chastened Japanese nature and its expression. This double influence may be amply seen in all the fine arts of the feudal ages—painting, specially of landscapes, calligraphy, architecture, and music; in all the martial arts; in literature; in the aesthetic and social taste and style; in customs and manners; and

in many details of common daily life. Zen, of course, was not the only controlling factor, but exerted its influence upon the Japanese side by side with other forces which had come down from the earlier ages and with still others which developed after 1600. Zen, however, constituted an ever-present ideal and heritage which is even now perceptible everywhere, and which could be developed only in so robust a feudal society as existed in Japan for seven long centuries. Zen is the great element of the Japanese character which has yet been the most inadequately interpreted to the outer world, and which, at any event, is perhaps the least intelligible to the American mind.

We cannot tarry longer on this point, for, important and precious as all these and other contributions are, and profitably as they may be enlarged upon, we are in this discourse concerned primarily with some other contributions of feudal Japan—with those contributions, that is, which have had a special bearing on Japan's activity as a *modern nation*. What does New Japan owe to feudal Japan that has promoted her national life under modern conditions?

Of some of the contributions of this character of which I may claim partial knowledge, it is possible to point out two aspects, moral and social. What peculiar *moral* life has been inherited from the feudal era, and what peculiar *social* organization had produced it and was sustained by it? The form of this question suggests, and the following discourse will show, how inseparably these two phases were bound up with each other; it is purely for the sake of discussion that I am obliged to divorce them one from the other as if they were not, as in reality they were, two sides of one and the same substance.

MORAL LIFE

The pre-feudal culture

The seven centuries of feudalism were preceded by about four centuries (794 to c. 1185) of court culture at Kyōto, the imperial capital. This culture was, in its essential characteristics, aristocratic, effeminate, and emotional. Its point of

view was mainly æsthetic, non-ethical; the denizens of the court, ladies and lady-like men, concerned themselves, not so much about the right or wrong of their conduct, as about the propriety and gracefulness of their behavior. Rather than asking *what* ought to be said or done under a given circumstance, they inquired *how* to say or do things approved by common consent to be good form and pleasing. Their culture was modal; while it excelled in grace and gentility, it lacked strength and variety. Its points of contact with the individual were dull and void of thrill, for it hardly touched his capacity for strenuous effort or self-denying enthusiasm. If you picture in your mind the French court life under the old régime as revealed in the memoirs of courtiers and in some of Dumas' novels, and in your imagination subtracted from this picture the qualities of dash and extravagance which were not absent in reality, you will have produced a likely replica of the court culture of the Kyōto of the tenth century.

The very religion in vogue had changed its nature: Buddhism had now become highly and elaborately artistic, and its ritualism developed to a point of complexity that has never since been equalled. This formal and æsthetic Buddhism was, in certain respects, further enervating the social fabric already enfeebled by the over-abundant culture of the time; it was absorbing the landed wealth and engrossing the personal devotion of the nation to an alarming extent. Had the condition been allowed to persist longer, Buddhism and Japan might not inconceivably have gone on corrupting each other, and in her archipelago history might have found another Ceylon or Tibet.

The feudal point of view

Fortunately this state of things obtained only at the capital. A step away from Kyōto, and everywhere over the land, one would see great social changes slowly but irresistibly taking place through the course of these five centuries, which were destined not only to save Japan from the fate that otherwise seemed to await her future, but also to enable

her to reconstruct the moral life of the nation on a radically new foundation.

For the first time in Japanese history there grew up a new class of warriors who were knit together by essentially personal relationships of fidelity and loyalty. For the first time, the men were inspired by a keen sense of individual honor, which they guarded with the sword; honor was valued higher than life, men staking their lives in contests for the honor of their lords, their families, and themselves, and even taking their own lives when it was thought that honor was irrevocably lost or that death alone could save honor. These two moral principles, personal fidelity and individual honor, were, as may be realized, needed by the very nature of the feudal society, and were cultivated by the men with incredible rigor. Then after the beginning of the feudal régime, these same qualities were put to a severe and sustained test during the centuries, first, of discipline, and then, of actual warfare, and thereby were much trained and tempered.

New Buddhism

New forms of Buddhism now prevailed among the warriors to meet their spiritual needs, for the old ritualistic forms, which once fascinated the courtiers of Kyōto, hardly satisfied the longings of the sworded men for virile doctrines and for direct roads to salvation. The Zen Buddhism, to which reference has been made, sought to gratify the former, and the Zhōdo and Nichiren the latter of these spiritual demands. Zen required a bold and intense mode of mental concentration. It was designed to break down the fetters that were said to bind the man to his blind and timid selfishness; it otherwise trained the disciple in the art of subduing obstacles that unenlightened mortals persist in throwing in their own paths, and of summoning one's mental and physical powers at a moment's call and bending them upon the execution of a given object in view. The methods of the Zhōdo and Nichiren sects were an antipode to those of the Zen; the former dispensed with self-discipline as a means of enlightenment, but taught an absolute faith in the saving power, respectively,

of a Buddha and of the truth embodied in a sacred book. It would seem that, before 1600, the robust methods of Zen gained greater popularity among the warriors than the gentle tenets of the other two denominations.

Confucian influence

To these spiritual factors were added, after 1600, moral teachings of Confucianism. They emphasized order and security to be obtained by the loyalty of the lower and the benevolence of the upper party in all human relationships, political, social and domestic. Of these relationships, the Confucianism adopted in the feudal Japan of this period considered as of first importance the relation between ruler and ruled.

The case of Confucianism affords a remarkable illustration of the truth, which is too readily forgotten, that no religious or moral doctrine that does not meet actual needs of society may be forced upon it; and that society in any given country and at any given period successfully adopts only such teachings as it has produced or has selected for their suitability to its material and moral welfare. Confucianism had begun to be studied in Japan at least one thousand years before 1600, but during this long interval there had been only individuals, not classes or communities, that accepted its more purely ethical precepts as their life-principles. That certain practical phases of Confucian ethics came to be universally studied in the feudal Japan in the late period under the Tokugawa suzerains was due to the general belief that they would serve now better than in any earlier age to secure the stability of the existing society; they were found to afford admirably clear and concise names and systems to the virtues that had grown up in Japan independently of Confucianism, and that had now been consciously employed, in a further developed form, as the foundation of the power of the feudal authorities and of the peace and order of the realm.

The Bushidō: History of its basic virtues

The code of ethics that resulted from the combination of these and other moral elements of the feudal ages is what is often called the "bushidō," the term familiarized to Occidental readers by Dr. Nitobe's interesting exposition. The "bushidō" was remarkably complex in its composition, for Japanese, Chinese, and Indian influences had contributed to its formation; yet it appeared singularly homogeneous and coherent, as its elements had been fused together during centuries of hard discipline and constant and universal practice.

Its foundation would seem to have been *loyalty*—loyalty to one's lord, or to any man or matter upon which he has set his heart—upheld by a sterling sense of personal *honor*.

Let us not forget for a moment, however, that the "bushidō," in its long history, was not always characterized by constant fidelity between lord and vassal. That there was a large element of opportunism among the "samurai" during the period of civil war (before 1600), manifesting itself too often in unnatural and revolting crimes of treachery and murder among men bound together by the closest ties of fealty or blood-relationship, may be seen by any cursory reader of the annals of these dark ages. The opening pages of the chronicle *Tō-dai Ki* present acts after acts that would parallel some of the blackest exploits of Machiavellian politics recorded of the sixteenth century Italy. That these enormities should be, as they were, perpetrated in Japan at the same time that noble acts of valor and loyalty were frequent, committed not seldom by the very same persons, suggests the deep interest of the social psychology of the time. And the same fact will also indicate the need of a *historical* presentation of the "bushidō," which has scarcely been attempted by any writer from a purely objective standpoint; it is obviously as impossible to present a true static description of so dynamic a growth as the "bushidō,"² as it would be to make

²Captain Brinkley's chapter on the "bushido" (*Oriental Series; Japan*, vol. II, chap. 5) appears to deal mainly with the two or three centuries prior to 1600, while Dr. Nitobe's well-known work (*Bushido*) seems to be based

a general analysis of Christianity that at once is true of any one period of its history and does justice to its central truths. The only conscientious method of describing any remarkable historical development would seem to be the historical one.

Were the changing phases of the "bushidō" studied in the spirit of seeking truth, it would be found, I think, that it was only after 1600 that the feudal rulers were, thanks to the peculiar social condition in which they found themselves, enabled at length to institute a rigorous and effective system of training designed to purge the "bushidō" as thoroughly as possible of the element of opportunism that had vitiated it. A tremendous machinery of education was it that was then elaborated with this object in view, but space forbids a description even of its larger features. Suffice it to say that this system of training proved remarkably effective in accomplishing its first aim, but somewhat at the expense of the true life and vigor of the historic code. Just as the exposition of the social ethics of ancient China by Confucius and Mencius was designed to compensate the actual decline of its practice then taking place by teaching an increased consciousness of its principles, so in a like manner the idealization and systematization of the "bushidō" in Japan under the Tokugawa shōguns indicated in fact a perceptible deterioration of its vitality. When the feudal classes learned to regard opportunism as hateful and unworthy of them, the whole body of this knightly code had become a little inflexible and punctilious. The long reign of peace after 1600, during which the martial arts were trained but not used, contributed to the same result in the "bushidō."

Even in this state, however, the "bushidō" was an immense potential energy; and it acquired an unexpected lease of life in the middle of the nineteenth century, when thou-

primarily on the perfected ideal code of the Edo period. Since they take up two different periods for the most part, these two works, mutually contradictory as their accounts may often seem, hardly correct each other. Nor may they properly be said to supplement each other, for, though largely concerned with different epochs, neither professes to be historical in method, but both treat the subject in a manner to lead the reader to suppose that they discuss it in its entirety. They serve, however, as valuable introductions to more accurate discussions of this subject which are still to come.

sands of men were suddenly animated by its thrilling power, and brought about the great upheaval that resulted in the destruction of the feudal régime. Feudalism was killed by the moral spirit it had nursed, when that spirit was liberated by revolution and fastened itself to the cause of national unity and imperial sovereignty.

Other factors of the "bushidō"

I have said that the "bushidō" was complex in origin though homogeneous in fusion. While its basic virtues were, it would seem, loyalty and sense of honor, it also was characterized, nearly at all times though in varying degrees at different times and in different persons, at least by the following moral tendencies:—contentment in simple material comfort, and disdain of lucre; the gallant surrender by the "samurai" of all that was of earthly value, including his very life, when it stood in the way of his fulfillment of a promised word of friendship and devotion, often resulting in sacrifices which would be considered unnecessary by Occidental observers; rigorous self-control and reserve; a habitually reflective and self-examining turn of mind, so that one's personal honor might be guarded, not with dense vanity and blind self-assertiveness, but with a clear conviction of its last irreducible claim; the habit of minute consideration and precise coördination of matters relating to the execution of any important plan of action—the training of a vision for the law of causality so habitual as almost to amount to a mental sport; the constant chastening of the mind so as to be able to meet more perplexing crises with greater coolness and assurance; the power to summon one's physical and mental resources at an instant's call, to intensify them if possible, and focus them on the consummation of one supreme act demanded by the exigency of the moment. To these must be added the delicacy of sentiment in regard to other members of society, attended not only by minute rules of etiquette, but also by quick adjustment of one's expression and behavior to suit different parties and varying moods and circumstances. The last but not the least factor, which had developed prin-

cipally among courtiers at Kyōto of the pre-feudal period, but which was cultivated in new forms throughout the feudal ages, was often called by the historic phrase, *mono no aware wo shiru*, literally, "to be sensible of the pathos of things," and in fact denoted a cultivation of the heart. It meant capacity for ready appreciation and cheerful response to a call for human sympathy; it manifested itself in intimate love of nature, in aesthetic enjoyment of the beauty alike of art and of human conduct, and in applause of the enemy's valor and sympathy for his fall. The fundamental unity of these apparently incongruous phases of conduct may be felt only by the aesthetic-moral sense of the "samurai."

The whole "bushi"

It should once more be emphasized that these component qualities of the "bushidō" were in practice considered seldom as separate elements, but as one coherent body of moral values, a veritable moral atmosphere which surrounded all "samurai" and which was imbibed by each. There was to be no specialization of the different virtues among different men, but each and every man was taught and expected to realize in himself, according to his nature and training, all of the virtues as a simple code of conduct. This was the ideal of the whole man in feudal Japan, and the ideal was taught and practised rigorously and with large success. You will appreciate the difference between those ages and ours as regards both the ideal and the degree of its realization. We fail to observe in this twentieth century any ideal for an all-round man which is attended by a social sanction more powerful than that of religion, or a universal inculcation and practice of any, even a partial, ideal which thrills and unites all members of society.

Skepticism and blind praise

It is difficult, therefore, for us to portray in our minds the actual state of feudal Japan animated by the "bushidō." And the very difficulty is liable to lead one to fancy either that all descriptions of the moral life of that society must be

grossly exaggerated, or that, on the contrary, Japan under the Tokugawa rulers must have been a paradise in which the virtues of fidelity and honor were in perfect practice. I am afraid that the first skeptical view is largely justified as a reaction against the current dithyrambic tales of Japanese feudal perfections; it, however, falls short of true criticism, since it does not consider the historical fact that the needs of maintaining the peculiar form of feudal society in Japan, especially after 1600, made it imperative that its units should, as far as could be accomplished through human agencies, be well-rounded men of the "bushidō." Otherwise the society would have been unstable and have readily succumbed to disintegrating forces.

As for the blind praise for feudal Japan, it is necessary to qualify it with the consideration that there were many lapses from the ideal, and that these were usually followed by a swifter and sterner chastisement than is agreeable for us to contemplate in this comfortable age.

The woman and the "bushidō"

The "bushidō," excepting a few of its leading traits, was essentially masculine and martial in origin and in character, but, as might be expected, it also changed the moral status of the Japanese woman in a fundamental manner. Her social position, compared with that of her sister at the court of Kyōto in the preceding bureaucratic period, would seem to have been materially lowered. No longer was she, as was her predecessor, courted by rivalling lovers with solicitude and deference; no longer did her feminine taste and views of life exert a controlling influence upon the customs and culture of polite society; no longer could she express without reserve her personal feelings and emotions even in her limited sphere, much less could she play a leading rôle in literary productions or in political councils. On the contrary, the social yoke under which she found herself was heavy beyond the conception of her elder sister. The feudal family had reinforced the right of the house-father, and the woman was again completely under the *manus*,

in turn, of her father, her husband, and his heir. Out in the public, the man prevailed, for thither the woman seldom ventured. Her sphere of activity was coëxtensive with her home circle, and, within this narrow horizon, her freedom of expression was curbed. She eschewed her personal opinions when they conflicted with the interest of the house or the public duties of her husband. The one commanding principle that ruled her from birth to death was self-effacement.

I fear such description will lead the foreigner, as indeed it has led many a well meaning observer, to the conclusion that the position of the woman of feudal Japan must have been one of unendurable misery. But it is a significant fact that, with the decline of her social status, her moral status rose immeasurably. Though seemingly more servile, she enjoyed genuine respect of the man to an extent unknown to her predecessor at Kyōto, for she performed an all-important moral service of which the latter could have no conception. Remember that the "samurai" was under constant discipline of fidelity and honor; his service was of arms, and involved, therefore, a possible sacrifice of his life at any moment. Every day as he left his home and mingled with the outer world, he should beware that any instantaneous call on his service must be met with clean conscience and untarnished honor. He should be absolutely certain that, if an unexpected death should overtake him, his wife would be able to control her grief, preserve her presence of mind, discharge the household obligations so abruptly thrust upon her, and rear her children in lessons of fortitude and honor worthy of their father. The great strain put upon her by the feudal society presupposed in her an adamant will. If the foreign critic must decry the social servility of the Japanese woman, he would do well to note that this constant demand on her moral courage exerted a thrilling influence upon the whole course of her life. Let him remember that, just as the social status of the Roman woman of the empire rose at the same time as their moral fibre weakened, so also, in a reverse process, the moral prestige of the Japanese woman of the feudal ages increased as her social freedom decreased.

Let the critic further consider that, but for her woman, feudal Japan could hardly have been what it was and have given to New Japan what it has. Since the woman was a tower of strength behind him, the man was enabled to go forth without care of home and do his work without the need of casting a backward glance. She effaced herself, so that he might serve his lord with honor; and he sacrificed his life, when need be, so that his lord might maintain his honor—a whole chain of duty and honor binding the entire feudal society. If one would criticize the Japanese woman, he should rather criticize the system of which she was so decisive a factor.

The chief defect of the "bushidō"

The chief fault of this social system, from the modern standpoint, may perhaps be found in its comparatively low estimate of the individual person. Not that, as superficial critics aver, the human life was cheap in feudal Japan; nor that the man as a being of honor was treated with a whit less respect and politeness than in our society. Life was dear; honor was dearer than life; and the man as the embodiment of honor had in a large measure been liberated from the thralldom of the clan and of the monotonous and non-ethical customs that in the preceding ages had stunted his moral individualism.

It seems essential to remember this great advance in the moral valuation of the individual man made in the feudal ages, as compared with the earlier period. It is, however, equally important to note that the feudal man was prized rather as an instrument of the "bushidō" than as a complex organism with his physical and mental qualities to protect or train, his special interests to serve, his temperament and predilections to cherish, his career to realize, and his personal character to develop. This organism would correspond to the individual person in the Occidental sense, who has survived all the levelling processes of the Middle Ages, has persistently asserted himself as an entity, and is actively developing his powers and remodelling his surroundings to subserve his interest. In comparison with his Western brother, the

Japanese "samurai" was conceived as a man largely in the abstract. The former is more individualistic; the latter was more impersonal, for he regarded himself essentially as a temple of honor. Aggressive self-assertion is the keynote of modern European civilization; self-control and self-sacrifice formed the pre-requisites of the Japanese feudal man. The more the "samurai" effaced himself and the more he lived away from his concrete individuality and lived in the abstract "bushidō," the more of a man he was held to be. For the society in which he lived was of such a nature as could be maintained only by the prevalence of this special view of life, and as could not engender a more individualistic ethics or prosper under its régime. Herein we see one of the real, great points of contrast between the modern Occidental and the feudal Japanese, not to say Oriental, civilization.

The question of the historical origin of this fundamental difference between the two civilizations is far too deep and complex for our comprehension. There is, however, no question to my mind as to the subtle and all-pervasive character of the effects of the contrasted points of view regarding the individual person upon the customs and morals, law and religion, in the respective spheres of the two civilizations. These effects, on Japan's part, will not be easily outlived, fast as she is adopting results of the self-assertive individualism of the West. Still do the Japanese retain some of their old reluctance to insist on their legal rights as against one another; still would they often yield their points and surrender their material interests rather than seeming to be too aggressive, for their fathers had been taught for generations to believe that nothing concerning one's own self alone, not even his rightful claims or high emotions, could be commendable. I have also witnessed cases of abrupt termination of friendships between Japanese and foreigners, to the complete amazement of the latter, when the former had silently and too long endured what seemed to them the selfish and mean insistence by their foreign friends on their feelings and interests, though the offence had been unintentional on their part and in no way touched the personal interest of the Japanese; these would as much disdain the seeming selfishness

in others as in themselves. The divergence of attitudes may sometimes result in less pathetic events. Who among you, for instance, have not experienced moments of surprise at the peculiarly impersonal and mechanical manner in which your Japanese acquaintances sometimes regard individuals and their affairs? In much the same manner that you yourselves often fall into the mistake of treating Japanese as general representatives of a race rather than as specific persons, the Japanese, on their part, may regard you perhaps as instruments of the occasion of contact and feel little or no genuine interest in your personal places in the human world. If they show you politeness and even have respect for the position you hold or the cause you advocate, you may not be certain that they also feel real interest in you as distinctive entities.

It would be a serious error to exaggerate the impersonal side of the Japanese attitude and to forget the existence of the reverse side in which devotion and sense of honor commanded all personal energy in their service. This latter aspect was the saving grace of the Japanese; indeed, it may have been largely responsible for the other, impersonal traits. Here the contrast between the Japanese and their neighbors, the Chinese, is instructive. If the Japanese had not been, as they were, trained in the school of loyalty and personal honor, had not been imbued with the hatred of opportunism, and had been obliged to fall back solely upon their non-personal view of life, there would have been little difference between them and the Chinese. The great quality of the Chinese would seem to be their dispassionate utilitarianism; the corresponding virtue of the Japanese was, it is clear, their sense of loyalty and honor. Witness how they continue to astonish the world now and then by the readiness with which they sacrifice their interest for causes they regard as necessary and honorable.

Nor should we be blind to the reverse of the picture. If the utilitarianism of the Chinese is sometimes liable to lead to crimes of opportunism, the Japanese habit of mind must inevitably conduce as often to acts of relentless coercion of others as to deeds of noble self-sacrifice. When the ruling

part of the nation sets its heart upon the execution of a great policy, the remaining part would be carried forward, whether cheerfully or reluctantly, along the common path of devotion and sacrifice. Illustrations of this kind of compulsion have not been absent in Japan in recent years. One has only to imagine this state of things, not as occasional, but as universal, during the feudal ages; the "samurai" were not only inspired with an abnormal sense of their own honor and fidelity, but also expected even the peasant and merchant classes to uphold it with enforced loyalty. Naturally this system frequently led to frightful abuses: honor as often cost freedom as earned it.

SOCIAL LIFE

Moral and social

The moral principles of the "bushidō," however instructive in theory, could neither have been the living force that it was in feudal Japan, nor have made the invaluable contributions that it has to the national life of New Japan, had it not been born in the heart of the feudal society, and had not, as a filial child, gratified the exact social and spiritual wants of the age. The "bushidō," that is, was neither grafted on Japan by a foreign propaganda, like the Catholicism of the sixteenth century, nor copied from abroad, like the Buddhism before the ninth century, nor yet formulated by a few men, like the Shintō of the Yoshida schools. The "bushidō" grew, as customs usually grow; it was the spirit of a great part of the compelling customs that struck root in that feudal society which itself continued to grow for at least seven centuries. Though the "bushidō" absorbed moral influences of Indian and Chinese origin, it selected them with extreme deliberation, and no alien factor made a permanent impression upon it which it did not completely and thoroughly assimilate to itself.

It falls far beyond the scope of this paper to present a full social interpretation of the "bushidō," but the following brief description of the social organization, not of the entire

feudal period, but of its last two and a half centuries under the Tokugawa rule, an epoch nearest and most intimately related to the new era, might be of some use. The description might perhaps aid you to appreciate something of the vital relation of the "bushidō" to the society which reared it and depended upon it; you might also feel prepared for the discussion, which you will meet later in this paper, as to how, after the end of the feudal régime, the "bushidō" adjusted itself to the changed social conditions of New Japan.

The Tokugawa policy and the two social classes

Few things were originated in the Tokugawa period, 1600 to 1868, either in feudal morals or in feudal institutions, but to it were handed down results of the moral and institutional growth of the past four centuries of feudal history. And these results were skillfully organized by the rulers into a great polity which, combining in itself, as it did, both feudal and absolutist principles in a masterly coördination, enabled the Tokugawa shogunate to endure in apparent security for more than two and a half centuries. The primary aims of this régime were: first, to prevent the recurrence of the civil war that had troubled Japan for ages, but to insure the peace and stability of the realm; and, second, thereby to perpetuate the political control of Japan in the hands of the house of the Tokugawa "shōgun." In the execution of this double policy, the two great social classes that had come down from the earlier period, the "samurai," or warriors, and the "hyaku-shō," or peasants, were carefully but in a natural manner so organized as to balance and offset each other's rights and obligations, and to substantially contribute to the peace of the land and the power of the rulers. Each class was accorded a rigid place in the whole social scheme, the "samurai" ruling the peasants, and the peasants supporting the "samurai." Neither was a caste, as the division of the classes was never absolutely insurmountable; each had, however, inherited its own customs and morals largely different from those of the other, and each was, in a different way from the other, granted a measure of autonomy,

and enjoyed, after its own fashion, the paternal care of the authorities. The keynote of the rule of both was Discipline, though it bore upon them in widely different ways. Let me illustrate these points by a brief survey of the organization of each class.

The peasantry

The peasant population, numbering probably twenty to twenty-five million men and women, formed the bulk of the nation. Though it was given no share in the government of the whole country, its social and economic position had greatly improved under the peculiar conditions that obtained in Japan during the century prior to the rise of the Tokugawa shogunate. The Japanese peasant of 1600 had in fact acquired a higher status, both in public and in private life, than the medieval serf of Europe: he had become the practical owner of the land he tilled, though his freedom of selling it was restricted; and he had learned step by step the art of the self-government of the village and the joint responsibility of the villagers. They usually selected village chiefs out of their own number, and often organized themselves in smaller groups within the village for the purpose of mutual aid and correction. The Tokugawa rulers utilized these customs and organs that had grown up among the peasants, elaborated and extended them throughout their own domains, and enforced the will of their government largely through the village institutions thus established. The example of the domains of the "shōgun" was also followed in the fiefs of the "daimyōs," or barons, so that by the end of the seventeenth century, the principles of village administration had become fairly uniform throughout Japan. Each normal village had its five-man groups, its peasant chiefs and councils, its regular mass meetings, its graded system of responsibility—the individual peasant to the group, the group to the village, and the village to higher authorities—and its constant vigilance and quick response to calls for mutual support.

All this freedom of the self-government of the village was, however, but a part of a carefully wrought system of paternalism which the Tokugawa rulers had devised for the entire

rural population of the country; the villagers were permitted to administer their own affairs even more completely than they had been wont to do, only in order that they would thereby be induced to submit all the more readily to the general policy planned for the whole of the productive classes of the nation. The peasants were to be satisfied and submissive; to be honest, diligent, and mutually helpful, as also patient and obedient. Agriculture was encouraged, but the peasant was restricted in his choice of the crops he would raise on his land. He virtually owned the land he cultivated, but was forbidden to sell or divide it beyond a certain acreage which must remain in his possession; natural economic causes, which I shall not discuss here, also helped to insure the small holdings of the peasant against the aggrandisement and eviction by his wealthier neighbor. In other words, the peasant should be neither too rich nor too poor; in fact, the land held by the average peasant was so small—so evenly small—that he could support his family only by dint of the most intensive farming and utmost toil and frugality.

In appraising this paternal-autonomous system of village government, one should not forget that its main object was, as I have already stated, to secure the peace of the country and thereby to perpetuate the political power of the Tokugawa. From a system built upon a principle in which the selfishness and the patriotism of the rulers were so closely blended together, one might well expect results neither wholly beneficial nor entirely harmful to the nation. The Japanese peasant emerged from the feudal period with little or no active interest and training in the conduct of the larger affairs of the country, but with the sterling virtue of industry, with a remarkable capacity for discipline, and with a secure though diminutive holding in land. We may see later in this paper some of the direct bearing of each one of these important results on the life of New Japan.³

³I venture to refer the readers specially interested in the condition of the peasant population in this period to my "Notes on Village Government in Japan After 1600," which began to appear in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society* in June, 1910.

The "samurai"

To return to the social organization under the Tokugawa. Over the supporting class of peasantry was the ruling class of "samurai," numbering, with their families, probably less than two million souls. Like the peasants of the villages, the sworded men under the one suzerain (shōgun) and the nearly three hundred barons (daimyō) of this period were, in ways different from the peasants but upon principles similar to those of their governance, granted a large measure of autonomy, and yet were controlled by a carefully built system of responsibility and paternalism. The barons of the fiefs ("han")⁴ were practically absolute princes in their respective territories, but any flagrant case of misgovernment on their part, or of internal dissension or family scandal, or an act of disobedience to the "shōgun," was swiftly and sternly punished by the latter's council. Likewise, the retainers of each baron, who were well organized for the enforcement of discipline and responsibility, enjoyed large freedom in the management of their own followers; yet they were accountable to their lord, not only for failures in their duties or disgrace to their honor, but also for any serious error in the conduct of their own household. The punishment of the "samurai," of whatever grade, consisted in enforced self-confinement, confiscation of the fief, severing of the ties of allegiance and support, or self-immolation.

Everywhere in this vast scheme were in operation effective devices of checks and balances, of responsibility and super-

⁴ This word, *han*, is habitually translated, by both foreign and Japanese writers in English, as "clan." But the basic principle of the organization of any clan is blood-relationship, while the *han*, like the fief in the feudal history of Europe, was essentially territorial. Neither in the relation between the lord and the bulk of the people of the *han*, nor in the relation between the people themselves, there was and could be no semblance of any actual or traditional tie of blood. To call a *han* a clan is to confuse two radically different forms of social evolution and social organization, the distinction between which is familiar to every student of history and sociology. It is remarkable how sometimes, as in this example, the human good nature permits transparent errors to gain currency before it awakes to see the great harm they have done. It is urgent, for the sake of truth, to discontinue the prevalent use of the misapplied and misleading term "clan" in speaking of an organization which was to all intent and purposes a fief.

vision; and everywhere was made, with much success, a constant appeal to the sense of personal honor and the dictates of the "bushidō," which have been discussed in an earlier part of this paper. A little reflection will show how well such a moral life fitted the social form of the time; it is equally easy to see how well this whole system must have subserved the cardinal aims of the Tokugawa rule, namely, to prevent the recurrence of civil strife, and to prolong the political control of feudal Japan by the house of the "shōgun."

THE END OF THE FEUDAL AND THE RISE OF NEW JAPAN

The fall of the feudal rule

We have seen, I trust, some features of the old order of things in Japan which should guide us in our understanding, not only of the feudal period, but also of the transitional and the new age that followed. Wearisome as it may seem, I venture to reiterate the first aims of the Tokugawa rule: namely, to restore and maintain peace and stability, and to stake upon the success of this policy the very tenure of the power of the "shōgun." It was largely with a view to carrying out this double policy, that the founders of the régime made the skillful use of the existing social conditions that we have seen, elaborating and balancing them in a manner to compel our admiration for the statesmanship of the authors of the policy.

The student will be struck with the peculiarly half-selfish yet half-disinterested nature of this policy. Still more remarkable, there is evidence that these statesmen actually foresaw that, inasmuch as they had built the power of their descendants upon the degree of the efficiency of the government of the latter in maintaining the security of the realm, they might some day be obliged to forfeit their power, should they fail in this primary function of administration. That time arrived in the middle of the nineteenth century: a sudden access of pressure from foreign powers made it then patent to progressive men that, under the radically changed conditions, the old régime of the shogunate was no longer

adequate to pilot the ship of state against the tidal wave of national upheaval and international struggle that rose so ominously before Japan. As a matter of fact, the council of the "shōgun" rapidly lost its control even over the feudal classes. Indeed, its vision of the real situation confronting it was too long obscured by its natural desire to conserve its own interest. The "shōgun" awoke at length, only in 1867, to the fact which had become evident to freer thinkers in the previous fifteen years, that, if Japan would persist as an independent state, she should frame a more centralized form of government than feudalism. After this period of convulsion, therefore, the voluntary surrender of the Tokugawa rule and what is known as the restoration of the imperial government supervened, as we all know, in the years 1867 and 1868.

The old forces in transition

Who would dare say that this revolution could have been accomplished so successfully as it was, had it not been for the social-moral system that had been maintained under the Tokugawa? The "samurai" class, with its habitual hatred of opportunism and its ever present ideal of self-denial and loyalty, was happily suited for assuming the leadership in the new movement for national unity. The sworded man, who had for generations been taught to value his personal honor higher than his life, was able to leave all meaner things behind and to march straight to his new goal, regardless of the obstacles and perils that would have daunted a man of mere courage. On the other hand, the peasants, docile and well-disciplined for centuries, formed an exact type of population to be led by the new leaders and to support the new rulers. The transition from the feudal to New Japan came about, therefore, with a tremendous upheaval on the part of those "samurai" who had awoke to advanced ideas of national welfare, but with hardly a shock to the placid mind of the peasantry. The former experienced a sharp conflict with the more conservative "samurai," each side leaving records of thrilling acts of heroism and loyalty; the peasants passed from the old age to the new,

scarcely shedding a drop of their blood. The same condition has characterized the first few years that followed the revolution of 1868, when Japan, old as she was, was still but an infant as a modern state struggling for existence against the aggressive brother states of the West. The old "samurai" were able to lead, and the old peasants, to be led.

How different would have been the fate of Japan if the feudal ages had not provided her with the peculiar social and moral system that it did! If the "samurai" had been individualistic and utilitarian, there might perhaps have been an ultimate change in the existing order of things, and even—though this is doubtful—a progressive career of the race under modern conditions, but there could hardly have been the united, seasoned, and purposeful advance of the nation as a political body that has characterized Japan since the revolution. Likewise, had the peasants been critical and individually self-assertive, it seems extremely unlikely that the nation could have safely steered through the many crises, domestic and foreign, that have often appeared about to overturn it, united as it actually was. I believe that there would have arisen internal dissensions imperilling the very existence of the state.

It is well that there is variety in the ways of political salvation of nations: China's greatness as a race, as has again been strikingly demonstrated during the past months, as also throughout her historic ages, seems to consist in her largely impersonal sense of opportunism and utilitarianism. That remarkable quality may carry her through the present crisis. As for Japan, she has saved herself from an impending dissolution and possible foreign conquest by the qualities of fidelity and discipline that had been trained in different forms in her two social classes. From this standpoint, one might almost say that the feudal régime was destroyed by the very forces on which it had rested for centuries, as soon as they were set free by a national crisis.

The new age—amalgamation

We may now move a step further from the transitional epoch that followed the downfall of the Tokugawa, and enter into the new age proper, which may be said to date from about 1875. How have the social and moral forces bequeathed from the feudal period operated since that time? It will be remembered that the two great social classes had, during the earlier ages, grown so separately and acquired such distinctive characteristics from each other, as to seem almost to be castes. Their views of life were divergent, and their interests were largely independent and in part even antagonistic. Hence, there was in Japan no "nation" in the strict sense of the term. This state of things proved convenient, as I have suggested, at the transitional epoch, and materially contributed to the triumph of the principle of new centralization over that of maintaining the decentralized feudal régime. It was, however, evident to the more thoughtful men that the very ideal of unity, upon the realization of which the future safety of the nation seemed to them to depend, would be meaningless so long as the two classes remained as far apart as before. There might be coherence, but hardly unity. The late Dr. G. W. Knox once related to me the following story which he had heard personally from the mouth of Count Itagaki. In 1868, when the "shōgun" had lost his power, Aidzu was one of the fiefs in northern Japan that remained loyal to the memory of their suzerain and held out against the new government. The army of the latter, marching northward, invested the Aidzu castle so closely that loyal peasants of the vicinity could no longer bring provisions to their lords who defended the castle. After they had exhausted their wits in attempting to communicate with the besieged, the simple rustics finally presented themselves before the staff officers of the besieging army, and begged them kindly to forward their tributes to the castle. Though all were impressed by the loyal sentiment of the peasants, Itagaki alone, who was present, could not help thinking in the following vein. This act was commendable merely because it was done by peasants, for "samurai" would be

expected to fight to the last man before they appealed to their enemy for help; so long as the ethical standards so radically different in quality applied to the two classes, and so long as the lower was not raised to the level of the higher, the nation would be incapable of competing with the energetic Western powers.

Ideas like these dawned early on the mind of many a patriot, though in varying degrees of clearness. The very five-article oath pronounced by the young emperor in 1868 at the beginning of his reign foreshadowed the general principle. Both of the old classes were capable of a high sense of public service, but one, whose fathers had lived on hereditary status and had not been obliged to earn their livelihood by productive work, was economically imbecile, while the other class, having for ages been deprived of full opportunities to emulate the condition of the "samurai," was morally and intellectually undeveloped. It was necessary to enlighten both, but it was first of all urgent to let one impart to the other the virtues of the old "bushidō," and to let them together learn lessons of economic and other material adjustment. The immediate ideal was, therefore, as complete an amalgamation, physical and moral, of the two former classes as could be achieved by human foresight and effort. The life of the new nation should be based upon a careful welding together of the legacies that had come down from the feudal ages; out of their fusion should grow a great middle class, or a precursor of one, that should constitute the backbone of the new nation. Other things should come after and with this result.

Though it was only a part of the colossal work of reconstruction that entailed upon the imperial government, the proposed amalgamation was in itself a great task, requiring utmost care and skill. It is impossible for me even to refer to all the larger measures that have been made and the more serious errors committed in relation with this work during the last three or four decades. There will be critics who would deplore the following, for instance, as among the errors—the creation of a peerage consisting of the old court and feudal nobility and of newly appointed peers, which is not

in all cases limited in term, but is for the most part hereditary, constituting a perpetual social burden imposed upon the posterity; the introduction of a distinctly bureaucratic spirit among officials, a spirit which may be readily copied even by a private large organization or clique of whatever character; the inflexible and somewhat intolerant system of education of government schools in a country in which private institutions of instruction should be welcome to supply the excessive deficiency of the public ones, and which can ill afford the more or less antagonistic feeling that the system is breeding among an increasingly large number of persons against the official education; and the much criticized management of public finance which, though it has thus far insured the state against really serious embarrassments, has not prevented an inflation of the currency and a rapid increase of the cost of living, with the attendant social unrest. On each of these points, however, opinions might honestly differ. On the other hand, among the successful agents for the amalgamation of the old classes may be mentioned the following—the same system of national education, and the system of military training—the two great practical schools in which class distinctions are totally ignored and knowledge and merit alone rule; the grant of a conservative but expansive political franchise; and the growth of national wealth and of the general economic life of the people, the last factor especially leading also to a new social alignment. To these forces, I cannot help adding the great international events that have involved the nation in neighboring regions and on the American continent, which have served at once as tests and as lessons for the cohesion, the disillusionment, and the self-reliance of the nation.

Whatever may be one's opinion of the forces that have helped or hindered the amalgamation, there will be little question as to the large degree of its success. In their love of the country and devotion to the sovereign, which are new forms of the "bushidō," and in their growing ambition for their welfare, both individual and national, the Japanese people of today are to a remarkable extent homogeneous. And the lines of demarkation that are indeed being drawn

in their society with increasing distinctness are results of a new economic evolution, not a repetition of the old order of things. Amalgamation is already being followed by new division.

The emperor

There is yet another institution to be considered, the importance of which in our discussion is supreme. To speak of the feudal contributions to New Japan without reference to the institution of the emperor would be like drawing an eye without its pupil. This institution was not, to be sure, created during the feudal period, but, though antedating it, has been, as we shall see, deeply affected by social conditions of the feudal ages.

As a matter of fact, the emperor was, in the first place, the very founder of Japan as a body politic; and then, in the seventh century, when her society was in danger of a possible foreign conquest and a certain internal dissolution, saved his tenure as sovereign by taking radical measures of reconstruction, and thereby saved Japan as a state.

By this time, the foundation of the position of the emperor as the historic ruler of the country seems to have been firmly established. Although, during the seven long centuries of the feudal rule, his political power was almost totally eclipsed by that of the suzerain and his barons; although, in the second half of the sixteenth century, he was even reduced to a state of unspeakable penury; and although, when his material condition improved after 1600, his sovereign rights were hardly less nominal than before—yet it is a remarkable fact in Japanese history that not even the most rough-handed suzerain ever for a moment presumed to replace the emperor as the titular sovereign. Throughout the feudal period, the emperor continued to command the implicit deference of all classes of people as the sole fountain of official rank and courtly honor; no suzerain's title was valid who had not received imperial investiture. Nominal as its control was and varied as its career had been, the emperorship had after all proved to be the oldest and most enduring, as well as the most exalted, of Japan's political and social

institutions. Even at the depth of his poverty and helplessness, the emperor had never ceased to be a sacred and inviolable personage.

From this state, he rose suddenly to a commanding position when, in the last years of the shogunate, the movement for national unity was begun and carried on swiftly to triumph. The emperor was at once conceived by the followers of this movement as its soul; and, on the success of the cause, he was universally regarded as the center, the incarnation, of national traditions and national aspirations, embodying in himself Japan's past history and future destiny. The old principle of loyalty, tried and vitalized as it had been during the feudal ages, had now been disengaged from its feudal ties, and took up the emperor as its common object of expression. For many years after the so-called restoration of 1868, therefore, loyalty to him and patriotism to the country were thought to be interchangeable terms. As time advanced, his councillors have carefully nursed the general trend of the national mind to regard the emperor as the embodiment of the great policies of the nation. Otherwise these policies, however wise, would have lacked sufficient authority and dignity to enlist the undivided devotion of the people that they have shown.

Why is it, then, that the Japanese emperor has not turned a despot? In the constitution which he granted to the nation in 1889, he asserts in clear terms that the sovereignty of Japan rests in his hands, not in those of the people; that the cabinet is responsible to him; and that the national assembly, explicitly designated "imperial" diet, is not an independent law-making organ, but a helpmate of the emperor in his legislative capacity, even the representative character of the lower house being considered its incidental, rather than essential, characteristic. Would it be safe for Japan to have such an autocrat over her, constitutional though he is now said to be? The answer is that the Japanese emperor has never been despotic, and no one can fancy by any stretch of imagination that he ever will be. Let me not essay to convince you of the truth of this assertion, for it seemingly contradicts the universal human nature, and otherwise may

not be fully proven without an extended discourse. Let it suffice to point out rather dogmatically what might otherwise be logically demonstrated—some of the probable historical reasons for this extraordinary state of things relative to the Japanese emperor.

Both the emperor and the people in their attitude toward him have acquired in the course of Japan's long history a strongly marked common habit in their conception of his political power. Before the seventh century, when the organization of the state was largely tribal, with the emperor as the patriarch of the whole tribe, he was accustomed to regard the people in a paternal spirit, not as a tyrant, and their attitude toward him was deeply colored with something akin to filial sentiment. This mutual feeling, as of father and children, has, despite the important changes that have since occurred in the status of the emperor, come down from the ancient period, and is manifest to this day. With the seventh century began a highly artificial bureaucratic régime modelled after the Chinese polity, in which the sovereign, so far as his *political* life was concerned, was placed in a position in which he was bound to assume a largely impersonal attitude, his councillors bearing the major part of the responsibility of the government. Social and religious forces, none of which we have space to discuss here, also strongly contributed to this tendency. This bureaucratic period, which lasted for more than five centuries, is full of significant lessons of human history; and among them must be mentioned the gradual establishment, in addition to the older patriarchal sentiment, of the principle of what I call, for lack of a better phrase, the *political* impersonality of the emperor. Politically, that is, he must not assert his personal preferences and predilections, and, if he has a strong will, it must be exercised, not in translating it into positive deeds born of his own convictions, but in sinking his idiosyncrasies, and in sanctioning and giving effect to the counsels of responsible advisers. Such a mode of conduct would appear to the Occidental mind to indicate a weak individuality, and it cannot be denied that there were weak sovereigns; I content myself here, however, with suggesting that the world is wide

and contains many viewpoints, and that circumstances favored the very strongest of the Japanese emperors of the period to regard this principle of their political impersonality as wise and to act accordingly. Then during the subsequent seven centuries of the feudal régime, except in the brief space of 1333-1336, the emperor was politically so completely overshadowed by the suzerain that he could not, if he would, assert his personal will. You may readily see that this state of things, continuing for so long a period, must have powerfully confirmed the historic principle of the imperial political impersonality.

This, then, is the unwritten law much more than a thousand years old, that, socially, the emperor and his subjects shall treat each other with family-like attachment, and, politically, he shall be impersonal and let properly constituted authorities act as his responsible ministers. If this law is not committed to writing, it is older than any written law in existence in Japan, and also immeasurably stronger, even as the fundamental laws of the English constitution are strong though unwritten.

And the strength of the Japanese principle has been greatly increased by the promulgation of the constitution in 1889. Though it does not verbally refer to the principle, the constitution has firmly established the regular organs—the diet, the cabinet, the privy council, and the judiciary—through which the fundamental principle should operate in the future. The constitution, when examined closely, ceases to appear merely as another product of the blind imitation of Occidental civilization on which Japan is said by some to have built her new career. The idea of having a written constitution is Western, as also are the prototypes of the diet and other new institutions, but the broad principles underlying them will be seen to be very largely Japanese. The sovereign remains socially gracious and politically impersonal. The government by his cabinet and privy council still retains a large degree of the old paternalism, which depended more on the wisdom of the rulers and the unity and continuity of their policies than on the fluctuating suggestions of the people; the door has been opened only partially to the influence of the Western

idea—by no means the only political idea that humanity is capable of conceiving, and an idea whose merit is still under trial—that no one's interest would be considered who has no representative to fight and assert it. And the opening is so carefully controlled that it must widen only slowly with the increase in national wealth and political experience. In other words, the late Itō and the other framers of the constitution have elaborated it in such wise as to *train* the self-governing capacity of the nation, rather than *exercising* it before it was mature. The emperor, while reserving the theoretical sovereignty in his hands, has thus deliberately founded his future power upon the gradual training of his subjects, which shall at once be promoted and tested by means of his constitutional organs. The whole structure of the new régime may, therefore, be said to legalize and define the great national principle that has a history of many centuries. Thereby, it would seem, even the remotest possibility that might have hitherto existed, if at all, of the violation of the principle by a willful sovereign is to all intents and purposes eliminated.

From this point of view, it is most fortunate that, in the extremely important formative period since 1867, Japan has been blessed with an emperor who in temper and in training typifies what her constitutional sovereign should be. Frank and generous but highly conservative, the reigning ruler has loyally supported the policies of the nation as interpreted by his gifted advisers; and then, when the wealth and education of the middle classes were sufficiently advanced, he sanctioned the grant of a political franchise which is so designed as to be shared by a greater and greater portion of the people automatically with their progress in knowledge and material welfare. Future historians will be able to appreciate better than we the great confirming influence which the present reign will have exercised upon the constitutional career of New Japan in its very first decades.

CONCLUSION

We have now completed a general survey of the vital relation of feudal Japan to New Japan. In her we behold a well-disciplined, coherent nation which, with its steadfast common aims, and with its conservative but expansive constitution—all revolving around the Emperor as the heart and soul of the united existence of the nation—distinctly constitutes a strong organism and powerful moral force. Its activity thus far at home and abroad is a matter of common knowledge; its future cannot help bearing a vital relation to the history of mankind. But this nation could hardly have become what it is, had it not been for the fact that it has built itself largely upon the social and moral forces that have been contributed to it from the feudal period.

I conclude this paper by asking a few questions which its subject touches but does not include. May New Japan, made up at least in part of the elements and depending on the training of which I have given an inadequate analysis, be said to possess all the essential requisites to fulfil its functions as a state and as a society? If she has thus far proved a success as a state among states, will she be equally efficient in her duties to her individual sons and daughters? Will the latter be always as loyal to her as they have been? Does the foregoing discussion suggest the existence in her system of any ominous gap which time may widen into serious proportions, or do you discern in reality signs of coming difficulties already inferable at this date?

THE SECRET OF JAPANESE SUCCESS

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No one can contemplate the state of society in Japan previous to the arrival of Commodore Perry without being profoundly impressed with its singular and in many respects its great qualities. The government commonly spoken of as the Tokugawa régime was the culmination and flower of the feudal system, but it differed from feudalism in Europe in many important points not the least of which was the entirely peaceful character of this period. From the earliest times to the rule of Iyeyasu about the year 1600 Japan was a rude and incoherent feudalism, clan vying with clan and faction with faction. Even when a peaceful condition was established in this earlier period it only lasted until some combination of clans could be made strong enough to overthrow the ruling clan. There was no stable equilibrium of powers in the country. But with the rise of Nobunaga about 1573 and Hideyoshi in 1587 the rival clans were reduced to submission and finally under the leadership of the greatest statesman that Japan ever produced, the Shogun Iyeyasu, the government was so firmly established that no important insurrection again took place until the shogunate was overthrown in 1868.

From the year 1600 to the end of the middle of the nineteenth century the institutions of Japan had a peaceful and for the most part an indigenous development. All foreigners were rigidly excluded and foreign trade forbidden with the exception of a few Dutch and Chinese ships at a single port. Iyeyasu reorganized the government on lines of ancient Japanese customs and traditions. The local clans with their lords, or daimyos, he confirmed in their pos-

sessions, but he reserved portions of territory for his own immediate retainers—the hatamoto—and distributed their lands in such a way that no daimyo could easily combine with neighboring clans for revolt. Later every daimyo was required to spend a certain portion of his time at the court of the shogan in Yedo, the capital city. The people below the rulers were divided into four classes, the highest being the knights or samurai, next the farmers, then the artisans and lowest the merchants. No member of one class, with rare exceptions, could enter the other class. Each class was carefully guarded as well as restricted in its privileges. The civilized world has never witnessed a like condition of peaceful development, of the supremacy of the state, of loyalty to the state, from the lowest to the highest, of a coherent and compact nation.

With the downfall of the Tokugawa shogunate after a brief struggle in 1868 and the collapse of the feudal system a few years later the modern era of Japan began. Step by step the process of modernization went on. The railway, the telegraph, the postal system, the reorganization of the army and navy, the development of foreign commerce, the establishment of a banking system, the abolition of feudal land tenures and the substitution of absolute ownership, the creation of a representative government, a cabinet administration responsible directly to the Emperor, all these reforms took place successively. New law codes in place of ancient customary law, a general system of primary, secondary and university education, all these and many other reforms were accomplished with a minimum of friction and a maximum of effect. It is a wonderful story, it is even more astonishing to the accurate student than to the casual observer. In some cases, I believe, the Japanese have exhibited more wisdom than their immediate foreign advisers who in the first instance were employed to aid them in the process of transformation. For instance under American advice in 1871 they introduced the American national banking system. It took the Japanese less than ten years to discover that this system was so faulty as to be useless for their purposes. The government sent a board of inquiry abroad to

study the various banking systems of foreign countries. This board patiently considered the most important banking organizations in existence and in an exhaustive report decided in favor of a bank on the model of the Bank of Belgium. In 1882 the Nippon Ginko—the great Central Bank of Japan—was organized with a view to replacing ultimately the national banking system of earlier date. This great bank has been of inestimable service in providing credit for Japanese industries and financing war loans at critical periods. When one remembers how poor in capital Japan is and what demands were made to carry on the war with Russia it must be evident that she must have had an excellent banking system to have withstood all danger of panic or commercial disaster. The Bank of Japan is the effective life principle of her entire credit system. Under the older national banking system it is doubtful whether she could have met the enormous war expenditure successfully.

This transition from a feudal organization of society to the modern régime including the successful prosecution of two great wars is the problem to be solved. What is the secret of Japan's success in so many fields of modern endeavor in competition with countries which have had the advantage of longer experience and larger accumulation of wealth? Are we here in the presence of an unparalleled phenomenon—a miracle in the evolution of nations—or can we trace the success of the Japanese to some principle of consistent growth, such as we find among some of the nations of the West?

Much may be said in favor of a theory advanced with some plausibility and force that the difference between the conditions of feudalism and those of the restoration is far less than we are apt to imagine. Modern scholars who have studied minutely the institutions of the feudal régime in Japan find in them the germ of nearly every modern institution. For instance representative government was thoroughly understood and practiced in the farming villages of Japan.¹ The Tokugawa government not only permitted

¹ See *Notes on Village Government in Japan after 1800*, by K. Asakawa, New Haven, Conn.

this form of local self-government but fostered it, and as a rule gave it unstinted support when in conflict with other jurisdictions. The same sort of self-government was practiced in the guilds, the five family group (Kumi) and in the family councils. From this circumstance we may conclude that the present prefectural assemblies representing the people of a given prefecture or even the national parliament are not an anomalous institution in Japan. The people were thoroughly familiar with the idea of a form of self-government and it needed only a slight modification to suit new conditions to make them thoroughly at home in it. In some respects the old feudal government was more inclined to favor the local autonomy than is the present government. It was the policy of the Tokugawa administration to throw off as much responsibility as possible wherever it was entirely safe to do so. If we examine other existing institutions, political, economic or educational, we may trace the nucleus of their existence to the feudal period. Banking of a sort was well established at that time. Bills of exchange, promissory notes and even checks, all on a limited scale as befitted a country without foreign commerce, were made use of. For the government at Yedo there was communication throughout the Empire carried on by runners with such effect that Kaempfer who was in Japan toward the end of the seventeenth century was astounded at its rapidity. Schools and higher institutions of learning were to some degree fostered. Department stores were by no means unknown in the feudal era. The samurai or knights were perhaps the most loyal and courageous body of soldiers that the world has ever known. Thus nearly every institution which Japan is supposed to have borrowed from the West existed in some form in this earlier period. The civilization of the Tokugawa period was in many ways a most complete and finished product.² So far from being wanting in the arts and refinements of a cultured civilization it would be easy to prove that for at least a considerable body of the people refinement toward the end of the Tokugawa period had progressed at the expense

² For a summary of the achievements of the feudal period, see *Feudal and Modern Japan*, by A. M. Knapp.

of vigor. About the middle of the nineteenth century Japanese reformers were attacking the luxury of the rulers and the decadence of the arts.

From this point of view then we have in the transition of Japan from feudalism to the restoration only a natural evolution, a transformation from the simple to the complex, from the less developed to the more developed, a growth without a serious break or strain. This interpretation accords with the modern doctrine of historical continuity, of social cause and effect and beyond question it throws much light upon some difficult phases of Japan's ready acceptance of certain reforms. The Japanese by their earlier experience and training, by their familiarity in the feudal period with economic and political problems were not the naïve and primitive people we at first imagined them to be, but rather a sophisticated people who needed only a slight impulse to appreciate the advantages of Western civilization, its larger scale, its more efficient processes and on the whole its greater opportunities for the individual. At the same time this mode of interpretation does not explain the striking and continuous success of the Japanese in the past thirty years, whether in the domain of politics or diplomacy, industry or finance, education or science, and last but not least of war whether by land or sea. The Japanese have exhibited a singular sagacity or common-sense which we have generally supposed to be exclusively our own possession or at least the possession of Occidentals. The many international complications of the past twenty years have shown that their capacity for meeting emergencies has painfully shocked some of the European governments and even caused the latter to sound an alarm of the "Yellow Peril."

The secret of Japanese success is I believe to be found in the relation of the Japanese to the structure of their society. The unit of Western society is the individual, however technically the definition of the individual may be construed for political or other purposes. In Japan under the feudal system both in theory and practice the individual was a subordinate consideration. The unit of society was the family. Nor must we understand by this term merely the

family in the Western sense of the word. In Japan the family may consist of sixty or seventy persons—it consists of all those who worship at the same family shrine. A family may consist of an entire village. From birth to death the affairs of each member of the family are regulated by the family—and in important cases by the family council. No Japanese would think of securing an education, of choosing a vocation, of spending his leisure, of taking a wife, or of leaving home on his own initiative. Such an act would be to him incomprehensible. Every act of every individual is determined not by himself but by the decrees of his family. It has been said that Japan is a paradise for children. No doubt children are petted and have their own way in that country to a much greater extent than with us, but only because it is understood that as soon as they get beyond the age of childhood their life-long discipline begins. The family never dies, it is perpetual, it is not a contractual institution, it is a religious commonwealth. No member of the family, not even the oldest, is free from the bonds of family discipline. If a debt is contracted by a member of the family it is assumed by all and in the feudal era might be an obligation imposed upon the family for generations. In every properly constituted household is a family shrine—either Shinto or Buddhist—at which each member worships daily.

In the institution of the patriarchal family the Japanese are not exceptional; the same institution is found in the early Aryan civilizations, as in early Greece and Rome the family was an all powerful and equally despotic commonwealth in which the liberty of the individual member was rigidly restricted. What is exceptional in the case of Japan is the fact that the patriarchal family has been maintained to within recent years and even at the present time is a vigorous institution compared with which our Western family institution is but a feeble relic. We may see in Japan at the present moment many social customs and institutions which have ceased to exist in Europe since the early Greek and Roman civilization.³

³ Cf. Ferrero's *Greatness and Decline of Rome*, Ch. 1. The analogies in some instances are striking.

Next in importance to the Japanese family, with its rigid discipline controlling the daily life of every member, was the power of the community over each family. As every household worshipped at the family shrine so the village community worshipped at the village Shinto shrine, set up usually in the outskirts of the village. The rule of the community over its inhabitants was supplementary to and quite as severe as the rule of the household over each of its members. And the thinking of the community was singularly homogeneous. To displease one was to displease all and the punishment for any serious infraction of the laws or customs of the community was terrible. To disobey one's parents for instance was not only to oppose the united will of the family but to run counter to the will of the community—it meant social ostracism, a far more effective weapon than severe corporal punishment. In extreme cases a person could be banished and that was in old Japan complete degradation and misery. Such a person could not go elsewhere because no family would receive him and he had no personal existence save as a member of a family. He generally became a *hinin*, a no-man, doomed to consort with the outcasts of society, beggars, strolling singers or jugglers.

Lastly every Japanese was trained in loyalty to his government and country. The technical profession of military loyalty was in the hands of the large class of samurai and to this class loyalty was not only a life career, but a religious rite with an elaborate ceremony. The discipline of a samurai was extraordinarily severe. Its puritanism in many ways exceeded that of any military order that ever existed. The code, written or unwritten, demanded sobriety, self-control, instant obedience. A samurai was a man of few words, simple and stoical tastes, and of the severest sense of honor. He believed that to him was entrusted the ultimate destiny of his country and his daily conduct, it was thought, should reflect that sense of responsibility. His children from their earliest youth were trained in the same school of stoic simplicity and laborious exercise. A samurai was not expected to show affection even to his wife and children or parents.

His wife was dignified sufficiently in being his wife and loyally conformed to the harsh conditions.

But loyalty was a duty not only of the samurai but was equally taught to and practiced by all classes. For instance the taxpayers were the farmers who paid their dues in rice, and judging by Western standards we might suppose that the farmers assumed this burden with some reluctance. But the farmers as a rule not only paid their taxes with alacrity but selected the best rice of the crop for their rulers. Tax-day was much more a festival than a day of gloom. Loyalty of some sort whether to the lord of the clan or to the shogun, or to the emperor, was part and parcel of the life of most Japanese. During the peaceful period of the shogunate, beginning with 1600, this loyalty expanded to far wider limits than had existed in the war-like years previous to 1600, but even under the Bakufu there were certain narrowing restrictions. Since the downfall of the last shogun in 1868, loyalty has had a national scope of which the Emperor is the center and soul.

This brief and fragmentary outline of Japanese society is given merely to show that the essential idea of the social structure in Japan under the feudal system was a strict subordination of individuals to groups and of both to the state. Such an idea as personal liberty never entered the minds of the Japanese whether rulers or ruled. Every person was supposed to have his proper place in the social organization and to be satisfied with that place.⁴ The people accepted this arrangement without question or doubt, and for the most part even unconsciously, inasmuch as it had its origin in a religious system that had existed from prehistoric times. Every individual had a secure niche, but the security was dependent upon perfect obedience to the system. It is often stated from our pulpits that religion is more a life than a creed, but in Japan it was all life, the creed was never formulated except in the writings of a few philosophers. Strangers in Japan are wont to express surprise at the placidity of all classes, their amiable humor and good manners. The Japan-

⁴ Cf. *The Legacy of Iyeyasu* where this view is strictly maintained.

ese seem to have little anxiety as to their morals or conduct. By contrast our own state of mind is one of worry. Some time ago there was an article written, I believe by Maeterlinck, on the subject of "Our Anxious Morality," as though we were in a state of uncertainty as to whether any individual would turn out to be a success or a failure in his conduct. In Japan there is much less of this for the simple reason that the social discipline and force of opinion as embodied in the habits and institutions of the people are so powerful that no one can escape them.

The system imposed a continuous discipline upon all classes of people. According to the *Legacy of Iyeyasu*, a document of immense importance in the government of the Tokugawa period, judges should be more lenient in condemning infractions of the law by the humble and poor than by the rich and powerful. The feudal society was aristocratic to the core but it demanded that each class live up to its status and privileges. In the 50th and 51st articles of this *Legacy* concerning adultery he states: "The upper classes are expected to know better than to occasion disturbance for violating existing regulations; and such persons, breaking the laws by lewd, trifling or illicit intercourse shall at once be punished without deliberation or consultation. It is not the same in this case as in the case of farmers, artisans or traders." In article 88 speaking of debauchery, it is declared that "it should be judged and punished according to the degree in which it constitutes a bad example for the lower classes." Each person from the lowest to the highest was expected to conform his conduct to certain conditions imposed upon his class. The mere spectator or man of leisure was not provided for. Hence a Japanese family reared in the old style is made up of a group of persons all engaged in busy employment, each with his or her allotted task performing the duties of the day willingly and cheerfully.

Lastly the sentiment of loyalty was a bond of union uniting each with the interests of all. Filial piety is the greatest virtue of children and loyalty the greatest virtue of the elders. Under the feudal régime to die for one's lord is not an act of sacrifice, it is an act of duty. Under the modern constitu-

tion it is a sense of obligation to advance the welfare of the country. Patriotism is not only a strong sentiment in Japan, it is a quasi-religious institution. The sense of the state is extraordinarily developed,⁵ thus contrasting vividly with the conditions in China where the sense of the state has been almost non-existent. Every step of progress in Japan during the past forty years has been attained by government action and the people have in the great majority of instances loyally supported their government. In Corea and China where loyalty to the government as an instrument of promoting the common welfare is relatively feeble, there are factions swayed by foreign interests—the Russian party, or the English party. But who has ever heard of a Japanese faction under the sway of a foreign power? Such a faction would be instantly condemned by public opinion. There is in the structure of Japanese society not a crack or cranny in which any foreign interest can insert its disintegrating wedge. The Japanese will accept foreign institutions, their science and inventions, with avidity but only to the extent, as they understand it, of leaving the social organization intact. What secondary influences these foreign innovations will exert in the future it would be hard to state. It must be admitted that Japan is bound to face difficulties in the future arising from her economic transformation greater even than those of the past and calling for all the resources of her statesmanship and patriotism.

Thus far at least Japan has done wonders in all the fields of modern endeavor. At present America is torn by conflicting opinions as to the best method of regulating the enormous aggregations of capital. Are we in any position to give advice to Japan—as we did forty years ago—on this intricate problem. Have we any ability to spare for the service of any other government when our own government seems absolutely helpless in the face of these powerful combina-

⁵Iyeyasu is credited with the saying "The world is the world's world and not one man's." So also Uesugi Harunori, Lord of Tonezawa said: "The State has been transmitted by our forefathers and should not be exploited for selfish purposes. The people belong to the State and should not be exploited for selfish purposes."

tions? Yet Japan has met this difficulty in at least one instance with directness and courage. Some years ago the American Tobacco Company secured practically a monopoly of the tobacco manufacturing business of Japan by buying out the principal tobacco manufacturers. It was quite evident to the Japanese that this business was in the grip of a trust and without much delay or hesitation the Japanese government urged and secured legislation permitting it to buy up all the tobacco manufacturing interests and converting the private into a government monopoly. Since then I do not know of another combination of capital of the same sort. "Why this is socialism" some Americans will exclaim. I can give the absolute assurance that no country is less socialistic than Japan. She simply met an issue as it stood, without any extensive theorizing beyond the acknowledged principle that governments are instituted to maintain the general welfare. Japan took hold of the industrial monopoly problem in the same manner that she met the banking problem.

Foreigners who have lived a few months, or even years, in Japan are likely to underestimate the strength of the Japanese merely because the individual Japanese often seems to be unable to cope with the individual American or Englishman of the same standing or occupation. The strength of the individual Japanese does not lie particularly in his own self reliance and ability. Standing alone he is likely to be wanting in a sense of certainty, independence and power. But the inference from this observation is often mistaken. The Japanese soldier is capable because he is part of a cohesive system which by inheritance he trusts. His own death does not trouble him—he recognizes that he is only a fraction of a larger group. When the war with China broke out it was confidently prophesied by many foreigners who had only a superficial knowledge of the Japanese, that the Chinese would be victorious. These foreigners overlooked the fact that the Japanese army had behind it an organized government second to none in the world, while China though superior in resources and men, was wanting in the very elements of such a government.

Japanese scholars who have made a comparative study of

Japanese and Western institutions are well aware of the wide differences between the two types and admit the advantages and disadvantages of both. But they all inevitably tend to accept their own type, with all its defects, as making for success in competition with foreign nations. We may quote in support of this view the opinions of Professor Junjiro Takakusu, Director of the Tokyo School of Foreign Languages. He says: "What is the secret of the corporate unity and oneness of spirit of Japanese soldiers and their remarkable discipline? What is the reason for the superior sanitation and commissary arrangements of our army? What is the reason for the utter scorn of death, which seems almost animal-like and that passionate patriotism which possess us. And finally what is the reason for the absolute security of military secrets. We must confess that looked at one by one we are weak but when massed together we are stronger than Western soldiers. And furthermore we Japanese have not only assimilated Western knowledge and mechanisms, but we have improved upon them in not a few cases, as for instance the Shimose gunpowder, the Murata rifle, the Arisaka gun and the Kimura wireless telephone. Our Red Cross Society while at first copied from the West, has attained a unique pitch of perfection and our relief of soldiers' families, our system of information, our care of prisoners of war and our issuing of government bonds, have all demonstrated that we can subordinate private and personal interests to public welfare, so that it is not too much to say that among the peoples of the world we are considered in this respect to be an ideal army and nation." (From the *International Journal of Ethics*, October, 1906.) He then gives his answer to this question. "The primary cause for all these phenomena is that in Japan the family is the unit whereas in the West the individual is the unit of society." And by family Professor Takakusu means not an institution in our sense of the word—but rather the family in its original and patriarchal sense. "In Japan," he adds, "the family system leads to mutual succor and mutual coöperation on the part of all those who are at all connected with it. The honor and glory of the house are the first concern of all. If there

is want in one section it is made up by another. And these families gathered together into groups, make a village, and groups of villages infinitely multiplied make a corporate nation. . . . It is this principle of mutual obligation which has given birth to Bushido and to the spirit of patriotism. A parent whose son is killed, although at first he may be inclined to rush to help yet will grit his teeth and say like Masaoka, 'It is for the sake of my lord and master,' that is for the state. When a telegram comes from army headquarters telling of the death of a husband on the battlefield, it is this spirit that makes wives rejoice that their husbands have fulfilled a soldier's duty. And from this same principle have come the wonderful military discipline, the contempt of death, the *esprit de corps*, the scarcity of Russian spies."

It may be asked whether a social structure in which the individual is so strictly subordinated to the group, whether the group be the family, the community or the nation, is as capable of developing the interesting qualities of life as is a form of society in which the individual has more play. This is a difficult question. Human nature adapts itself to varying conditions and resents any change unless it is stirred by a keen sense of wrong or by a passionate aspiration for the right. The average human being is far more inclined to accept revolution than reform, because the former can be accomplished by an abandonment to enthusiasm while the latter calls for the cooler qualities of investigation and mature judgment. But it has always seemed to me that the life of the ordinary Japanese, hemmed in by social barriers of ancient origin, limited by a severe social discipline, must be a dull affair compared with life in the freer West. But on the other hand a Japanese appreciates far more than the average American the small increments of freedom which he is permitted to enjoy. And even this freedom he attains only after a long apprenticeship to a severe discipline. A Japanese finds it difficult to cast off restraints—the social discipline is likely to be a weight which he cannot readily throw off. His moments of spontaneous good fellowship are fewer than with us. He is often secretive or ceremonious where an

American would be open and human. For in the end he knows that he may not follow his own judgment but will have to be obedient to another and greater power. It often happens that the spontaneous friendliness which has existed between an American teacher and his Japanese student is converted a year or two after graduation into a strictly formal relation. The young man has become part of a social mechanism—he is no longer free to say or do what he likes or even to cultivate the friendships he wishes. For him *Roma locuta est*.

But on the other hand no one can withhold his admiration from a people who are willing whenever the call is made to subordinate private to public interests. There are many notable examples of this trait in the past fifty years, none perhaps greater than the surrender of the feudal fiefs in 1871 by the daimyos to the Emperor. It was an act of supreme sacrifice of a powerful yet partial interest for the good of the whole. Hundreds of the feudal lords were reduced to comparative poverty and millions of their retainers lost their ordinary means of subsistence. Five years later the samurai yielded their right of wearing two swords—almost as great an act of renunciation as the surrender of the fiefs. Even the Bakufu government in 1868 made but a feeble resistance when it was once understood that public opinion was in favor of its abdication. During the more recent period of the Restoration there are many instances of the same kind. There is no private interest in Japan sufficiently powerful to antagonize the interest of the state. When it became evident after the war with Russia that the railways of Japan must be owned and operated by the government in order to maintain her military efficiency, the transfer from private hands to the government was completed in a short period of time without much controversy or friction. This principle that all private interests must conform to the general good will in the end, I believe, be a solvent of all future economic issues of Japan and keep it in the very forefront of civilized nations.

The secret of Japanese success is their social solidarity, their oneness of aim and purpose, their cohesion of interests,

and above all their faith in the supremacy of their government, as an instrument of the common welfare.

To turn for a moment from Japan to our own country. No one can fail to note the confusion of private interests at present in America, the chaotic advice, the uncertainty of any constructive policy by the government. The leaders of commercial and industrial enterprises are dissatisfied with the existing conditions and yet make no suggestion for a more rational policy. Unrestrained monopoly cannot be tolerated, yet every restriction is met by bitter opposition and criticism. Are we inferior to the Japanese in patriotism, in capacity or in public spirit? Is our love of private gain so overmastering that it cannot yield to a more generous sentiment? The policy of "jamming things through," in America, whatever the obstacles may be, may produce a few leaders of capacity and power, but their gain must ultimately be the nation's loss. In such men the sense of the state is atrophied. They do not perceive the cohesion of interests, the interrelation of parts, and resent any suggestion that their activities must be subordinated to larger considerations.* To such men the Japanese point of view would be devoid of vitality and adventure. Such men are blind to the secret of Japanese success.

* On this point see *The Future in America*, by H. G. Wells.

THE PROGRESS OF JAPANESE INDUSTRY

By Hon. William C. Redfield, Member of Congress

When I set forth to find out, if I could, what the industrial situation in Japan actually was, by meeting the men who were doing the work and by visiting the factories and the mills in that country myself, I had no idea of using the information save for the perhaps sordid purpose of adding to the business of my own factory. Least of all had I a thought of appearing before such an audience as this and talking about it. I would very much rather speak to you about something a little less material. I should like to tell you something of Nikko and its wonderful temples. I should like to go over again my trip along the inland sea. I should like to have you go with me over to the island of Awaji, on a little steamboat, which was built for short men, and on which I could not stand up at all the whole forenoon. Those are the things I should enjoy telling you. Then, too, I should not like to seem to you unappreciative of the art and the traditions of art in Japan.

But it falls to me to talk with you on the economic side of the life of that great people. In so doing, I am going to try to avoid figures all I can and to touch as much as possible upon the fundamental basis of all economics—their human side. For you and I have been told too often that economics are a dreary thing. They are not, unless the food we eat, the clothes we wear, the work we do, the incomes we want and the money we spend, are dreary things. Those are human things, and he who would see economics thoroughly, must see and grasp the human side ere he attempts to apply figures. One is the bones of the science; the other its living life-blood and the flow of its every activity. Therefore, I want you to see a picture and not a form only. I want you to grasp a growth and not a theory. I want you to see a people evolving out of poverty into comfort, and not a

question of exports and imports. I don't care how much a Japanese artisan earns in a day. I care very much if it enables him to live a better life. So let us learn the evolution of Japan's industry in that way, so far as we can in the brief time we have. First let us divide our subject as the ministers of old did, that we may look at it with a certain amount of intelligence. We will speak of it, therefore, in four ways—the evolution of Japanese industry, the basis of Japanese industry, the outlook of Japanese industry, and, finally, Japanese industries as competitors and customers. Among them all we should fairly cover our theme.

To begin with, there is no other country in the world so interesting to the observer of industry as Japan, because it is almost the one country among them all where the old and the new in industry are going on side by side, each in full vigor. The day of the handicraftsman is nearly gone in Massachusetts. It is gone in England. It is gone in Germany. But in Japan the handicraftsman still reigns supreme. Side by side with an enormous mass of most skillful and artistic handicraftsmen goes on the modern factory system, and we must admit that in equipment, in size, and in management, the great Japanese factories have little to learn from Massachusetts. It is a matter, therefore, of extraordinary interest to see these two great phases of industry operating together. Not only that, but they may be seen on a very considerable scale. I should like to take you all first to Kyoto for many reasons. I should like to get you out of Yokohama as speedily as I could. To my mind Yokohama is a sort of foreign mushroom growing on Japanese soil. I did not like Yokohama; I did not like its atmosphere of gain. So we will pass from it and go where we may find old Japan at work in Kyoto. And now, ladies and gentlemen, I hope your purses are full, for when you enter Kyoto, you will need your purse reasonably well filled—not that the prices are so high but that the goods are so attractive. I really regard Kyoto as one of the most dangerous towns for the traveler from a financial standpoint that I ever knew. If you go into the Damascene shops and watch them in-laying in gold and silver, and then pass to the great potteries of

Kin Kusan, where there were nine hundred artists working at decorating porcelain when I was there, I am afraid, if you are fond of the fine porcelains that Kin Kusan put out, that you will say goodbye to your financial prudence.

In the old city of Kioto, the ancient capital, then, you find the beautiful, artistic industries of Japan in full force and vigor; they are wonderfully intricate and wonderfully beautiful to see. It is amazing and instructive to us with our mechanical ideas to see the close artistic work of the Japanese workmen in the old city of Kioto.

Now take the train for an hour to the south, and you come to Osaka with its million of people and its cotton mills; you have gone from the old world to the new, from the handicraftsman to the factory. You have left behind you the ancient and the artistic, and have come down to the sordid commonplace of a weaving-room and a spinning-room. Osaka is full of great cotton mills, and from there southward it is but a step again to Kobe and Hiogo, where in the great mills of the Kanegafuchi Cotton Spinning Company you will find a prosperity in the cotton industry which would make New England sit up and think. It was my good fortune, at their request, to take the steamer over to the little town of Sumoto, where I believe I was the only foreigner and where I was received with cordial hospitality. I could, if I had time, tell you of the interesting experience of going into a cotton mill and showing them how to start up a piece of machinery—showing them how it worked, which was rather an unusual experience for a lone foreigner on a Japanese island.

From there we will go to Nagasaki and see the women carrying baskets of coal. On my visit there, Mr. Matsuyama of Mitsui & Co., Ltd., told me that these women have a record of loading as much as eight thousand tons of coal in a single day. It may interest you, as showing the change that is going on, to know that he also told me that the day of the women workers loading the coal was passing away, because, although they received only somewhere from twelve to twenty cents a day in our money, it was cheaper to do the work with modern coal handling machinery, and

I was consulted as to what it should be and as to where it should be installed. In a very short time this one of the picturesque industrial phases of that particular port of Nagasaki will also have passed away.

Then at Nagasaki it is rather a striking thing for an American to walk out into a shipyard under a great ship of 21,000 tons, designed, built, to be managed, manned, officered, by Japanese, a ship with triple screws, a passenger vessel equipped with every modern convenience. Only a few days later I had the pleasure of traveling on her sister vessel to Manila. It makes one ponder, in view of the collapse of American shipping, to see such a vessel as that built in this Japanese yard, owned by Japanese owners and officered by Japanese officers, and built of the steel made at the Imperial Steel Works. One realizes that Japan in that important industry has become or is becoming independent. Not that the steel works ever have paid a profit; indeed, they have not. But they are run by the government, with the government as their largest customer; and they are at least sufficient to make the Japanese free, so far as her iron and steel supply is concerned, from the need of consulting other nations. In the making of machines, the building of ships and the manufacture of cotton, as I have said, we find in Japan in full operation—and in many cases in successful operation—all that we have here at home in scientific manufacture. Nor must we regard the men who control these interests as men whom we can teach very much. Mr. Matsukata, who is the head of the Kawasaki Dock Yards, is a graduate of Yale University. Another gentleman, the head of a large cement works, is a graduate not only of Yale but also of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. One of the heads of these large factories was a member of the Harvard Club. You often run across men with American education, to which has been added European training and European brains, a combination which has made a certain selected number of these Japanese exceptionally skilled and able men.

Right here I want to say a word on the subject of Japanese commercial honesty. There is not anywhere in Europe or America a group of men higher in honor, more clear in

thought, more delightful to meet, more able in their work, than the set of Japanese gentlemen who are operating these great industries. We must forget all that we have heard coming from such centers as Yokohama as to tales of commercial dishonor. I am perfectly aware that in some respects Japanese commerce has not reached the heights of our highest ideals, but at its best it is as good as ours, and the best brains and thought of the nation are determined that it shall be always at its best. Very briefly, then, Japan presents the spectacle of the old and the new in industry, progressing side by side.

Now as to the bases on which her industry rests. Japan lacks large, free capital. She is as yet a comparatively poor people, as counted among the great nations—poor I mean in the sense of accumulated cash resources. Her capital is equally small. Her industries are handicapped by the lack of abundant capital for their expansion. That is one of the fundamental facts about Japan which is basic to all thought of the present and the future of the empire. The national debt of Japan is almost identical with that of the United States, while her population is but half. The national debt is largely held abroad. The strain upon the finances of the empire to carry on the necessary public works is very great. Many of these important public works are being deferred now for lack of the ready means to carry them on. Only for a moment will I touch on a few figures. The taxes of Japan have grown enormously in the last few years. The debt, which was in 1871 about \$2,500,000 is now about \$1,100,000,000. The taxation has grown in like proportion, from a total of about \$36,000,000 in 1894 to a total of \$160,000,000 per annum in 1909. Japan is not a rich country in cash, and nobody knows it better than the men who govern Japan. When I was there, the question of the development of the railway system was being considered with great care. It is urgently needed. The roads are all narrow gauge, and at times the industries suffer for railroad facilities, but the improvement even at Japanese wages would cost hundreds of millions of dollars. The question has been postponed, with other improvements,

because Japanese funds are not sufficient now to carry on those very large works.

Yet I do not want you to get the impression that Japan is in any sense insolvent. It is not. Her statesmen are guiding her with rare self-sacrifice and with uncommon wisdom, and her treasury shows a surplus every year. It is simply that her growth has been so rapid and her outreach so large that she lacks, as other nations do the ready cash with which to do the work as fast as she would like to do it.

Japan rejoices, on the other hand, in a wealth of labor of a remarkable character. I suppose there is no more thrifty, able, capable worker than the average Japanese. He is accustomed to living to his satisfaction on the most limited scale. He is of good mental and physical capacity, and capable of becoming a very great factor in industry. One of the fundamental facts in Japan is her splendid supply of abundant physical labor. Let us think a moment what our condition would be, if we could only cultivate about one-fifth of our territory. That is the case in Japan. A fraction less than 20 per cent of the land of the empire, speaking now of Japan itself, is arable. The other four-fifths is mountainous or of such a character that it cannot readily be cultivated. The holdings of the farmers are very small. They average about four of our acres, taking the whole empire together. And the result is that the population presses very closely upon the means of supplying food. Hence the Japanese exports his population; hence he has become a colonizing people; hence he goes whither he can to improve his circumstances.

The fact of the abundance of labor and of the pressure upon the means of living have combined to keep wages in Japan very low. Here we touch upon the third vital factor in Japanese industry—first, that the wages are low as compared with ours, and second, that they are rising very rapidly. For example, the wages of a mill weaver in the year 1907 were 0.42 of a yen. A yen being fifty cents, that was something less than twenty-five cents of our money to-day. But a weaver's wage has risen since 1905 from 0.18 to 0.42, or more than double. That of the shoemaker

rose from 0.41 in 1905 to 0.58 in 1907. And in every other Japanese industry, without going into too much detail, one finds the same advance in wages. So we have for our other element upon which to base our Japanese industry very cheap labor, but labor which is rapidly advancing in price. You cannot assume in discussing Japanese industry that the wage there is fixed, even for a short time to come.

But on the other hand, the Japanese mechanic is not trained yet in the mechanic arts, in the arts of handling machinery. He has had no chance. There are some in the great factories, but not enough. This *Japanese Year Book*, which I have before me, frankly says that it takes three Japanese mechanics to do the work of one European or American mechanic. That is merely a matter of training. The president of the big cotton mill that I have mentioned wrote to me that in ventilating his mill I must figure on three to four times as many operatives to do the work as was the case in our New England mills.

As regards the materials of industry, the empire extends over so great a latitude that the material products range from the sub-arctic to the sub-tropical of Formosa, and from the sea products of the ocean to the continental supplies of Korea. Formosa, I suppose, is one of the most productive countries of its size in the world. The sea products are a great source of wealth in Japan. She draws lumber from Formosa, and northern Korea; cotton from Korea, and lumber also from Karafuto. The empire is rich, of course, in silk. A little more than one-quarter of all the world's silk comes from Japan, and about 60 per cent of all we use in America is derived from there. She has no cotton on her own soil save that which is about to come rather than has come from Korea. She draws some of it from India, more from China, and most from the United States, but she is no worse off in that respect than England, the largest of all cotton manufacturers, who draws her supplies wholly from abroad.

Japan is blessed with ample materials for power. She has abundant coal and a very widespread and abundant supply of water power from the numerous streams coming from the mountain ranges. Consequently, Japan offers

a great field for the development of electric light and power, which is being very rapidly taken up. I have the pleasure of knowing the gentleman who operates the largest coal mines in Japan, and from them now they are making coke, gas, coal tar, ammonia, and other products.

To these resources she adds a market in China which is right at her doors and of its kind is the largest of the world; and the presence of that market just across the way is the reason why the cotton spinning industry took hold first in Japan and has progressed the most. She has already made her presence felt in our cotton mills in eastern New England. Some of the Chinese trade we used to have she has taken away, and will continue undoubtedly to take more, because she possesses a peculiarly intimate knowledge and sympathy with that market, and a closeness of touch with it, that no other nation can possibly have. We must expect for a time at least to lose a certain amount of our cotton trade in China to Japan. There is, as I have said, this great opportunity in the textile field. The four hundred or so millions of China are across the way and offer a magnificent market that Japanese brains are thoroughly familiar with and Japanese energy intends to look after.

The outlook for the iron and steel industries is not very bright for Japan, for she lacks a good supply of iron. But as Japan is a colonizing people, and as her people spread into the rich country of Formosa and Korea, and to the north, there is certain to come from the increase of wealth derived from their labor and thrift in these relatively uncrowded countries, a largely increased demand for the industries of Japan, which will give her a domestic market which she has heretofore lacked; so that Japan will come, normally, to find herself somewhat in the position that Germany occupies. Considering the great industrial countries, we would say England has very largely an exporting market. There are not people enough to take nearly all of the output of her factories. The United States has almost entirely a domestic market, the foreign sales of merchandise being only one-twentieth of our output. Germany, on the other hand, has both a domestic and foreign market, and into that happy

position Japan is evolving, by reason of her development of Korea and Formosa and of Karafuto at the north, as well as of her own territories,—and to which she may add the great market at hand in China.

Now if in Korea and in Formosa there is applied, as there is sure to be applied, the wonderful system of intensive cultivation which exists in Japan, there cannot fail to come from those countries a great increase in the agricultural wealth of the empire, and also in her domestic buying power. We may, therefore, look for a growing demand for Japanese industry which will speedily bring the prices of the wages up and the prices of the commodities up just as they have progressed in the past.

Side by side with these there is every reason to believe that the great porcelain industry in Japan and her other handicraft work will continue to grow and to expand as it has done for centuries. This country itself forms one of the largest—perhaps the largest—market of Japanese porcelains, and there is no reason to doubt that that great branch of her industry, in which she is so far advanced, will continue for many decades to come. In porcelain and other arts Japan holds a unique place; we all would be losers, were those industries to suffer.

There is every reason to think, therefore, that the outlook of Japanese industries, save those of iron and steel perhaps, is one of exceptional brightness. If so, what is to become of us? What is the position of Japan as a competitor? It is not for a moment to be expected that a nation as capable and intelligent as the Japanese will fail to supply the largest part of their own things so far as they have the material sources that enable them to do so. It would be absurd to think that anything else would be the case. It is not to be expected, either, that they will fail to supply the great Chinese market with cotton goods and with everything else they are able to take to a market which they understand better than anybody else and which is just across the road from their own mills. We must expect, therefore, for the present to lose a certain amount of trade in Japan in goods that we have been selling them but which they now make or

will come to make themselves. We must expect also to lose a certain amount of our Chinese market for the very same reason. But the very prosperity that will come to Japan, as Korea and Formosa and the other lands develop under her keen agricultural touch, the very growth of these industries arising from her Chinese market and her own growing, will increase the needs of Japan for things she does not make and must buy. That is always the rule as nations grow in industry. Furthermore, her labor, growing in productiveness, will grow in wage, for the wage is always based—whether the employer will have it so or not—ultimately on what the man produces, and as Japan produces more, her laborers will earn more. So it will not be true long that Japan will have any such advantage in price in the world's markets as is now represented by the difference in wages between her artisans and ours. Today for a given duty they employ a good many more people than we. In some of her industries too, she must frankly be admitted to be backward. Her locomotives cost more than ours do, and we sell them there and have 720 running on the Japanese railroads.

Some Japanese are very backward in certain ways. It is a very curious sight to see women driving piles for a building, which goes on all the time in Tokyo. The human being is still used as a draft horse, but the time is not so very far distant when the Japanese artisan can employ his time better than by pulling a jinriksiha through the streets of Tokyo. That will evolve out of existence just exactly as the coal handling woman is being evolved out of existence. With this evolution toward a higher wage comes the evolution toward a larger demand, and that demand will not be confined in Japan to the things that Japan produces any more than it is confined in America, or in England, to the things those countries produce. So, while there may be painful processes of readjustment, in the ultimate result what is good for Japanese commerce is good for American commerce, and that is true of any commerce anywhere. I have small patience with a narrow view of commerce, which makes it war between one man and another. Commerce, if it be a true commerce, is a thing that helps buyer and sel-

ler, and whatever, therefore, aids the buyer of Japan to buy, aids certainly the Americans to sell. So there is no reason to doubt that by the very act of her taking away a market here and there, she becomes better able to buy other things that we desire to sell.

The industry of Japan is in a sub-normal condition. The handicrafts are highly evolved and perfected. The factory system is well developed in some ways, but not largely developed and not highly perfected. There does not yet exist the great mass of artisans from whom a factory manager can draw a large supply of skilled labor at will. It has to be made. It is being made very rapidly. Her industries are not in the condition where we can speak of them as in any degree fixed. Neither are ours in this country; they change from year to year with startling rapidity. Hers are far less fixed than ours. They have to develop rapidly, and they have developed rapidly. We cannot form from the industries of Japan today any sound judgment as to what those industries will be ten years hence. This much we can say; they are certain to expand. Their artisans are certain to grow in number and in earning power. Japan is bound to gain rapidly in wealth. Her people are industrious and thrifty—very much like the French in both of those respects; and if she increases in wealth and in the growth of her industries, she will become—we must expect it—one of the great and growing factors in the commerce of the world. But for that reason no less our friend and no less valuable a customer for our produce.

THE FOREIGN TRADE OF JAPAN

*By R. Ichinomiya, Manager of the New York Branch of the
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It is my purpose to present to you a brief review of what Japan has accomplished in her foreign trade, and at the same time to call your attention to a few points in the way of suggestions that may be of interest to students of the International relations of American commerce. There is no question but that Japanese foreign trade has made enormous strides since the breaking up of the policy of seclusion. Taking the total of the import and export trade during the year 1880, as representing a basis of one hundred units, and calculating from that the progress which the annual trade has subsequently made, we obtain the following results: 1880, 100 per cent; 1885, 102 per cent; 1890, 212 per cent; 1895, 408 per cent; 1900, 756 per cent; 1905, 1245 per cent; 1910, 1419 per cent; and in the last named year the grand total of imports and exports reached in value Yen 922,622,-804. That the rate of progress made in the initial stages was not as rapid as in later years is simply due to the primitive methods used then and to the many other difficulties to be met. It may not be amiss to mention a few of these difficulties.

The primary, and perhaps most serious, was in the ignorance of the foreigners and Japanese of one another's language and customs. Merchants, whether Japanese or foreign, could not, except in the rarest instances, confer with each other on business matters directly, and were compelled to employ special clerks, generally Chinese, as interpreters. The one aim of these men was to obtain their commission on the business done through their offices, just as now in the open ports of China, so that it was but natural that they should be indifferent to the development of trade. The only alternative was that one of the two parties, either the for-

eigners or the Japanese, should learn the other's language, trade customs and needs, with other relative matters, and so master the situation. And in this respect it would seem that the Japanese have taken the initiative. This tendency to do away with the middleman was extended to the Occidental merchants residing in Japan in so far as many of them were simply go-betweens, intermediaries between the *real* importers and exporters and not between the producers and consumers. They had little or no experience in actual trade, and usually lacked capital as well, but in the primitive stage of foreign trade they could get along nicely. Taking no pains to adapt themselves to the changing conditions, it was only natural that this class should have been gradually pushed aside when affairs became more orderly and real commercial competition came into existence, the result being the inevitable complaint against the winner of the business competition.

The reform of the monetary system was of very great assistance to the development of industry and the progress of trade. The national bank regulations, promulgated in 1872, modelled on the national bank act of the United States of America, being a total failure, an amendment to that act was passed in 1883 taking from the national banks the privilege of note issue and granting this exclusively to the newly-created Bank of Japan, a central institution, suitable measures being taken for the redemption of the outstanding national bank notes. Thus, by the end of 1885, there was no longer a disparity between paper money and coin, then mostly in silver, and in 1886 the system of specie payments was restored. The depreciation in the value of silver was always a great hindrance to the people in international commerce, however, and it was not until 1897 that this trade disadvantage, caused by an irregular and unstable fluctuation in exchange rates, ceased to exist when the imperial diet passed a statute on the currency and a portion of the gold received from China as an indemnity was applied to the national reserve. Thus the foundation of the gold standard system was firmly laid, and Japanese foreign trade entered upon its second stage of expansion.

With the development of transportation and communication both on land and sea, Japanese merchants were no longer dependent upon foreign firms established in Japan, but gradually began conducting the import and export business on their own account directly with foreign nations. The tendency of Japanese foreign commerce then took on a different aspect, and began to show a steady increase particularly in the importation of raw materials and in the export of finished articles, indicating the healthy growth of the home industries.

Apart from a consideration of the staple products of Japan for export, most important in determining the prospects of the country's foreign trade is the question as to what opportunities, facilities, aptitude and financial capacity Japan possesses for developing her industries. I may say without fear of contravention that the country contains practically all the elements essential for her great advancement industrially. Japan wants the raw material, for she cannot produce within her limited area all she requires for the industries which are bound to expand almost without limit. Her geographical advantage in lying between such countries as China, India, Australia and America, enables her to import at a moderate freight rate, such raw materials she may need as cotton, wool, the various minerals, etc. The only question that remains is for her to exercise a wise discretion in the choice of suitable markets in which to make such purchases. The supply of motive power is ample. Besides possessing extensive coal mines, the utilization of her fine water power is proceeding rapidly, the results to be seen in the electric-lighting, traction and many other fields. Japanese labor, skilled and unskilled, is plentiful, and in spite of the gradual rise in the standard of living, is still comparatively inexpensive. The increasing importation of the most modern machinery of all kinds, together with the increase in quantity of Japanese manufactured goods, certainly shows the knowledge and skill of the Japanese workman are not of low grade.

The only thing that Japan has lacked, and still lacks, for the development of her industries, is sufficient capital. In spite of the increase of national wealth it is to be regretted that the supply of working capital cannot keep pace with

the demand. The investment of foreign capital, therefore, is eagerly sought; and in this connection I may state that when foreign money is invested, the burden of the working end of the business should rest solely upon the Japanese, for the ability and trustworthiness of the younger generation in business affairs is beyond question, and the expense is very much less than for men of other nations.

Criticism of the commercial morality of the Japanese has been heard occasionally, and the employment of Chinese by foreign banks in Japan and China mentioned as an evidence. *The Japanese are not commercially unmoral.* To begin with, out of 2173 Japanese banks in Japan, with resources of 3634 million Yen, not one has ever employed a single Chinese with one exception, the Yokohama Specie Bank, Limited. This bank, it is true, did formerly employ a few Chinese in its Yokohama and Kobe offices, and for the one and only reason that those offices are engaged in the business of foreign exchange, especially in relation to business with China, but the bank has since discontinued the employment of Chinese, and no Chinese today employed by any bank or commercial concern in Japan. In European and American banks and mercantile houses conducting business in Japan the number of Chinese employees is very limited, if indeed any are still employed. These banks continue their employment simply because it was the Chinese who originally entered their service, and as long as they are willing to remain, there is no reason why they should be replaced by Japanese. These Chinese do not of course hold important positions, and were originally employed not because the Japanese were considered morally inferior to them, but for more practical reasons, one historical and the other commercial. China having for many years been a silver using country, and there being no proper coin of fixed weight, size and fineness, but silver bullion of every description as to fineness and size being used as a medium of exchange, the Chinese people have naturally become more or less experienced and trained not only to easily distinguish good silver from bad, but almost to tell its fineness by the ring of the metal when touched with a metal rod. It is

therefore quite natural that so-called silver experts are found among the Chinese. Considering the monetary system prevailing in China, these people are quite necessary for the banks that are carrying on business in that country. Before Japan adopted the gold standard, as I previously explained, silver was practically the only circulating medium in Japan. Even trade dollars were used to supplement the Japanese coinage. Japan having had legal tender notes and coin issued by the government for generations, her people naturally lacked the acquaintance with, and consequently the knowledge of silver bullion, and were not so well fitted to detect the variation in fineness as the Chinese experts. This is the reason why a few Chinese silver experts were at one time employed even in Japan by the Yokohama Specie Bank, Limited, a Japanese concern engaged in international exchange, and in similar lines; but with the gold standard firmly established in Japan, there was no longer a reason for the employment of Chinese silver experts in that bank or in any foreign banking institution in Japan.

There is also a commercial reason for the employment of Chinese by the foreign banks. According to commercial usage among the Chinese, the seller of a shipment of goods draws a clean bill of exchange upon the buyer, but not a documentary bill, i.e., a bill of exchange with the shipping documents attached. In other words, they do not hypothecate the goods to the bank as security for the draft. It is, therefore, difficult for the bank to determine whether a clean draft which they are about to negotiate, is actually commercial paper or not. To be able to act intelligently on this point, and also as there is no Chinese mercantile agency that can supply the desired information regarding the financial standing of Chinese merchants, as is practiced in Japan and elsewhere, it has been considered advantageous for the bank to employ a reliable Chinese whose influence and financial responsibility may be sufficient to safeguard the interests of the banks. But, as I have stated before, the tendency to do away with any kind of middlemen, and to reach the objective directly and straight, seems to prevail also in this direc-

tion; and as far as Japan and Japanese institutions whether banking or commercial are concerned, there no longer exists any necessity for Chinese employment.

In order to further explain the increase of foreign commerce along the lines of the fundamental principle of trade progress, I will take the aggregate import and export figures, for the year 1901, of raw or partly manufactured materials on the one side and the finished products on the other, the unit being 100, and compare them with the ten years following. Thus:

YEAR	EXPORT		IMPORT	
	Raw or half manu- factured material	Finished articles	Raw or half manu- factured material	Finished articles
	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
1901.....	100	100	100	100
1902.....	99	103	126	73
1903.....	103	124	150	75
1904.....	109	139	167	83
1905.....	95	137	193	127*
1906.....	135	157	149	129*
1907.....	152	147	198	131*
1908.....	132	124	164	92
1909.....	147	143	173	87
1910.....	153	168	217	85

* The increase in the years 1905-06-07 is due to the effect of the Russo-Japanese war and the subsequent post-bellum boom.

The progress and expansion of any undertaking depends internally upon the material influences and externally follow the lines of least resistance. When the above figures are analyzed it is interesting to note that while the raw or half manufactured materials have increased largely in both export and import generally, the manufactured articles imported to Japan, do not correspond with such an increase. On the contrary, in the case of exports, these will show a very large increase in the trade with those countries where the home industries are not much advanced, but a smaller increase, or rather a decrease, to those countries where home industries are in a flourishing condition. Even though making due allowance for the effect of the tariff, the following figures of

the trade with the United States of America and China will clearly indicate this tendency:

To the United States of America

YEAR	EXPORT		IMPORT	
	Raw or half manu- factured materials	Manufactured goods	Raw or half manu- factured materials	Manufactured goods
	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
1901.....	100	100	100	100
1902.....	114	101	122	76
1903.....	108	135	110	96
1904.....	134	158	144	97
1905.....	120	161	234	284
1906.....	174	171	177	130
1907.....	185	168	198	145
1908.....	179	130	183	171
1909.....	196	133	137	79
1910.....	204	180	133	105

To China

1901.....	100	100	100	100
1902.....	114	108	154	59
1903.....	156	193	173	68
1904.....	180	152	209	70
1905.....	260	221	202	35
1906.....	225	290	221	33
1907.....	261	243	257	23
1908.....	161	188	246	36
1909.....	140	229	251	37
1910.....	135	289	304	14

The antiquated idea that one may gain by underselling another is giving place to the belief that ultimate success must come through coöperation. Unhealthy price-cutting competition will naturally result in a deterioration in quality; and even if one succeeds, after a prolonged struggle, perhaps selling at a loss, in beating down his competitors, he will awake to a realization that his market is gone and that there is no longer a demand for his product at all commensurate with the damage done to it. In direct foreign trade Japanese merchants have had a number of such unfortunate experiences. For example, I may mention that Japanese mattings, imported into the United States of America, were subjected

to duty of 3 cents per square yard on quality up to a cost value of Yen 7.71 per roll, and on anything above that value were subject to a duty of 7 cents per square yard and 25 per cent ad valorem additional, the idea being to make the importation of the finer sort of Japanese matting absolutely impossible, so protecting the American carpet manufacturers. This arrangement put practically the maximum limit on the price of Japanese matting to be imported. In spite of the difference between the maximum and minimum limit, which is the cost of producing, being thus very small, the Japanese attempted a cut-throat competition with one another in the sale of mattings, this naturally resulting in the deterioration of the quality of goods and nearly in the destruction of the market. Reestablishment of the market and improvement in quality have since been in order, but even under the recent tariff revision, it seems to take a very much longer period and still harder labor to restore the old market.

I do not mean to say that there should be no competition, but I do mean that competition of a negative character always results in harm to the trade. On the contrary, if competition is directed toward the positive side, that is toward improvement in quality at the same price, more durability and usefulness, reduction in the cost of production, prompt delivery, better and cheaper transportation facilities, etc., the result may be altogether different. There is an old Japanese proverb which reads, "There is no poverty that overtakes a handworker," meaning that prosperity is only the reward of hard work. This is now obsolete, and does not hold good in our modern business. Hard work along the same old line does not bring satisfactory results; all it can hope to accomplish is the maintenance of the old position without advancement. Hard work accompanied by improvement in methods will alone obtain progress. In pushing the foreign trade, the most important qualification is the knowledge of the language and customs of the people that are met with in that trade. Wants and requirements of a local and particular character must from time to time be investigated and studied so as to leave no changes unnoted. In the trade with the Orient, especially with China, where a vast future is in store, it is not so easy a matter to meet the requirements. In this

respect I can safely say that the Japanese, owing to their geographical, racial and linguistic advantages, are the people best fitted to acquire the foremost position. Next to the Japanese will come the Germans. If you will notice how the German merchants both in China and at home are working along the line I have indicated, you will not wonder that they have made such remarkable progress in the Oriental trade during the past few years.

The Germans at home for instance have had a school of Oriental languages, including Japanese, for fifteen years, and are studying every method to push the sale of their merchandise in East Asia. Some of the German salesmen go so far as to adopt the Chinese dress and Chinese queue. You are aware how the Chinese cling to their calendar. The Germans have noticed this, and never fail to mark their goods according to it. If, for instance, it is the year of horse, the Germans print a figure of a horse on the goods to be sold to the Chinese that year. So, in what might seem trivial matters they seek the good will of their customers. These things are perhaps difficult for the Occidental manufacturers to understand; but unless they do try to understand them, they can never hope to obtain and retain a strong foothold in the Oriental trade. Chinese habits and traits, in particular, are difficult for Western people to comprehend, but so long as China is talked of as one of the world's greatest markets, then, intending traders will have to surmount these difficulties in one way or another. In this connection, what seems to me the most practical and natural way is to bring about coöperation of the Western manufacturers and Japanese merchants, the Western manufacturers attending to the productive end and the Japanese to the selling end of the business. A few of such coöperations has already been proved by experience. The General Electric Company is manufacturing and selling electric machinery in Japan in coöperation with the Shibaura Works of Tokyo. The Western Electric Company is in similar coöperation with the Japan Electric Company. These coöperative methods have been remarkably successful. Vickers and Maxim of England have established a steel foundry in Japan in coöperation with the Hokkaido Colliery and Steamship Company of Japan.

In any coöperation of American manufacturers and Japanese merchants, the Americans will probably have to supply the raw material, and skill of a certain kind, perhaps one or two superintending engineers and foremen. The Japanese must attend to the selling end in Japan and China. They are better qualified for that part of the business than the Americans, for they understand the customs and tastes of the Chinese, and have facilities in promoting the trade not possessed by the Western people. Successful manufacturers are not always successful salesmen, and no business can prosper unless it prospers at the selling end. This consideration seems to emphasize the advisability of the American manufacturers seeking Japanese coöperation. Frequent trouble occurs, however, when the Western people demand a controlling power in a company to be established in Japan upon such a coöperative basis. If the Western people insist upon such a controlling power, then it would be useless to attempt to start a coöperative business. It would defeat the object of the coöperation fundamentally. The usefulness of the Japanese in the coöperative arrangement comes from the exact knowledge of the requirements of the consumers, and how to comply with those requirements, a condition essential to the making of any business successful. Now if the Western people have the controlling power in the coöperative factories, they will not adopt the suggestions made by the Japanese in the way of satisfying the peculiar tastes of the Oriental consumers, and will model their manufactories and their products in the Western way. The desire of the Western people to have the controlling power in the factory to be established in the East, has been and will continue to be a stumbling block in the way of the successful execution of any coöperative business. If the American people attempt the coöperation on broad principles, and with a trusting spirit towards the Japanese, the system will prove one of the most successful of modern business methods. The Japanese, I can say without hesitation, are ready and willing to avail themselves of such opportunities; and they will stand for the principles of "the open door and equal opportunity" both in domestic and foreign trade.

MEDICINE IN JAPAN: ITS DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT STATUS

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The earliest historical period of Japanese medicine is shrouded in mystery and may properly be termed the mythical period. As in Egypt, Greece and other ancient countries, it was the age of the "demi-gods." It extends from the dawn of Japanese history, supposed to be 700 B. C. to about 100 B. C., a period of six hundred years. Early traditions attribute the source of the first knowledge of the cure of disease to the teachings of two dieties, known in Japanese history as, O-Na-Muchi-No-Mikoto and Sukuna-Hiko-Na-No-Mikoto. It is hinted by modern scholars that these earliest ideas of the treatment of disease originated in China and Korea. Still the medical knowledge of the period has always been popularly regarded as emanating wholly from the Japanese themselves.

Tradition informs us that experiments were early made upon monkeys to determine the action of certain vegetable substances possessing supposed remedial virtues, of which thirty-seven were thus tested and employed in sickness. These consisted chiefly of roots and the barks of trees and represented the sum total of the Japanese materia-medica of that period. Attempts at the study of anatomy were made, monkeys being dissected in the hope of thus learning the arrangement of the organs of the human system. The knowledge of anatomy thus gained was but little advanced, save in very limited circles, for a period of about two thousand years. Observations were also made as to the age to which people lived and the tradition is preserved, "that few lived beyond one hundred years."

This was looked upon as the age of pure Japanese medi-

cine and its principles were jealously defended when, in later years, the Chinese system was introduced. In this earlier age no attempt seems to have been made to investigate the *causes* of disease, the whole range of treatment being entirely symptomatic. Yet the profession of medicine was held in high esteem, the medical men of the country being mostly related to the imperial house and to noble families. In the reign of the twelfth emperor of this "divine age" the custom was changed and "elderly men of experience" were allowed to assume the responsibility of treating disease; while those unable to pursue other vocations might be employed in digging medicinal roots and in gathering herbs. It is further said that when monkeys were kept for the scientific purposes referred to, persons of both sexes, infirm from birth and who could not do regular manual labor, were given the task of caring for them.

It is interesting to note that the Japanese, in that early age, anticipated the modern scientific use of the monkey for the testing of drugs. It has long been recognized by modern men of science that there is no animal that so nearly resembles man, in the effects produced by drugs, as the monkey.

It is of equal interest to note that the four elements, wind, fire, water and earth, were employed to explain the various phenomena of human life. Tradition reports the second emperor as saying nearly six centuries before Christ; "It is discovered by the great skill of the heavenly gods that the human body is made of four elements, wind, fire, water and earth, and by their combination to possess the body with the soul." This was also the teaching of Empedocles, the Greek philosopher, 450 B. C.

The same theory was held later by Egyptian and Grecian philosophers, one of whom, Hippocrates who lived two hundred and fifty years later, originated the science of modern rational medicine. He held that the body is made up of four elements and from these are derived the four humors—blood, phlegm, bile and black bile, these humors, in turn, determining the temperament of the individual in which one or the other may predominate—sanguine, phlegmatic,

bilious and melancholic—a classification used by westerners, to some extent, even today.

The Japanese regarded the cause of disease as originating either from the spirit of air or of water.

The country is of volcanic origin and volcanic upheavals of varying severity have been of frequent occurrence during its history. These seismic disturbances have produced numerous hot medicinal springs in different parts of the country and these were resorted to for the treatment of diseases in this early age, as at the present time.

Cold water was early employed in the treatment of fevers but the use of this remedy was later abandoned for a period of seven hundred years, namely from the twelfth to the nineteenth century A. D. Mingled with these more rational methods tradition assures us that successful treatment of disease frequently required the exorcism of evil spirits. To what extent this superstition and the religious treatment of disease was due to the later introduction of Buddhism is difficult to determine. It should be remembered that these statements are based upon legendary information as preserved in records dating 712 A. D., at which time authentic Japanese history began.

Among the occult phenomena popularly believed to enter into the ætiology of disease, the superstition of fox possession should here be noted. The animal is supposed to assume human form by placing a skull on its own head, facing the north star and then, by prayers, genuflections and rapid circulatory motions, rapidly take on the human form. As a girl, he is made responsible for many startling tales and experiences.

I well recall the haggard appearance of a young man as he came to the hospital clinic one morning and sitting before me gravely asked to be relieved of his disease of "fox possession." His story was, that on the previous evening, as he had attempted to go home from a neighbor's house, his path leading along a ravine between the mountains, the light of his lantern, in some mysterious manner, suddenly went out. Wandering for a while, he discovered a light in the distance, which he took for that of his own home. As

he walked, however, this light receded and finally disappeared. In weariness he sank to the ground. There now appeared to him a beautiful woman, who directed him on his way. She too finally vanished but to his joy the road led to his home.

To dispossess the person of this hallucination is usually the proud work of the priest. He gravely says to the patient, "I will perform for you religious ceremonies and prayers and if you will go to such a temple, offer there your prayers and your offerings, you will immediately be relieved." The result usually verifies the promise—a pure case of mind cure.

The name of this animal seems to have been taken from a legend occurring 545 A. D. Ono, a native of Mino, greatly longed for his ideal of feminine beauty, who finally appeared and became his wife. With the birth of their son was also born a dog in the immediate neighborhood, which, when grown, became intensely hostile to Ono's wife. One day the dog attacked her with unusual fury, when she, in uncontrollable fear, assumed her former shape, leaped over the fence and disappeared *in the form of a fox*. "You may be a fox," cried Ono, as he saw his wife disappear, "but you are the mother of my son and I love you; *Ki-tsu-ne-Kitsune*." And so every night, as the shadows gathered and the dogs were in kennel, she came back and nestled in his arms; hence the name *Ki-tsu-ne*, "Come and sleep."

The second period in the history of Japanese medicine extends from 100 B. C. to 700 A. D. and embraces the period known as the extended introduction of Chinese medicine. This includes Korean medicine many of whose physicians and learned men came to Japan as teachers and as practitioners during this time. Kempfer repeats a legend of the coming of the first foreign physician: In the reign of the Emperor Kogen, 214 to 158 B. C., a physician from China with three hundred young men and an equal number of young women, came to Japan, "his real purpose being to escape the tyranny of his own government." In order to be permitted to leave China, he represented to his emperor that there existed in Japan the medicine of immortality, but so sensitive and tender were the plants from which it

was procured, that it would only yield its virtues when handled by virtuous hands. If, therefore, success was to crown his efforts, he must have the assistance of the company proposed. His request was granted. The place of his landing in the province of Kii is still shown, as also the remains of a temple once erected in his honor, "for having introduced good manners and useful knowledge."

Following the military invasion of Korea by the Empress Jingo Kogo, 201 A. D., increased medical knowledge was brought into the country and this was further increased in later years by the coming of botanists to study the medicinal flora of the country. Later it became the rule to collect these herbs on the fifth day of the fifth month, a custom observed at that time even by members of the Imperial house. The knowledge of human anatomy was shown by the belief that there was a hole in the liver which communicated direct with the heart.

In the sixth century Buddhism was brought to Japan. Shortly after this an epidemic of some skin disease prevailed. Some claimed that this punishment was in consequence of the introduction of the new religious faith, while Buddhist believers claimed it was a punishment from Heaven because of the burning of a Buddhist idol by command of the Emperor. One of the court officials falling sick of the disease was permitted to pray to Buddha for relief, the first act of its kind recorded in the history of Buddhism in Japan. The officer recovered and this led to the use of charms against disease and to the offering of prayers to Buddha for relief from sickness. From that time to the present, Buddhist priests have sought to perform the double duty of priest and physician. Buddhist teaching, too, increasingly emphasized the older theory that all human suffering arose from the discord of the spirits of the four elements, and the treatment of disease, became increasingly a religious rite, and the priest a religious healer.

In 669 A. D. a school of learning was established by the Emperor Tenshi and thirty years later a medical department was added. In this school was taught the Chinese system of internal medicine, materia-medica, cultivation and curing

of medicinal plants, acupuncture, massage, diseases of the skin, and bone complaints. The students were chiefly the sons of officials and the entire course of study covered twelve years. An interesting custom prevailed of requiring physicians having official appointments to send to their alma mater their first year's income as an "expression of their gratitude" for their education. This was doubtless a return in part of the allowance made by the government to medical students, that all their time might be devoted to study. Later this "return gift" was fixed at one-tenth of the income from the first year of practice. In 735 A. D. a severe epidemic of smallpox appeared, which led the more observing to carefully study the disease. Though this was known in China as early as the beginning of the Christian era, a full description of the malady was not recorded in Japan until 1323, nearly four centuries after the first accurate description was given of the malady by Rhazas, the Arabian physician.

In 806 A. D. a severe plague visited the country and the friends of "Japanese medical art as taught in ancient times by men and gods" joined in the agitation lest this fact should be forgotten. They finally persuaded the reigning emperor to believe that the plague was a punishment from High Heaven for so completely ignoring the legacy received from earlier patriots, and adopting, instead, the foreign (Chinese) method of treating disease. A medical work was accordingly prepared embracing one hundred volumes, which elaborately set forth the principles and the practise of the more ancient and honored system. This led to a government edict and so severe were the requirements imposed upon physicians, and against Buddhism, that any medical officer of the court who should even meet a Buddhist priest or nun on the street was incapacitated for duty for that day; and should he make a mistake in his prescription or in the writing of his directions, the physician was to be punished by a three years imprisonment and a fine of eighty pounds of copper coin; while should any impurity be found in the medicine given, sixty lashes were to be administered

and a fine of eight pounds of copper coin imposed by the emperor.

This enforced reform, however, was of but short duration and the Imperial successor, Saga, restored the Chinese system with its Buddhistic philosophy, which continued, with varying successes, to the latter part of the nineteenth century.

One remedy given to the west, the moxa, requires notice. Its employment as a means of counter irritation received early emphasis by the Japanese and its use remains at present a popular remedy. The traveler in Japan today will probably be drawn by a jinriksha coolie, who will have several black spots on each side of his spine or along the shin bones, the marks of the application of this remedy. It is made from the flower of *artemisia vulgaris*, popularly known as burning grass or, in Japanese, *mo-gusa*. A work of several volumes was early written, giving the diseases for which treatment by moxa was indicated and the rules for its application, and Kempfer gives an elaborate summary of this treatise under twenty-six different headings. The Dutch, witnessing its value as a counter irritant, adopted it, but instead of using the combustible grass, sought the same end by the use of the hot iron, retaining, however, the Japanese name, *mo-gusa*, the "moxa" of the present day.

As an example of the philosophy underlying the practise of medicine at this time, the conversation between a pupil and teacher may here be quoted: "Why does cold, when taken into the system result in fever?" asked the pupil Kotei of his teacher Ki-Haku, and the latter replied, "Heat is produced at the point of extreme cold. If, therefore, one contracts cold in winter, he suffers from fever in the spring time."

The third period of Japanese medicine extends from about 600 to 1500 A. D. This period simply marks an extension of Japan's intercourse with China and India and the gradual but sure increase of the Chinese system of medicine, during which time it became more highly developed than in the country of its birth. From the middle of the twelfth century,

however, political interests and military exploits claimed increasing attention, leading men to abandon literary and professional pursuits and to seek honor in war. The government now withdrew in part its patronage from learning and priests again came to the front as medical practitioners, some of them ultimately becoming men of learning. The old "natural method," the pure Japanese system, now found many staunch advocates and in time greatly modified and improved the Chinese system. Among these advocates was one Nagata Tokuhon, 1512-1630 A. D., who lived to the age of one hundred and eighteen years. In his practice he sought to work with nature. It is related that a certain nobleman, sick of a fever, called Tokuhon for his medical opinion. "What do you like and dislike most?" was the first question asked by the physician, and to this the sick man replied, "I should like to eat some water-melon, to have all of the clothing removed, to have the screens taken from around me and thus allow a freer circulation of air." This was accordingly permitted and, further, he was allowed to drink cold water as desired, a procedure prohibited at this period by the physicians of the Chinese school. Tokuhon's theory was that nature afforded indications as to what the system most needed. If called to treat a person suffering from any nervous disease, Tokuhon would give little attention to medicinal treatment; but would, rather, search for the causes of the disorder, and often effected a cure by working upon the mind of the patient. For instance, were the patient a farmer and anxious that it should rain, he would speak to him of the probabilities of an approaching storm; were she a woman, anxious because of the long absence of her husband, he would assure her of his speedy return; or if a young girl, converse with her about marriage; and so, sometimes by exciting anger, sometimes sorrow, again by inflicting physical pain, or, indeed, through fear, he would arouse his patients to health, "or to that condition in which he could be best reached by simple medicines." Tokuhon had a large following. In 1543 A. D., forty years after the discovery of the passage around the Cape of Good Hope, a Portuguese merchant vessel came to the

shores of Japan. This was an event of the greatest moment to Japanese medicine and was the beginning of a long, intimate and helpful relation of the Dutch with the Japanese. Up to that time Japan had held relations with Asia only—Korea, China and India. In 1549 Francis Xavier, a Jesuit missionary, began his work and a few years later a hospital was established in connection with this Jesuit mission, and placed in charge of Dr. Lewis De Almeida. The Nobunaga government treated these Europeans kindly and in 1568 A. D. gave a piece of ground ten acres square in Kyoto, where a church was built and land given sufficient to yield two thousand bushels of rice annually toward the maintenance of the mission. Two medical priests were connected with this church and conducted a dispensary for the poor. To favor the medical side of the work, a still larger piece of land, was placed at their disposal for the cultivation of medicinal and other plants, of which it is said some three thousand different kinds were planted. Climatic conditions favoring their growth, a rich addition was thus made to the medicinal herbs and to the flora of the empire.

A few native students of medicine now attached themselves to these foreign instructors, and surgery, heretofore unknown, began to be practised. The circulation of the blood became better understood. "The Dutch physicians possessed knowledge," declared the historian of the day, "but they were exceedingly rough in applying it; while the Chinese system of medicine is restrained by the conservative teachings of the past." The old Japanese school again forged to the front and included many learned and influential leaders. Literary attainment was now regarded as necessary in the physician, and many scholars minimized the importance of distinctively medical knowledge and claimed that any philosopher in close touch with nature could grasp her secrets and correct the penalties of her broken laws. Numerous books on the treatment of disease were written by laymen, to the utter confusion of the medical knowledge of that day.

In 1750 A. D. the theory of "negative and positive essences and of the five elements" was held and practiced by many

Japanese. The new theory was that disease is a poison and is due to a poison. Poison should be attacked by poison and when we have destroyed the cause of disease, the disease itself disappears. By this process, however, there is loss of *Gen-ki*, or vital spirit, which must be restored and nature aided to resume her sway. Disease was now claimed to come within human control and death from sickness was declared to be due to ignorance rather than to the decree of Heaven. The teachings of Mencius, the student of Confucius, doubtless influenced this theory, he claiming that we can hold Heaven responsible for death of friends only after the utmost means have been employed for their recovery.

The political intrigues of the Jesuits and of the Portuguese now aroused the hatred and indignation of Hideyoshi, the Shogun who had succeeded the Nobunaga reign, and by the harshest possible means he expelled them from the country. Some knowledge of the medical art of these men was preserved by their native students, but the event lessened foreign intercourse and retarded the development of education and of medicine. With the cutting off of intercourse with the Portuguese and the Spanish, the old friends of Japan, the Dutch, now enlarged their relations and these were soon supplemented by the English—in sharp rivalry, with the Dutch for the commerce of the country. This rivalry continued until 1621, when the English withdrew and the Dutch continued their trade at Nagasaki. Here they were always careful to have, among other officers of this branch of the Dutch East India Company, a physician. Among these physicians many were noted for their ability, as Doctors Armans, Schambergen, Hoffmann, and Kempfer.

Christianity was still under the ban of the government and the importation of all religious books was strictly prohibited. This prohibition, however, did not include the study of medicine, and the Japanese interpreters of Dutch were allowed the freest intercourse with the Dutch physicians, in order that they might learn their art. This gave rise to a school of medicine known as the "Orlander" or Dutch school.

As previously noted, the pathology of European medicine at that time differed so little from that of the Chinese (the former being founded upon the doctrine of Hippocrates and Galen that all bodily ills arose from a disturbance of the four humors, blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile, while the Chinese ascribed all physical troubles to disturbances of gas, air, blood, and phlegm), that the Chinese school had reasonable ground for contention that the basic principles of their own art were quite as good as those of the West.

Smallpox was an early bane and, in the gregarious habits of the people, wrought terrible havoc among them. Vaccination finally afforded relief and is today compulsory and universal. Doubt existing as to the origin of vaccination in Japan your speaker, in 1884, with the assistance of native members of his hospital staff, made careful inquiry into the early records of its introduction, and learned that this was done by the Dutch physician, Mohniki. The child of his interpreter, Yegawa of Nagasaki, was the first to be vaccinated. A portion of the resulting scab was sent north to a Kyoto physician, Hino-Tozai by name, who vaccinated his grandchild. From this child virus was sent to a physician in the province of Yechizo, from which time the practice rapidly spread and that too, in spite of the strong opposition of the Chinese school and the still potent influence of a year-old proscriptive edict of the Shogun. The beneficent result of vaccination against smallpox was now increasingly recognized and constituted another influence making for the popularity of the western system. Later, in 1858, a vaccination institute was established in Tokyo, which, under the efficient superintendence of the board of health, became one of the best in the world and has, for now more than twenty-five years supplied with virus the surgeons of the Asiatic squadron of the American navy.

Up to the latter part of the eighteenth century the knowledge of western medicine had been gained chiefly from the teaching of western physicians in Japan. At this time, 1771, A. D. Gempaku Sugita (1733-1817) a "descendent of a house of hereditary physicians loyal to the Dutch school," became the possessor of two Dutch anatomical

books. The illustrations in this work differed so widely from the heretofore accepted knowledge of human anatomy as taught by the Chinese school, that Sugita and his friends were anxious for an opportunity to compare the two with human organs. The government was therefore petitioned for its assistance and, in response, permission was granted for the dissection of an executed criminal. As the drawings of the two schools were compared with the organs of the human body, it was at once seen that the resemblance to the Dutch plates was exact, while the teachings of the Chinese school were false. A new era of possibilities for medical science now opened, for the realization of which a knowledge of the Dutch language constituted the key. Accordingly Ryotaku Maeno, Gempaku Sugita, and Junon Nakagawa met at Yeddo on the fourth day of March, 1771, to begin the study of the Dutch language. In three years these men acquired proficiency as translators, "wrote and rewrote the *Tafel Anatomia* eleven times" and finally, at the end of four years, gave to the country the result of their labors in the *New Treatise on Anatomy*. These men now became the center for the study of the Dutch language and of the history and life of western countries and a few years later, 1808, "when an English ship entered the harbor of Nagasaki contrary to the orders of the Tokugawa government," fuller knowledge of the nations of the west became imperative,—a knowledge which these same scholars and their pupils could now give. Two books, Hokuhen Tanji, *Things Northern*, and Bashin Hiko, *Private Opinions*, soon appeared and in 1811 a translation bureau was established by order of the government and Gentaku Otsuku, a student of Dr. Sugita, placed in charge—the first scholar of western learning appointed to an official position in Japan. The English language now became an object of study, which soon led to the translation of numerous works on general subjects. By the middle of the nineteenth century, a large number of Japanese physicians knew fairly well the literature of European medicine as then developed, and in all branches, save surgery, were fairly reliable practitioners. In spite of this, however, members of the Chinese school had such

influence at court that they secured favorable response to their petition to the government that the practice of western medicine for internal diseases should be prohibited in Japan, on the ground that Europeans and Asiatics were dissimilar in their natures, and the medicine applicable to the one was not suitable for the other. As late as 1849, an order was issued making it necessary to secure government permission for authority to translate books on western medicine; and as the "censorship was in the hands of the government and therefore the friends of the order," a stop was practically put to the further publication of European books on medicine. This edict however, did not include the practice of surgery, which, based upon what had proved to be accurate anatomical knowledge, was permitted to be practiced.

In 1852 Commodore Perry's visit to Japan produced such political and social unrest that popular clamor demanded the "strengthening of all national defenses and general preparation for war." Anticipating a sanguinary conflict, it was deemed a necessity that her surgeons be made familiar with the treatment of gun-shot and saber wounds. Such a work was translated and appeared in 1854 and thereafter the opposition to western medicine, both by the government and by the Chinese school, rapidly lost strength and (in 1857) a hospital and medical school for the teaching of European medicine was established by the government at Nagasaki, the Dutch physician, Dr. Pompevan Meerdervoort, in charge. This event began the fourth period of Japan's Medical History. On the fifteenth of May of that year his inaugural address was given to the assembled students and their friends and Dr. van Meerdervoort began his work as the physician and surgeon of the first hospital established by the government. From this school the two most promising students, namely, Ito Gempaku and Hiyashi Genkai, were selected for Post Graduate work in Holland and were sent thither by the Japanese government—the first students to be sent to Europe for a medical education. Medical science, therefore, was the first to profit by Commodore Perry's visit, and since that time the value placed upon European medicine has been a strong link between the Japan-

ese and the west. Medicine, more than any other science given to Japan as the result of her intercourse with the Occident, has bestowed upon her the greatest benefits, and her people today regard with gratitude and with confidence the work of her medical men as the most signal agency in the country for conserving health, increasing longevity and contributing to the nation's power.

Following this, Japan's relations with America and England became increasingly intimate and English and American medicine exerted a strong influence upon her. The fighting which resulted from the war of the restoration immediately emphasized the need for surgeons, and Dr. William Willis, an English naval surgeon, was engaged to accompany the government forces. Willis was, fortunately, a man of thorough training and of noble character and did much to aid the Japanese.

At the close of the first battle he was informed of the wish of the officers of the army to have the wounded of the government forces treated first, and the wounded of the enemy attended to later. Willis immediately protested against this course of procedure and emphatically declared that he would not allow his instruments to be unpacked unless all the wounded could be treated alike. He carried his point. This spirit of the government only reflected the spirit that had long prevailed in Asia, and is still too frequently seen in China, as regards the treatment of the wounded of the enemy. It was, however, in striking contrast to the order issued by the Empress Jingo Kōgo, when her troops were despatched for the invasion of Korea in the third century, which was, "Spare all who surrender, but destroy all who refuse to yield."

At the close of the war Willis was placed in charge of a large hospital in Tokyo, to which a medical school was attached, and in which he was appointed professor of surgery. He was the first to teach the Japanese aseptic surgery. The methods of English and American surgery thus early took root and the translation of English works were now made and widely read.

It was Japan's first purpose to employ English and Amer-

ican medical teachers, making the English language the medium for instruction, but the presence of a Dutch physician at Nagasaki, who praised the rapid progress of German medicine in the late sixties, greatly influenced the choice of the government for German teachers; while the Rev. Dr. Verbeck, a Dutch-American scholar, a teacher of many of the younger officials and Advisor to the Japanese government, also recommended this latter course. The government, therefore, made known its wish to the German government that medical teachers be furnished. This was at the time, however, of the Franco-German war, when the necessary surgeons could not be spared from the country. At its close, the military surgeons, Müeller and Hoffman, were sent to Japan, the first of a series of German teachers who for nearly forty years, continued to occupy professorial chairs at the University.

During the late sixties and seventies a considerable number of American and English missionary societies took up work in Japan. As it was the policy of the larger societies to locate a physician at every central station, it came to pass that a considerable number—eleven—were located in strategic centers of population, and each with a hospital and a surrounding group of dispensaries, became a local center of large medical interests. To these hospitals and dispensaries the native physicians, still practicing the Chinese system and now eager to learn all that was possible of western medicine, would bring groups of patients for treatment, and, on receiving clinical instruction concerning the diseases thus presented and their treatment, would depart to put into practice the knowledge gained.

Dr. James C. Hepburn was the nestor of this number and led us all in consecrated and efficient service. He came to Kanagawa in 1859 but, unable to practice his profession there because of the opposition of the Japanese government, he moved across the bay to Yokohama—a concession for foreign residence. Here he opened a dispensary and being near the capital, his work, especially in surgery, made a profound impression upon the nation. In this he was aided at times by the English naval surgeons.

Students gathered around him both for didactic and clinical instruction and thus his medical work became of the utmost value in allaying prejudice, and winning the confidence of the Nation. In 1873 at the age of sixty years he gave up his medical practice and devoted himself wholly to religious and literary work. He was the first to compile a Japanese-English dictionary.¹ From 1870 to 1880 medical institutions and medical and surgical knowledge rapidly increased. This was greatly favored by a government edict in 1875 to the effect that thereafter medical licenses would be granted only to those who could pass an examination in western medical science. The representatives of the Chinese school were allowed to continue their practice but they made no further effort to re-establish their prestige. They remain, in the writer's memory, as men of rare dignity, representing the best scholarship of their day, and as men, too, who received and who deserved, the respect and the confidence of their fellows. It cannot be doubted that the work of these men, in developing the system of Chinese medicine to a point far beyond what it ever became in the land of its birth, prepared the way for the rapid growth of medical knowledge in the generation following them. They labored as they believed and prepared those who were to follow for a still larger service. All honor to their memory.

In 1872 the writer, as a member of the American Board's Japan mission, took up residence in Kobe and was appointed as medical director of the International Hospital there, and the following year to the Prefectural Hospital in Hiogo. Called to assist in controlling a severe epidemic of beriberi in the prison, he recognized a disease of which little was known and therefore requested permission to perform a post-mortem examination, subsequently using the unclaimed bodies of criminals for dissection. This request was granted

¹Other Medical Missionaries were: Dr. D. B. Simmons, Reformed Church; Dr. Henry Lanning, Episcopal, Osaka; Dr. R. B. Tensler, Episcopal, Tokyo; Dr. Wallace Taylor, American Board, Osaka; Dr. Arthur Adams, American Board, Osaka; Dr. H. Faulds, United Presbytery, Tokyo; Dr. Palm, Edinburgh Medical Missionary Society, Nigata; Dr. W. Norton Whitney, Friends, Tokyo; Dr. McDonald, Canadian Methodist, Shidznoka and Tokyo.

by the central government—the first dissection of a human body made in that prefecture.

In addition to the medical department of the Imperial University at Tokyo, numerous medical centers were rapidly established, while many prefectural governments soon had their own hospital and medical class—in most cases presided over by English, American or German physicians; while as soon as medical graduates were given to the country, these were employed in the larger hospitals first as assistants and then as medical chiefs. Thus in time the services of the foreign physicians became unnecessary.

At present there are three higher medical schools in the country, namely, at Tōkyō in the north, at Kyōtō in the center, and at Fukuoka toward the south. The course of study is four years. The teachers are wholly Japanese, the services of all the foreign teachers having been terminated by resignation or death. The title given to the graduates is *I-gaku-shi*, or Master of Medicine. In addition to the above, there are now eight other medical schools, three supported by the prefectural governments in which they are located and five by the general government. The course of these latter schools is also four years, but the entrance requirements are lower than of the higher schools. Many of the graduates take post graduate work abroad, usually in Germany, while a number have studied in England and in America, some at the expense of the government.

As is well known, the progress of medicine in Japan during the last thirty years has been unique. Physicians take early to specialties and form numerous fraternities for the promotion of the science. Of these there are thirty-nine prominent and prosperous associations, with many other minor organizations, and these deal with all the branches of medicine. They usually hold regular monthly meetings and many of these associations publish their own journals, in which are recorded the results of their investigations. Many of these associations have special laboratories and hospitals, and means for making the newest and most exhaustive researches. Some of these reports are printed

in English, some in German, but most in Japanese. Dr. Kitasato, distinguished abroad for having first discovered the diphtheria bacillus, and regarded in Vienna as having brought distinguished honor to the laboratory where the discovery was made, has one of the more celebrated laboratories, the Bacteriological Institute at Tokyo. Here physicians, both Japanese and foreign, may be taught the latest principles of bacteriology.

There are about fifty medical magazines now published in the country, many of which contain extracts from the latest English, American and German medical literature.

I should add that all the common schools of the country now have physicians appointed to their care whose duty it is to look after the general health and sanitary condition of the pupils and to make thorough physical examinations at fixed intervals. At the last census there were 9664 physicians thus employed.

The laws relating to the practice of medicine and surgery require that every practicing physician or surgeon shall hold a license from the Government. These licenses, except in the case of persons who were in practice before the year 1875, and in certain other cases, can only be obtained upon passing a satisfactory examination in natural philosophy, chemistry, anatomy, physiology, materia medica, general medicine, surgery, ophthalmology, obstetrics and clinical diagnosis. The first four of these branches constitute the first, and the following six branches the second, or *pass* examination. These examinations, which are held semi-annually, in different districts of the several prefectures of the empire, are conducted by a special officer detailed for the purpose. This officer is assisted by a certain number of prominent physicians, chemists, and professors, who are residents of the locality in which the examination is held. The time and place of these examinations are fixed by the home department and applications of candidates are required to be sent in at least one month before the examination takes place. The certificates of candidates must be signed by at least two practicing physicians or teachers of medicine, and no candidate

is eligible for the *first* examination until he has pursued his medical studies for eighteen months, and for the *second*, or *pass* examination, for three years. In case of rejection, the candidate may try again after six months.

The home department is empowered to grant licenses to practice, without examination, to those possessing the diplomas of the government medical schools or of recognized foreign medical schools; also, in special cases, for districts where there may be too few educated physicians, and where, in his opinion, necessity demands the presence of others. An official list of physicians licensed to practice is issued by the home department, while the licenses of those who have given up practice must be returned to the government. The licenses of physicians guilty of grave misdemeanor or of crimes, may be revoked either for a time or permanently, as the home minister on consultation with the central sanitary board may decide.

The last report of the sanitary bureau shows that there were 35,160 physicians in the country, of whom about 15,000 still practice, to some extent, the Chinese system, while about 7000 have graduated from the modern medical colleges. Of these latter, 1791 from the Imperial University at Tokyo, 354 from that at Kyoto and 236 from the Imperial University at Fukuoka. These, 2381, hold the higher title of *I-Gaku-shi*, or Master of Medicine. There are 2898 pharmacists, 26,837 apothecaries, 25,959 midwives and 4034 veterinary surgeons. The latter come under the control of the Agricultural Department.

THE SANITARY BOARD

The importance of hygiene was much appreciated and greatly emphasized in the early seventies, and a thoroughly competent physician, Dr. Sensai Nagayo, sent to America to study our system of medical education and public health. Later he crossed to England, and to Holland for further study and then, returning to Japan, applied himself with great devotion to carry out among his people the knowledge he had acquired abroad. It was he who introduced the

licentiate examination for physicians and the most notable book contributing to their aid at that time was Hartshorn's *Compendium*, which, when translated, was enthusiastically welcomed both by student and government. In 1876 this same Dr. Nagayo was sent to represent Japan at the International Medical Congress held at our Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia. This was the first time that Japan ever sent a representative to a meeting of an international character. The helpful items of information which Dr. Nagayo there found were: the methods of taking statistics of births and deaths; for preventing infectious diseases; problem of water supply; disposal of sewage; treatment of refuse; sanitation in railway carriages; regulations for food and drink, etc. Shortly after his return a severe epidemic of cholera invaded Japan, affording an opportunity for the use of the knowledge he had acquired abroad. But for the urgent demand arising from this fatal epidemic, for these preventive measures he would have experienced difficulty in overcoming conservative prejudice. Dr. Nagayo long remained at the head of the sanitary bureau and within twenty years Japan had made more signal progress in the practical application of sanitary science than any other nation in the same time. This she always acknowledged and still acknowledges as mainly due to the good influence of America and Americans. The value of the science of hygiene as enforced in Japan is especially emphasized by the fact that on the west she is related to countries where sanitary science has been but poorly understood and from which pestilence is so apt to invade Japan. This has emphasized her appreciation of the value of sanitary science; and her recent experience in the Japan-Russian war, in which the medical board had no difficulty in enforcing its requirements among the soldiers, shows how intelligently it is understood and valued by both government and people.

Numerous hygienic societies exist and the Woman's Hygienic Association now has several thousand members. These hold frequent meetings for discussion and for instruction by lectures. Hospitals are numerous, there being some-

thing over 1000 in the empire. Many of these are private; some are charity hospitals; and a few are for lepers.

NURSES

When your speaker, in 1883, proposed the establishment of a nurses' school and the training of Japanese women for the work of nursing, he was met by opposition, both from Japanese and from resident Europeans, on the ground that the status of the Japanese woman was such as to render such a step premature and hazardous.

The first nurses' school, thus proposed, was later established in Kyōtō in connection with the medical work of the American Board and the Dōshisha, and Miss Linda Richards, the first nurse graduated in New England, resigned her position as superintendent of nurses in the Boston City Hospital, to become the superintendent of the Kyōtō school. The first five thousand dollars for this work was given by the Woman's Board of Missions of Boston, in which the Branches of Worcester County took an active part. This Kyōtō school became a model for other schools, was visited by officials and others, and its rules and methods carefully studied. Today, nurses' schools exist in nearly every prefecture of the empire, in connection with private or prefectural hospitals.

The long position of subordination occupied by the Japanese woman, and the training of absolute obedience which she has had, especially fits her for the service of nursing; and though gentle and obedient, yet when brought face to face with any great emergency she manifests remarkable courage and fortitude.

In the early history of the Kyōtō school a striking illustration of this was seen in a medical service arising from earthquake, when, within ten minutes, ten thousand people were killed and fifty thousand injured. To the center of this disturbance I hurried with a corps of native assistants and nurses, where we found a surgical service almost unprecedented in its arduous responsibility. On the third day of that service, when amputating a leg at the knee joint and

about to pick up the arteries for ligation, the distant roar of an approaching earthquake shock was again heard. The large number of patients in the waiting room were hurriedly carried to the yard by their friends, but every nurse and medical assistant braced themselves for the shock, stood bravely by the patient, and steadily performed their respective duties. So too, in the great epidemics of cholera that have swept over the land, and again in the late Russo-Japanese war, these nurses have unflinchingly done their duty, with absolutely no fear of death.

In 1886, Japan was admitted to the Geneva Convention of the Red Cross Society. Today, this society has thirty-one branch offices in Japan, with a membership of more than thirty-five hundred.

At the suggestion of Count Ito there was later created the Volunteer Ladies Nursing Association which during the Japan-China war, became affiliated with the Red Cross Society. Devoted patriotism soon led ladies of rank to become members,—princesses, wives of nobility, of diplomatic staffs, and others, and today this association has forty-one branches and nearly ten thousand members. Ladies of high social standing studied nursing, and their influence has done much to elevate this work throughout the country. Its activity was greatly accentuated during the late national struggle with Russia, their work being to "make bandages and dressings, care for patients, furnish a portion of the personnel of the relief stations, visit hospitals, distribute magazines, and aid patients in their correspondence with friends." The members of this association fused so perfectly with those of the Red Cross Society, and this in turn with the personnel of the army medical department, that all worked together in perfect harmony.

It is important to bear in mind the work of these auxiliary organizations, so contributory to medical efficiency, when considering the latter work.

This hasty sketch of the long history of a great subject would be incomplete if it omitted to notice the triumph of Japan's Sanitary and Medical service in the Japan-Russian war. As introductory to this, and explaining the obedi-

ence of the Japanese soldier to the orders of the medical board, the peculiar military discipline of the Japanese army must be noted. The relation of the officer to the soldier is that of parent and child: the officer representing the emperor who in turn is the head of the national family. When therefore, the soldier is made acquainted with the wishes of his officer, he is expected to make every effort to carry them into effect.

The hard lessons learned in the earlier Japan-China war, when the rate of mortality from preventable disease was painfully high, emphasized the necessity of organized, scientific sanitation. The whole subject was therefore thoroughly investigated and developed, the best points of military sanitation in the German and French systems appropriated, supplemented by such modifications and additions as would meet Japan's peculiar conditions and needs. In the system as finally developed and in the men who were to carry it into effect, the nation had complete confidence. The soldier when leaving home, was made to fully understand this, and that, should he become disabled from any preventable disease, he would be looked upon by physicians, and by the public, as a credit neither to himself, his family, nor his country. He went to the war to obey orders. He was given his package of aseptic dressing, told to guard it carefully, and instructed how to use it when wounded; he was told to take a bath and put on clean under-clothing before going into battle; to keep a supply of boiled water or tea in his canteen; to drink no water when on the march, except from wells or springs previously labelled as safe by the sanitary officer. And because of his faith and implicit trust in his officers he religiously carried out these instructions. The confidence of the soldier in the commands of the medical officer was enhanced when he saw that the latter was honored by his emperor who bestowed upon him rank and reward for service, and exacted the most perfect harmony of action between the medical and the commanding officers.

Another important fact contributory to medical efficiency was the remarkable liberality of the government in its

allowance for medical supplies, number of medical officers, etc. The grand result was,—an army death-rate lower than that of any nation in any previous war in history,—a death-rate estimated by competent observers on the ground to be less than one-half that of the opposing army. Even with the ratio increased by the large number of deaths arising from beriberi which occurred late in the struggle, the ratio of death from wounds to death from disease was one to one and five-tenths and before that epidemic, 1 to 0.46. In the China-Japan war it was 1 to 12.09.

It should be remembered that this was due not to superior surgical skill, but (1) to the efficiency of the sanitary service and (2) to the intelligent obedience of the soldiers to sanitary requirements. Indeed the surgeons of the Japanese army, though in the main superior to those of the Russian army, were not distinguished for superior surgical skill. But they were humane in their treatment of their men, and to their honor be it said that there was no instance where a surgeon performed an unnecessary operation for the sake of perfecting his surgical technique; and this too, though there were 4517 medical officers in that service.

In closing, I would add but a word as to the present status of Japanese medicine. In the use of the microscope as a diagnostic aid, in pathology, in bacteriology and in ophthalmology, her specialists have attained to great eminence. In the medical treatment of disease and in general surgery, however, extreme conservatism and routine are conspicuous. This has resulted from the fact that for about a quarter of a century, the graduates from the medical department of the Imperial University at Tokyo, who in turn, have become the medical teachers and leading physicians of the nation, were, in internal medicine and in surgery, under the tutorage of but two men. These were eminent in their profession and their pupils were devotedly studious, but the training was from a limited view point and the routine and conservative methods of the present generation can be overcome only by a broader touch with the advanced medical and surgical knowledge of the world.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Centuries before the Christian era, Japan developed a system of medicine which in its close touch with nature, reflected the taste and instinct of a nature loving people. In the centuries which followed, this pure Japanese system was defended against the encroachments of the Chinese system and finally, by modifying it, did much to develop the latter to a point far beyond that which it ever attained in the country of its birth.

2. Chinese medicine, modified both by the Japanese system and by Buddhistic philosophy, maintained a growing influence for nearly two thousand years, until finally supplanted by the European school of rational medicine.

3. The auxiliaries to successful medical effort, viz., sanitary science and trained nurses, stand today on a high plain of development.

4. In microscopy, pathology, bacteriology and ophthalmology, Japanese specialists have attained to a high degree of eminence. In order that the practice of general medicine and of general surgery may be brought to equal eminence, a broad touch with the medical and surgical work of the world is necessary.

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THE NEW JAPAN

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Japan is in some respects one of the most attractive countries in the world. One who has visited it can never forget the charm of its hospitality, the neatness of the homes and villages, and the courageous energy with which the people are grappling with their new and difficult problems. Evidences of the new life which is stirring the nation are apparent on every hand. Tokyo, the intellectual and political center of the nation, has become one of the influential cities of the world. Osaka is the center of the new industrial Japan and there the commercial and manufacturing enterprises of the country may be seen on a large scale. The occasional traveler too often neglects this city, which is one of the most distinctive cities of modern Japan. Kyoto continues to be the artistic and Buddhistic heart of Japan. One does not expect to see much change in the sacred Shinto city of Yamada, or the shrines and temples of scenic and historic Nikko; but even there the traveler finds indications of progress. The new highway, three miles in length, connecting the two Shinto shrines at Yamada, is not surpassed by any road in Europe. Everywhere the traveler is charmed by the beauty of the scenery. Japan is a land of mountains and valleys, of streams and gardens. A journey through it is a succession of delights to the lover of nature, and even the humid heat of a Japanese August can be uncomplainingly borne when one can look upon scenes worth going far to see.

The contrast between Japan of today and the Japan which I found ten years ago is not so immediately apparent as one might imagine. Visibly there is comparatively little change. The charm of the Japanese scenery is still unmarred, save in a few places, by the crass materialism which in America lines our railways with huge signs advertising cathartics, bile beans,

soothing syrup, and pale pills for pink people. Japanese architecture is the same, save here and there a new public building is of foreign style. Increasing numbers of educated men wear European dress; but the native garments still predominate on the streets. The railway service is excellent; but the jinrickisha still awaits the traveler at every station, and the bare legged runner swiftly draws him over the smooth streets between the long rows of shops with their picturesque signs. The visitor can easily find external signs of changing conditions if he looks for them; and in some instances they obtrude themselves. Nevertheless, Japan, to the eye, is still Japan—the most beautiful land of northern Asia.

But as one moves among the people, he becomes conscious of subtler changes. Ten years ago, I found a militant Japan. The people had not recovered from their rage and chagrin over Russia's seizure of Port Arthur and Manchuria, thus depriving them of the hard-won fruits of the China-Japan war of 1894. The nation was thinking of revenge. It realized too that Russian aggressions must result in war. It was therefore drilling soldiers, building warships and accumulating military stores.

The Japan of today is not less militant than the Japan of former years. It understands perfectly that the Russians will not permanently acquiesce in the stinging defeat which was inflicted upon them. The Japanese know that the Koreans hate them and that the Chinese are jealous of them. They know too, that many foreigners throughout the Far East are suspicious of them. They discern, moreover, that the position which they have now won in the world in general and in the Far East in particular is one which can be held only by military force. The Japanese, therefore, are maintaining an army and navy at a high stage of efficiency. They do not need as large a standing army as some other nations, for in Japan practically every able-bodied man receives military training, and after his return to civil life, is amenable to his country's call at any time. One hears many stories to the effect that enormous stores of munitions of war are being accumulated. It is difficult to tell how far this is true; but no one doubts that

the Japanese are keeping themselves in first-class military condition just as the British, the Germans and the French are keeping themselves, and as a strong party wishes to keep the United States. All this is natural as conditions now are.

But Japan, while not less military, is more commercial than formerly. It understands war is a costly business. It spent \$585,000,000 in the Russian-Japan war, and the nation is staggering under the enormous debt of \$1,125,153,411, or \$21.50 per capita. People have to pay from 20 to 30 percent of their incomes for taxes and a Tokyo paper (the *Kokumin Shimfun*) says that "the heavy debts of Japan are more than the nation can endure." Japan realizes that its material resources are greatly inferior to those of most other first-class powers, and that the position and ambitions of the nation require wealth as well as an army and navy.

The Japanese cannot get this wealth by agriculture; for not only is Japan a comparatively small country territorially but only about 12 per cent of its area is easily susceptible of cultivation. It is a land of hills and mountains. The valleys are unusually rich, but they are not extensive and there are no vast stretches of rich prairie soil like those in Manchuria and the western part of the United States.

So the Japanese have entered upon a period of commercial and industrial development. They have studied to good effect the example of England and are trying to make themselves a manufacturing people. Trade is being fostered on a large scale. Factories, the best modern machinery, extensive shipping interests, and great business enterprises testify to the zeal with which the Japanese are entering the sphere of commercial activity. When one considers the contempt with which trade was regarded by feudal Japan only a few decades ago, he is amazed by the skill and persistence with which the new Japan is striving for the mastery in the markets of the world. It is not easy for the white races to compete with them. The Japanese already lead in the trade of the Pacific ocean, and dominate that of Korea and Manchuria. They are competing with foreign and Chinese steamship lines on the Yang-tze River to Hankow, planting colonies in every

port city of the Far East, and running their steamships to Europe, America, India and Australia.

The advantages of Japan in this commercial rivalry are short haul, cheap labor, control of transportation lines both by land and sea, and government subsidies. Several of the great enterprises of modern Japan are controlled either directly or indirectly by the Government. In some instances, the government owns them outright; in other instances high officials and members of the Imperial Family are heavy stockholders. The *Financial Economic Annual*, issued by the Government, states that in 1905, out of a total of 4,783 miles, the state owned and operated 1,531 miles of railway. By the railway nationalization law and the railway purchase law, passed in March 1906, the Government acquired ownership and control of all the lines in the country, with the exception of a few of relatively little importance. Its holdings now represent about 90 per cent of the total mileage. Payment for the lines purchased is to be made by public loan bonds aggregating nearly \$250,000,000. The Japanese people are moving as a unit in the furtherance of their commercial ambitions. The business man does not have to fight alone for foreign trade, as the American tradesman must. He has the backing of the nation. Allied industries support him. Shipping companies give him every possible advantage. He is, to use an American term, a part of an immense "trust," only the trust is virtually a government instead of a corporation.

I heard much criticism of Japanese commercial methods. European and American business men spoke with great bitterness of their unfairness. They alleged that Japanese firms obtain railway rebates; that transportation lines are so managed that Japanese firms have their freight promptly forwarded while foreign firms are subject to ruinous delays; that foreign labels and trade marks are placed upon inferior goods, so that it is difficult to sell a genuine brand to an Asiatic, as the latter believes that he can get the same brand from a Japanese at a lower price. They also alleged that foreign traders in Manchuria are compelled to pay full duties upon all goods, but that the Japanese, through their absolute

control of the only railway, are able to evade the customs. It was said that of \$12,000,000 worth of Japanese goods which went into Dairen in a single year, only \$3,000,000 worth paid duty. For a long time, Japanese goods were poured into Manchuria at An-tung on the Yalu River. Then foreign powers encouraged the Chinese to place an inspector of the Imperial Chinese Customs at An-tung. The Japanese could not oppose this, but they did their best to have a Japanese inspector chosen. An American in the customs service, however, was appointed. His experience in endeavoring to enforce the laws against the Japanese would make interesting reading, if it is ever published.

The rage and chagrin of European and American business men in the Far East can better be imagined than described. A disgusted foreigner declared to me that there is not a white man in the Far East, except those in the employ of the Japanese, who are friendly toward them, and that their dominant characteristics are "conceit and deceit." He denied not only the honesty but even the courage of the Japanese, insisting that the capture of Port Arthur was not due to the bravery of the assailants, but to the incompetence of the defenders. He said that the Russian soldiers were as heroic as any in the world; but that their officers were drunkards and debauchees, and that the war department, which should have sustained them, was rotten with corruption. He stated that at the battle of Liao Yang, both Russian and Japanese generals gave the order for retreat at about the same time, each feeling that the battle was lost; but that the Russian regiments received their order first, and that as the Japanese saw them retreat, they moved forward. He held that the anti-Japanese agitation in the public schools of San Francisco was secretly fomented and made an international incident by the Japanese themselves, in order to divert attention from what they were doing in Manchuria; and more to the same effect.

I have cited these opinions as they are illustrative of many that I heard in the Far East. I need hardly say that I regard them as unjust. Their very bitterness indicates the prejudice which gave some of them birth and added exaggeration to others. Even if they were all true, the Japanese

are simply doing what it is notorious that some American corporations have been doing for years. Rebates, adulteration, evasion of customs, short weight, unfair crushing of competitors, and kindred methods, are not so unfamiliar to Americans that they need lift hands of holy horror when they hear about them in Asia.

The fact is that the white trader has had, until recently, his own way in the Far East. He has cajoled and bullied and threatened and bribed the Asiatic to his heart's content and his pocket's enrichment. He has dominated the markets, charged what prices he pleased, and reaped enormous profits. When he has gotten into trouble with local authorities, he has called upon his government to help him out of the scrape. The story of the dealing of western nations in Asia includes some of the most disgraceful incidents in history. Now, for the first time, the white man finds himself face to face with an Asiatic who can beat him at his own game. The Japanese are commercially ambitious and want those rich markets for themselves. They are going after them and getting them. It is rather late in the day for white men to go into paroxysms of grief and indignation over commercial methods they themselves have long practiced. I do not mean to be understood as excusing such methods in the Japanese or anyone else. I am simply calling attention to the fact that the Japanese are a strong, alert, aggressive and ambitious people, who have precisely those ambitions for supremacy which characterize white men.

The Japanese are developing almost as much of a colonizing spirit as the Chinese. Like the latter, they are seeking distant lands, and like them, too, they are succeeding in them. The pressure in population of Japan has already been noted. The Empire had 37,017,362 inhabitants in 1883; 39,607,254 in 1888; 41,388,313 in 1893; 43,763,855 in 1898; 46,732,807 in 1903; 48,649,583 in 1906; and it now has over 50,000,000 exclusive of Formosa and Korea. The cost of living is rising. The limit of the soil productiveness has been reached and Japan has to import food for her people. In a recent year she purchased abroad 4,296,418 piculs of rice, chiefly from China, Siam and Burma, and 4,294,267 piculs of beans, the

latter largely from Manchuria. She bought flour in the United States to make bread for her troops during the war, and her imports of this staple in the following year cost \$1,819,166. It will readily be understood that possession of Formosa, Korea and Lower Manchuria and a strong navy mean the very life of the nation.

Japan's new and rapidly enlarging foreign trade also involves the residence in other lands of some of her subjects. There is a large Japanese population in Korea, Manchuria, Formosa and the Hawaiian Islands, and an increasing one in the ports of China. The Japanese population in the United States was 71,712 in 1909 and is probably about the same now.

A discussion of the problem of Japanese emigration to the United States does not fall within the scope of this article. The agitation in California and the national complications that ensued are well known. Lest we be misled by newspaper reports about the danger of having "great numbers of Japanese men sitting beside little American girls" in the schools of San Francisco, we may recall the result of inquiries by Mr. George Kennan, as published in the *Outlook* of June, 1907. He found that of 28,736 pupils in the public schools of San Francisco, only 93 were Japanese; that 28 of these were girls; that 34 of the boys were under fifteen years of age; that of the 31 over fifteen years of age, only two were as old as twenty, and that the average age of the rest was seventeen. All but six were in grades with Americans of the same age. The number of "Japanese men sitting beside little American girls" therefore consisted of just six youths under twenty, and these were divided among four schools—one in each of three schools and three in the other.

The story of moral and spiritual development in Japan is replete with interest. It is difficult to realize that when Dr. James Hepburn arrived in Japan in 1859, he was not permitted to preach; and that the only opportunity he could find to do anything, except literary work in his own study, was to teach English to a few boys whose fathers were desirous of having them learn the leading language of Western nations. Now the Rev. Allen Klein Faust, Ph.D., in his

Christianity as a Social Factor in Modern Japan, says that there are 1,031 foreign missionaries in Japan, 1,847 Japanese ministers, evangelists, missionaries and teachers; 161,228 communicant members of churches, and half a million adherents. That is, 1 in every 100 of the population is an adherent of Christianity, and 1 in every 320 is a baptized communicant. These figures include the Greek and Roman Catholic and Protestant Missions. Protestants have 186 schools with 17,664 students; Roman Catholics 51 schools with 6,183 students; and Greek Catholics 3 schools with 328 students.

The influence of Christianity is far greater than these figures would indicate. In most countries, Christianity made its first converts among the lower strata of society, but in Japan it has won its greatest successes among the Samurai or knightly class, the class which has furnished the majority of the army and navy officers, journalists, legislators, educators, and leading men generally of the new Japan. It can readily be understood, therefore, that the Japanese churches have a strength out of all proportion to their numbers. Fourteen members of the Lower House are Christians. A former President of the House was a Presbyterian elder. Christians may be found among the influential men in almost every walk of life. At the semi-centennial Conference in 1909, the Rev. Dr. Imbrie said:

Fifty years ago, notice-boards were standing on the high-ways declaring Christianity a forbidden religion; today these same notice boards are seen standing in the museum in Tokyo as things of historical interest. Fifty years ago, religious liberty was a phrase not yet minted in Japan; today it is written in the constitution of the nation. Less than fifty years ago, the Christian Scriptures could be printed only in secret; today Bible societies scatter them far and wide without let or hindrance. Fifty years ago, there was not a Protestant Christian in Japan; today they are to be found among the members of the imperial diet, the judges in the courts, the professors in the imperial university, the editors of influential newspapers, the officers of the army and navy.

Count Okuma, former prime minister of Japan, in a remarkable address at the same conference, is reported in the *Japan Daily Mail*, October 9, 1909, as follows:

He was glad of this opportunity to express a word of hearty congratulation to those who were assembled to celebrate this semi-centennial of Christian work in Japan. Though not himself a professed Christian, he confessed to have received great influence from the creed, as have many others throughout Japan. This is a most important anniversary for the country. It represents the work of one whole age in our history, during which most marvelous changes have taken place. He came in contact with, and received great impulses from, some of the missionaries of that early period, particularly from Dr. Verbeck, who was his teacher in English and history and the Bible, and whose great and virtuous influence he can never forget. Though he could do little direct evangelistic work then, all his work was Christian, and in every thing he did, his Christian-like spirit was revealed. The coming of missionaries to Japan was the means of linking this country to the Anglo-Saxon spirit to which the heart of Japan has already responded. The success of Christian work in Japan can be measured by the extent to which it has been able to infuse the Anglo-Saxon and the Christian spirit into the nation. It has been the means of putting into these fifty years an advance equivalent to that of one hundred years. Japan has a history of 2,500 years, and 1,500 years ago had advanced in civilization and domestic arts, but never took wide views nor entered upon wide work. Only by the coming of the West in its missionary representatives and by the spread of the Gospel, did the nation enter upon world-wide thoughts and world-wide work. This is the great result of the Christian spirit. To be sure, Japan had her religions and Buddhism prospered greatly; but this prosperity was largely through political means. Now this creed has been practically rejected by the better classes, who spiritually thirsty, have nothing to drink. While extending congratulations upon the advance made thus far, he prayed for still greater effort and advance in the future and such advance as should be manifest in lives of lofty virtue of the Verbeck kind. To teach the Bible was all right, but to act it was better. Japan is well advanced in scientific knowledge, but head and heart are not yet on a level. Profession and conduct ought to go together. Only thus can evangelistic work be counted a success.

The secular press does not fail to note the trend, for we find in the *Japanese Advertiser* for December 25, 1910, the following editorial:

There can be no gainsaying that the Christmas season, quite apart from its religious significance, is making great headway in this country. A walk through the streets of Tokyo today gives abundant evidence of the influence of the season, for all the shops are stocked with goods that are associated with the foreign Christmas quite as much as with the Japanese new year. In the tram cars, one sees advertisements of Christmas novelties, crackers and the like, intended for the Japanese eye. Dotted throughout the city are the

Christian churches, each one of which is now engaged in celebrating the holy season with religious services, as well as sacred concerts and other entertainments suitable to the occasion. It must be conceded that Christianity is making great progress in a country where its principal festivals are coming to be accepted by the mass of the people, even if that acceptance is only concerned with the purely secular manifestations of the faith. It is a great stride forward compared to what it was only a few years ago when the attitude of the people was still antagonistic toward the religion which, together with all its associations, they regarded with contempt. Doubtless those whose memory carries them back a generation could describe vividly the changes that have come over the people in this connection.

I would not make too much of these facts. Japan is still far from being a Christian nation. The obstacles yet to be surmounted are numerous and formidable. But it is indisputable that Christian ideas are permeating the literature and the thinking of Japan to a far greater extent than is commonly realized.

I confess to a deep and sympathetic interest in the future of the Japanese. Irritating as some of their methods are, trying as it is for the proud and arrogant Anglo-Saxon to feel that at last he has met a competitor whom he cannot easily overcome, I confess that these things increase rather than diminish my respect. Here is a people whom it is worth while to reach. Are we to concentrate our activities on inferior peoples? Has America no message for the strong and masterful races of the non-Christian world? I like the Japanese the more because they are united, ambitious and aggressive. I do not defend their vices any more than I defend the vices of my countrymen; but I want to see the Japanese united with the best people of Europe and America in the service of Christ. Forces and temptations which prevail in America, but which numerous and powerful Christian churches help us to fight, are surging into Japan where the opposing forces of righteousness are still comparatively new and small. It is Christ alone that keeps the United States from utter moral lawlessness and disintegration. We ought to be profoundly concerned that the Japanese should have the same Christ to help them. I want to see Christian missions in Japan strengthened, not because I regard the Japanese as

inferiors, not because I feel that we deserve any credit for the knowledge of Christ which was brought to us from the outside, but because I regard the Japanese as fellowmen and because I know that they need the same Christ that I need.

The Japanese already have a political vision. They dream of the leadership of Asia, and they are preparing for it with a skill and energy which elicit the wonder of the world. They already have a commercial vision, and they are strenuously trying to realize it. They already have an intellectual vision and they have built up one of the best educational systems in the world. Baron Kikuchi says that 96 per cent of the children of school age in Japan are in schools, the highest percentage of any nation in the world. What Japan needs is a spiritual vision which will purify and glorify these other visions. This spiritual vision is vital to the future of Japan. Few foreigners have been so deeply in sympathy with the Japanese as the late Lafcadio Hearn; but in his chapter on "The Genius of Japanese Civilization" he wrote:

The psychologist knows that the so-called adoption of western civilization within a time of thirty years cannot mean the addition to the Japanese brain of any organs of power previously absent from it. He knows that it cannot mean any sudden change in the mental or moral character of the race. Such changes are not made in a generation. Transmitted civilization works much more slowly, requiring even hundreds of years to produce certain permanent psychological results. . . . It is quite evident that the mental readjustments, effected at a cost which remains to be told, have given good results only along directions in which the race has always shown capacities of special kinds Nothing remarkable has been done, however, in directions foreign to the national genius. . . . To imagine that the emotional character of an Oriental race could be transformed in the short space of thirty years by the contact of Occidental ideas is absurd. . . . All that Japan has been able to do so miraculously well has been done without any self-transformation, and those who imagine her emotionally closer to us today than she may have been thirty years ago, ignore the facts of science which admit of no argument.¹

The Japanese mind has long been adapted to war, to politics, and to certain kinds of industrial and scientific development. Knowledge of western methods and discoveries has simply enabled the Japanese to do more effectively and on

¹ Kokoro, pp. 16-18.

a larger scale what they had been doing after a fashion before. The spiritual realm, however, is a new world to them. Shintoism and Buddhism have not known, and therefore could not make known, a personal God. In his instructive book, *The Future of Japan*, W. Petrie Watson declares that religion, conceived as God and as a final and sufficient explanation of all phenomena, is not a Japanese notion; and that of a religion as it is conceived in Europe, there is little or none in Japan. The Japanese regard religion as subordinate in life, and the temper of their mind is such that it is usually difficult for them to acquire a just view of its authority and indispensableness in individual and national existence. His conclusion is that Japan is addressing herself to the great responsibilities of the modern world without any religion at all, in the proper sense of the term; and that the effort is pathetic and disappointing rather than heroic and inspiring, since there is no fresh beginning of history which has not been born from a new religion or from the new interpretation of an existing religion. He admires the administrative efficiency with which Japan is doing her work at present, and the splendid enthusiasm which it is bringing to its present tasks; but even savages are often recklessly brave and eagerly willing to die for their leader. There is therefore reason for profound anxiety as we study the relations which Japan has formed with the modern world and the power that she is exerting. Only as the Japanese grasp Christ's high ideals of life and build upon the solid foundation of Christ's teachings will they be able to maintain themselves as a great power. The Japanese must be brought within view of the necessity of a religious interpretation of life, ampler, clearer and more categorical than that which they have found or can find either in a religion of loyalty, or in Bushi-do, or in esoteric Buddhism, or in superstitious Shintoism. Japan can not hope to reap the results of the religion of Europe without an ultimate reckoning with their case.²

Thoughtful Japanese are beginning to see this. Various utterances of her leading men might be cited. Baron Mak-

² *The Future of Japan*, cf. especially chapters xiv, xxviii and xxx.

ino, minister of education, said to the secretary of the Young Men's Christian Association: "We are greatly distressed about the moral condition of the students and the low character of the ordinary lodging houses where young men live and shall welcome whatever help the Young Men's Christian Association can do to help solve the problem." Prince Ito, in a notable address, laid down the following propositions: That no nation could prosper without material improvement; that material prosperity cannot last long without a moral backbone; that the strongest backbone is that which has a religious sanction behind it.³ Equally significant was the remark of Baron Shibusawa, the distinguished chairman of the commission of representative business men of Japan which visited the United States some time ago. In an address at a dinner in New York he declared:

Japan in the future must base her morality on religion. It must be a religion that does not rest on an empty superstitious faith, like that of some of the Buddhist sects in our land; but must be like the one that prevails in your own country, which manifests its power over men by filling them with good works.

The very solidarity of the Japanese would make their influence for Christ more powerful than that of almost any other people in Asia. The spirit of self-sacrifice which is so prominent in the Japanese character, the absolute willingness to dare and to die for the nation which hurled the Japanese corps as one man upon the fortifications of Port Arthur and enabled them to capture what probably no other army in the world could have captured, would, if pervaded and inspired by the Vision of Christ, make the Japanese among the most nobly effective peoples that the world has known. To give them the Christ who can do this is worthy of every possible effort on our part.

³ *The Japan Mail*, September 4, 1909.

THE MODERN JAPANESE CHRISTIAN CHURCH
ITS RELATIONS TO MISSIONS IN JAPAN; TO THE
EVANGELIZATION OF THE ORIENT; TO THE ULTI-
MATE INTERPRETATION OF CHRISTIANITY

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The subject assigned me confines the discussion within rather narrow limits. The term "modern," as applied to foreign missions, commonly signifies roughly the nineteenth century. For Japan then it includes only the period subsequent to Perry's treaty, 1854. "Japanese Christian Church" I interpret to mean, for the purposes of this paper, not the church in Japan but the Christian church in so far as it has come under Japanese administration—become, so to speak, indigenous, "Japanese." Thus it will be seen that the work of the Jesuits in the sixteenth century and the work of several modern foreign missions which is still under the administration of the European missionary, effective and noble as all that work has been and is, does not here come under review. This paper deals rather only with those communions that have lately become nationalized.

BEGINNINGS

It goes without saying that the Christian church in Japan was the fruit of the labors of the foreign missionary as the first human agency. When the first modern missionaries went to Japan there was no church and barring some believers who remained from the work of Xavier, who for generations handed down their faith from father to son, and who held that faith only in secret, there were no Christians. Not only so, there was not even an ear to hear. The faith and teaching which the missionaries

took was a bitterly hated and strictly prohibited thing. At first then the missionaries sowed the seed, and reaped the first-fruits, preached, taught, baptized and gathered into churches. It could not be otherwise.

EARLY GROWTH

The first church was organized at Yokohama, March 10, 1872. It consisted of nine members, was not denominational, and was felicitously named "The Church of Christ in Japan."

From this early time the Japanese Christians were zealous for the conversion of their countrymen. During the next decade to be sure the missionaries took the leading part in Christian work and exercised, directly or indirectly, very large influence in the affairs of the young churches themselves. But the members of the little native Christian community nearly all took upon themselves responsibility for bringing others to the knowledge of the truth. At the beginning of the decade the idea seemed to obtain that to become a Christian was to become an evangelist; and by the latter part of the decade native ministers had been trained in theology and some were ordained. Little missionary societies were organized, some of which have lived and grown till today; and at least one Christian weekly began to be published.

The next two decades (1883-1903) saw many vicissitudes, seed sowing and rapid ingathering—some years the church membership was increased by more than a half or almost doubled—now a season of reaction when Christianity lost favor among the people, and again a period of readjustment when numerical growth was much retarded and theological beliefs were greatly and rapidly modified, when faith was shaken and some strong workers swerved from their pristine faith and left the ministry; some left the church altogether. Later, just before the next period when began the absorbing quest for a healthy independence, the church settled down to a more normal growth. But amidst all the vicissitudes of these two decades there was advance

in numbers, advance in intelligence of the faith, advance in the institutions of organized Christianity, advance in the responsibility borne by the Japanese ministers, advance in the whole life of the church toward a native, Japanese form of Christianity.

REACHING MATURITY

From the comparatively early days of the organized churches there were in each of the larger communions strong men, Japanese, who were capable of leading in the organization of the churches themselves and in that of the other institutions of the Christian community. They were effective preachers, some of them preëminent. Others wielded a powerful pen. There were within the churches educators of influence and laymen of national, even of international fame for the institutions which they founded in the spirit of the Master for the salvation of the orphan, the wayward, the ex-convict, and for other unfortunates. There had grown up a body of men in the churches who were in fact what some of them have since come to be called in word "The Leader." Back of them too the rank and file of the church membership were full of an increasingly strong desire for independence.

At the same time the most influential missionaries to Japan, both those who bore commission from American and European missionary boards and the few like Janes at Kumamoto and Clark at Sapporo who were providentially led to Japan just at the psychological moment, and who served her people for very limited periods, were men who appreciated that Christianity is a life and not form and dogma. They were content to see Western *forms* of church life and Western *statements* of Christian truth disregarded, if only the *life* itself and the *truth* itself should take root in the hearts of the people. Mark Hopkins when president of the American Board said, "It is our business to make Christians and not Congregationalists." This was from the first the attitude of the American Board's mission. It was largely the attitude also of the missions

of other communions. The Right Reverend Bishop Andrews, English Bishop of the Episcopal Church in Hokkaido, regards self-support as a most vital question in the Japanese church today, not to save a few pounds of gold to the English church, but to bring to the Japanese church a new life in all its abundance. In the interest of self-support and independence a portion of the missionary work within his diocese and in that of Kyushu too has been made diocesan.

The fundamental purpose then of most of the missions to inculcate the Christian life in such wise that it should manifest itself in forms and expressions native to the country; the increasing number and power of individual Japanese "leaders" fitted by inheritance and training, by real ability, and by personal experience of the Christian life for wise and effective leadership; and the increasing readiness on the part of the laity to assume the responsibilities, financial and other, of a self-supporting, self-propagating Japanese church—all these things conspired to encourage the hope of an early realization of a thoroughly nationalized Christianity.

At this juncture came the Russian War of 1904-5 with its uninterrupted series of signal victories for the Japanese arms. The terms of the Portsmouth treaty of peace were unsatisfactory to a portion of the Japanese public. But the eighteen months of fighting and of successes culminating in the wonderful battles of Moukden by land and of Tsushima in the Japan Sea served as a powerful stimulus to the already rising national self-consciousness. The nation came to a vivid sense of its power and importance and to a no less vivid sense of its responsibility in the Eastern world and in the whole world.

And just as the nation was stimulated by these events so also was the Christian community. The churches came to feel more keenly than ever the need, the compelling importance, of complete independence of any thing that looked like foreign control. Should the spirit of the church of Christ lag behind the spirit of the nation? The Christians must needs have this independence alike for their

own self-respect and for their standing in the eyes of the non-Christian public. To continue to have his affairs controlled by the foreign emissary marked the Japanese Christian in his own eyes and in the eyes of his non-Christian neighbor as falling in point of citizenship and nationalism below his fellow-countrymen. To continue receiving financial aid from foreign mission boards moreover seemed to imply some sort of foreign control in the affairs of the churches aided. Two decades earlier the Christian leaders had been recognized as the leaders in society at large. Now they are losing this leadership and falling to a place of relatively inferior influence and power. Something must be done. Obviously the first thing to be done was to secure full independence of foreign control and in order to this independence of control the churches must rise to independence of financial aid. Men of spiritual insight also saw that only by such independence and self-support could the churches rise to their opportunity and worthily present Christ to their fellow-countrymen, not to mention neighboring peoples. Thus it transpired that since about the time of the Russo-Japanese War all the churches experienced a great impulse toward independence and self-support and three great communions, the Congregational, Presbyterian and Methodists, have already attained to that goal.

The history of this phase of church development is intensely interesting and profoundly important. As we proceed in the study of the times it will become apparent that almost everything really turns upon financial self-support and very little need be said about independence of mission control *per se*. The reason is not far to seek. In the great communions the churches from earliest times had developed a considerably self-governing organization. This is most strikingly illustrated perhaps in churches of the Congregational order of government where the local church alone is the seat of authority and that local church is organized to conduct its own affairs without vote or voice from the outside. But self-government is hardly less a fact in the Presbyterian order, for here also the local church

is first, and is self-governing through its session. Later a group of such local churches form themselves into a Presbytery which is self-governing, ordering certain phases of the life of the local churches of which it is composed but not looking to any higher authority outside itself until a group of Presbyteries organize themselves into Synod or Assembly to be over them an authority within limits. In the Methodist churches also which are Episcopal in order and have a foreign bishop appointed by the home churches great pains seems to have been taken by the missions in Japan to give large place to the voice of the native brethren in matters of church government.

Let us glance now somewhat in detail at the later steps of development of the three great communions in attaining to full self support and independence.

In the Kumi-ai (Congregational) body as above intimated, owing to the policy of the American Board mission, to the earnestness and ability of the Japanese ministers, and to the intrinsic character of the Congregational polity, there had been from early times local churches self-governing, local associations self-governing and a National Council, meeting annually, self-governing. Still there was a certain indefiniteness in the relations between these several self-governing bodies on the one hand and the American Board mission on the other. There was perhaps a modicum of influence emanating from the mission by virtue of the financial aid granted to a few of the local churches and by virtue too of the coöperation by men and money of the mission with the national body and in some instances with a local association or even with a local church in regular evangelism in new fields. There was need of clearly defining relations, of sealing the independence of the Kumi-ai body, and of forming plans by which that body could push evangelization in a way more adequate to the spirit of the times and more adequate to the great opportunity.

Accordingly in 1905 two committees, one of the Kumi-ai churches and one of the American Board mission, were chosen to consult together about ways and means. The joint meetings of these two committees were marked by

frank expression of opinion and great cordiality of feeling. The Japanese committee were eager for some plan by which should be ushered in a new and more effective era in the development of their churches and also a forward movement in the evangelization of their country. It was finally proposed by the missionaries that the Japan Missionary Society, organ of the Kumi-ai churches, take over some thirty of the churches and congregations hitherto aided by the mission and become responsible for their support and development. The Kumi-ai committee, after due deliberation, heroically accepted this heavy responsibility. For this purpose a budget was made up of two items, first 8700 *yen* as a parting gift from the mission to the thirty churches, to be paid during three years, and second the promise of the Japanese body to raise 6000 *yen* during a like period. At the expiration of the three years "eighteen churches had actually assumed self-support, and six had been handed over by the Japan Missionary Society to the local associations within whose borders each was located. Three more attained self-support January 1, 1909, and the remaining are under some kind of provisional care."¹ Since January 1, 1909, the Kumi-ai body has been fully self-governing, self-supporting and self-propagating; it might also be added self-respecting—a veritable pillar and ground of the truth.

For the "Church of Christ in Japan," as the churches of Presbyterian government are called, unfortunately the way to a like independence lacked something of perfect harmony between the Church and the associated missions. To begin with there were four associated missions to be dealt with, Presbyterian North, Presbyterian South, German Reformed and Dutch Reformed; and these four missions differed somewhat among themselves in their opinions as to relations with the native church. A slight difference of theological belief and a question concerning the use in the Meiji Gakūin Theological School of W. N. Clarke's *An Outline of Christian Theology* had arisen to disturb some-

¹Christian Movement in Japan, 1909, p. 224.

what a perfect cordiality of feeling. When negotiations for the adjustment of coöperative relations between the church and the missions began moreover there was a tendency on both sides to insist upon rights.

In February, 1906, a committee of the Synod of the "Church of Christ in Japan" (Presbyterian) made the following statement: "It is now more than thirty years since the church was founded. It extends from one end of Japan to the other, and carries on its work through a Synod and Presbyteries. It has a board of missions actively engaged in the work of evangelization and the establishing of churches. Therefore it seems to it reasonable to claim that it has a right to a voice in all work carried on within its organization or closely connected with it. That is the principle for which the Synod stands; and for which it believes that churches in other lands, under like circumstances, would stand."²

On the other hand, some of the missions were disposed to urge their rights. Dr. Arthur J. Brown in his discussion at the World's Missionary Conference, 1910, said: "I heard a great deal during my tour in Asia about the rights of the boards and societies in the missions which ought to be preserved. I would rather go to the other extreme and say, 'we have no rights in Asia and Africa except the rights to serve our brother in the name of Christ.'"³ This insisting on rights by both parties, theological differences, etc., proved considerable of a hindrance to the progress of the negotiations and somewhat of a disturber of cordial feeling. But these things could at worst only retard somewhat such an adjustment of relations as should ultimately leave the native church a thoroughly self-governing, self-supporting and self-propagating church of Christ. And that consummation has now been successfully reached with two methods of coöperation or affiliation with the four associated missions, according as each mission may elect.

The same kind of movement for independence occurred

²World's Missionary Conference, 1910, vol. 2, p. 36.

³World's Missionary Conference, 1910, vol. 2, p. 345.

in the Methodist fellowship. In a general conference, May 22-June 2, 1907, was consummated a union which consolidated into one Japan Methodist Church results of the work of missions of the Methodist Episcopal, Methodist Episcopal Church, South, and the Methodist Church, Canada. On Sunday, June 2, Rev. Yoitsu Honda was duly consecrated as first bishop of the new united Japan Methodist Church. Bishop Honda is the first Japanese bishop of any church. He is probably the first bishop to be consecrated from any of the Far Eastern peoples.

With regard to the relations of the missionaries to this new church, the Japanese members of the conference made the overture which is embodied in the following resolution:

Resolved: That every missionary regularly appointed by the Methodist Episcopal Church, the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, or the Methodist Church, Canada, to work in coöperation with the Methodist Church of Japan, as contemplated in the basis of union adopted by the commissioners of said churches, shall by virtue of such appointment be entitled to all the rights and privileges of actual membership in the annual conference where his service is being rendered, so long as his administration and conduct conform to our discipline.

Every such missionary who may in writing elect to serve in this relation shall be subject to the assignment and direction of the missionary authorities of the church by which he is supported, in consultation with the *Kantoku* (bishop).

In the event of his non-conformity to our discipline, the *Kantoku* shall in writing so advise the missionary authorities of the church to which such missionary is responsible; and the course to be pursued shall then be determined by consultation between the *Kantoku* and said missionary authorities.⁴

These terms were considered quite satisfactory and were cordially accepted by most of the missionaries. Accordingly the missionaries now "are either *Bucho* (presiding elders or chairmen), evangelists at large itinerating over part or the whole of a district, or by the joint action of the appointing power of their respective missions and Bishop Honda, assigned to the oversight of particular fields, or, in some cases, they are left free to develop work

⁴Cary's History of Christianity in Japan, p. 341.

of their own in the cities where they reside or in the surrounding country, alway however making it contributory to the work of the Japan Methodist Church."⁵

The Episcopal and Connexional organization is proving a heavy financial burden but the brethren are struggling with it manfully and in time they are bound to win out.

Through this somewhat detailed survey it will be seen that Christianity in its Congregational, Presbyterian and Methodist forms has taken root in Japan. The institution of the church has become native to the soil. It has become nationalized. The other communions are pressing on toward the same state of maturity. For the most part the foreign and native workers alike are eagerly anticipating the day when each can say, "our church has been planted in Japan."

RELATION OF NATIVE CHURCHES TO MISSIONARIES

There was a period of about a decade just before the negotiations for independence above outlined when the relations between the missionaries and their Japanese brethren were from time to time considerably strained. It was a period when the Japanese and foreign workers were coöperating in the work of Christianizing Japan, but the methods of coöperation were less clearly defined. The missions were working along the lines that had been in use for many years. They were sometimes inclined to regard themselves as the principal workers and their Japanese brethren as "helpers," "native agents," or what-not, according to the terminology of the home boards used in statistical tables and in reports where the work among uncivilized tribes and highly civilized peoples was all treated alike. The foreigners were also not infrequently rather over tenacious of "orthodox" statements of Christian truth, despite the fact that it was their general purpose to promulgate a life rather than a form, the truth of salvation rather than any statement of that truth. They

⁵Christian Movement in Japan, 1909, p. 294.

also felt such responsibility toward their home boards in the administration of funds as now and again gave offense. In short, the missionaries had not yet become fully acclimated. They were still working in a sort of religious extra-territorial atmosphere.

At the same time, the real life of the Japanese churches and ministers was rapidly developing. Their leaders were more and more becoming competent leaders. They chafed under the financial restraints. Their Oriental intuition in the interpretation of the Oriental Bible and the Oriental Christ made it impossible for them to express their faith in the terms of Occidental, much less in those of medieval creedal statements; and the mere suggestions of the "native helpers" sort of missionary report, however much they might be explained away, were an offense to the sensitive Japanese spirit. Moreover, our Japanese brethren felt that all this sort of relation of subordination to the foreign propagandists prejudiced them in the eyes of their own nationals and greatly hindered the progress of the Gospel and the growth of their churches.

The actual working out of such relations moreover, in all honesty be it confessed, led to no little mutual irritation and friction. Occasionally, a joint committee of Japanese and foreigners would be divided concerning some question under discussion exactly on race lines. This fact itself tended to rouse feelings other than fraternal. Is it any wonder that both Japanese "leaders" and foreign workers earnestly desired a better way? The wonder is that the missionaries didn't sense the situation and remedy it earlier. But perhaps the time and the native church were not ripe for the change much earlier than it came.

Now that the organic relations between the three great Japanese bodies and the associated missions have been clearly defined the relations of the individual missionary have also become clear and pleasant. There is a new cordiality on the part of the churches, their laity and their ministry alike, toward the foreign missionary. They rejoice in our presence, welcome our aid and seek an increase in our numbers. They welcome us as individuals

into church fellowship and as members of the churches they welcome us to a place in the local and national bodies. In the Methodist body foreigners in some cases serve as presiding elders. The happy solution of the problem of relations in these three bodies, Congregational, Presbyterian and Methodist, has blazed the way for a like happy adjustment in all the other communions which will undoubtedly in due time be fully realized.

INCREASED AGGRESSIVENESS

Beginning with the period of endeavor on the part of the Japanese churches for a full independence—for convenience, say the close of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905—there has been a notable increase in activity, a new aggressiveness amongst the churches. Old lines of effort have been retained and vigorously pushed. Individuals of the Christian community have zealously and effectively led in various forms of eleemosynary work, orphanages, prison-gate efforts, schools for the blind, etc. Still eleemosynary work is the point perhaps where today the churches most feel their inadequacy, a point also at which foreign workers are able to render most effective service. They are doing so in the rescue of fallen women, in settlement work, in leper hospitals and in other like endeavor.

There is an increasing volume of Christian literature issuing from the presses, periodical literature and literature in the more full and permanent forms. But most of this is sporadic and disconnected. There is now being put forth an effort to produce more systematically a literature suited to the need of the times. The Japanese because they write in their own tongue are the most effective writers. But missionaries are active in forwarding the plans and in producing certain works for which no competent Japanese author seems as yet to have arisen.

In education also a new impetus seems to have been given. The churches are uniting in an effort to develop a better system of Christian educational institutions culminating in a Christian university. This is for the double

purpose of raising up a better equipped ministry for leadership in churches and a better equipped laity for leadership in public affairs, in all the walks of life. As yet however the things to record in educational effort are plans in the making rather than institutions founded.

As should be expected the most strenuous efforts of the churches have been put forth in direct evangelism. At the beginning of the negotiations for independence and really as a part of the movement for independence the Kumi-ai churches inaugurated a special campaign for evangelism to continue through one whole year. A special budget was raised by prominent laymen to meet the expenses of this campaign. The same sort of thing has been done now for six successive years. The methods of evangelizing have been varied as experience has shown wise and as conditions in the churches and in society have seemed to demand. But the great forward movement has continued with what we hope to be increasing effectiveness, till for the year 1910 the accessions to the churches on confession of faith were about one-tenth of the total membership. And there has been a similar forward movement in evangelization in the Presbyterian and Methodist bodies with similar gratifying results.

This extra and somewhat extraordinary evangelistic work has been carried on chiefly by pastors who have their own churches to care for and who really have more work in their own several parishes than they can do. Prominent laymen and missionaries have helped in the campaigns as they have been able. But the planning of the work and the chief labor of carrying the plans have been done by the Japanese pastors who are already over-worked.

At the same time these three great churches have had a care for their fellow nationals who have emigrated to Hawaii, to America, to Korea, to Manchuria, to China and elsewhere. Especially have they sent missionaries to the Japanese in Korea and Manchuria and organized Japanese churches in those countries.

And, latest and ripest of the fruit of independence, Japanese Christianity has itself entered upon the era of foreign

missions. The Church of Christ of Japan (Presbyterian) has sent a mission to China and made a beginning of work for China's millions. The Kumi-ai body has sent (June 20, 1911) a mission to the Korean people. As Korea has been annexed to Japan this may not be technically speaking a foreign mission. But since the Koreans are a people of alien birth, alien customs and alien language it is to all intents a foreign mission. So that the Japanese church with its coming to maturity has become self-propagating at home and propagating abroad.

It may be well to remark here by way of parenthesis the value of this development for the sake of the evangelization of the whole Far East, for despite the differences between Japanese and Koreans or between Japanese and Chinese they are all Orientals with essentially the same intellectual, ethical and religious background for their several civilizations. All write with the same ideographs, all own Confucius as moral teacher and all have been influenced by the religion of Shaka Muni. Thus it comes that the Oriental can understand the Oriental as we Occidentals can never hope to do. So also the Oriental can evangelize the Oriental as we Occidentals can never hope to do. All hail the day when the Japanese church shall be able adequately to undertake the evangelization of the neighboring Eastern peoples.

CHURCH UNION

In common with other mission fields Japan is making her contribution to church union. The allegiance of the Japanese Christian to his own denomination is a constant surprise to the missionaries. It is comparatively rare and seems strangely difficult for a faithful Congregational or Presbyterian or Methodist Christian to transfer his membership to another body even if he reside in a place where there is no church of his own order. And yet the accomplishments already made in the line of church union and church federation are considerable. The Church of Christ of Japan (Presbyterian) is itself a union of churches

that grew up as the result of the work of four large missions. The Japan Methodist Church includes churches that were formerly associated with three home churches. The *Seiko-kwai* (Episcopal) unites in one body the churches that grew out of the labors of the missions of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel and the Church Missionary Society (British) and of the American Episcopal Church.

There have been at times negotiations with a view to the organic union of other bodies as of the Kumi-ai and Presbyterian several years ago and more recently of the Kumi-ai, Protestant Methodist and United Brethren. These efforts did not prove successful. But they were by no means in vain for they brought about a better knowledge of one another and a fuller appreciation of the strong points of the organization of each other. There is moreover in the air to-day a definite feeling after something like a federation at least of all the Christian bodies in the country. The great Protestant Foreign Missions have had such a federation for some ten years already by which they consult together and work together. The federation has published nine issues of an annual entitled *The Christian Movement in Japan*, which itself holds a valuable place in the Christian propaganda.

In such a country as Japan missionaries coming face to face as they do with a non-Christian society which yet has a teaching of its own soon learn to put little or no stress on things of lesser importance and to unite in presenting to the people the great and living truths of the Gospel, to disregard the points that separate denominations and to emphasize the truths which all hold in common. The native churches also having no interest in the divisions of the church in the West and not even understanding the reasons for those divisions find themselves nearer together than the emissaries who bring the Gospel to them. Thus the missionaries and the native churches alike are pre-disposed to church union. The first churches organized were all undenominational. The contribution of Japan then to the movement for church union comes naturally from both the foreign and the native workers.

INTERPRETATION OF CHRISTIANITY

The story is told of a Japanese student in a class in exegesis in an American institution, bringing in an interpretation of a particular passage of Scripture that surprised his instructor. The instructor asked the young man from what commentary he got the interpretation. The fact is the young man had seen no commentary. The explanation was the one that appeared most natural to his own Oriental mind. It was intuitive. The incident is such as might well occur in any Occidental class room where there is an Oriental student.

As a matter of fact every great civilization that has received Christianity has made its contribution toward the interpretation of Christian truth. Greek philosophy led to certain valuable theological statements. Roman Imperial examples led to the development of a world-wide church organization. Teutonic experience applied the Christian teaching of faith to the everyday life of the individual. And if according to the expectation of John Robinson "the Lord has more truth and light yet to break forth out of His holy Word," simple analogy would lead us to expect that the Far East would have something to add toward the fuller appreciation of the Divine Revelation. Now add to the simple analogy the fact that whereas the Greek, the Roman and the Teuton were all Western and yet have helped us to know our Eastern book, the Japanese has the advantage of his Oriental inheritance of thought and feeling and life and therefore brings to the interpretation of our Oriental religion a peculiar fitness that ought to enable him to see in it ever increasing newness of light and to receive from it ever increasing abundance of life. We of the West may well expect our brethren of the East to become our teachers in not a few Christian things. This they are indeed already doing. And this they themselves aspire more and more to accomplish.

SOME RESULTS OF CHRISTIAN WORK IN JAPAN

By Rev. Charles M. Warren, for twelve years a missionary of the American Board in Japan

The great visible result of the Christian work which for fifty-two years has been carried on in Japan is the churches. Of these, however, another is to speak. The task of this paper is to call your attention to some other results of Christian work as a whole, irrespective of creed or race.

Japan has been a missionary country since the second entry of the Roman Catholic missionaries, and the first arrival of the Protestant missionaries. The country has been open to foreign residence since 1859. She still is a missionary country as may be seen from the fact that there are now about eight hundred foreign Christian workers, men and women, still at work there. And lastly, a very interesting fact, Japan desires to be considered for years to come a missionary country. In this I do not, of course, ignore the fact that there are Christian Japanese who consider it patriotic to urge that all the Christian work should be done by the Japanese themselves. But of these the number is gradually diminishing as it dawns upon them that it is rather a narrow selfish provincialism than a disinterested patriotism that causes this. On the other hand, there are three facts that lead us to believe that Japan desires missionaries. First of all, the missions of all denominations are requesting new missionaries from their home boards. Some missions are even requesting a doubling of their forces. This, of course reflects foreign judgment, but it shows, what for our purpose is the main thing, that the missionaries feel that the relations between themselves and the Japanese churches which are influenced by, and in turn influence the international feeling—that these relations are such that they can conscientiously, not to say enthusiastically, invite others to come to enter into these relations. Secondly, the individ-

ual churches desire more missionaries as is evidenced by the frequent requests which these churches are making that a missionary be located in their little town to work with them. They prefer, of course, an experienced missionary and frequently name their choice; but if they can not get a man already on the field they gladly welcome the newcomer from America. Again, the Japanese leaders in the churches are asking that new missionaries be sent out. To one familiar with the situation twelve of fifteen years ago, the revolutionary character of this position will be obvious. Then they did not desire this and this anti-missionary feeling was given expression to in word and deed. But now they have outgrown that feeling, experience having proved that in the continuance of the missionaries there is no danger to the independent status of the churches. In this connection it is interesting to note that the recent pro-missionary movement was launched by a Japanese pastor of Tokyo, who, having visited this country, went home so imbued with the idea and spirit of the brotherhood of man that he made this the basis of his action in appearing by request at the annual meeting of one of the missions and pleading for more missionaries. The statements on this last point are probably most accurately descriptive of the situation in the Congregational churches in Japan. But they are, though to a lesser degree probably, indicative of the general attitude of the Japanese churches on the missionary question.

In the above and in what follows, the missionary is differentiated from the Japanese Christian workers because our purposes in a paper at this conference necessitate our looking at the missionary not in his capacity as a Christian worker but as a foreigner. This is of course contrary to our desires and contrary to our method of procedure in Japan where the missionaries take such great joy in the solidarity of the work and in the unity of the workers, foreign and Japanese.

All this preliminary discussion of the missionary is introductory to, and explanatory of, the first point that I wish to make: namely, that the missionary has been a factor

in bringing about whatever of good feeling now exists between the *peoples* of Japan and the United States. The word *peoples* is used in contradistinction to *governments*. In this country the theory that the people are the ultimate rulers is pretty nearly substantiated by the facts. In Japan, constitutional in government though she may be, and a legislative parliament though she may have, yet the real government is not yet by the people.

The platform of this conference magnifies the truth that mutual understanding is of great importance in the establishment and maintenance of pleasant relations between peoples. What has the missionary been able to contribute towards this mutual understanding between Japan and the United States?

The first relations of the Japanese with Americans were diplomatic, which means that they were of governments. It must be an unceasing source of gratification to Americans that the first American ambassadors, who had in charge the work of establishing relations with the Japanese were men of the type of Matthew C. Perry and Townsend Harris. From the time of the sending of these men to Japan, as well as of the Iwakura embassy to the United States and Europe in 1871, the Japanese date their friendship for us. We do not mean that at that time the Japanese looked upon Commodore Perry as anything but a powerful barbarian to whose superior might they were compelled for the time to bow. Later and calmer judgment, however, has convinced them that not only do they owe a debt of gratitude to the United States for having compelled them to open their doors, but that they should also be grateful that it was Commodore Perry who did it in his tactful though firm way instead of a representative of a European nation. For, at that time at least, European nations were not in the habit of dealing with Asiatic peoples gently and tactfully.

So much for the diplomatic contact. After this the next force making for this great end was the missionary. The statement of four facts will serve to show the possibility of the missionary's helping in this matter:

First, the large majority of Protestant missionaries now,

about three-fourths in fact, are Americans. Second, the Christian schools have been largely carried on by the American missionaries. And third, the American missionaries encouraged by spoken word and financial aid the going of young Japanese men and women to America for purposes of study. No statistics are available but personal experience leads me to believe that nine Japanese young men and women are educated in America to one in Europe. Thus we see the especial possibilities for influencing Japanese, especially young, impressionable Japanese. These missionaries love their native land, absence only making it the more dear. They come also to love their adopted home, Japan. With these peculiar feelings towards the two countries the conditions for setting forth to the Japanese the good points of America are ideal; and the reasons being obvious and cogent, no opportunity is lost. And many and many a Japanese, from prime-minister and university professor down, is glad to tell how his warm regard for the United States began in his esteem of the missionary representative of America.

An excellent illustration of this point is seen in the address given by Professor Fujisawa of the Imperial University of Tokyo before the Jubilee Christian Conference held in Tokyo two years ago. The title of the address was "The Influence of Missionaries upon the Education and Civilization of Japan." Now a professor of an imperial university in Japan is considered to be in a certain sense a public official. So that it meant a certain amount of official recognition of Christianity for him to appear at the Conference at all. Among other things he mentioned a list of notable men of title who had expressed their appreciation of what missionaries had done not only for the country, but also for themselves personally. He also cited the fact that Prince Iwakura, whose mission to America and Europe has already been referred to, upon leaving America sent an official letter of thanks for what Dr. Ferris had done to help Japanese students in America. His comment upon this is as follows: "It seems to me that this letter of thanks for what Dr. Ferris had done to help Japanese students in

America is the voice of the nation." This Dr. Ferris was secretary of one of the mission boards.

In all the above I have been going upon the assumption that the Japanese people have towards the Americans a real warm friendly feeling. This assumption is the result of my few years of experience among the people. And I have been unable to find another missionary who does not share this feeling.

And not only in Japan but also upon his return to this country the missionary is in a position to reiterate his belief in the feelings and intentions of the Japanese towards the United States, and in some small way endeavor to replace by the truth as he sees it what seems to him to be the tissue of falsehood which has been woven by some Americans, whether sincerely or with unworthy motives.

The name that spontaneously arises to our lips as we hear this program of missionary activity is that of John H. DeForest, statesman-missionary. Probably no man among the whole missionary body in recent years has done more than he along the line we are considering. Of long experience with the people, having an oratorical vocabulary and style in Japanese attained by very few foreigners, he accomplished so much in his own field of labor, Sendai, that his name became known and the demand for his talents nation-wide in Japan. He addressed huge gatherings of Japanese students and officials in the interests of international peace, until at last he became almost missionary-at-large for the Empire. But while he was able to do so much among the Japanese in unfolding American customs and ideals, perhaps an even greater work awaited him upon his return to this country on furlough. All through his career he had been an expositor of Japanese character and ideals to the American people as correspondent of the Independent and other periodicals. While he was at home on furlough a few years ago the opportunity for platform work in the interests of international peace was thrust upon him and so conspicuous was his success that he was made Japan vice-president of the American Peace Society, and his printed addresses circulated as a part of their recognized peace propaganda.

Upon his return to Japan he was decorated by the emperor for his conspicuous services in the cultivation of good feeling between Japan and the United States. That this recognition of those services was sincere and shared by the people is shown by the great public reception given him upon his arrival at Sendai and by the immense assembly which attended his funeral last spring. It is shown by the exceptional treatment accorded him when he visited Manchuria in war time; and again when he visited Korea at about the time of its annexation. The Japanese officials realized that in him they had a friend to whom they might entrust the truth that he might interpret it to the American people. Dr. DeForest is the most conspicuous example of what is being done today, though on a humbler scale, by practically every one of the five hundred missionaries in Japan. And this is only the active and open, as it were the official side of the missionary's work along these lines. In addition there is the daily word of personal conversation or that spoken from the pulpit or the teacher's chair.

The fact that this conference ~~is~~ proves your belief in the efficacy of a good understanding between nations in the maintenance of right relationships between nations. In dealing with thought and feeling, especially the thought and feeling of a whole nation, it is practically impossible to furnish proofs. I have simply suggested for your consideration a few points upon which may be based an estimate of the usefulness of the missionary in this regard.

From the standpoint of the mission boards of fifty years ago this would have been regarded as a by-product. But the enlightened leadership of our boards today is proud to claim this as a direct result of the sending of missionaries. And if it is contributing one iota towards peaceful relations between Japan and the United States it may well be considered a not unimportant part of the work of missions.

A second result to which I would call your attention, though very briefly, is the work of the Christian institutions. In this portion of the paper the missionary and the Christian Japanese work is considered as one, for we are considering now some results of fifty-two years of *Christian* work not

of missionary work. Some of these institutions, then, you are to understand are carried on by the missions, some are almost entirely the work of the Japanese Christians, and some are the product of a combination of the two forces. This paper takes it for granted that you are acquainted with the splendid work which the Y. M. C. A. is doing all over Japan and therefore simply mentions this at the head of the list of institutions. These institutions are of nearly all the kinds with which we are familiar in this country.

The Japanese are themselves amply able to do their own medical work. As medical missions, then, play at present only a small part in Japan missionary work we are not surprised to find few hospitals and dispensaries on our list. There are *some*, however, and at the very beginning of Christian work this was a very important feature.

The most conspicuous and valuable of these Christian institutions are the schools. Nearly every mission has some schools connected with it of kindergarten and of high-school grade for boys and girls. The oldest, largest and most celebrated of these schools is the Doshisha University, which has had a history of thirty-five years and owns a finely situated plant in Kyōto. Next to the schools perhaps the orphanages are the most important. The most conspicuous of all these is the Okayama Orphanage. The founder of this, Mr. Ishii, professedly following the example of George Müller of Bristol, built up, with the help and counsel of the foreign missionary, an institution in which at one time twelve hundred children were cared for, entirely on a faith basis. Of the institutions of secondary importance we may notice rescue homes for women, homes for ex-prisoners, homes for old people, a factory girls' home, settlement work, day-nurseries and creches.

Such in outline are some of the institutions that express the philanthropic side of Christianity. But perhaps Christianity's best work has been in awakening the public interest, and in inspiring the public enthusiasm, in philanthropic institutions. The Y. M. C. A., to take a concrete case, soon proved to be meeting a deeply felt need. Before many years there was organized in competition a Y. M.-B.-A., a

Young Men's Buddhist Association. Buddhist workers for young men were compelled in self-defence to organize along similar lines. Again, the success of the Christians with their orphanages was the cause of the springing up of a host of imitators. If imitation be the height of flattery, the Christians feel flattered indeed when very frequently in imitation of their own methods there appears at their doors a subscription paper for a Buddhist orphanage three or four hundred miles away!

I also have a good authority behind me in saying that although the instructional form of service was not unknown at the Buddhist temples before, yet since Christianity's advent the sermon is much more common in the Buddhist temple than it used to be. One of the most authoritative recent publications on Japan is Count Okuma's *Fifty Years of New Japan*, which is a collection of monographs on various subjects by men whom Count Okuma esteemed to be the best qualified available men on that particular subject. The writer of the chapter on Buddhism is J. Takakusu, Doctor of Letters in Japan, and M.A. and Ph.D. from foreign universities, professor in the Imperial University at Tokyo. Let me quote: "The methods and attitudes taken by the Christians in their missionary work gave the Buddhists new incentives for the improvement of their organization, doctrines and philanthropic work." And again: "Another evidence of Christian influence upon Buddhism is shown in the establishment of sectarian schools of various kinds, and especially in an eagerness to start schools for girls and women—a point to which hitherto small attention has been paid." Thus does this fair-minded Buddhist authority, writing for Japanese readers, speak of the influence of Christianity upon Buddhism.

The lives also of the missionary and of the Christian pastor have proved in many cases a revelation; and the people are demanding in their Buddhist teachers a moral life. In self-defence, too, the tone of the non-Christian teaching has been raised. Christian preaching often results in more earnest living up to the light they have. For instance, a friend who has a very effective stereopticon talk

on the "Prodigal Son" tells me that as the non-Christians who come, attracted by the free entertainment, are leaving, they frequently remark to each other: "That's right. We ought to go to the temples more and be better men."

Now, the foregoing is simply evidence on my third point, which is the change in ideals due to Christianity. Ideals have been elevated. The instances adduced above are in the more visible realm. But the influence of Christianity towards the elevation of ideals in more intangible and spiritual ways is just as real, though harder to demonstrate. Ideals have been elevated. One needs only to go back fifty-two years to compare the condition of things then and now to see the truth of this. To enumerate some of these; there have been changes in the ideals concerning woman, personal morality, business morality, family life, and lastly, the value of man. Some, at least, of these changes in ideals were brought about in part by the flood of new ideas on all subjects that has been released in Japan during these fifty years. These changes are the resultant of a combination of forces at work, some will say. Very well. They were so caused and some of them might have come about without any help from Christian life and teachings as such. Take for instance the change that has come about—or at least is coming, slowly—in the ideals of business morality. As I return to America and meet people, I find that there is hardly any idea that has a wider acceptance with regard to the Japanese than the one which compares the commercial integrity of the Japanese with that of the Chinese greatly to the detriment of the Japanese. Now personally I believe there are two sides to that question; but without doubt there has been in the past a deplorable deficiency in Japanese business circles in their ideals of commercial honor. The beginnings of this are to be traced to the fact that in the old feudal régime the merchant was the lowest of the classes of citizens. He was expected to cheat—and he, of course, did not disappoint those expectations. That was considered not a trick of the trade, but rather a legitimate method in trading. Now these merchants are the ones who are most in contact with the

commercial classes of foreigners, and their ideas with regard to what is legitimate in business have necessarily been modified by that contact. They found that if they wanted to do business advantageously with the European merchant they would be compelled to conform more nearly to the European standards of business morality. Baron Shibusawa, Japan's greatest man of business, heading the deputation of business men to this country two years ago, was shocked at the bad name the Japanese merchant has among us; and seeing the basis of truth in the charges, upon his return to Japan strenuously urged in the widely read trade-journals the acceptance of a new code. It may be possible in this case that purely upon the honesty-is-the-best-policy principle this would have been changed in any case.

In the above I do not mean to imply that the Japanese merchants have already arrived. I believe there is still room for improvement. But anyone at all acquainted with the facts will admit this change for the better in ideals along this line.

From the above it will be seen that I am very ready to ascribe to other causes whatever of credit I can see that they deserve in bringing about this change of ideals. But allowing amply for all these other sources, the change in ideals, especially with regard to the highest matters, or if you prefer, the most spiritual matters, has only come about through Christian influence. Let us consider the ideal as to the value of the individual human being. In this I don't mean merely in the ancient sense of a soul to be saved into heaven. I mean the value of the whole man, body, mind and soul. Let us briefly note some of the changes in ideals concerning man that have come about in these fifty years. Fifty years ago, to begin with a stock illustration, the warrior with a new sword could order any member of an inferior class to kneel down in order that he might test the new sword in making a clean cut in taking his head from his shoulders. Not that this was done very often. But it could be done and actually was done. Compare with this the present law upon the statute books which says, "Thou shalt not kill," and says it equally to the prime

minister and to the common citizen. Ah, but you are overturning your own argument, it will be said. These laws are based upon the Code Napoleon and bear no relation to the work of Christians in Japan. As far as that goes the Code Napoleon is based on the Mosaic laws which Christianity claims as its foundation and background; so that the result is the same whether the law was copied from the Paris law books of the Sinaitic. Of course I do not claim any peculiar credit for Christianity as such in the Japanese legal code. But, permit me to ask, whence comes the public opinion that lies behind those laws? For no one who knows the Japanese can for an instant think that if the police force of the country were withdrawn Japan would become an anarchistic aggregation of savages. The laws are enforced in large measure by public sentiment as well as by police force, though this public sentiment may not yet be so enlightened as that of countries which emerged from their feudal age three hundred instead of fifty years ago. Whence, I repeat, comes this public opinion? And again, how is it in some cases that public sentiment actually surpasses the laws? New laws of a high moral purpose are from time to time added to statute book or city ordinance. Of such a nature is the recent closing of the most flagrant of the five prostitute quarters in the great city of Osaka. After the conflagration of two years ago, by the circulation of petitions the authorities were forced to refuse the rebuilding of one section of the city for that purpose. And the leaders in the movement were Christians. The work certainly would never have been done were it not for the Y. M. C. A. and the churches of Osaka. And unless Christianity had been quietly at work for years sending forth its high ideal of womanhood and of personal morality the tens of thousands of non-Christians who signed that petition never would have done so. Without this new ideal of civic and personal righteousness among the masses in that great city it would have been impossible for this great cleansing to have been forced upon the city.

But to return to the ideals concerning man's value. Fifty years ago there *might* be someone to kill the body; there

certainly were few to aid, or cure, or care for that body. The hospitals, the lazarettos, the institutions for the orphan, the blind, the deaf and dumb have all been built since then.

And the ideals as to the method of conducting the already existing institutions have changed for the better. In one case we have absolute knowledge as to how this came about. An American medical missionary came to know conditions in the prisons of Japan and with an introduction from the American minister to Okubo, the minister for home affairs, he enlisted that statesman's interest. Prison doors throughout the empire were opened to him and his investigation was made the basis of a report to Minister Okubo himself. At that time the Japanese idea of the function of prisons was the punitive one with the added idea that if they were made otherwise than places of punishment they would be crowded by people glad of even such asylum. The report sent in to Minister Okubo stood squarely upon the modern humanitarian idea that the criminal is incarcerated for the protection of society, not to cause him to suffer for his crime. And in the report stress was laid upon the efficacy of Christianity itself as a corrective in the prison as in the nation. This book was placed as a text-book in the hands of persons responsible for prisons in the Empire and the results in a very few years were astonishing. This one book had changed in a remarkable degree the ideals of legal and penal circles as to the value of man. That the Japanese consider the above to be the facts in the case and that they hold in honor the man who did it is shown by the fact that the story is narrated in Count Okuma's book already referred to. Count Okuma's book remarks: "In conclusion there is one thing we must not forget for a moment, namely, the important part played by Christianity in these reforms," and then continues with the story as told above. And again when last year there was a prison congress in Washington, D. C., the Japanese representative told the story. When he learned that the man to whom his country felt such a debt of gratitude was still alive he expressed great surprise and gratification and made a special journey in order to visit that ex-medical missionary and

convey to him the official thanks of his government. The man who did this was a Christian gentleman serving as a Christian missionary and definitely endeavoring in every way that presented itself to spread Christian ideas. He accomplished his reform by means of a book that stood squarely upon Christian principles, and which definitely taught Christian principles and ideas. This conference being held at Worcester it is eminently fitting to state that the man who was responsible for prison reform in Japan is your honored townsman, Dr. J. C. Berry.

Fifty years ago if one were of the wealthy or warrior class he might obtain a very limited education. Today education is compulsory, with 36,000 schools of all grades and sorts in the empire. Such is the change in the ideal of man's value from the intellectual standpoint.

Fifty years ago where were the 92 rescue homes for women, the 100 orphan asylums, the 74 reformatories, the 37 homes for ex-prisoners and all the other institutions indicative of the present desire for the moral and spiritual welfare of the people?

This is only the merest suggestion of the different ideals now and fifty years ago concerning the physical, intellectual, and spiritual welfare of man. The difference is there: whence comes it? The axiom that water cannot rise higher than its source has only a limited degree of truth when transferred to the spiritual realm. Spiritual truth is to be likened to a developing plant rather than to running water. But in one sense as it is true that water cannot rise higher than its source, so it is true that reform cannot rise beyond the ideals of the reformers. These ideals are rapidly approaching the Christian. To what other source than the Christianity in Japan can they be traced? They were not brought from Europe and America by the Japanese themselves; for it is an interesting phenomenon that when the Japanese Christians come to America they are frequently shocked at the wickedness and worldliness of this self-styled Christian country. They were not obtained through diplomacy. Unfortunately the golden rule is not yet working between nations. The men from Europe and America who form

the commercial classes in the ports of Japan are certainly not responsible for inculcating any high principles of spirituality. For though, as we have seen, they might help in the development of a *commercial* morality, the high ideals concerning woman, for instance, are not traceable to the influence of the morality of the ports of Japan. If Christianity is not to be credited with these phenomena—if, as my subject puts it, this is not one result of fifty years of Christianity in Japan, then are we at a loss as to its cause.

I have endeavored to show that there is among the fifty millions of Japanese citizens an increasingly enlightened body of ideals along these various lines. We are not to consider this as a fixed thing, nor as up to the grade of some other countries. But it is growing and growing rapidly. While the general civilization, itself the result of Christianity in other countries, which Japan has absorbed, has undoubtedly played an important part in bringing this about, yet to some extent it is the direct product of the influence of Christian teaching and Christian lives. So deeply do I feel this that I believe that if there were not a single Japanese Christian or a single church building in Japan today—if, in other words, there were absolutely no visible or tangible result of these fifty-two years of Christian work—yet in view of this change of ideals alone every cent of money expended and every minute of time spent in the Christian propaganda would be well worth while.

A LITERARY LEGEND: "THE ORIENTAL"

*By Wm. Elliot Griffis, D.D., L.H.D., Educational Pioneer
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A literary legend has been developed, which sets in sharpest opposition the so-called Orient and the fondly named Occident. Poet, dramatist, sentimental writer, novelist and maker of sensational machinery for the stage, picture show and quick-selling newspaper, have created the "Oriental" of imagination, fancy, prejudice and bigotry, who has no counterpart in reality, or has ever existed. It has become a "vested interest," a staple and stock in trade, a permanent and ever-promising speculation to picture "the Oriental" as a being in human form whose nature is fundamentally different from the "Occidental." Such a delineation and contrast has mercantile value. It pays in what the American loves so dearly—money. It increases the sale of tickets at the box office. It enlarges the circulation of the newspapers. It delights the mob. The vote seeking politician approves as if it were soundest orthodoxy. It has ever been used in certain varieties of pulpit ministration and missionary propaganda to buttress the dogmas supposed to be of Christian origin.

The creation of this ideal person, "the Oriental," is a comparatively modern affair. We look in vain in the ancient literatures to find him. The greatest of all libraries throws no direct light on "the race problem." The first Christian saints know nothing of his whereabouts.

The religions came out of Asia. The thought of the mother continent is the basis of all European faiths. Yet, though religion is the deepest thing in man, the men who made our religions, the Orientals, are supposed to be separated from us proud Occidentals by an unplummetted abyss of mental differences. The binding thread of all human history is the reaction of "the East" upon "the West." Over and over again has "Europe" precipitated itself on

Asia, as in the raids of conquest by Alexander and the waves of wild fanaticism gendered during the crusades, when the European peoples weltered in ignorance and superstition. Huns and Mongols, Saracens and Moors have shown like energies in return. The legions have thundered past, but the European marauders have but slightly disturbed "the East" that "bowed in thought again."

History makes no denial of the fact that in the only belt of the world's area that has any notable history, there have been action and reaction; but these phenomena, so far from proving that Asiatics and Europeans are in any way fundamentally different, do but demonstrate that they are the same. Identical in the passions of animal instincts, greed, pride, ambition, conceit, and race hatred, they are one. In both the world of Islam, of India and of China, the poet, singer, fiction writer and maker of pictures, whether in word, by pencil, or in pigment do the same work of exaggeration and misrepresentation, by appeal to local ethnic or religious feeling that has no basis in science. Race-hatred, ignorance, instinctive, that is, animal repulsion of every sort and kind are increased by orator, writer, and artist for a purpose. Compare the mountain range of the literature of caricature and the appeal to passion and selfish motives with the paucity of truth, of knowledge and of exact information. In most popular or ever salable histories of "the world," one-fourth of the whole of it and of the race usually get a small fraction of the last volume in a series of twelve or more. Our atlases, that devote scores of pages to counties, states and countries, usually give to China and Japan, a corner and to all of Asia a single page. How many of our states know anything authentic, trustworthy or at first hand, of India's or China's history? What is "Orientalism" as depicted on the stage, in novels, popular magazines, or in books which are seriously read by other than a small minority.

The "Orientalism" which sells, for which editors will pay, which "goes" on the theatre boards, which gets up periodical war scares and from nervous congressmen compels votes for big battleships, or which is set forth by poli-

ticians bidding for votes is not intrinsically different from that which was and is dearly loved in Europe. Fashion, in Tom Moore's time, fed on it. It is still a "Frenchy" commodity, that is ever in demand in the literary and theatrical world. Yet probably in no country more than in the United States of America, is our legacy of prejudice against "the Oriental" so worked in the interest of dollars and cents.

Our grandmothers were thrilled by the sort of "Orientalism" dished up for them by Moore, Byron, Coleridge and Scott. We get our mess from Kipling, Brother Hobson, the Sand Lots, Mr. Hearst's newspapers, some senators, numerous editors and playwrights, and makers of photo plays.

What a pretty story Agnes Repplier has told of the Orientalism afforded by text-books—the kind that England loved. The staple consisted of the Lake of Cashmere, harems, slave markets, Georgians, dark-eyed Arab girls, and Moorish Lochinvars, with plenty of gazelles, poodles, etc. Pathetic indeed were the attempts of Moore to adjust Lalla Rookh and his other Orientalisms to the established conventions of London Society and the British constitution! It was indeed difficult to temper his particular variety of Orientalism so as to chasten its form for the reading of boys and girls, for whom "Sanford and Merton" was considered proper.

We today may laugh at the opinions of Tom Moore's contemporaries, that he was "familiar with the grandest regions of the human mind, that he showed "entire familiarity with the life, nature and learning of the East," and was "purely and intensely Asiatic" in the detachment of his mind and in his poetical delineations. Why not when turbans and "Oriental" drapery were worn at balls, when fine ladies sported the dress of sultanas and houris, and stout British matrons wore rainbow-striped gauze frosted with gold—until Thackeray mocked at such tomfoolery and drove the dim ghost of Lalla Rookh first into the rural districts and then out of educated England. Nevertheless it still persists at the country fairs and itinerant penny shows.

Yet behold what food our American gods feed upon, from the United States Senate to the San Francisco hoodlums. In quest of fame, dollars, votes, congressional appropriations for a colossal navy, what will not our newspapers permit and our fellow-sovereigns believe? Consult files of our journals, especially, and monthlies since the Russo-Japan war. Behold the unspeakable Chinese, whowith "trickery" and "cunning," maintains a subterranean harem of white women. Descry that innumerable horde that is about to overwhelm us from China. Mark those regiments of Japanese ex-soldiers drilling in Hawaii! See the multitudinous kodaks which Japanese spies are leveling at our forts. See Magdalena Bay surveyed for the Mikado's fortifications. Can the valor of ignorance go farther than some of our half-dime picture shows, in depicting the set determination of the Tokyo statesmen to reduce the United States to a colony of Japan? One can almost descry Togo and his fleet off the coast while some possibly wait, in agony of alarm, to hear his chains rattle that let down the anchors of his warships in San Francisco Bay.

Hardly less sensational in their effect are the horrid phases and over-tinted pictures of Japanese life, country and people made by the lackadaisical school of writers. These picture the Mikado's soldiers as demigods, the Japanese harlots and geishas as paragons, and Japan as an unspoiled Eden. Of course the Japanese women excel Eve, Venus, Martha Washington and Queen Victoria, but the men are ugly, tricky and capable of all meanness and villainy.

As to the unreality of all this, an American at least not bound to take European tradition as truth, should be heartily ashamed. The exaggeration of falsehood, whether in praise or blame, should have no lodgement in the mind of one who lives on a continent, destined to be the middle term between Europe and Asia, and who loves the truth. I, for one, after forty-six years' knowledge of the Japanese people and nearly forty years' acquaintance with Chinese youth and men, do not recognize "the Oriental" of popular imagination. A scarecrow is not to be mistaken for a living man, nor a flatterer's version for a true translation. To

one who has lived among the Japanese and knows something of their history, literature, and art it is impossible to agree with the impressionist Hearn, or the vile traducer whose motive, directly or indirectly, is fame or cash. The writers like Hearn and Sir Edwin Arnold, who overpraise and idealize the men, women and things of Nippon do, in reality set store chiefly upon what the twentieth century Japanese is ashamed of and has justly banished to the moles and bats. Those who overpraise the Chinese in order chiefly, like the deists of the eighteenth century, to strike at the Christian religion, or, in our time, to sneer at the missionaries, belong in much the same class as those who raise the nightmare of a "Mongolian" invading horde, or a mass of "moon-eyed lepers" corrupting the guileless Americans.

After nearly the whole of an adult life spent directly or indirectly with "the Orientals," as in large part were the lives of my father and grandfather before me, and with an honest perseverance and fairly steady industry in research, I see absolutely no difference in the human nature of an Asiatic, a European or an American. From the point of view of science, no fundamental difference exists that should prevent mutual respect, appreciation, social intercourse and in time naturalization and full recognition of humanity. The ignorance and prejudice that now exist on this whole subject is a disgrace to America and to our Christianity. Sooner or later, we must acknowledge that Asia has been the great mother of inventions, art, science and religion and as she has always been the teacher of Europe while Europe has for the most part but developed and applied, so now. "The Orientals" have more to teach us than we can possibly teach them. Mutual respect of persons and civilization and interchange of ideas and products will stimulate the evolution of the race towards the perfect man and the intimate civilization. In this work, America which is neither in the Orient nor the Occident, should lead the world. To the man of science there is no East nor West, they being purely expressions for convenience of speech and thought.

THE CITIES OF JAPAN

By Hon. Harvey N. Shepard

The entrance of Japan into the family of nations, so that membership is confined no longer to people of European civilization, but, regardless of historical origin and religious preferences, embraces every state able to maintain an efficient and stable political organization, gives an added interest to the institutions of the Island Empire. When travelling there we all observe the dress and the manners of its people; admire the grandeur of its mountains and the picturesqueness of its valleys, and the beauty of its temples; and we know something in a general way of the national government; but it is not often we learn how the several communities are administered locally, although this page of their history is by no means lacking in value.

The local governments are of recent development, and are based upon French and Prussian models. It is a curious anomaly that the local governments, the codes of law, and the educational systems of the Japanese are French or Prussian, while in commercial undertakings English practice is the rule. In exchange, in insurance, and especially in shipping, the terms in vogue are English, and they sometimes have no equivalent in German or Japanese law books. A similar discrepancy exists in other departments of social life. While the government and the state are largely under German forms, the people and society work under English and American ideas. The British are perhaps the most respected, but Americans, I think, are rather more congenial. Naturally the people do not love Germans and Russians, as they do not forget that Russia and Germany snatched away the prize of the war with China.

The empire is densely settled. While the United States has a population of 28 persons a square mile, and Europe 101, Japan has 317. Everybody marries, and there is no race suicide.

Agriculture is the leading industry, and 60 per cent of the population find employment in the cultivation of the soil. Therefore one reason for solicitude, the density of the population, which is nearly twice that of China, is that not more than one-sixth of the soil can be cultivated. The mountains are too steep and too sterile; they catch an abundant rainfall, which, however, rushes out untimely, so that nearly all the rivers lie in broad and sandy beds, a mile wide at flood and a few yards in the dry season. As in China, much of the soil has been washed away, and the fields have been strewn with stones.

The tendency to city life, with which we are familiar in the United States and Europe, has shown itself of late also in Japan; and the farmers and other inhabitants of the country districts are moving into the cities and towns. In 1896 only 16 per cent of the population resided in cities and towns of over 10,000 inhabitants; now the number is estimated at 25 per cent, but the exact figures will not be known till 1915.

Up to 1878 the villages, towns, and cities, were mere subdivisions of the forty-three prefectures into which the empire is divided; their officials were appointed and were regarded as government agents. But in that year both they and the prefectures were given elective assemblies. In 1884, however, another law was promulgated that the village heads again should be chosen by the government, on the ground that those elected by the people were not qualified for their duties. This was a severe blow to the local government system, which was still in its infancy. Fortunately, the city, town, and village regulations, published in 1885, to further extend "the old customs of interrelationship between the neighbors," and to protect "the inherent rights of cities, towns, and villages," altered the title of the head man of a town, or of a village, and made him an elected official for a term of four years, subject to the approval of the prefect. The approval by the prefect has come to be a mere form, since a wise prefect, though he is an appointive officer of the central government, does not often put himself in opposition to public opinion. The head man may or may not be

a professional official and may or may not receive a salary, dependent upon the importance of the town or village.

A city government consists of a mayor or shicho, his assistants, one to three in proportion to the population, a council of six to twelve members, and an assembly. The assemblies were authorized in 1884 to nominate three candidates for mayor and report the nominations to the emperor, petitioning him to choose one of them. When these regulations were about to be put into operation, special regulations were established for Tokyo, Kyoto, and Osaka, as exceptionally large and prosperous cities; and so in these three cities the prefect took the place of the mayor. Subsequently in 1898 the administration of these cities was made to conform in the main to that of the other fifty cities. The department of home affairs now invariably selects the nominee who has received the largest vote in the assembly. The assistants and the councilmen are elected by the assembly. The mayor and his assistants, who need not be citizens of the city when they are chosen, hold office for six years, and are paid. One of them convokes the meetings of the council and is its chairman. The councilmen hold office for six years, one-third retiring every two years; and their functions include the preparation of business for the assembly, attendance at its meetings, the execution of the decisions of the assembly, the administration of the city revenue, and the general superintendence of city affairs. In November of last year an imperial ordinance made a change in the duties of the councils of Tokyo, Kyoto, and Osaka, which ordinance I have not seen; but I am told by Dr. W. W. McLaren, professor of economics in Keio University, that it deprives the council of its administrative functions and leaves it the mere ghost of its former self, since now it can do nothing except to give advice when consulted by the mayor.

All heads of departments, except the treasurer, who is elected for six years by the assembly, on the nomination of the council, and all clerks are appointed by the council. "The number of such persons shall be determined by the assembly." "The amount of salary to be paid to the shicho, to the assistants, and to other salaried officials as well as to

servants, shall be fixed by decisions of the city assembly." In charge of the departments are committees, elected by the assembly, and composed of councilmen, assemblymen, and citizens at large. "The city assembly shall be competent to examine papers and accounts relating to the city affairs and to demand reports in order to ascertain whether the management of affairs, the execution of the decisions of the assembly, and the collection and the application of the revenue, are properly carried out."

The city assembly is the popular representative body; and varies in number, in proportion to the population, from thirty to sixty. It is empowered to "represent the city, and decide on all subjects relating to the city affairs." The assemblymen hold office for six years, one-third of them retiring every two years, are eligible for reelection, and, like the councilmen, draw no salary, but receive "compensation for the actual expenses needed for the discharge of their duties." All male citizens may vote for the assemblymen, if they are over twenty-five years of age, have resided in the city two years, and have paid one dollar a year in direct national taxes. The voters are divided into three classes, according to the amount of taxes paid to the city, and each class elects one-third of the councilmen. The object of this division, as in the similar Prussian system, is to give the highest taxpayers a power and a representation greater than they could secure by numbers.

"The elections shall be made by ballots on which shall be inscribed the names of those for whom the vote is cast, and, after having been safeguarded in a folded paper, shall be handed to the chairman by the electors themselves; the names of the electors shall not be inscribed."

"When the electors hand in their ballots, they shall orally give their full names and places of residence; and the chairman after having referred such names and places to the lists shall put the ballots unopened into a ballot box. The ballot box may not be opened until the polling is closed."

"No member of a city assembly may bind himself by the direction or request of any of his constituents." It elects from its own members its president and his deputy, one of

whom takes the chair except "when the matter of any question relates personally to him, or to his parents, his brothers, his wife, or his children." In the case of a large city it is permissible to divide it into wards each with its own mayor, assistants, council, and assembly. This provision is copied from Paris where there is a mayor in each ward, and from London where there are assemblies in the several districts. The local government units are not defined sharply. For instance, the Tokyo district, called Tokyo-fu, consists not only of the city and its suburbs, but also of twenty-two towns and one hundred and fifty-six villages contiguous to the city, and of hundreds of small islands, one of which is a thousand miles distant.

The law says: "A city shall be considered a juristic person and shall administer by itself its own affairs;" and it is given by general laws a wide grant of power, to do anything, within its area, which it may think fit, provided that its actions do not conflict with any national law and are not contrary to the public good, and also provided that the consent of the higher authorities be obtained for certain projects. This method of bestowing wide powers upon local authorities is borrowed from continental European countries, and undoubtedly it has many advantages when compared with the Massachusetts habit of bestowing only specific powers. It precludes the necessity of frequent petitions to the legislature, and the waste of a great deal of time and money to obtain for local authorities necessary powers.

The most important function of the assembly is to consider and vote the budget. This must include, among other things, suitable provision for the common school education of all the children for six years between the ages of six and fourteen. The imperial rescript enjoins that "education shall be so diffused that there may not be a village with an ignorant family, nor a family with an ignorant member." The number, therefore, of children in the schools is very large. In Yokohama, for instance, 89 per cent of the children of school age, boys and girls, are enrolled; and in Nagoya 97 per cent. In Osaka there are 42 public kindergartens with

6500 children, about 37 to each nurse. The official figures for the whole empire show that in 1870, 15 per cent of the girls of school age, and 40 per cent of the boys, were in school; but that in 1908, 95 per cent of all the children, boys and girls, were enrolled; and in some towns every child was upon the books.

Wandering about in Shizuoka I came to a boys' school; and it was interesting to see how in its furniture it conforms to our ideas. At home these boys have no chairs, but squat upon the floor. Here they had chairs and desks. The army surgeons have shown that the squatting position of the Japanese is the occasion of the shortness of their legs, which are out of proportion to the remainder of the body. The introduction of chairs and tables is intended, among other things, to alter this defect. Another illustration of thorough care is found in the fact that, before a schoolhouse is built, the site is examined to see if there is adequate space for playgrounds, and if there is a sufficient supply of good water. School books are printed in clear type, with standard spaces between the words and lines, to check the strain upon the eyes. The schools, moreover, have school physicians, to look after the general health and the sanitary conditions in their respective schools, and to make physical examinations of the pupils at fixed intervals.

While Japan is careful of the well being of its children with the one hand, with the other hand it is doing them a lasting injury. On account of their low wages, and also because they are less troublesome to manage than men, there is a big demand for them in the factories. But to attend school, and in addition to work in the factories, especially at night, inevitably lowers the standard of these little workers, and threatens a general deterioration of the nation. It is the children, whose tiny fingers paste match boxes, and put on the labels. A brush manufacturer of Osaka sends brushes to a thousand homes in country districts, in order that the bristles may be fastened into them by childish hands, practically the manipulation and straightening of each bristle in a tooth or hair brush. The most nimble of these industrious

little workers receive only 2 to 4 cents a day. The latest official figures, those of 1910, show over 40,000 children, under fourteen years of age, in factories and shops.

Thousands of young girls contract to live for three years in a compound, like so many peas in a pod and to work in the mills twelve hours a day one week, and twelve hours a night the next, at 10 cents a day, and on Sundays also. Some compounds are very bad. The places where food is served are mere sheds, with leaking roofs and gaping walls, and pools of water accumulate on the earthen floors. The seats are 4-inch bare boards, and the tables two 10-inch boards nailed together. The sleeping quarters are a trifle better, and the floors are covered with matting; but the girls sleep in rows, fifty, or even a hundred, in a room. Another sad feature in Japan is the employment of a million or more of bright and healthy men, capable of receiving an industrial education, in the performance of tasks which are delegated elsewhere to horses and mechanical traction.

A change is at hand. Many owners now make their factories homelike. A cotton mill in Osaka, which employs twelve hundred people, provides a hospital, with professional nurses and a physician in constant attendance. All the employees have one meal of excellent quality, each day, in a large and comfortable dining room. Also there is a large amusement room and lecture hall in which entertainments are given. Schools, libraries, bath rooms, recreation grounds, and flower gardens, are furnished in other factories; and facilities for saving and other methods of mutual help are provided. Some owners entertain their workers with picnics, and theatrical performances. These, however, are the exceptions. The great change will come from the factory act, recently passed by parliament, although it does not become operative for five years, in order that there may be no sudden dislocation of industry. Children under twelve then cannot be employed at all, and children under fifteen, and women, cannot work more than twelve hours.

There are many evidences of growing wealth. The savings bank deposits in Nagoya, for instance, have increased in ten years six fold, and the postoffice savings deposits have

increased twenty-five fold. The revenue of the city in the same period has increased three fold, and the expenditures in the same proportion. There is municipal progress in all portions of the empire. Old cities have taken new life, and new cities have come into existence. Public works of great magnitude, such as waterworks, sewerage systems, harbors, new streets, parks, and public buildings, have been undertaken. Thousands of houses have been destroyed to make straight and graded streets, from 60 to 100 feet in width, with good sidewalks, where formerly sidewalks were unknown. Sanitation and hygiene, including surgical and medical treatment for the poor, have not been neglected; for the Japanese are quite abreast of the times in these things, and in the control of epidemic or contagious diseases. Gas and electric lighting plants have been established, and excellent systems of electric tramways. Many of the streets are lighted at night, the more important with electric lighting. There are several new theaters, which are quite European in appearance, though behind the curtain all generally is still Japanese. But western plays are not infrequent, especially in Tokyo, where recently *Hamlet*, translated into Japanese, was the attraction. It also is significant that, while you cannot find a European who likes Japanese music, hundreds of Japanese enjoy Beethoven and Wagner. There are many excellent newspapers, and several of them are in English, although they are edited by Japanese. Quite a number have a large circulation; but, unfortunately, they are not free from the defects which characterize so many of our own newspapers.

I cannot recall being solicited once by a beggar in any highway or other public place; and, while this probably is not due to the absence of poverty, but in part to an energetic police, and in part to improved public charities, a considerable portion doubtless is due to better social conditions.

Whatever may be urged against the morals of Japanese traders, and of this matter I heard a great deal, not only in Japan, but in every portion of the Far East, though personally I came across nothing in the least suspicious, the administration of local affairs is honest; and the public works have been carried out without a charge of extrava-

gance. One of the commercial complaints against the Japanese is that they make and sell articles under the trade-marks of other nations; travellers have run across such articles in Manchuria which had been made by the Japanese and which bore English printed trade-marks. But German factories are doing this same thing in regard to Japanese goods, and articles made in Germany bear Japanese trade-marks and signs copied with all the care of German ingenuity. Is it the old story of the pot calling the kettle black?

Some of the cities, as does Oakland in California, provide a fund for the entertainment of visitors and for advertising their attractions. Nearly all maintain commercial museums, where you may inspect samples of their products, and where courteous attendants will give you explanations and prices, and tell you where to go to make purchases. At the end of 1910 there were no fewer than seventy commercial museums and exhibitions. By far the most interesting of these commercial museums is in Kyoto, the old capital. The building is well adapted to display the beautiful products of the city; and every effort is made, not only to secure for the benefit of the public fine examples of early Japanese arts and crafts, but also, in order to improve modern manufactures, by comparison with others, the museum collects, and exhibits samples of articles produced in other parts of the world. Moreover, public lectures are given free from time to time under the auspices of the museum. The spirit which has prompted municipal reform and organization has shown itself also in the establishment of chambers of commerce in nearly all the important cities. Tokyo and Osaka started these organizations, and today chambers of commerce are found in sixty principal cities. The members present to the authorities their views concerning the revision of laws and of institutions, reply to questions put to them by the authorities, act as arbitrators in commercial and industrial conditions, publish statistics, and render protection to commerce and industry. Nearly every city publishes a yearly statement, sometimes in English only, rarely in Japanese only, and generally in both languages, giving full information of the municipal enterprises during the year, the revenues and expenses, and school, health and trade statistics.

Nagoya has developed into a modern industrial city with 400,000 inhabitants, most of whom seem busy and prosperous. Its streets have been extended on a spacious scale; and along the center of its main thoroughfare, which is 7 miles long and 78 feet wide, runs a well equipped electric tramway. The shops and workshops are the best built, the largest, and the newest looking in Japan, and they are noted for a wonderful array of signs. Its factories also are well worth visiting. Corporations, combinations, trusts, and department stores, flourish there.

The story of the last five years in Osaka is one of continual progress and activity. Among many achievements worthy of notice are the completion of an extensive system of electric tramways; the extension of the water supply; the inauguration of a sewage system; the development of a net work of suburban electric lines and their connection with the municipal tramways; progress in the construction of a commodious harbor; and the improvements of the numerous bridges, which are a marked feature. Foreign trade has made great strides, and foreign visitors, for business or pleasure, have increased in numbers. Its merchant fleet now displays the flag of the Rising Sun in all parts of the world. The rapid growth in the population, no less than 50,000 a year during the last four years, has caused extensive building operations, the opening of new streets, and the constant introduction of new features in administration, and in civic enterprise. The streets and canals are thronged with people. Now you pass through a long street given over to pottery and porcelain; then through one for umbrellas and fans; and next through others for cotton fabrics, rugs, brushes, leather goods, bronze and metal work, provisions, and clothing. In addition to these enterprises, a good deal is done for secondary education, especially for technical schools and colleges. There also is a first class municipal library; and there are many temples, shrines and Christian churches. Here at least we do not find the "changeless East."

Unfortunately Tokyo, the capital, does not present so bright a picture. Its streets are poorly made, even the important thoroughfares are not paved, the lighting is inadequate, fire protection is furnished by antique appliances, and

the smoke nuisance grows unchecked. Newness and poverty are no sufficient excuse for these bad conditions, for since 1860 the large cities of Europe have demolished their walls, drained their moats, widened their streets, built new avenues, and generally changed their mediaeval aspect by taking on a modern appearance and equipment.

Tokyo in June last took over its tramways, at a purchase price double the cost of construction. Nevertheless Tokyo is not the first city in the world to pay an enormous sum for an unexpired franchise, nor is it the first city to begin to operate its tramways under a cloud of debt. Many British cities have gone through the same experience, and careful management generally has worked wonders in a few years. Manchester began to operate its tramways with the heavy handicap of a large franchise purchase, but in ten years the water was squeezed out and the renewal account on the sinking fund was kept intact. The same may be accomplished in Tokyo. Already the service has been improved, and, through higher wages and shorter hours, better employees have been obtained, who will coöperate with the management, for general experience shows that efficient labor, though the wages are higher, is always the cheapest.

Tokyo and Osaka are about to establish employment bureaus, with some financial aid from the national government. The government also has offered to Tokyo a yearly subsidy of \$5000 for each establishment capable of lodging 100 vagrants, if it also attempts to improve their mode of life. The Tokyo City Asylum for the poor was organized in 1872 to shelter beggars and outcasts and to give them employment; and, as a first step, 140 poor men and women were housed in the mansion of the former Lord of Kaga, now the site of the Tokyo Imperial University. The asylum was supported at first by the prefecture; but, when the city regulations came into force, it passed, and ever since has remained, under the superintendence of the municipality. Its cleanliness is a pleasing feature. The Japanese are a clean people. The very poorest does not live upon the ground as do the Chinese and the Indians; he lives upon a platform, raised above the ground. No hardened soil for him, no chilly

pavement of brick or stone; a wooden floor, a piece of clean matting, a broom, and a bathtub, the poorest Japanese will always have.

Everywhere, in the universities, the schools, the hospitals, the military posts, and the houses, even in the streets, and the country I saw from the car window, I was impressed by the neatness of it all. There is no rubbish in Japan anywhere. The atmosphere is pure, the sky hangs clear above the beautiful islands, and crystal streams murmur down the green hillsides. Born and brought up under the influence of such surroundings cleanliness is instinctive.

Japan is in many respects the most remarkable country on earth, combining all the fascination of an ancient civilization with the interest of a vigorous new nation. The intense, fiery, patriotism, of which it has given remarkable proof of late, and its willingness to borrow, whenever other people's institutions seem better than its own, mark it off in the clearest and most emphatic way from every one of its geographic neighbors. The abandonment of the old order, at the cost of rank, fame, wealth, and even livelihood, for tens of thousands of its foremost citizens, and the upspringing of a whole nation are amazing, and give proof of a widespread, unselfish patriotism, unequalled in history. Aristocracy gave way in a day to a constitution and a parliament; feudalism and its mediaeval retainers to an European army and navy; public schools, both for boys and girls, were established throughout the land; and its post, its telegraphs, and its railways, equal those of the west; and all this was accomplished, not by the slow growth and gradual development of years, but almost at a wave of a magician's wand. For a whole people to lay aside what they were born to reverence and follow, because alien customs promise a greater good, is a spectacle unparalleled. The stigma has been removed from trade, the peasant walks free, secure in the possession of inviolate civil rights, and, more wonderful yet, women have come out of the guarded seclusion of the east, and enjoy a social existence and legal equality. May it be a bright future which awaits this charming people, who win so quickly the admiration, the sympathy, and the affection, of the stranger within their gates.

THE EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE DIPLOMACY

By Masujiro Honda, Litt.D., editor of the "Oriental Review"

Diplomacy is of absorbing interest always, for it often determines the destiny of a nation, of a continent—even of a race. If the result is sometimes unpleasant to one party or the other, or to both, this is merely incidental. To harm others is not its aim; the true object of this intellectual, international wrestling being to decide which of the parties concerned is the better entitled to the honor, and the responsibility as well, of promoting the welfare of mankind by standing for an ideal, for a system, for a form of civilization. It is true enough that there are intellectual games in which each move is in secret and the purpose of which is to befog the opponent as much as possible; but there are others which require no concealment of the hands or moves, and in which each player seeks only to do his best without desiring the ill of others. The medieval, military type of diplomacy is represented by the first kind, and the second stand for the modern, industrial type. This is, however, a general statement which does not apply to many individual cases. The diplomacy to be used with Russia, for instance, must necessarily be different from that with the United States; nor can the *modus operandi* applicable to Germany be successfully adopted in dealing with China. The nature of this paper compels occasional allusion to other nations than Japan, but any such allusion is not meant in the spirit of captious criticism, for the diplomatic game requires at least two players. Something of what had been accomplished in the dark between China and Russia, Japan inherited in Manchuria in the broad daylight of public gaze; and there is still a great deal left unsuspected and unearthed concerning what is taking place in Mongolia, Ili and Tibet.

All this, however, will become more intelligible when translated into the terms of American diplomacy. In this country of free thought and free speech there are those who do not hesitate to prophesy an eventual annexation or absorption, economically of course, of Canada or Mexico. But both the Washington authorities and the people in general have never planned or schemed for such an eventuality. Only "geographical gravitation," or the "finger of destiny," or "unavoidable circumstance" may thrust upon the United States the necessity of taking under American protection, not only the next door neighbors of the Union, but also some republics on this and the other side of the Panama canal. The Monroe doctrine claims to prevent other nations from acquiring territory on this continent, but it does not purpose to interfere with this country's obtaining new possessions either on this continent or elsewhere. Contrast this condition with that in China and Japan with their, if unpronounced, still worthy ambition of keeping Asia for the Asiatics, keenly awake as they are to the fact that the occidental powers are already firmly intrenched on the continent of Asia, while the United States presses for the territorial integrity of and the open-door in China. The two Asiatic powers must be left free to solve the problems which concern themselves, but when a question arises which concerns the common destiny of both—then whether China shall lead Japan or Japan lead China, becomes a consideration of minor importance before the appalling dilemma whether there shall be an independent Asia or not. It is a question for the Asian of life or death, for one-third of the population of the earth have no other continent upon which to settle, except the one that is already so thickly populated. Europe is of course for the Europeans; the continent of America is also destined apparently to be a land of non-Asiatics. The Asian is also barred from Africa, from Australia and from New Zealand. There is no open door for Asiatic immigrants in these countries and continents, but there must be free entrance for all mankind into Asia. Readjustment and revision of the relations of Asia to the rest of the world should be the highest aim of

Japanese and Chinese diplomacy, and this aim can be attained only through our gradual rise in national and racial efficiency on the one hand; and, on the other, through sincere efforts on both sides to understand one another. The following sketch of the evolution of Japanese diplomacy will, it is hoped, at once illustrate how the international dealing of a nation depends for its success on the material efficiency and moral vigor of that nation, as well as contribute something toward the mutual understanding of the east and the west by indicating what foreign policy Japan is likely to pursue in the future.

For the sake of argument, it may be admitted that diplomacy is the practice of maintaining and extending national power in international dealings; national power including honor, prestige and moral influence as well as material interests. Japan's earliest contact with the outer world was with Korea, China and India, and from them she acquired Confucianism, Buddhism and the Asiatic arts and sciences, while taking care not to be subject to either their political or intellectual domination. In the middle of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese began to visit Japan's shores, as a sequence to their attempt to extend not only their trade but also their religious and political influence. For about a century, Jesuit missionaries and European traders were welcome in Japan; the Japanese themselves were active in sea-faring and engaged in trade with South Sea Islanders. As a result of Dutch-Spanish rivalry in India and elsewhere, however, Protestant Holland warned Japan of the grave danger of falling under the carefully concealed political influence of the Catholic nations. Before, however, this alarm was sounded, the feudal authorities of Japan had already become aware that native converts to Christianity and their European teachers were more than likely to jeopardize the national integrity of Japan. The policy of the closed-door was adopted, native Christians were persecuted and Jesuit missionaries banished, only a limited number of Dutch and Chinese traders being permitted to come to a tiny island in the harbor of Nagasaki, while the construction of large ocean-going vessels was pro-

hibited to the Japanese. This policy of seclusion continued for two centuries down to 1853, when the flood-gate of western civilization was opened through pressure of the United States.

This retrospect suggests a certain speculation. Suppose Japan had continued in touch with Catholic Europe in spite of the Dutch warning, what would have happened? The land of the Rising Sun might have been reduced to the position of the Philippines, with more Christianity perhaps, but certainly not much of political independence left. What would have become of China, if Japan had been lost to Europe, say in the seventeenth century? When a Catholic monarchy was again pressing hard on Japan from the north, a Protestant republic came to our rescue from the western hemisphere as the same power later rescued the Philippines from Catholic domination. Suppose a diplomatic miracle should happen to Japan now, so that she would be guaranteed the undisturbed safety of the present position without spending a penny on army and navy, with what eagerness and determination the entire population of Japan would devote themselves to a higher attainment of all the arts of peace and lend their moral and financial support to the four hundred millions of their neighbors now struggling for a better government. Is this not practically what America and England did in Japan's conflict with the northern power?

From these and other endless reveries we must return to actualities to bring this paper within the required limits.

Early in the last century, Europe's attention began to turn from the Mediterranean and western Asia to the Far East. England's strong position in India necessitated the opium war which marked the beginning of territorial aggression on China in 1842. Russia, on the other hand, had become a Pacific power as early as the seventeenth century through the possession of the Amur region, and, when she proclaimed her ownership of Kamtchatka in 1707, Japan came in direct contact with her. The Island of Ezo, the Kurile group and Saghalien were frequented by Russians, and begun to be absorbed by them. In 1861, several years after the conclusion of the first Russo-Japanese treaty of

amity and trade, Russia occupied the island of Tsushima as a coaling station and it took half a year before she was persuaded to evacuate the place, through the joint-protest of the British minister at Yedo and the commander of the British East Asian Squadron. After the Restoration, in 1872, Japan offered to buy the Russian portion of Saghalien for a sum of 2,000,000 *yen*, but, instead, a nominal exchange of Saghalien with the Kurile Islands was eventually effected three years later.

Thus, the Dutch-British rivalry, which was partly responsible for Japan's refusal to trade with the English in the seventeenth century, gave place to the Russo-British competition for power in Asia in the nineteenth century. Excepting the fact that an English captain hoisted the Union Jack upon the Bonin Islands, situated on the sea-route from North America to south China, Great Britain had not affected Japan politically, because she was too busy with the opening up of China and planting her commercial interests there. This same group of islands above mentioned was subsequently claimed as an American possession, but the moderation of the United States government brought the controversy to a happy termination in 1875, when finally it recognized Japan's claim to its possession. Commodore Perry's idea of occupying a Japanese island, however, was not suggested by any motive directly antagonistic to Japan. The wonderful development of the Pacific states of this country and the discovery of California gold in 1848 compelled the United States to turn her attention to the Pacific trade, and it was most providential that Japan was introduced to the comity of nations by a peaceful and generous friend across the ocean. The vacillating weak foreign policy lent a suitable pretext for arousing the whole nation into a patriotic revolt against the feudal authorities, resulting in the restoration of full power to the emperor in 1868. Long before Japan's door was opened to western nations, France had warned, through a missionary on the spot, of British designs on the Loochoo Islands and told the islanders that the only way of escape was to treat with France to check Great Britain. The feudal government of Japan,

therefore, trained its soldiers after the French model, France being considered the strongest military power of the day. This marked the beginning of Japanese diplomacy being influenced by Franco-British rivalry in European politics. In the time of our revolutionary trouble, France naturally sympathized with the old régime, while England supported the strong clans espousing the imperial cause. In consequence, therefore, when the new government came into existence, the British minister, Sir Harry Parks, exerted great influence over the men whose political aims England had secretly furthered. It is indeed a matter for thankfulness that he did not take undue advantage of his position to endanger the territorial integrity of Japan.

The imperial government organized the foreign office as an independent department in 1869, but its work could not but be negative or defensive in nature, as was the case with our diplomacy under the feudal régime, its sole aim and effort being to endeavor to lose as little as possible of our material possessions and to maintain our national dignity, as best as we could. In 1871, when a newly appointed British chargé d'affaires arrived in Tokio, he desired that the emperor receive him in audience according to occidental etiquette, which demand was firmly rejected by the Japanese government as infringing upon international courtesy. When, however, the Russian minister requested an imperial audience, declaring that he would conform to any recognized rules of politeness adopted by the court, the emperor at once received him in European fashion. In the following year, 1872, a Peruvian steamer, with 230 Chinese laborers on board, anchored in Yokohama, whereupon the British representative heretofore mentioned, intimated to the Japanese foreign office that these Chinese coolies, being actual slaves, should be sent back to their own country. This advice was at once acted upon, although it is worth noting that certain of the cabinet members of the time opposed this emancipation lest it might lead to international complications, while the French minister at Tokio ridiculed the idea of Japan standing for humanity, and the United States minister also suggested the wisdom of non-interference in

the matter on the part of the Japanese authorities. In spite of all opposition and every possible obstacle, however, the governor of Kanagawa was instructed to seize the Peruvian vessel and send back the slaves to China. The government of Peru, on hearing of this incident, despatched an envoy to Japan to protest against it. The matter was finally referred to the arbitration of the Czar of Russia, whose award was entirely in favor of Japan. This created a new precedent in international law.

Some Loochoo islanders, stranded on the island of Formosa, were massacred by the aborigines in 1872, and in the following year a special envoy was despatched to Peking to demand satisfaction. The Chinese authorities claimed that the Loochuans were also Chinese subjects and that the Formosan savages were beyond the power of Chinese control. Seeing that nothing could be accomplished through diplomatic negotiations, the Japanese government in 1874 sent an armed expedition to chastise the Formosans. The Peking government resented this as an infringement on China's territorial rights; and the Japanese ambassador retorted that China having acknowledged her inability to punish these offenders, the Formosans, if left unchastised, would commit similar outrages so giving an excuse to some occidental power to annex Formosa, so that Japan's successful expedition was in effect practically in common defense of both China and Japan. China at length consented to pay an indemnity to Japan, acknowledging the latter's sovereignty over Loochoo, and admitting, also, that she was responsible for the acts of the Formosan aborigines. In 1879, however, when General Grant visited the Far East, the Chinese government applied to the ex-president for mediation because it was not satisfied with the way in which the Loochoo question had been settled. Eventually however, the two islands of Miyako and Yaeyama were ceded to China to remove any ill-feeling between the neighboring nations, who ought to be, as General Grant put it, cooperating in warm friendship against western aggression.

The so-called *exchange* of Saghalien for the Kurile group of islands was effected in 1874 after a prolonged and vexa-

tious negotiation with Russia. In fact the Russian descent upon northern Japan was a question that troubled the minds of the Japanese both under the feudal and imperial régime, and Japan was glad enough to agree to this sham exchange, a sham because she believed in her right to claim both, in preference to the perpetual menace to her territorial integrity.

The revision of the unilateral, unequal treaties made with the European and American powers occupied the zealous attention of Japanese diplomatists for more than twenty years, that is between 1871-1894, the main contention being the removal of extraterritorial consular jurisdiction and of a clause which deprived Japan of tariff autonomy, both imposed upon her through the inexperience of more or less impotent officials in the early days of her renewed intercourse with the occident. To this end, various diplomatic methods were tried in quick succession with the hope of impressing the western peoples with the fact that the Japanese were worthy of being considered as equals. At one time the adoption of the Roman alphabet was advocated by some as the simplest and so the best method of writing the Japanese language. An improvement of the Japanese physique and stature was suggested as likely to come as the result of mixed marriages with the Caucasian race. European dress and dancing were encouraged in official circles and elsewhere. All these measures, however, did not influence the attitude of the treaty powers, but merely fanned into a flame the conservative and reactionary sentiment of the people. Men were exiled from the capital or the country, but the idea of Japan for the Japanese grew stronger and stronger, until finally one minister of foreign affairs, who endeavored to secure a treaty revision through agreeing to place occidental judges in Japanese courts of law, was attacked by a fanatical patriot with a bomb and had to sacrifice his portfolio as well as a leg. At another period, a rigorous enforcement of treaty terms to the letter was tried, so that foreigners in Japan would realize the need of a revised bi-lateral treaty. This scheme also failed, because the foreigners merely complained of personal inconvenience,

while some indiscreet patriots went to the extent of insulting occidental residents in the country. A complete codification of laws, incorporating the best principles and usages of Europe and America, was accomplished in due time, and the first session of the imperial diet assembled in 1890 in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. As a finishing touch, as it were, to all these laborious preparations, the justice and success of the China-Japanese war of 1894-1895 accelerated the work of treaty revision, so that Japan has since been on the footing of legal equality with the great nations of the world.

With the Chinese war in 1894-1895 Japan entered her second stage of diplomatic experience, the stage in which an active self-assertion of her conscious power became the dominant note. It was, in one sense, a conflict of modernism and medievalism, because Japan wished to keep Korea independent and progressive as a buffer state between the two Asiatic powers, while China insisted upon her patronage of a conservative and subservient Korea. Diplomatically speaking, however, Japan's victory in arms ended in a signal defeat on the field of the political game, a triple combination of European powers stepping in and wresting from her a substantial portion of her acquisition from China. One blunder begot another. In the consternation of this diplomatic humiliation, Japan failed to think of restoring the Liaotung Peninsula on the explicit condition that China would never cede or lease her territory to any outside power, which alone would have obviated the necessity of fighting Russia ten years later. Through her victory in arms, Japan vindicated her claim to respect as an Asiatic power, and also testified to the superiority of occidental methods over oriental systems. Through her failure in diplomacy, Japan realized the need of political allies and friends in Europe and America, for after all Asia was not strong enough to be independent of European politics and the European balance of power. The triple intervention aforesaid claimed that Japan's possession of any part of continental Chinese territory was inimical to the peace of the Far East. Notwithstanding all this, one of the parties soon began to exact

from China material remuneration for ousting Japan, and proposed, amongst other things, an occupation of that very part of China whose ownership by Japan was represented to be subversive of peace and order in Asia. Another of the triangular league later "leased" another part of China for ninety-nine years for the murder of one or two missionaries. The deletion of European politics from Korea and Manchuria became an absolute and alarming necessity for the independence and integrity of Japan herself. With England as her ally, and the United States as her moral supporter, and with almost universal European and American sympathy, enabling her to raise war funds abroad, Japanese forces were victorious both on land and sea, but—Japanese diplomacy was again outwitted by its adversary over the chess board at Portsmouth, all this largely because Japan neglected to interest the press of the world in her cause and claims, while the Russian side of the story was ably, tactfully and appealingly presented to more than one hundred journalists of all nationalities. Newspaper men exist on the reporting or "making" of news. It is no cause for wonder therefore that they should have shown scant affection for the country which gave them, through its representatives—nothing. Russian diplomacy was particularly successful in so pleading its case to the American government, through its chief executive, and to the American public, through the press, as to arouse the vague but none the less disquieting fear that Japan might one day occupy both the Russian and Chinese coast of the Asiatic Pacific, and next descend upon the Philippines, Guam, Hawaii, and finally upon the Pacific slope of this western continent. This to our view was the true inception of the rumors of a pending conflict between the United States and Japan; disaffected journalists, labor leaders, big-army-and-navy-ists, better-national-defense-men, and even temperance orators invoking the name of Japan as scapegoat.

Political alliances, ententes and conventions, coupled with an intelligent interest and sympathetic attitude of the press, important and essential as they are to diplomatic success, must necessarily lead up to the higher stage of development

into which Japan is just entering; and this final culmination of diplomatic effort is nothing more or less than an assiduous cultivation of a mutual understanding by the masses, over and above the governments and the press, of the needs and necessities of each country, bound together with others in the bond of commerce and friendship. Through the immigration question, through the recent revision of Japan's treaties with the United States and with the European powers, through the boycotting of Japanese goods by Chinese, through Japan's negotiations with Russia to facilitate railway connections between the Japanese and Russian sections of the Manchurian Railway, as well as through the altering of the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance to make the Anglo-American treaty for general arbitration easier of accomplishment—all these varied experiences have driven home to Japanese diplomacy that most important lesson—that it is not by “saving one's face,” in an abstract way, not by territorial acquisition and expansion, both of which have only resulted in inspiring the rest of the world with an altogether exaggerated sense of Japanese pride and ambition, but that it is only when backed by industrial and commercial expansion and prosperity that a nation can maintain and extend its moral and material influence in its foreign relations; and that national wealth can be increased only by making friends, sometimes rivals if necessary, with manufacturers, sellers and buyers of different nationalities, not certainly by frightening or fighting them. Some people may contemptuously call this “dollar diplomacy,” but “dollar diplomacy” is nothing but the democratic, industrial, honest, peaceful, twentieth century type of diplomacy, in contradistinction to the bureaucratic, military, underhanded, belligerent, medieval type of diplomacy which must be relegated to the limbo of the benighted.

It may throw a side light on our main thesis, if we add here a phase of our diplomatic service. Aside from foreign advisers to the various departments of the imperial government (one of whom we still retain and treasure in the foreign office) Japan has been represented abroad entirely by her own diplomats from the very beginning. Naturally, trained

who?

and experienced diplomats were few if any, at first, At one time, old nobles were made ministers and ambassadors to utilize the glitter of their gold and rank for impressing foreign nations with the importance of the country they represented. They failed in most cases, however, to enhance Japan's prestige abroad, because their wealth or rank was poverty or obscurity in the great countries of Europe and America. At another time ability was the only standard for our diplomatic officials, so some of them could do nothing but study books and newspapers in their legation offices, not having money enough to shine in society. At present all diplomatic and consular agents have to pass special examinations and begin their career from the lowest post, the system thus endeavoring to combine ability and experience. When a bright diplomat happens to have money of his own he is likely to be most successful in a foreign capital. A Japanese diplomat with a foreign wife is still a problem. Our practice of transferring diplomats from one country to another in two or three years is open to criticism; it has advantages and disadvantages of its own. One good sign at home, however, is a tendency to detach the foreign policy of the government from party dispute, the continuity of purpose and unity in methods being thus assured, without occasional disturbance from politicians who lack in expert knowledge and experience. The foreign office at Tokio, moreover, was more or less under the influence of the army and navy departments until quite recently, because, in matters relating to national independence and self-defense military and strategical considerations had often to precede or accompany diplomatic proceedings. Now that Japan's political status in the world is perhaps secure, our diplomacy is more directly representative of the economic interests of the people.

With regard to the further working of this industrial stage of Japanese diplomacy, we may better quote an English author as a fit conclusion of this paper, instead of venturing upon a risky attempt at prophesy:

Everything in fact tends to show that within a comparatively short space of time Japan will have asserted her position, not only as a great world power, but as a great commercial nation in the Pacific. What is to be the outcome of it all, is the question that will naturally arise to the mind. I think that one outcome of it will be, as I have shown, the capture by Japan of the Chinese trade, if not in its entirety, at any rate in a very large degree. Another outcome will, I believe, be the enormous development of Japanese trade with both the United States and Canada. Some people may remark that these are not essentially political matters, and that I am somewhat wandering from my point in treating of them in connection with the influence of Japan upon the world generally.* I do not think so. A nation may assert its influence and emphasize its importance to just as great an extent by its trade as by the double-dealings of diplomacy or by other equally questionable methods. Of one thing I am convinced, and that is that the influence of Japan upon the rest of the world will be a singularly healthy one. That country has fortunately struck out for itself, in diplomacy as in other matters, a new line. It has not behind it any traditions, nor before it prejudices wherewith to impede its progress. The diplomacy of Japan will, accordingly, be conducted in a straight-forward manner, and its record so far in this respect has, I think, provided a splendid object-lesson for the rest of the world. The influence of Japan upon other nations will I hope as I believe, continue to be a healthy one. If that country sets forth prominently the fact that while aspiring to be great, it possesses none of those attributes of greed, covetousness, aggressiveness, and overbearing—an arrogant attitude in regard to weaker powers, it will have performed a notable service in the history of the world. For myself I have no doubt whatever that Japan will teach this lesson, and in teaching it will have justified the great place that she has attained among the nations of the earth.—*The Empire of the East*, by H. B. Montgomery, 1909.

JAPAN AS A COLONIZER

By Inazo Nitobe, Ph.D.

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With the acquisition of the small island of Formosa in 1895, Japan joined the ranks of colonial powers. Since then she has had the island of Saghalien by the treaty of Portsmouth in 1905 and Korea by annexation last year. Besides these territories she has also in her possession the small province of Kwang-tung in the Liao Tung peninsula; and a long, narrow strip of land along the Manchurian railroad, the last two being leased from the Chinese.

In recounting what Japan has done as a colonizer I shall for several reasons devote my time to a review of what Japan has achieved in Formosa. First, because it was the first colony and as such served the purpose of colonial education for us. Second, because it may be called the only colony with which we have had any experience worth speaking about. The other colonies and possessions are so new to us that whatever policy we may have formed for them has not yet borne any fruit. And thirdly, because the administration of this island of Formosa forms a precedent for the government of later acquisitions; and also because you can infer from a description of our policy in Formosa what we shall do with other possessions and colonies. To these three reasons there is an appendix to be added—namely, because I can speak of this colony from a long and personal connection with it, and to me the last is the strongest and the best reason.

Now Formosa, or more properly, Tai-wan (since Formosa is not a Chinese nor a Japanese name, being a Portuguese appellation), was ceded to us at the termination of the Chino-

Japanese war. When accession from China was proposed by Japan, we were not at all sure that the suggestion would be complied with by the authorities. But the Chinese plenipotentiary, Li Hung Chang, took up the proposition as though it were wise on the part of his country to be freed from an incumbrance, and even commiserated Japan for acquiring it. He pointed out that the island was not amenable to good government, that brigandage could never be exterminated there, that the presence of head hunting tribes was always a menace to social order, and that the climate was not salubrious, and also that the opium habit among the people was widely spread and extreme. The island, somewhat like Sicily, had, in the course of its history, been subject to the flags of various nations; Holland, Spain and China ruled it at different times, and at one time Japanese pirates had practically usurped supreme power over it. At another time the French flag floated on its shores. Such an instability in government is enough to demoralize any people; but among the people themselves there were elements which put law and order to naught.

The indigenous population consists of head-hunters of Malay descent, who live in small communities in a very low grade of culture. The only art with which they are acquainted is agriculture, and that in a very primitive style—what the Germans name *Spatencultur*, not agriculture proper but rather what Mr. Morgan, if I remember rightly, in his *Primitive Society* calls a primitive form of horticulture. They have no ploughs; they have no draft animals; this horticulture is all that they know. But these people are very cleanly in their habits. This may be due to their Malay instinct of frequent bathing; and they keep their cottages perfectly clean, unlike other savages of a similar grade of culture. The main part of the population, however, consists of Chinese who have come from the continent and settled in Formosa. They came chiefly from the opposite shores, the province of Fukien and from the city and surroundings of Canton. It seems that the Chinese emigrants could not perpetuate their families in their new home for any number of generations, succumbing as they did to the

direct and indirect effects of malaria, and hence the Chinese population proper was constantly replenished by new arrivals from the main land. The aborigines or savages living a primitive life, constantly driven into the forest regions and high altitudes, did not increase in numbers; so when Japan assumed authority in this island she found few conditions that bespoke a hopeful outlook. The Chinese, representing two branches of their race totally different in character and in their dialects—their dialect being unintelligible one to the other—occupied the coast and the plains and were chiefly engaged in agricultural pursuits. They had a few fortified cities and towns among them; Tainan and Taihoku, with a population of about 40,000 were the most important.

Brigandage in Manchuria

The peaceful Chinese inhabitants were constantly exposed to depredations of the brigands. In fact, a great many villages, besides paying taxes to the government, had to make regular but secret tribute to the brigand for immunity from spoliation. But this is nothing peculiar to Formosa. When I was in Manchuria I found just the same thing there. Perhaps my friend, Professor Iyenaga, described to you in his speech this morning the brigandage in Manchuria. When I was there a few years ago I found that the mounted bandits often threatened the caravans which carried merchandise and silver ingots. The government could do nothing with them and so the caravans formed a kind of league, a kind of guild; and then the brigands also formed a kind of guild, and both the caravan guild and the brigand guild would send their representatives to meet somewhere; and the caravan representative would offer to pay something and say, "Now, we will pay you so many thousands of dollars a year, if you promise to spare our caravans," and the brigands would say, "All right. If you carry such and such a flag we will not attack your caravans, but we will attack other caravans that do not pay us." Thus without any action on the part of the government there is peace procured between the brigands and the caravans.

It is the same with the beggars; in Mukden I saw a number of wretched looking creatures begging from house to house. These paupers form a very strong body; they have

a delegate of their own. A number of them will stand in front of a store and of course no one will go into such a store guarded by beggars, and that store loses trade. So a number of these stores get together, form a guild and send a delegate to the guild of the beggars and say, "Please don't stand in front of our stores." Between them the two delegates settle the matter for a certain sum of money. So it was with these Formosans, in their dealings with the bandits. They paid tribute, so many dollars or so many head of cattle a year. Still the agriculturists who had their farms away from the villages, even though they were free from brigandage, were exposed to the attacks of head-hunters who would steal unawares from their haunts among the mountains to shoot anybody. I must make a digression and state that these head-hunters are very partial to Chinese heads; they say that they are easier to cut, being shaved in the back. Well, these head-hunters had a custom among them according to which young men must secure some head as a trophy without which they could not obtain recognition for bravery or celebrate any feast among their tribes. Hence the Formosan people had never known the meaning of a quiet, peaceful society or of a stable government. They had never known the security of property or of life. Successive administrations had, none of them, been able to assure them of these elementary duties of government. With a people brought up under these circumstances, patriotism was a thing entirely unknown.

In accordance with the stipulation of the treaty of Shimonoseki, one of our generals, Count Kabayama, was dispatched as governor-general of Formosa. In that capacity he was about to land at the island with a large army; when he was met by the Chinese plenipotentiary at the port of Kelung, and in an interview which took place on board of the steamer *Yokohama Maru*, the 17th of April, 1895, it was arranged that a landing should be effected without opposition. This marked the first landing of our troops since the acquisition of the island of Formosa by the Japanese. There were at that time some Imperial Chinese soldiers still remaining on the island, but on hearing of its cession to

Japan they were required to disarm and leave the country. Many did so, but a few remained to oppose our army; and then also there were a few patriots who did not feel ready to accept our terms, not ready to accept an alien rule—and these either left the island or took up arms against us.

Since there was now no government, some of the so-called patriots proclaimed a republic, one of the very few republics, (I say *one* of the very few because this is not the only case—we had a similar instance in Japan), that were started in Asia. Mr. Tang was elected president and the republic of Formosa lasted three or four months, leaving behind nothing but some post-stamps valuable for collectors. At this time the professional brigands took this opportunity of general disturbance to ply their trade. I dare say the peaceful inhabitants of the island suffered more from the hands of their own countrymen, that is, largely from Chinese troops and brigands, than they did from us. Evidence of this lies in the fact that several towns received our army with open arms as a deliverer from robbery and slaughter.

Though the island was pacified no one knew what was to happen next. We did not understand the character of the people. Very few Japanese could speak Formosan and fewer Formosans could speak Japanese. There was naturally mutual distrust and suspicion. The bandits abounded everywhere. Under these conditions military rule was the only form of government that could be adopted until better assurance could be obtained of the disposition of the people. For this purpose it was calculated that some ten million yen, I may say five million dollars, was yearly needed for the pacification and government of Formosa. Out of this necessary sum only three million yen could be obtained by taxation, according to the old régime. The balance had to be defrayed by the central, that is by the Japanese, government. Now an annual expenditure of six or seven million yen in those years, to be spent in an island away from home, with no immediate prospect of return, was by no means an easy task for the rather limited finance of Japan. You know how land values are rising everywhere. Even in Africa, England had to pay very much more than she had expected in getting

land in the south; and I think Italy has by this time found Tripoli rather more expensive than she had calculated at first. A colony that looks at a distance like the goose that lays the golden egg, on nearer approach and especially when you have to pay the bills, often proves to be a white elephant. So with us impatient people who had expected great things and great benefits to come from Formosa, began to call for more frugality and some of the very best publicists went even so far as to propose that the island of Formosa should be sold back to China or even to some other power. In the course of some thirty months, two years and a half, no less than three times were governors changed.

The first governor general was Count Kabayama, known as a hero of the Chino-Japanese war; the second was no less a man than Prince Katsura, now of some international fame as the prime minister of Japan for many years; and the third was General Nogi. Finding that the country could ill afford such a luxury as a colony, the parliament of Japan cut down its subsidy of six or seven million yen from the national treasury by about one-third, thus reducing the subsidy from six or seven million to only four million. Now who would accept a position held by a man as Nogi, but now reduced financially to two-thirds of its former prestige and power? Only a man of unbounded resources, of keen perception and quick decision, not a second or a third-rate man, would accept such a place; and Japan is forever to be congratulated on finding the right man at the right time for the right place, Viscount Kodama, who, as a member of the General Staff, had made a study of the Formosan problem and was ready to accept the governorship and to see if he could put to rights the bankrupt housekeeping of the colony. I am afraid that the name so well known among us is perhaps very much less known in this country. Kodama is a name which is cherished by our people with love and respect. Perhaps you can best remember his name if I tell you that he was the real brains of the Russo-Japanese war. It was he who actually directed the whole Japanese army in the war with Russia.

In accepting the governorship of Formosa he was particularly fortunate in the selection of his lieutenant, his assist-

Governor

ant, the civil governor; he made the discovery, as he called it, of a man who proved himself his right hand, and who actually came far above his most sanguine expectations. I mean Baron Goto, one of the rising statesmen of modern Japan. Baron Goto in the last cabinet held the position of Minister of Communications and was President of the Railway Board. Until Baron Goto was made civil governor of Formosa under Kodama he had been known as an expert on hygiene, having been a medical doctor. The advent of these two men in Formosa marked a new era in our colonial administration. Upon entering their new post of duty early in 1898, the first thing they did was the practical suspension of military rule; at least it was made subservient to civil administration. Military rule is apt to become harsh and to the Chinese especially, who are not accustomed to respect the army, it is doubly harsh.

Next, Kodama and Goto, to whom English colonial service was an inspiring example, surprised the official world by a summary discharge of over one thousand public servants of high and low degrees, and collected about them men known and tried for their knowledge and integrity. They used to say often and often, "It is the man who rules and not red tape." In an old and well settled country "red tape" may be convenient, but in a new colony great latitude of power and initiative must be left to responsible men. I emphasize this point because these men, I mean the governor general and the civil governor, attributed their success largely to the selection and use of right men.

Brigandage was still rampant when Kodama went to Formosa, and with military rule in abeyance there was some likelihood of its growing worse. To offset this, the constabulary department was organized and made efficient by proper care in choosing men for the police and by educating them in the language, and in the rudiments of law and industries, for their arduous tasks. Exceedingly arduous were their callings, since these policemen were required not only to represent law and order but they were expected to be teachers. They kept account, for instance, of every man, and they watched over every man and woman who smoked opium;

they had to be acquainted with children of school age and know which children went to school and which did not. Moreover, they were required to teach the parents the rudiments of entomology. I do not know how policemen in this country are educated; but I think they are better educated, though perhaps not in entomology and hygiene. But our Formosan police were expected to teach the people how to take care of themselves, and especially about pests, about disinfection, and about lots of other things that would scarcely be required of any policeman in any other part of the world. Moreover these policemen were required to live in a village where there were no Japanese, just a purely Formosan village, alone or sometimes with their wives. Of course the policemen were required to know the language and to speak it. Now under civil administration armies were not mobilized against brigands, and if there was any trouble it was the policemen who had to go and settle brigandage. But the brigands were invited to subject themselves to law and if they surrendered their arms they were assured not only of protection but against hunger. Not a few leaders took the hint and were given special privileges, so that they were assured of a future living. Those who resisted to the end were necessarily treated as disturbers and as criminals. Twelve years ago brigandage was so rampant that the capital of Formosa, Taihoku, was assaulted by them; but in the last ten years we scarcely hear of it. I went to Taihoku ten years ago and whenever I went a few miles out of the city half a dozen policemen armed with rifles used to accompany me for my protection. But in the last five or six years a young girl can travel from one end of the island to the other, of course excluding savage or aboriginal districts, of which I shall speak later.

Thus what Li-Hung-Chang in the conference of Shimonoseki said, turned out to be of no consequence. According to him brigandage was something inherent in the social constitution of Formosa. He said it was something that could not be uprooted in the island; yet here is Formosa to-day with not a trace of brigandage. That is one of the first things which was accomplished by Japan as a colonizer.

Opium

Then another great evil in the island to which Li-Hung-Chang alluded was the opium smoking. When the island was taken, it was a favorite subject for discussion among our people. Some said opium smoking must be abolished at once by law. Others said, "No, no, let it alone; it is something from which the Chinese cannot free themselves; let them smoke and smoke to death." What took Baron Goto for the first time to Formosa was the desire to study the question of opium-smoking from a medical standpoint; and the plan he drew up was the gradual suppression of the smoking habit, and the *modus operandi* was the control of the production—this was to be done by the government, because, if the government monopolizes the production and manufacture of opium, it can restrict the quantity and also it can improve the quality so as to make it less harmful. A long list of all those who were addicted to this habit was compiled, and only those who were confirmed smokers were given permission to buy opium. People who never smoked opium before, or children, were not allowed to buy, much less to smoke opium, and strict surveillance was to be instituted by the policeman, who, as I mentioned before, knows every man in the village. The annual returns made of the confirmed smokers and of the quantity consumed in the island show distinct and gradual decrease of opium. At one time the number of smokers was, in round numbers, 170,000. In ten years the older ones died off and younger ones did not come to take their place; so there is constant diminution. In ten years the number decreased from 170,000 to 130,000; and now it is about 110,000. So there is this constant annual decrease and that, we think, is the only right way to do away with this habit. It may interest you, perhaps, to know that American commissioners from the Philippine Islands came to study our system. When I met them they expressed much satisfaction and I dare say they are going to have the same system introduced in the Philippines, for the Chinese in these islands. Thus the second evil which Li-Hung-Chang said was inherent to Formosa also disappeared, or rather is fast disappearing.

There are two more obstacles which we consider are in the

way of the further development of the island of Formosa; these are, first the mosquito and second, the savages. By mosquitoes I mean especially the anopheles, the malaria-bearing mosquito. Malaria is the greatest obstacle in the way of developing the resources of the island. The Japanese immigrants who have come suffer, I may say one-third of them, from malaria. If I want labor and if I take with me 100 Japanese laborers to Formosa, I can count on the efficiency of only 60 or 70, because one-third of the laborers must be expected to be sick with malaria. Hygienic and sanitary measures are vigorously enforced but this can be done only in the larger cities. In the city or rather the capital of Taihoku, they made a very perfect sewage system; they tore down the old castle walls and used the stones in making the sewage ditches, and ever since then the number of people suffering from malaria has decreased greatly. In fact, it is said that malaria has disappeared from the city. Careful observations resulted in substantiating the fact that among the mosquitoes in this city less than 1 per cent belonged to the dangerous species of anopheles. The rest of the mosquitoes are harmless, that is to say, as far as malaria is concerned. Then also, speaking of sanitation, I am reminded of what we have done against the pest; the pest, or the bubonic plague, was a very common disease there, but in the last four years we hear nothing of it. By constant care and by strict enforcement of sanitary laws is the pest now eradicated or near eradication.

But as to the aborigines, or the savages of Formosa we cannot say we have nearly eradicated them. They belong to the Malay race and are fierce and brave. As I have said before, they live in the mountains; they never live on the plains. And when they want a head they steal down, hide themselves among the underbrush or among the branches of trees, and shoot the first Chinese or Japanese that passes by. In fact I knew of a savage who had his rifle so placed on a rock that he could shoot any person who happened to walk past in just a certain direction and at a certain height; and there he waited for days and days for somebody to walk right within his range; and he succeeded in getting a head! With

such people it is practically impossible to do anything. In number they must be over 100,000; we cannot count them, but we are pretty sure there are 115,000. Repeated attempts we have made but we never have succeeded thus far in doing much damage to them, though they have succeeded in doing much damage to us.

All that we can do and all that we are doing, in order to prevent their descending from among the heights, is to place a wire fence on the ridge of the hills. Barbed wire was used at first, but now we use a wire fence which is not barbed but is of ordinary wire with a strong electric current running through it. That may sound very savage to you, but it is the only way that we can keep them off from us. I have been in this place and seen the fences. The wire is strung on posts about five feet high; there are four wires with a foot between them, and a strong electric current running through. At first they tried their best to get over the fence, but they have learned not to approach it. This wire fence stretches a distance of some three hundred miles. It costs several thousand dollars; yet every year we build this fence some miles further in. The next year we go another stretch, so that their dominion will be more and more confined to the very tops of the mountains. Of course I do not wish to give you an impression that we are dealing harshly with them, because we offer them their choice. We say, "If you come down and don't indulge in head-hunting we will welcome you as a brother,"—because they are brothers. These savages look more like Japanese than Chinese and they themselves say of the Japanese that we Japanese are their kin and that the Chinese are their enemies. Because the Chinese wear their queues they think that their heads are especially made to be hunted. And now every year, as I say, we are getting a better control over them by this constant moving of the wire fence and by the salt-famine for they have no salt since they are cut off from the sea-shore; they raise their rice, they raise millet, they have their own animals, and so they do not want food, but what they want badly is salt. So we say, "We will give you salt if you will come down and give up your arms;" and tribe after tribe has recognized our

power and has submitted itself to Japanese rule. Then we build them houses, we give them agricultural tools and implements, give them land, and let them continue their own peaceful ways of livelihood.

Thus I have dwelt in a very sketchy, very unsatisfactory way, on the four points to which Li-Hung-Chang in the conference at Shimonoseki alluded as great obstacles in the way of developing Formosa. What now is the result? At first we could not manage a colony with the money that we could raise in the island; every year we had to get some subsidy from the national treasury. It was expected that such a subsidy was necessary until 1910. But by the development of Formosan industries, especially of rice and of tea, (of Oolong tea, for which you are the best customer, because Oolong tea is made chiefly for American export), by developing the camphor industry (because all the camphor that you use, if not artificial, is produced in Formosa); by developing sugar, the production of which was increased five-fold in the last ten years (a tremendous increase for any country in any industry)—by developing these industries, we can get money enough in the island to do all the work that is needed to be done there. By this I mean that irrigation work, for instance, is now being carried out on a large scale. Then there is the improvement of the harbors; both in the north, at Kelung, and in the south, at Takao, commodious and deep harbors are now being constructed or improved. We have built a railroad from one end of the island to the other. Schools and hospitals are now to be met with in every village and town. Then the police attend to the health, to the industries, and to the education of the people. In all these things we think that we have succeeded quite well, especially when we compare our colony of Formosa with the experiments that other nations are making. We often speak of English colonies as being models; we speak of French colonies as examples not to be followed; and we are looking to your experiment in the Philippines to find what it will amount to. Comparing our Formosa with the colonies of these different powers, we have good reason to congratulate ourselves.

I have made a very rough, sketchy address this afternoon. I have only tried to show what were the general lines of policy pursued in the development of Formosa. We have been successful. A colony was at first thought to be a luxury, but now Formosa is to us a necessity. The example that we set there in that island will be followed in other colonies of ours. I may say that the general lines of the colonial policy of Formosa were first of all, the defense of the island. So much is said about our increased navy, some people in this country think that we are increasing our navy in order to attack San Francisco or Manila; but with the acquisition of Formosa, of the island of Saghalien, and of Korea, our coast line has increased immensely and yet our increased navy is not sufficient for the proper defence of all the coast lines that we have, for the first great object in the colonial policy of Formosa, and I may say of Japan, is the defence of the new territory.

The second is the protection of property and life, and the dissemination of legal institutions. People unaccustomed to the protection of law feel as though it were despotism. But they will soon find out that, after all, good government and good laws are the safeguard of life and property, and we have to teach in Korea as well as in Formosa what government and what laws are.

Then the third point is the protection of health. I have spoken to you of what we have done in Formosa; similar lines of policy will be pursued in Korea. When I saw Prince Ito in Seoul and when I told him that the population in Korea had not increased in the last hundred years and that perhaps the Korean race was destined to disappear, he said, "Well, I am not sure. I wish to see whether good laws will increase the fecundity of the Korean people." In Formosa it was a very well known fact that without new recruits coming from the mainland of China the population would diminish. There were more deaths than births. But since we assumed sovereignty there annual returns show a gradual increase of births over deaths; hence, as I said, the third great point in the colonial policy of Japan is the protection of health.

The fourth is the encouragement of industries. In Formosa the government has done much to improve the quality as well as the quantity of rice, and to improve irrigation. The improvements in the sugar industry which have been made were suggested by the government. When the work was started ten years ago we got sixty tons of cuttings from Hawaii; and we have about twenty mills, the machinery being imported from Germany, England and Hawaii. The experiments in the manufacture of sugar were also made by the government and when the experiments resulted in improvement, this was told to the people; experts were sent out to the different villages, preaching the advantages of better culture. So with other branches of industry. The government is constantly encouraging the people to make improvements.

And then the fifth policy is that of education. In Formosa we have just reached the stage when we are taking up education seriously. We could not do it before this, because our idea was first of all to give to those new people something which will satisfy their hunger and thirst; their bodies must be nourished before their minds. And now that the economic condition has improved in the last year or two, schools are being started in all the villages.

These broad lines of colonial policy which we have practised with good results in Formosa, will be transferred in Korea. We do not trouble ourselves about the question of assimilation. In the last number of the *JOURNAL OF RACE DEVELOPMENT* published by this University, I read an article by Mr. MacKay, British consul in Formosa. He concludes his article by expressing two doubts, namely: one in regard to the commingling of races, that is, Chinese and Formosans; and second, in regard to the Japanization of the Formosans. He doubts whether either will take place. Well, as far as the Japanese are concerned, we do not trouble ourselves about these questions. I think assimilation will be found easier in Korea because the Korean race is very much allied to our own. In Formosa, assimilation will be out of the question for long years to come and we shall not try to force it. The idea is that we put no pressure upon them, with the object of

assimilation or Japanization in view. Our idea is to provide a Japanese milieu, so to speak, and if people come and if they assimilate themselves, well and good. We have a proverb in Japan which says, "He who flees is not pursued, but he who comes is not repulsed." If the Formosans or the Koreans come to us, we will not repulse them. We will take them with open arms and we will hold them as our brothers, but we will not pursue them. We leave their customs and manners just as they like to have them. Our principle is firm government and free society. Firmness in government is something which they did not have before, and that is what we offer to them.

And therefore I beg of Americans who are interested in the development of Japan as a colonial power, not to be misled by reports which now and then appear in different periodicals and newspapers by critics of all nationalities and of all countries. I have often read articles written by foreign critics who speak of our administration in Korea as a failure. A well educated man, an American, wrote that in Formosa the people are very much opposed to the Japanese government, are very much dissatisfied with it. If I were to go among the farmers in the west of this country and ask, "Are you satisfied with Mr. Taft's administration?" they would say "Yes, we are." But if I were to press the question. "Do you think there is something to improve?" "Of course," the farmers will say, "I do not think Mr. Taft's administration is *perfect*." Well, I may note down in my book that the American people are dissatisfied with Mr. Taft and may rise against him at any moment. Such a rumor you may hear from time to time in any newspaper about any country; but as our adage has it—"Proof is stronger than argument;" and I have given but a few proofs, though, if time allowed, I could give more.

Typical.

JAPAN IN SOUTH MANCHURIA¹

By Toyokichi Iyenaga, Ph.D., Professorial Lecturer in Political Science, University of Chicago.

To Japan few problems of international relation are of more vital concern than the Manchurian question; for upon its wise solution depends the future of the empire and peace in the Far East. Nothing, therefore, will be more welcome to us than a clear and just understanding by other nations of our status in South Manchuria, and the grounds upon which it rests.

HISTORICAL RETROSPECT

The historical retrospect claims our first attention, if we are to weigh the Manchurian question equitably. Two tragic events of supreme importance fasten most powerfully the Japanese thought and imagination upon Manchuria. Only known to the West till the middle of the past century as the habitat of nomads and mounted bandits, Manchuria suddenly sprang into international significance by the China-Japan war of 1894-95. During its progress Japanese soldiers overran and conquered a part of the Chinese territory known as the Liaotung Peninsula. As the reward of war China ceded it to Japan by the Shimonoseki treaty. No sooner, however, had the peace terms been made known than Japan was confronted by a formidable coalition consisting of Russia, Germany and France, bent on depriving Japan of the best fruits of victory.

To this *force majeure* Japan was compelled to submit, and she retreated in 1895 from the Asiatic mainland with whatever grace her self-discipline could command. The ink was hardly dry on the note addressed by the three European powers to the Mikado, counselling him to renounce his claim to the Liaotung Peninsula on the plea that its reten-

¹ Address delivered on November 23, 1911, at Clark University.

and by Japan would be a sailing message to the capital of China and the peace of the Orient. When Germany seized Kiao-chow, France seized Kwang-Chow Wan, and the Russian eagle flew over the fortress of Port Arthur. Swift and dramatic thereafter was the course of Russia, who with the mercilessness of an avenging host soon laid Manchuria under the boots of her Cossacks, and posted their vanguards on the south bank of the Yalu. The kingdom of Korea and the Island Empire itself were thus drifting toward a position where they would both be at the mercy of the Tsar.

Brought to this perilous position, Japan at last unsheathed her sword for self-preservation. Twice within a decade Manchuria had thus become the battlefield upon which the fate of the Japanese nation was to be determined. The risk it meant, and the supreme efforts it demanded, made the Russo-Japanese war an event of importance unprecedented in the annals of Japan. For a nation, just emerged from feudalism, which had hardly ever tested its mettle against a European foe, to fight the enemy whose proved valor and doggedness, and whose immense resources and population, had for half a century past been the terror of Europe, was surely to run a risk that few nations since the days of Marathon have had to face. Tremendous as was the task of overcoming Russia, right splendidly was it performed by our generals, soldiers, and sailors through their superb heroism, discipline, and self-immolation.

The sacrifices demanded of the people were no less exacting. To the altar of the state they offered 130,000 lives and 2,000,000,000 yen of treasure. Great as are these figures, they by no means fairly represent the true cost of war. They give no account of the thousand hardships endured by the wounded and by the wives and children of those who fought and died, which, as Cardinal Gibbons justly remarks, are the most frightful sufferings of war. These human sufferings are seemingly evanescent, but they are not forgotten. A national outpouring of spirit so profound, so intense, so far-reaching, has left wounds in the deep recesses of the nation's breast that have not yet healed. At the same time Japan will never forget the great debt she owes to the moral and

financial support so gladly given at the most critical moment by her loyal ally, Great Britain, and her constant friend, America.

Such, in brief, is the historical ground upon which rests Japan's present position in south Manchuria. Justice demands that the statesmen in power, who sway the destinies of nations, should recall this historical retrospect. As the heroic deeds recede into the background of history, the agonies of the dying are hushed in the silence of the tomb, and the heart-breaking woes of widows and orphans find their echo only in desolate homes, the cold letters of treaties and conventions alone remain to serve as the basis of judgment on the claims of opposing interests. Already critics are not wanting who claim that the advantages secured by Japan in south Manchuria are far in excess of those she merited by her success in the late war.

Totally different was the first verdict of the Japanese people upon the terms of the Portsmouth treaty. When its text became known in September, 1905, the Japanese nation in almost one breath raised its voice against it. In Tokyo the disaffected citizens planned a monster demonstration at Hibiya Park, and there came into collision with the police and gendarmerie. The meeting finally broke up, but the enraged populace, degenerating into a mob, paraded the streets, set on fire the official residence of the home minister, attacked the official organ *Kokumin*, and burned and destroyed 169 police stations, with more than a thousand attendant casualties. The disturbance was not suppressed until the aid of soldiers was called in, and the martial law proclaimed in the capital. This incident is recalled here, not to extenuate the weakness of the Japanese people, who for the first time since the outbreak of hostilities lost their self-restraint, but to bring into a clearer relief their point of view upon the results of the war. "After an unbroken series of victories," they cried, "What have we got? No indemnity! No Russian territory but the half of the Saghalien, which was once ours! No guarantee to limit the Russian armament on the Pacific to ensure our future security! Only the lease of a strip of territory around Port Arthur

and a few hundred miles of railroads in south Manchuria—these for the blood of hundreds of thousands of our brethren, and billions of money!”

It was in the face of such an opposition on the part of the people that the peace treaty was concluded. The statesmen in power took upon themselves the responsibility of caring for the true interest of the nation. Komura's triumph at the Portsmouth conference table must, therefore, be pronounced as one of the most remarkable victories Japan gained during the epoch-making years of 1904-05. It showed Japan's attachment to the last to the high ideals she set before her. It secured all the objects for which Japan went to war—the right of existence and growth of the empire, the preponderating influence of Japan in Korea, the maintenance of China's integrity and of the principle of the “Open Door.” The waiving of the claim for indemnity was at once a moral and diplomatic gain. To have prolonged the war for the sake of obtaining an indemnity would have brought upon Japan the condemnation of the world. To have exacted an indemnity would have left an eternal thorn in the breast of Russia, and thus long deferred the friendship and coöperation of the two Powers in the Far East. By wise moderation Japan gave signal proof of her solicitude to listen to the voice of humanity, and saved herself from the impending financial *impasse*.

The material interests secured were, however, undoubtedly not at all commensurate with the outlay incurred and the victories gained. The more imperative, therefore, became the duty of the rulers to adopt such proper measures as to safeguard the interests acquired, and to recoup the exchequer drained by war by means of the industrial and commercial development of the regions brought under Japan's control. The story of the consolidation of her interests in accordance with the terms of the Portsmouth treaty, and its corollary, the Peking treaty of December, 1905, is what constitutes Japan's present status in south Manchuria.

So much haziness exists in the mind of the western public in its conception of the Manchurian status, that a plain statement of what Japan and her sons have done and are

doing there seems not amiss. Such a survey, though it might seem superfluous to those well posted on the subject, will clear the way for the further discussion of the political, military, and economic grounds upon which Japan bases her Manchurian policy. Anti-Japanese propagandism prosecuted by a certain section of the press and publicists has conveyed to the American public the impression that Japan is in virtual control of the southern portion of Manchuria, while the northern section is still in the Russian grasp. As a matter of fact, all portions of Manchuria, once occupied by the Japanese and Russian troops, except the Kwantung Province and the "railway zone," have been entirely and completely restored to the exclusive control of China. Out of the territory measuring 360,000 square miles, what remains under the control and administration of Russia and Japan is in total 1803 square miles of land, together with the 1773 miles of railroad, having on each side of the tracks on an average about one hundred feet of land embraced in the "railway zone." Of all this, what actually came under the jurisdiction of Japan was the seven hundred odd miles of railway, the seventy square miles of the "railway zone," and the Kwantung Province. Let me briefly describe them.

THE KWANTUNG PROVINCE

The province lies on the southern extremity of the Liaotung Peninsula and includes Port Arthur and Dairen (Russian Dalny). The territory covers an area, together with that of the adjacent islands, of 1,303 square miles. It had in 1910 a population of 462,399, of which foreigners numbered 112, Japanese 36,688, and Chinese 425,599. Transferred by Russia to Japan, the lease of the province continues under the same conditions as under the old régime.

With its seat in Port Arthur, the government of the province is in the hands of the governor-general, assisted by a civil administrator. The former, besides assuming the defense and administration of the province under lease, supervises the maintenance of peace and order in the entire Japanese railway zone, and oversees the administration of

the South Manchurian Railway. He also commands the railway guards, who are quartered in different places along the road. The expenditures of the Kwantung government for the financial year 1911-12 amounted to 5,791,653 yen, beside the local expenditure of 1,059,524 yen, of which 859,524 yen was defrayed out of local revenue. In this estimate, however, the expenditure of the railway guards is not included, since it belongs to the account of the department of war of the home government. Of the sum quoted above the national treasury grant for this financial year amounted to 3,644,047 yen, which, together with 200,000 yen of grant for local expenses, shows that more than half of the expenditure of the Kwantung government is still borne by the national exchequer.

With the paltry sum of \$3,000,000 gold, not larger than that expended by the German administration of Kiaochow, the Kwantung government maintains its staff and equipment; keeps peace and order in the province as well as in the railway zone; administers civil affairs, including that of justice, the latter by means of efficient law-courts and a well-kept prison; sustains seven public schools, one high school, one high school for girls, one technical college, beside several minor educational establishments; supports a marine bureau and a meteorological station; and attends to the work of sanitation, relief, encouragement of industry, and other requirements of civilized life in the territory under its care.

THE SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILROAD COMPANY

The chief factor in the development of South Manchuria is the railroad company. It was organized in 1906 to undertake the works connected with the railroads transferred by Russia to Japan by the Portsmouth treaty. Its authorized capital is 200,000,000 yen, and at the same time it enjoys the statutory powers to borrow to the actual extent of its authorized capital. One-half of a million shares, each of 200 yen, is held by the Japanese government, representing the value of the property handed over to the company—namely, the railroads in existence at the time of transfer, all property

accessory to them, and the coal mines at Fushun and Yentai. The remaining half of the shares was to have been distributed among the Japanese and Chinese subscribers, who were guaranteed by the Japanese government with the interest of 6 per cent per annum on the paid up capital for the period of fifteen years. The organization committee of the company, however, decided to call for a subscription of only 20,000,000 yen, in view of the financial depression then prevailing, and to resort to debenture issues in England in order to raise the funds needed for the successful prosecution of the company's enterprises. Accordingly a loan of £8,000,000, was floated in London at three separate times during 1907-08, bringing to the company the net of £7,490,000. On January 31, 1911, the company floated in London another loan of £6,000,000 out of which the previous loan of £2,000,000 was returned, so that the existing loan of the company stands at £12,000,000.

The company has undertaken various enterprises, the chief of which are railroad, shipping, harbor construction, mining, electric light and power plants, gas works, several undertakings in the railway zone, hotels, and experimental stations.²

1. The railroads that came into the possession of the company on April 1, 1907, were the Changchun-Dairen trunk line of 437.5 miles, the Antung-Mukden military (2 feet 6 inches) road of 188.9 miles, and the short branch lines to Port Arthur, Lin-shu-tun, Yinkou, Yentai, and Fushun, making the total of about 720 miles. These roads with the exception of the Antung-Mukden had been converted by the Japanese army from the Russian gauge of 5 feet into the Japanese standard of 3 feet 6 inches in order to adapt them to the rolling stock brought over from Japan. To reconvert the roads to the standard gauge of 4 feet 8½ inches, and to double the main track from Dairen to Suchiatun of 238 miles, in order to make them an effective international artery between the west and the east, were, therefore, the first work of the company. Both of these undertakings have been

² This résumé is based on the article in the *Taiyo*, October 1910, by Mr. C. Seino, Director of the South Manchurian R. R. Company.

already completed. The company runs express trains, provided with Pullman sleeping and dining cars, three times a week to connect with the Russian line at Changchun, with the Chinese line to Peking at Mukden, and with the steamship line to Shanghai at Dairen. The standardization of the Antung-Mukden line was also finished on October 31, 1911. The road is now open to the public, and will enable the European traveler to save about two days, bringing Tokyo to the reach of London within a fortnight.

The company has its workshops at Dairen, Liaoyang, Kung-chu-ling, and Antung-Hsien, and is building near Dairen an extensive shop, with the capacity of repairing at the same time 20 locomotives and 46 freight cars of 30 tons each. The growth of passenger and freight traffic, and railway receipts is shown by the following figures:

	FIRST HALF OF 1907	FIRST HALF OF 1909	FIRST HALF OF 1911
Passengers.....	704,300	1,029,418	1,440,400
Freight.....	533,283 tons	1,756,225 tons	2,267,858 tons
Receipts.....	4,093,425 yen	5,858,158 yen	6,323,302 yen

In short, during the period of two years 1908-1909 the traffic of passengers has increased by 40 per cent, that of freight has more than trebled, and the entire receipts more than doubled. The growth has been no less marked in later years.

Besides the railroads mentioned above the company is participating in the building of the Chinese Changchun-Kirin Railway of about 80 miles, having contributed half of the capital for construction. This road, when finished, will open up large tracts of forest and the lands in the Sungari valley for the production of wheat and beans. This Changchun-Kirin road, according to the treaty made between China and Japan in September 1909, will be extended to Hoiryong on the Korean frontier, where it will connect with the Korean system, linking it with the port of Chongjin on the Sea of Japan.

2. *Shipping and harbor work.* To connect Dairen with Shanghai, and thus facilitate the through passage of European travelers bound to that commercial metropolis of China,

the south Manchurian Railroad Company has started twice-a-week steamship service between the two ports. Since the route is the shortest between Europe and the Lower Yangtze regions, its patrons are daily increasing. The passengers, freight, and receipts of the steamship line were in the second half of 1908 respectively 1536 passengers, 10,264 tons, and 66,750 yen, while the corresponding figures for the first half of 1911 stood at 2221 passengers, 37,518 tons, and 144,633 yen. The company is also engaged in the shipping of its coal from Port Arthur.

Far more important is the harbor construction at Dairen, for upon it depends the question whether or not the terminal port of the railroad will succeed in attracting the trade of Manchuria. It is undertaken at the estimated cost of 18,000,000 yen. The plan follows closely that formulated by its former builders. The construction of the eastern breakwater, 1221 feet long, 20 feet wide, and 19 feet above the tide, is nearing its completion. Between this and the northwestern breakwater, 12,500 feet long, with the same dimension and height as the former, is provided the opening of 1200 feet. Facing this entrance are built the magnificent wharves, with a frontage of over 6000 feet, and capable of accommodating steamers up to 28 feet in draught. The installment of cranes, and other equipment, enable the goods to be discharged from a ship and placed aboard the freight cars in one operation. These facilities for handling the cargo, together with the fact that Dairen is open to navigation throughout the year, are advantages not enjoyed by other Manchurian outlets.

3. *Mining.* The right of exploiting the coal mines at Fushun and Yentai was the most valuable of the rights and privileges secured in connection with the railroad. The coal field of Fushun runs parallel to the Hun for 10 miles. The thickness of the seam ranges between 80 and 175 feet. The most conservative estimate places the resource at 800,000,000 tons. The seven pits working, provided with the up-to-date machinery, yield now the daily output of about 3500 tons. The newest shafts, called Oyama and Togo pits, when in good working order will probably yield a daily out-

put of 5000 tons. The Fushun coal, in addition to its consumption by the company, supplied in the year October 1910 to September 1911 the home market to the amount of 410,862 tons, while its export to Shanghai, Hongkong, Singapore, Tientsin, Chefoo, Harbin, and Korea, amounted to 259,245 tons.

Connected with the mining enterprise at Fushun, the company has laid out new streets at Chien-Chin-Chai, installed electric and gas plants, laid water works, and established a school and a hospital.

4. *Undertakings in the railway zone.* By the "railway zone" in Manchuria is meant the tracts of land adjoining the railroad, which, by virtue of the Russo-Chinese agreement of 1896, Russia acquired from China. Upon these lands Russia obtained the right to erect any buildings and carry on all kinds of work. Furthermore, by the disclosure made at the time of the Fisher controversy at Harbin by M. Pokotiloff, Russian minister at Peking, it became publicly known that the authentic French text of the sixth article of the agreement conferred upon Russia, not only the privileges just enumerated, but also "le droit de l'administration exclusive et absolue sur ces terrains."³

The Portsmouth treaty made Japan the legatee of the railway zone south of Changchun, with all the rights and privileges appertaining thereto. The Japanese railway zone covers an area of 70.54 square miles, and that of Russia measures 513.63 square miles. Small as is the Japanese zone, the land is well distributed in all of the important trading centers along the South Manchurian Railway and the company has undertaken various works here. New streets lined with commodious houses in the vicinity of the native towns have been laid out at Wa-fang-tien, Hsiung-yo-Cheng, Kai-ping, Ta-shih-chiao, Hai-Cheng, Liao-yang, Mukden, Tieling, Kai-yuan, Chang-tu, Szuping-Chieh, Kung-Chuling, Fan-chia-tun, and Changchun. Some of them are provided with water works, sewerage systems, parks, elec-

³ These points are fully treated in the able articles "Japan in Manchuria" by Dr. K. Asakawa in *Yale Review*, vols. 17 and 18.

tric and gas works for lighting and heating purposes—blessings not enjoyed by many of the towns of Japan.

To care for the sick excellent hospitals at Dairen and Chien-Chin-Chai, with branches at nineteen other localities, have been established. The Dairen Hospital, provided with the most efficient medical staff and modern equipment, daily treats on an average seven hundred patients, and receives one hundred and fifty inmates. For educational purposes there have been established within the zone eight elementary schools, with seven subordinate establishments. To some of them are attached manual training schools and dormitories, the latter for the convenience of non-resident students. In some places the railroad company has established well-organized market-places and recreation grounds such as the Electric Park at Dairen, and in one town even a slaughter house. As no detail for the care of the living is neglected, so even the dead are properly cared for by the system of cremation and by the provision of cemeteries.

For administrative purposes the railroad company has divided the "zone" into ten units, whose heads, appointed by the company, discharge on a small scale, with the aid of a staff of employees, almost all the ordinary functions of a town chief, or a village headman. All public expenses connected with the undertakings described above have been paid by the company, while most of the local expenses are defrayed out of the levies charged upon the residents. Lands unused and some houses built by the company are rented to the residents on payment of specified rents. In 1911 the houses and population within the zone numbered respectively 14,867 and 59,361.

In addition to the long list of enterprises already given, the railroad company undertakes the business of warehousing; has established three experimental stations—central laboratory, geological laboratory, and experimental silk mill (the last was lately temporarily closed)—with the object of promoting the scientific utilization of the agricultural and mineral products of Manchuria; installed at Dairen a gas plant and an electric power house of 3000 kilowatts with which it runs the street car line of 13 miles; has built and maintains

excellent hotels at Dairen, Port Arthur, Changchun, and Mukden, with their customary appendages, barber shops, liveries and laundries; and has built elegant summer cottages on the sea-shore near Dairen to attract the visitors from Shanghai and other ports.

The expenditures incurred by the Railroad Company up to September 1911 for all the enterprises described were, beside the capital investment of 100,000,000 yen, in total 104,442,439 yen.

OTHER FACTORS IN SOUTH MANCHURIA

Beside the Kwantung government and the South Manchurian Railroad Company, there are a few elements which are wielding powerful influence in the development of the region. The Japanese settlers themselves, with a few notable exceptions, can hardly be counted among these influential factors. The great majority of the first stream of colonists were adventurers who came on the heels of their soldiers to hunt fortune with empty hands. They find it impossible to compete with the Chinese as farmers, who are content to work with the primitive methods on an incredibly small income. The wages of farm hands range from 15 sen to 30 sen (15 cents of American money) a day. Out of this scanty pay the thrifty Chinese are able to save money, as has been so well proved by large amounts of money found on the corpses of men who were found dead on the road side during the recent epidemic plague. Nor is it easy to beat the natives in retail business, in which they are past masters. The bulk of the Japanese population in Manchuria might, therefore, be said to be not in an enviable position. Their business as provision dealers, carpenters, musicians, etc., is mostly limited to their kin. The standard of their intelligence and morale has not hitherto been high enough to command respect of the natives, or of foreigners. But a better class of settlers now coming in will, it is to be hoped, bring with them the dawn of a new era.

To the above rule notable exceptions are found in some enterprising bean-cake mill owners at Dairen and New

Chwang, Okura and Company, Yokohama Specie Bank, Mitsui and Company, and a few others. Especially noteworthy is the activity of the concern last named. Directed by the best business talent at its headquarters in Tokyo, the great firm is now playing the most significant rôle in the commercial development of Manchuria. By dint of intelligence, foresight, and energy, it has created out of nothing the present most important item of Manchuria's international trade—the bean trade. In 1905 the first consignment of the crop was sent to Europe, which, however, ended in failure; in 1908–09 the export amounted to 397,156 tons; in the year 1909–1910 the export from Dairen alone reached 274,000 tons. Although the trade might be subject to many fluctuations, this means a newly discovered trade with Europe of 30,000,000 yen or so annually. By the latest news, I learn that the soya beans have also begun to be imported into the United States.

INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE

Turning now to the status of industry and commerce in South Manchuria the first striking fact is that the manufacturing industry is conspicuous only by its absence. The number of manufacturing concerns can be counted upon five fingers. A dry dock at Dairen managed by the Kawasaki Dockyard Company, the colliery and iron industry at Pen-shihü by Messrs. Okura and Company, a score of bean-cake and bean-oil mills at Dairen and Newchang, a lumber industry of joint Chinese and Japanese enterprise on the Yalu, a British-American tobacco factory at Mukden, a cement works, a match factory, and a flour mill, and some native industries of raw silk and of distilling spirits from kaoliang, and a few others,—these constitute about all of the manufacturing industries undertaken in south Manchuria outside the sphere of activity of the South Manchurian Railroad Company.

The present source of wealth of Manchuria lies chiefly in its agricultural products. The principal products are kaoliang, wheat, and the soya beans. The annual crop of beans is estimated at 1,700,000 tons, which has the approximate

value of \$35,000,000 gold. The gross estimate of the Manchurian crop placed by some at \$40,000,000 gold must, therefore, be far below the true mark.

Commercially the soya bean reigns supreme. Other staple agricultural products are mostly consumed at home. Beans and their by-products—bean-cake and bean-oil—form the chief items of export trade. The value of the annual trade of these two items is between 70 and 80 million yen. The other articles of export trade are wild cocoons, wild silk, timber, cattle-hides, furs and skins, bristles and bones. The principal imports are cotton piece goods and yarns, flour, kerosene oil, railway material, machines and machinery, sugar and matches. The total value of trade for 1910 (January to December) that passed through the ports of Dairen, Newchwang, and Antung was 181,674,901 gold yen.

So much, then, for plain facts. The recitation given above will suffice to show the broad outline of what Japan has accomplished in south Manchuria within the short period of seven years. These works, be it recollected, were undertaken under strict limitation of power and influence prescribed by Treaties. In short, by maintaining peace and order within her sphere, and by her insistence that China suppress the brigandage and robbery rampant in the land, Japan has contributed in no small measure to the safety of person and property, and the well-being of the inhabitants. By setting good examples of schools, hospitals, and scientific institutions, Japan has demonstrated to the Chinese the blessings of education, medicine, and science, to which they were strangers for ages past. By fostering the growth of industry and commerce, Japan has considerably increased the comfort and wealth of the natives, and has opened to the world a store-house of treasure, whose doors were locked since the beginning of time. By these works for the cause of civilization and humanity, reënforced by the rights guaranteed by treaties with the interested nations, Japan claims to establish the *raison d'être* of her presence in South Manchuria.

THE "OPEN DOOR" POLICY AND ITS ALLEGED VIOLATION
BY JAPAN

One of the cardinal principles of Japan's Manchurian policy is that of the "open door" and equal opportunity to all. It has been repeatedly avowed by the Japanese government in treaties and conventions. Loud, however, has been the cry raised since the war by some western critics against its alleged violation. For a time the American public listened with eagerness to such charges. Indeed, the attack became once so popular that, it was asserted, a book on the Far East, unless sufficiently stuffed with the anti-Japanese material, could never hope to run the market. Synchronous with the tide of reaction against Japan that set in after the war, the past half a decade was the golden age of those authors. Slowly, however, the tide is changing. The late disposition of the western public to relish no longer those stale stories shows that it is not only weary of them, but has found strong arguments that go to upset them.

It is here fair to admit that some discriminations against foreigners there might have been, especially during the military occupation and the early days of the railroad management, if by discrimination is meant the favors conferred by the authorities upon their compatriots sooner than those given to foreigners, whose language and methods were not so intelligible to them. Again, the system of offering rebates to large shippers in proportion to their freight bills, abolished two years ago, ought never to have been adopted. Whatever might have been its business expediency, it was an unwise policy from national standpoint. It lent to Japan's enemies a powerful weapon of attack. Especially to the people, who have always looked upon this peculiarly American system as the means devised to defeat the "square deal," it was the cause of much suspicion. So long, however, as the system was open to public inspection, and its privilege enjoyed by all, Japanese and foreigners alike, it did not in the least violate the principle of equal opportunity to all.

The stories of discriminations and underhand dealing were originally invented by those who were at sea to explain the

loss of the Manchurian market for American and European products, and the striking gain for the Japanese. But the insinuations have fallen far short of the mark. For there are positive and too conclusive causes that have contributed to the success of the Japanese trade. The first and foremost is the fact that Japan is the largest buyer of Manchurian products. Out of the total export of beans and bean-cake, which form, as already stated, the major part of the Manchurian export, Japan bought in 1909 for her own consumption alone 94 per cent of bean-cake and 17 per cent of the beans exported—the two items amounting in value to over 30,000,000 yen—beside handling herself the greater portion of the bean export business. So important is this fact as a commercial factor that it makes a writer in the *Far Eastern Review*, Mr. G. Bronson Rhea, exclaim: "It is a far cry from high diplomacy to the humble soya bean, yet we hold to the belief that the past and present commercial situation and ultimate solution of the vexatious Manchurian question is bound up in the control of this one product." In the purchase of other articles of Manchurian export, Japan is also among the leaders. It is but the simple law of commerce that places so large a buyer on the vantage ground as a seller over those who receive in return only cash for their wares. There are again other reasons no less strong for the advance of Japanese trade. These are the small cost of production and transportation, the facilities for financial transactions extended by the Yokohama Specie Bank, the identity of scripts and manners, and other means calculated to foster trade with the Chinese.

After analyzing in detail the subject under review, Mr. K. K. Kawakami, in his forthcoming book, "American-Japanese Relations," sums it up in these words:⁴

Japan has subsidized her steamship lines to Manchuria, installed commercial museums in various important towns in order to advertise her merchandize, sent commercial agents to inquire into the Manchurian markets, and, what is more important, has become a most liberal purchaser of Manchurian products, thus establishing

⁴ The manuscripts of the book touching the subject were shown to the speaker through the courtesy of the author.

close business relations with the native producers and merchants. These, reinforced by the advantage which she enjoys over Western nations in geographical position, in the cost of production and transportation, have enabled her to push her trade in Manchuria with remarkable success."

CAUSES OF THE LOSS OF AMERICAN TRADE IN MANCHURIA AND CHINA


What interests Americans will be the question how far and in what line has Japan made incursions into their Manchurian trade. In flour, kerosene oil, and railway material, which are among the chief articles of American import into Manchuria, Japan is America's customer, not her competitor. In them America finds her rivals in Russia and Germany. The Harbin flour mills, the Baku oil, and the Sumatra oil of the Asiatic Petroleum Company (a German concern), and the steel mills and car factories of Russia and Germany have been hard at work to make raid upon the American trade. Though their efforts are not yet crowned with success, they have affected in a measure the American import. In supplying cigarettes to the Manchurian market, the Japanese tobacco monopoly tried for a time to wrest the trade from the British-American Tobacco Trust. But the superior organization and business method of the latter have again made it master of the situation.

It is in the trade of cotton goods alone that Japan has played the rôle of a successful competitor of America. Japan has developed the trade in Manchuria from nothing in 1900 to 151,400 pieces of sheeting, 52,000 pieces of drill, and 1,800 pieces of shirtings in 1908, while the American trade of 1,140,620 pieces of sheeting and 442,291 pieces of drills in 1904 has dropped to 515,195 pieces of sheetings and 194,570 pieces of drills, in 1908. For the year 1909 the imports of sheeting, drill, and shirting from Japan and America through the three ports of Antung, Dairen, and New Chwang, stood thus:

	FOR JAPAN	FOR THE UNITED STATES
	<i>pieces</i>	<i>pieces</i>
Sheeting.....	261,744	692,174
Drill.....	114,814	317,561
Shirting.....	109,174	166,042

These figures, however, must be read with caution, for as some of the American goods are re-shipped from Shanghai on Japanese vessels, it is often difficult to determine the true origin of the imported goods. Whatever may be the exact amount it is certain that America has sustained loss in its Manchurian trade of cotton goods, and to that amount Japan and England are the gainers.

The causes of Japan's successful intrusion are obvious—the cheap labor and the small cost of transportation. When it is remembered, however, that it was American cotton goods, because of their low price, heavy make, and toughness to stand washing, that drove out of the Manchurian market the English sheetings and drills reigning supreme fifteen years ago, America, if she has today the losing end of the bargain, “cannot complain that Japan has not given her a “square deal.” Further it must be added with emphasis that, if the American cotton industry has suffered to some extent in Manchuria by Japanese competition, the American cotton growers have by no means been losers. The raw cotton imported in 1910 from the United States to supply Japanese cotton mills was valued at 17,193,128 yen. The American cotton import of 1911 reached a phenomenal value of sixty million yen! We can see no reason why the cause of manufacturers alone should find its defenders, while that of the farmers is left unnoticed.

Neither is the decline of American import of cotton cloth confined to the Manchurian field, nor is it the sole cause of the loss of American trade in the Far East. Even in the Philippines, under the very eyes of the American eagle, there has been a marked advance in the import of the Japanese cotton cloth. Still more glaring is the fact that the phenomenon of the decrease of American trade is observable in the whole of China.  Mr. Frederick McCormick in a

striking article "American Defeat in the Pacific," which appeared in the columns of the *Outlook*, January 1911, points out that "it is not Japan that has slaughtered American trade in China," but "those who have benefitted by Chinese industrial development and by America's losses are the capitalistic nations of Europe." The reasons he assigns for the decline of American trade are: (1) "that in all the more important lines, such as cottons, flour, and steel, sales and distributions are in the hands of foreigners and are left to shift for themselves;" (2) "that the American trade in China receives no assistance from the American nation." The writer lodges a complaint against the American trader, naively adding that "he wants to sell to the Chinese not what the Chinese want, but what the American trader wants them to want." The time seems, then, to have come to look into the Manchurian commercial situation with proper insight instead of attributing everything to the wickedness of Japan's playing a Machiavelli.

JAPAN'S MONOPOLISTIC POLICY AND THE "OPEN DOOR"

What seems to lie at the bottom of the various complaints lodged against Japan by well-meant Anglo-American critics is their dislike of the excessive governmental activity in those enterprises which are undertaken in Anglo-Saxondom by private individuals. Japan has created state monopolies of tobacco, camphor and opium in Formosa; nationalized the railways; granted subsidies to steamship lines; and given aids to many industries. In Manchuria the Japanese government has the controlling voice in the South Manchurian Railroad Company. We have seen how wide and varied are the operations of the company. Indeed so all pervading seems the activity of the company in almost every sphere of life that one is led to doubt whether there is any room for private enterprises in south Manchuria. With the inborn Anglo-American hatred against the too-powerful governmental control, the critics look upon Japan's Manchurian system as a machine invented to stifle and defy competition. What adds to their spite are the red-tape, the

excessive importance assumed by the minor officials of the railroad company, the haughty attitude of Japanese towards the natives, and the air of exclusiveness the islanders have not yet succeeded in getting rid of.

This, however, is an Anglo-American critic's point of view. While wishing on our part that a more free and liberal atmosphere be infused into Japan's Manchurian régime, and that the unhealthy state of things therein, owing to the lack of individual initiatives, gradually mend itself, we must say that the prejudice of the western critic should not blind him to the fact that it is entirely within Japan's sphere to pursue at home whatever policy she deems it best to serve the interest of the nation, and, knowing her own weakness, to adopt in Manchuria within the bounds prescribed by treaties such proper measures as to ensure her strength in the face of keen international competition. No more can the critic protest against Japan's policy of granting subsidies and aids to different industrial concerns, than the latter can complain of America, who, in order to protect her industry, collects a duty of 50 per cent upon all imports of Japanese manufactured silk, and 60 per cent upon porcelain wares.

That Japan is sincere in her attachment to the principle of the "open door" and equal opportunity to all can never be questioned. Not only does the pledge so often made demand its fulfillment, but it is the true interest of Japan to invite the coming of foreigners for trade, and the investment of their capital in Manchuria. And how can this end be attained but by proving Japan's honest intention to share with foreign merchants and capitalists the profits of trade and industry in the region? The short-sighted policy of exclusiveness, if ever tried, will sound the death-knell to Japan's prestige and career in Manchuria.

RUSSIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD JAPAN AND ITS RESULTANT

In formulating the Manchurian program, be it remembered, there were underlying it, beside the economic ground already explained, some political and military considera-

tions of greatest importance to Japan. First of all, there was the attitude of Russia that needed close study. That attitude towards Japan was for some time after the war, as might be expected, not altogether reassuring. Not only was there a powerful faction in Russian society, which openly advocated the war of revenge, often voiced by the *Novoe Vremya*, but the Russian government itself never relaxed its effort to strengthen its Far Eastern position. No sooner had it recovered from the shock of revolution than the government decided to construct at a cost of 200,000,000 rubles the Amur Railway, which, when completed, will run along the north bank of the river for 700 miles, and make possible the through communication from Moscow to Vladivostock on the all-Russian territory.

More significant from the Japanese standpoint is the plan of doubling the track of the Siberian Railway. It is now vigorously pushed, and by 1915 will probably be the accomplished fact. Japan, fully conversant with the masterly performance of Prince Khilkoff, which was chiefly responsible in saving General Kuropatkin from greater disasters than what overtook him at Liaoyang and Mukden, is justified in looking with fear upon this mighty military weapon when double-tracked. It has been estimated by some experts that the single-tracked Siberian road attained toward the end of the war the maximum capacity of transporting per month 60,000 troops, with all their equipment. The new road might then enable Russia to amass on the frontier of Manchuria an army of a million men, double the strength of General Linievitch's Grand Manchurian Army, within less than a year. Moreover, the Russian government formulated after the war a policy "to dispatch every year half a million colonists from European Russia to the Amur, Baikal, and coast provinces." Though the policy does not seem to work out as desired, yet the plan to raise a strong army out of the mujiks thus settled will see its consummation in not a distant day. "General Kuropatkin is said to have recently remarked" writes Dr. Hirano in the Japanese magazine, *New Japan*, "that Russia should make the Eastern Chinese Railway her first line of defense and the Amur

river and the Amur Railway respectively the second and third lines. The General's remark shows with what wisdom and scrupulosity Russia is making preparations for future emergencies in the eastern world."

Russia apparently has already buried her hatchet. Her friendship with Japan is, thanks to wise diplomacy on both sides, becoming closer and closer. Their manifest common interests and destinies in the Far East will tend more and more to their coöperation. In this connection it is proper to say that Japan has never been slow, as shown in the diplomatic negotiations prior to the outbreak of the war, to recognize the Russian special rights and privileges in Manchuria, to which Russia justly laid claim by her civilizing efforts undertaken at a great cost. Although her mistaken aggressive policy is responsible for her Manchurian disasters of 1904-05, Russia has never forfeited her claims to those rights and privileges in Manchuria except those she transferred to Japan by the Portsmouth treaty. This liberal attitude of Japan and the willingness of Russia to join hands with the former foe in the solution of the Manchurian question are the foundation of their recent *entente*. And yet no one can blame Japan in taking proper measures for the defense of her own interest. When seen in this light, the strong pressure Japan exerted upon China to carry into effect the improvement of the Antung-Mukden line, and Japan's proposal to China to construct jointly the Changchun-Kirin-Hoiryong-Chong-jin line, will become more intelligible.

CHINA'S WEAKNESS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Another factor Japan had to reckon with was of course China. Restored by Japan to its owner, the destiny of Manchuria necessarily hung upon the sovereign power. China, however, belonged to the category of unknown quantities. To find the true value of this unknown quantity was what taxed Japan's brain most. Two ways naturally presented themselves for consideration. In the first place there was the so-called "Awakening of China." The China-Japan war, the Boxer episode, and the Russo-Japanese war un-

doubtedly shook China rudely from her centuries-old lethargy. Through these agencies the national consciousness came suddenly into being, manifesting itself in the "right-recovery" and constitutional movements. The Chinese government itself showed its disposition to set the house in order. Some reforms were, in fact, initiated. For military purposes it was declared that China would organize thirty-seven army divisions. The late war minister, General Yin-Tchang, had in his pocket, it was said, the plan of expanding these to seventy divisions.

Such a formidable military organization, if perfected and used to wreak vengeance upon Japan for the humiliation of 1895 or any other grudge China might have, would certainly be a terrible menace to the Island Empire. It was manifestly the anticipation of the dawn of such days that induced Professor Jenks of Cornell University to offer the good intentioned advice to Japan to get out of Manchuria, and thus court the good grace of China. It was not, however, this forecast of China's strength that specially troubled Japan. It was, on the contrary, the inherent weakness of China that caused much apprehension on the part of the Mikado's empire. Had China been strong, there would have been no Manchurian question. Were she to become truly strong, the question would be simplified. It is to the true interest of Japan to see China wide awake, reformed, and strong; for in such an event even had Japan to give up the Manchurian railroads and the Kwantung Province, she would be amply compensated by the expansion of her trade with her friendly and prosperous neighbor. Unfortunately, such happy days seemed to the eyes of Japan too far away. The half-hearted policy of reform and the time-honored diplomacy China pursued, in spite of the terrible lessons of warning brought home to her, gave Japan every reason to take a pessimistic view. The recent paralysis of the Chinese government, so complete, so pitiful, in the face of the revolutionary crisis, too well proves that Japan's fear was not misplaced and sufficiently vindicates her past Manchurian policy. Indeed, this *denouement*, whose outcome it is yet difficult to foresee, is a thousand times more eloquent than

words. It makes useless our task of explaining further the drift things were taking in the past. Here we only add our prayer that the present political upheaval of China, extremely to be regretted as it is, will be but the throes of her re-birth—a prelude to the bright days to come.

Suffice it to say, then, that the cardinal points of Japan's Manchurian policy—the preservation of the fruits of war, or, in diplomatic language the maintenance of the *status quo*, and that of peace in the Far East—were in constant danger of being overturned by the weakness of China.

This meant, on one hand, the possibility of encroachment of Russia from the north, that might bring to naught Japan's efforts of 1904-05. On the other hand, China's weakness opens a way to the introduction of a third power, or other powers, into the council-board of Manchuria, that might force Japan to repeat the bitter experience of 1895. All these considerations made it incumbent upon Japan to take proper precautionary measures to guard herself against future emergencies, and to strengthen her position in south Manchuria.

AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATION AND THE MANCHURIAN QUESTION

It is but natural that Japan should look with extreme apprehension upon an intrusion of a Third Power, or other Powers, into the Manchurian arena, lest she be deprived of the fruits of war secured at such an enormous cost by those who have wasted therein neither a cent nor a drop of blood. An illuminating example was set before her not many years ago. Whatever the intention of the author of the neutralization scheme of the Manchurian railroads, it completely ignored history. It is but simple justice that Russia and Japan should have in the solution of the Manchurian question the voice their paramount interests entitle them to command. That the American government acquiesced in the failure of the neutralization plan through the refusal of Russia and Japan to entertain it demonstrates the disinterested motive of the proposal.

When, therefore, Mr. Willard Straight says that "to create a substantial foreign commercial interest, and by so doing secure a political safeguard for the "Three Eastern Provinces," is as necessary to China's welfare, as the maintenance of her integrity and the preservation of the "Open Door" are essential to the realization of the well-warranted hopes for the future of our Eastern markets," we are constrained to raise a dissenting voice to the first part of his statement, which implies an aggressive political-commercial campaign of serious import. The declaration is tantamount to the confession that the furtherance of commercial interests will be used for political purposes. An American commercial campaign in Manchuria, if conducted with such an end in view, is bound to result in much irritation to the other vitally interested powers, if not in grave consequences. It is neither wise nor just. And it is the firm conviction of the speaker that the majority of the American people would endorse his view point rather than that of the representative in China of the powerful American syndicate. For it passes my belief that the wisdom of the essentially sane and practical people to whom Manchuria means nothing but a commercial and industrial field, where they have no historical, political, or military interests at stake, will ever allow their national policy to be harnessed to the financial machine of the money power, and be driven at its beck over the road that might lead them to grave issues.

So far as the American-Japanese relation is concerned, it will not be too presuming to say that there are no questions of importance, except the one under discussion, that are likely to endanger the long standing friendship between the two nations. Nothing explains better the attitude of the Japanese nation toward America than the conversation published by the *Jiji Shimpō* of September 15, 1911, between President Jordan of Leland Stanford University and Baron Shibusawa. The gist of this is that the Baron, after assuring the American visitor of the unchanging kindly and grateful feeling Japan has toward America, observed that his nation cannot feel sure of the friendship of the United States until a better understanding than the one reflected

in the neutralization proposal of Secretary Knox is attained on Japan's position in Manchuria. Is, then, the Manchurian question worth to Americans the cost of the Russian and Japanese friendship?

The foregoing are, then, the historical, political, military and economic grounds that have secured to Japan her present position in south Manchuria. Her future conduct will doubtless be governed accordingly. So long as this special position is fully recognized by other nations, there is no reason whatever why Japan should not welcome their co-operation in the development of Manchuria. Especially with her ally and friend, Great Britain and the United States, whose capitalistic power is paramount among nations, Japan must be extremely solicitous to join hands for the exploitation of the resources of south Manchuria.

JAPAN'S ANNEXATION OF KOREA

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Japan was prompted to take the decisive step of annexing Korea for reasons that are easily understood. They are: (1) to insure her own national safety; (2) to assure enduring peace in the Far East by eliminating one of the most fruitful sources of disturbance; (3) to promote the welfare and prosperity of the Koreans; (4) to do away with the disadvantages, administrative and financial, of a dual system of government—the residency general and the Korean government; (5) to consolidate the identical interests of Japan and Korea in the Far East by the amalgamation of two peoples whose similarity in race and past culture makes such a task possible.

From the strategic standpoint, Korea is to the Japanese Empire as a spear pointed at its heart. Whatever nation holds this weapon becomes supremely important to Japan. Korea, even in the days of junks, if in the possession of a powerful monarch, must of necessity have been a constant menace to the safety of Nippon; but in this age of steam, when the Korean Strait has been transformed into a mere ribbon of silver, the installment of a strong hostile power in the peninsula would prove the death-blow to the aspirations, if not the very existence, of the mikado's empire. No question, therefore, has exercised a more powerful influence upon the course of the New Japan than this Korean problem.

The history of the Japanese-Korean relations during the three decades that intervene between the conclusion of the first treaty of amity and commerce in 1876 and the establishment of a protectorate in 1907 is in reality the story of Japan's attempt to safeguard her security by the maintenance of Korea as a buffer state. The first trial Japan faced to test the strength of this political doctrine came naturally

from China, which has always striven to lay a shadowy claim of sovereignty over Korea. The China-Japan war of 1894-1895 resulted in the complete political effacement of China from Korea, and the definite recognition of Korean independence by the powers. Thus for a time the buffer state theory seemed vindicated. China ousted, however, Japan found herself confronted in Korea by another formidable power. The struggle of 1904-1905, undertaken at an enormous expenditure of blood and treasure, finally drove Russia out of Korea, and at the same time fully convinced Japan of the futility of an attempt to seek her salvation by dreams made of such stuffs as those of a strong Korean nationality. Through these two costly experiments Japan learned that something decisive must be done with this country, which, while its interests and destiny are so closely allied with those of Japan, cannot maintain its own independence.

So, after the Portsmouth and the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1905 had definitely recognized Japan's paramount position in Korea, the first task Japan undertook to accomplish was to eliminate from Korea the danger of any foreign complications that might again invite foreign intervention. By the agreement signed in November, 1905, the Japanese government took into its hands the management of Korean foreign affairs.

After this important step was taken, Japan began in good earnest to put the Korean house in order. For this purpose it was agreed that a resident general, representing the Japanese government, should reside at Seoul. At first his power was purely advisory. But it was soon found that the optional method was doomed to failure, for the Korean government, free to adopt or reject at will the advice of the resident general, usually chose the latter alternative, and as a consequence by the agreement of 1907 the power of the resident general was vastly increased. He was given the power to initiate as well as to direct measures of administration, to enact and enforce laws and ordinances, to appoint and dismiss high Korean officials, and to appoint to any public posts, except to the ministerial seats in the Cabinet,

any Japanese subjects of his choice. Korea, in short, was brought under the protectorate of Japan.

The importance Japan attached to the work of pacifying and regenerating Korea is shown by the fact that she sent as the first resident general her foremost statesman, Prince Ito. With sincere devotion to the cause of Korea, he brought to the task all the wisdom, experience, and prestige gained during his long service to his fatherland. After three years of arduous labor he succeeded in conciliating the court and silencing the opposition, in evolving some order out of chaos, and inaugurating many reforms the benefits of which have been lasting.

But even the statesmanship of Ito was not equal to the task of curing the cancer that had eaten deep into the heart of Korea. The surgical operation needed was left to Prince Katsura, the former premier. Throughout his administration, Prince Ito had hoped by pursuing the policy of conciliation and uplift, to make Korea capable of standing on its own feet. He was, however, forced to acknowledge, after the most sincere efforts to teach Koreans the science of statecraft, that they would never be able to govern themselves. The first public intimation of this conviction was made in April, 1909, when Prince Ito, speaking before Korean tourists said that Japan and Korea had hitherto stood side by side, but that they should now proceed together and form one empire.

Some publicists have asserted that the tragic death of Ito at Harbin sealed the fate of Korea. Nothing is further from the truth. That Prince Ito retired from the residency generalship some months before his assassination without any apparent valid cause, goes to show that he had already become convinced that annexation was inevitable, and that the performance of it would better be confided to another. In an interview with the writer, Prince Katsura assured him that the measure of annexation was decided upon after due conference with Prince Ito, and only after it had received his complete endorsement. This declaration is further emphasized by the fact that the first act of Count Terauchi, after signing the treaty of annexation, was to send from

Seoul a telegraphic message to the family of the late prince requesting them to convey the intelligence to the spirit of the deceased statesman. The suggestion was carried out on August 30, 1910, when Prince Hirokuni Ito, as the representative of the family, conducted a solemn ceremonial service at the tomb of the illustrious dead.

Such, then, is the short story of the successive steps leading to the annexation. The lessons of history, extending through three eventful decades, taught Japan most conclusively that nothing short of annexation could solve the Korean problem, and that only by this radical measure could the permanent security of Japan and the peace of the extreme East be assured. The imperial rescript proclaiming the annexation, therefore, begins with the declaration that the emperor, "attaching the highest importance to the maintenance of permanent peace in the Orient and the consolidation of lasting security to our empire and finding in Korea constant and fruitful sources of complication," had instituted a protectorate in the peninsula. The existing régime, however, having proved ineffective to preserve peace and stability, "it has become manifest that fundamental changes in the present system of government are inevitable."

Imperative as was the measure of annexation from the standpoint of Japan's self-preservation, still more urgent was its adoption from the consideration of putting an end to the spirit of unrest in Korea and advancing its true welfare. Since the establishment of the residency general, every effort has been made to eradicate the existing evils, and to promote the well-being and prosperity of the Koreans. The residency general can, indeed, present to us a formidable array of reform works undertaken under its auspices. A brief outline of these reforms is here needed, in order to give us a full realization of the points wherein the protectorate, in spite of its commendable efforts to introduce salutary reforms, has failed to bring peace and happiness to the Korean people.

PURIFICATION OF THE COURT AND FINANCIAL REFORM

Among the many ills afflicting Korea, no one was more baneful than the court, the hotbed of corruption and intrigue. The functions and properties of the court were hopelessly mixed with those of the state. Laws were enacted, and justice administered, often at the whim of the king or of his courtiers. Appointments of high officials were frequently made through the influence of court favorites. Sales of offices were openly advertised at the court, and, needless to say, the appointment went to that highest bidder, who knew best how to fill the royal coffers and then to reimburse himself with the squeezes exacted from the people. Bribes and the confiscation of private property for the benefit of court officials were common.

Almost as influential as the imperial household itself were its bureaus and offices which outnumbered those of the central government. These superfluous offices were filled with thousands of worthless officers, whose chief occupation was, when not engaged in hatching plots, to attend absurd state ceremonials and harmful religious rites. For these religious services there were employed, and often domiciled in the court, a crowd of soothsayers, geomancers, sorceresses, and others of their ilk, who through densest ignorance and unbridled vices added their deadly quota to the pollution of the court. To this long list of evildoers were further added unscrupulous foreign adventurers, who frequented the court, and busied themselves in devising grotesque schemes to defraud the royal treasury of its funds. What was its actual condition can best be imagined by the items of expenditure of the Imperial Household, given in the first report of the Japanese financial adviser, Baron Megata. Out of the total expenditure of 2,923,000 yen, the largest sum, 905,000 yen, is the item of expense for religious observances; the sums of 432,000 yen and 220,000 yen are respectively for food and the banquets of courtiers, while but a paltry 25,000 yen is for the use of the imperial family.

Out of confusion between the functions and properties of the state and those of the crown had resulted the chaos

in the public finance. Many of the legitimate functions of the finance department of the Korean government had been usurped by the financial board of the imperial household, in control of court upstarts. Owing to the lack of organized method of tax collection, the court and the government each sent out its own agents to collect taxes and levy compulsory contributions upon the people. The people were ground between the two millstones, the court and the government.

To make the confusion worse confounded, the currency system was in the most wretched state. The Korean metallic currency consisted of silver coins, a nickel coin of 5 sen and a 1 sen copper cash, the last two being most widely circulated. The court caring mainly for the profit derived from minting nickels coined the debased nickel coin to such an amount that its market value fell to one-half its face value. On the other hand, the copper cash, whose face value represented its actual value, often fluctuated from 100 per cent to 60 per cent premium. To cap all, the revenue derived by the state from its people of over 12,000,000 was only 7,480,287 yen for 1905.

To make a clean sweep of the court and to rescue the finances of the country from certain ruin, were, therefore, the prime necessities of reform. In spite of the persistent opposition and bickerings of the court officials, the delicate task of cleansing the imperial household was finally accomplished by the resident general. He "separated it effectually from the executive; differentiated its property from that of the state; purged it of a rabble of sorcerers, necromancers, and other scheming parasites; dismissed a host of useless officials; abolished many costly and worthless ceremonies—792 annually were reduced to 201, while 2900 employees were dispensed with; repaired the palace; replaced the old-fashioned sedan chairs with modern carriages and the ancient oil lamps with electric light; established a museum, botanical and zoölogical gardens, and a library; and finally, reorganized the household, and placed upon its staff several competent Japanese officials."

Meanwhile Megata and his worthy successors under the residency general worked hard for financial rehabilitation. They adjusted the state and crown properties by bringing under the control of the finance department the collection of all taxes and by transferring into the possession of the state all immovable properties belonging to the crown. In lieu of these transfers the State became responsible for the liquidation of the debts hitherto contracted by the imperial household, as well as for its future maintenance. The financial administrators further resuscitated and vigorously put in force the budget system; instituted the national treasury, and finally established the gold standard by withdrawing the old nickel coins and copper cash, and substituting them by the new sound currency. Whereas in former days pawnbrokers, innkeepers and the like carried on the most primitive kind of banking business, the residency general called into being various banks. Whereas formerly the Korean government had little or no credit to float state bonds, the residency general helped it to raise many public loans, the most important of which is that of 20,000,000 for the undertaking of various public works. By these salutary measures the revenue of the Korean Treasury has doubled itself within half a decade, and a brighter era has dawned upon the financial world of Korea.

REFORM IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND PRISONS

In Korea the judiciary and the executive were formerly not separated. Provincial governors, prefects, and district magistrates discharged judicial functions in their executive capacity. Under such a system there was no limit to the evil done. "Civil cases were usually determined in favor of the longest purse, and criminal ones depended on the arbitrary will of a tyro sitting in judgment; a witness generally ranked as *particeps criminis*, and evidence was usually extorted by torture." Floggings were often so severely administered as to render the victim a cripple for life, if he did not die under the infliction. Innocent persons

were often thrown into jails by the executive, either to extort money or to wreak personal vengeance. Prisons attached to governor's yamen were shocking dungeons. In winter the prisoners were sometimes frozen to death, and in summer fell victims to suffocation or epidemic diseases.

All these abuses have been thoroughly reformed. Several well administered prisons have been opened, where sanitary measures are rigorously enforced; special rooms set apart for female prisoners and the sick; religious teaching given by Christian and Buddhist teachers; and out-door work introduced to give air and exercise to prisoners. The judiciary is now independent of the executive. Torture has been abolished; Koreans have been trained to serve as barristers; a penal code has been framed; temporary regulations for civil and criminal procedure enacted, which are soon to be replaced by a civil code and a code of civil and criminal procedure; and finally the rights of an individual to enjoy his life and property fully guaranteed.

ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Until recently Korea had no regular system of public education. The institutions in existence were of the most primitive order. In a village there was a *Clu-pung*, where the village dominie gathered about him the children of the neighborhood and taught them the rudiments of reading and writing. In each district there was the *Han-gio*, maintained by government patronage or donations of private individuals, where were received the students of *Clu-pung* desirous for more advanced study of Chinese. And finally, as the highest seat of Confucian learning, there was in Seoul the *Syong-Kyūn-Koan*, where instruction was given in Chinese classics. The method of teaching in vogue in these so-called schools was patterned after that of China, and, while this was bad, the Korean was still worse. This is not surprising since the pedagogical profession had fallen into hopeless disrepute. "The traditional Korean school-teacher," says an eye witness, "is looked upon as more or less of a mendicant. Only the poorest will engage in this work,

and they do it on a pittance, which just keeps them above the starvation line." Modern education in scientific and useful subjects was an unknown thing in most parts of the country. The only beam of light that pierced the Korean night came from the lamp burning in the missionary schools.

The work of the residency general was thus nothing less than the creation of an entirely new system of public education. The educational authorities wisely planned not to destroy at one stroke the old educational structures but to utilize them as far as possible, and replace them gradually by something better, and to establish the modern schools which will serve as models to Koreans, hoping that they will come to build such schools of their own accord. The system of education inaugurated was somewhat the same as that adopted in Japan, with modifications adapted to the degree of intelligence and conditions prevailing in Korea. There are thus public common schools, high schools, and normal and technical schools. There were at the time of the annexation 60 common schools, 9 high schools, 1 normal school, 1 foreign language school, 1 medical school, 1 commercial school, 1 industrial training school, and 1 agricultural and forestry school.

The slowness of the educational pace was due to the lack of money, the scarcity of native teachers, as well as to the peculiar educational difficulty Japan had to face.

NATURAL RESOURCES OF KOREA AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT

While the financial, judicial, and educational reforms were thus vigorously pushed, the cause of material development was no less sedulously cared for. To facilitate transportation, 640 miles of railroads have been constructed; 7682 miles of telegraph, and 7931 miles of telephone wires laid; highways repaired or constructed; posts and parcel posts organized; and steamship lines opened.

The natural resources of Korea are not so limited as its present extreme poverty might imply. Gold, lead, iron, copper, and coal are found in the northern mountains. But

except the gold mines worked by Americans at Unsan, and a few coal mines at Pying-Yang and other localities, the subsoil is almost left unexploited. Manufacturing industry can hardly be said to exist. The Korean waters helped by the Black Current, teem with fish, and with the extensive sea coast, they are ideal fisheries. But the fishing method is so primitive that the annual catch by Koreans amounts to only 3,000,000 yen. The chief wealth of Korea lies at present in its agricultural products. Rice, barley, wheat, and beans are the principal products. Their total annual crop is about 14,000,000 *koku* (approximately 70,000,000 bushels) which at rough estimate is worth 110,000,000 yen. By improvement in agriculture this annual crop can be vastly increased, perhaps doubled. Further, incredible as it may seem, the indolence and stupidity of Koreans have left nine-tenths of their country as waste land or denuded mountains. Sixty-six per cent of the country's cultivable area lies fallow!

The residency general, therefore, bent its energy to improve agricultural methods, encourage industry, and develop other natural resources. It helped to organize the Oriental Development Company, whose business is to reclaim waste lands, to accommodate farmers with lands, seeds, implements, and shelters, and to engage in other undertakings deemed necessary for the development of the country. The residency general has also established a horticultural station, nursery gardens, irrigation reservoirs, and a model farm at Suwon, with four branches at Mokpo, Kunsan, Pying-Yang and Taiku. The director of the Suwon Station, Dr. Honda, told the writer that by agricultural improvements it will not be difficult to increase the present crop of cereals in Korea by 40 per cent.

No less commendable is the work of afforestation. No feature of Korea strikes its first visitor more than the ugly barrenness of its hills and mountains. This is, however, due not to the niggardliness of Nature, but to the reckless felling of trees by the people for fuel, and to despotism. It is said that when Tai-Won-Kun built his costly palace at Seoul, the people, in order to escape the forced contribu-

tions for tall trees, and for labor to convey them to the capital, cut them down and burned them. This deforestation of mountains is a principal cause of injury to agriculture. To mend this, model forests have been established where are planted millions of young trees imported from Japan, and every effort is made to afforest the bare mountains throughout the country.

How the reform work inaugurated by Japan stimulated the activity of Korea in various spheres of its life is plainly shown by the phenomenal growth of its commerce. The total of its foreign trade in 1903, the year before Japan's intervention, barely reached the mark of 28,000,000 yen, while the figures for 1910 stood at 59,500,000—an increase of 106 per cent within less than a decade.

RESULTS OF JAPANESE ENTERPRISE

The results of Japanese enterprise under the régime of protectorate in Korea above sketched, are summed up by Captain Brinkley, editor of the *Japan Mail*, in these words:

In less than a decade Japan has served up for her neighbor's nourishment all the fruits of her own activities during a cycle of unprecedentedly crowded life. . . . In their cities Koreans no longer live in perpetual contact with accumulated filth. In their passage from place to place they have ceased to rely solely on sedan chairs and ponies, as railways and electric trains have become available. In agriculture they have model farms to guide them, and the most fruitful seeds are at their disposal. In the hour of sickness they command expert medical aid or facile access to well-equipped hospitals. In their chief towns they drink pure water from modern aqueducts instead of the contents of contaminated wells. In educating their children they have the use of schools where the most serviceable branches of modern knowledge are taught. When they are wronged they can count on justice instead of extortion, and in their daily existence they are beginning to know the blessings of security of life and property.

FUNDAMENTAL REMEDY LACKING IN THE RÉGIME OF PROTECTORATE—ITS DRAWBACKS

Why did this enterprise bring no commensurate blessing upon Koreans? Why have they turned their backs upon all these gifts? Why was Japan forced to confess after the

trial of three years, that she failed to find in the régime of a protectorate sufficient hope for the realization of her object, and that the "condition of unrest and disquietude still prevails throughout the whole peninsula?" In spite of the utmost efforts which Japan exerted to cure the Korean patient, there was one fundamental remedy lacking under the old prescription. The patient's mind was ill at ease. Medicines and nutritious food produced little effect until the peace of his spirit was restored. Koreans had always looked with suspicion upon the doings of Japan. Their ideas of loyalty and patriotism could find no reconciliation with that of submission to Japan. Insurgency was, therefore, often looked upon as the act of devotion to the Korean emperor. The murderer of Prince Ito and the would-be assassin of Premier Yi were hailed in some quarters as heroes. These criminal ideas were further utilized by a host of thieves who infested the land, and now comfortably adopted the dual profession of insurgent and brigand. To cut down these robbers and stamp out the insurrection, Japan was forced to organize a large body of police and *gendarmerie*, in addition to the garrison army of a division and a half. During four years these forces have shot over 14,000 of these insurgents, which naturally accentuated the bitter feelings of Koreans toward Japanese. And yet the insurgency was far from being wiped out.

The régime of protectorate thus not only failed to bring peace to Korea, but carried with it certain drawbacks that tied down the hands of Japanese administrators. The following is a single instance. One of the serious difficulties Japan met in solving the Korean educational problem was how to adapt and apply its fundamental principle of education in Korea. Japan's cardinal ethic of a good citizenship is loyalty and patriotism. It is inculcated in the minds of her sons and daughters, from the students of common schools to those of universities. Taught to the Korean youths, this moral weapon becomes two-edged. Misapplied, it is suicidal to Japan. The Japanese educators in Korea were, therefore, extremely solicitous to impart to the Korean children the correct understanding of this moral teaching. They them-

selves compiled most of the text-books for schools, and prohibited the use of other books than those that had passed their rigid inspection. It is, however, difficult to see how such a temporary makeshift could succeed in preventing Koreans from their ultimate disillusionment. For so long as Korea retained its own king and semi-independence, it is but natural and logical that Koreans should devote their loyalty and patriotism to their own emperor and country. And who could blame them for that? The more Koreans were imbued with the spirit of loyalty and patriotism, the more they were fired with the zeal to liberate their country from the grasp of Japan, however utopian that might be. Such misguided youths either swelled the ranks of insurgents or turned assassins of ministers of state. The moral lesson taught by Japan was, therefore, in a sense, equivalent to adding fuel to the fire of insurgency. The difficulty of ruling Korea under the régime of a protectorate was, in essence, the same as Americans, who preach at home the doctrine of independence and state rights, experienced in ruling the Philippines, until to the Filipinos were given some measure of self-government and a hope of entire independence. In the case of Korea, the only exit from the dilemma was found in the measure, whereby Korea becomes an integral part of the Japanese Empire, and Koreans the loyal subjects of the Japanese Emperor.

DISADVANTAGES OF THE DUAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

Beside the fundamental drawback in the régime of protectorate above stated, there were other disadvantages that are more or less inherent in a dual system of government. These were administrative and financial. It might be imagined that the various reform works hitherto undertaken for the good of Korea were wholly at the expense of the Korean government. Far from it. The burden of defraying the cost of most of these reforms had been shouldered by the Japanese treasury. Such were the cost of initiating and completing the judicial and prison reforms, of establishing educational institutions, of sustaining the army and *gen-*

darmerie for the maintenance of peace and order, of constructing and running the organs of communications—railroads, telegraphs, telephones—of maintaining the residency general, and of undertaking various public works. For the latter purpose the Japanese government lent to the Korean government over 14,000,000 yen free of interest and without fixed period of redemption. All these imposed on the Japanese treasury an average annual outlay of 28,000,000 yen for the period of five years—1906–1910—making the total of 143,016,057 yen. This does not include the cost of building the railroad for which Japan spent another 90,000,000 yen. This financial burden had to be borne by the Japanese government without complete financial control over the Korean exchequer.

Further, there was an administrative disadvantage in the régime of a protectorate. Without dilating upon the details, it suffices us to say that the protectorate, consisting of the residency general and the Korean government, was a cumbersome governmental machinery. Each had its own department and bureaus; each its own staff of officials and employees. That such a complex machinery lacked smooth working even under the leadership of Ito is too well proved by the frequent changes made in the organization of its parts. It is then but proper that a way was sought to mend this lack of harmony in administrative organization at the first opportunity. That way was found in the simple and unified organization of the government general, which resembles in main the government of Formosa under Japanese rule.

PEACEFUL ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ANNEXATION AND THE METHOD ADOPTED

Count Terauchi has accomplished with consummate tact the work of annexation. To carry out the program there were two ways which naturally suggested themselves. One was by the exercise of sovereign power on the part of the Japanese emperor, which however, implied the use of

force. The other was by an agreement with Korea, with the full consent of the Korean emperor and government. It was obvious that the second method of procedure was decidedly preferable, and, as a consequence, the Japanese government, after formulating its policy in July, 1909, for the eventual annexation of Korea, waited only for an opportune time for its prosecution. In May, 1910, the government directed the resident general, Count Terauchi, who had succeeded Viscount Sone, to proceed to his post. He was in receipt of the necessary instructions authorizing him to arrange for the annexation. Early in August the count opened the discussion of the subject with the Korean government. Several other conferences followed, and the final phase of the negotiation is told by Count Terauchi himself in a document which he courteously sent me, and which, having a historical interest, is produced here:

The Korean Court and the Government, assured of the wisdom of our Emperor and of the liberal attitude of His Majesty's Government, came to repose implicit confidence in us, so that during the negotiations all our proposals were accepted save only those dealing with the new name of the Peninsula and future title of the Imperial Family. We proposed that its members should bear the title of Taiko (Grand Duke), but the Korean authorities demanded for them the title of Wang (Prince), and that the name of the Peninsula should be Chosen. These conditions were agreed to. In all other respects the negotiations were very smoothly conducted. A final meeting of the Korean authorities was held in the presence of the Korean Emperor, attended by all the members of the Cabinet, together with Prince Yi-Keui, the uncle of the Emperor, representing the Imperial Family, Kim-in-Sik, President of the Central Council, representing the Elder Statesmen, the Minister of the Imperial Household, Lord Chamberlain, Chief of the Body Guard, and Chief of the Emperor's aides-de-camp. At this meeting the Emperor dwelt on the amicable relation existing between Korea and Japan, and explained the advisability of amalgamating both nations in order to place their mutual benefit and welfare on a permanent basis. This was followed by the reading of His Majesty's proclamation, and the investment of the Prime Minister, Yi Wang Yong, with full power to conclude the treaty of annexation. Thus authorized, the Premier produced the draft of the treaty for imperial inspection. He explained its provisions clause by clause, and upon obtaining the imperial sanction to it repaired to the office of the Resident-

General. The Premier assured me that everything was prepared, and nothing was left undone which was considered necessary for the execution of the compact. The treaty was then signed by him and by me."

The annexation treaty was signed on the afternoon of August 22, 1910, and promulgated on the 29th of the same month. By the treaty the Korean emperor ceded all rights of sovereignty over Korea to the emperor of Japan. Korea is now re-christened Chosen, the ancient title of the peninsula. The security and dignity of the Korean imperial house are sustained by the guarantee of the Japanese government for its perpetual maintenance, with the generous annual allowance of 1,500,000 yen. Japan thus fulfills her pledge to maintain the safety and dignity of the Korean imperial house made in the convention of November 17, 1906, which replaced and superseded the agreement of July 23, 1905, in which it was stipulated that Japan would guarantee the independence and integrity of Korea. The last promise was not given in the convention of 1906. The Korean emperor now becomes Prince Li Wang. Upon the other members of the imperial family the appropriate titles are also given, with grants of sufficient allowances. Seventy-two peers of Chosen have been created to reward the elder statesmen, cabinet members, and others who have rendered meritorious services to the state, with generous gifts of money ranging from 25,000 yen to 100,000 yen. For this purpose, and to give employment to the destitute of the Yang-ban class, the sum of 13,000,000 yen was allotted. The membership of the central council, composed exclusively of Koreans, was also increased, so as to admit many statesmen who can reasonably claim a voice in Korean affairs. Local councils have been organized in various provinces for the purpose of consulting the Koreans themselves about the management of their own affairs.

In order to relieve the suffering of the people, and that they may appreciate the blessings of the new régime, the land taxes in arrears have been remitted, and the land tax for the year 1910 reduced by one-fifth of the rate. In addition, the sum of 17,398,000 yen was distributed among the

people, portioned out to 12 municipalities and 317 rural districts.

The object of this grant was to instruct Koreans in the means of livelihood, to promote education, and to provide against bad crops and natural calamities. For the first mentioned purpose there were established altogether 35 sericultural training houses, 21 training houses for weaving, 13 common sericultural workshops, 8 training houses for paper making, 3 fishery training houses, 37 seedling nurseries, 4 mulberry farms, 8 common industrial workshops, and 4 industrial training houses. Resident and travelling instructors for these institutions numbered some 150 in July, 1911. In the line of education 133 public primary schools and 7 industrial apprentice schools (a phenomenal increase from the time of the Residency-General) had been founded while a decision had been made that a grant-in-aid should be given to 217 various public and private schools.

Charity hospitals and their branches have been established in the chief towns and cities. An amnesty to prisoners and criminals deserving commiseration was granted, the number pardoned being 1711. At the same time 12,155 aged members of the Korean aristocracy and literati were granted imperial gifts, while 3209 filial sons and faithful wives were rewarded with suitable gifts as models to the people for filial piety and faithfulness.

Religious freedom has been proclaimed. It is well worth adding here that the attitude of the government general of Chosen toward Christian missionaries and native converts has not undergone any change since the time of Prince Ito. That attitude is announced by the present governor-general in these words:

It is beyond the sphere of administrative authority to interfere with the liberty of conscience. Confucianism, Buddhism, or Christianity, so far as they aim at the betterment of mankind, and the improvement of the mental and spiritual condition of the people, not only stand in no opposition to the administration of the country, but are calculated to aid in the good purposes of a government. For this reason my attitude toward any form of religious faith is impartial and without any prejudice. It is, however, absolutely necessary to separate the religious question from the civic, and I cannot permit any form of political interference under the guise of a religion.

This sane but firm attitude of the present governor general is intelligible to those who are familiar with the conditions

under the old régime of native converts, some of whom flocked to the standard of Christianity with the sole object of accomplishing their political aim, and so constituted an element of disturbance of civic order and peace. At the same time we can readily understand the solicitude of the government general that its position on the missionary question be fully appreciated by the missionary body, which forms not only the most powerful foreign element for good but the majority of the foreigners residing in Korea. Out of 800 foreign residents 500 are missionaries and their families. Coöperation, not antagonism, seems, then, to be the right principle of action to be adopted by both parties—the missionary and the government general. It will certainly be conducive to the good of Korea for each party to restrict its activity to its proper domain. Happily this seems to be the present-day working basis of the most influential portions of the missionary body.

With regard to the management of the external affairs of Korea, Japan declared at the time of annexation the rules to be followed by her. These rules, in substance, pledged the extension to Korea of Japan's existing treaties as far as possible; granted all privileges that are accorded to foreign residents in Japan proper; and guaranteed protection under Japanese jurisdiction of all legally acquired rights of the foreign residents in Korea. It is but logical that, since the treaties of Japan with foreign Powers have become operative in Chosen, the right of extra-territoriality hitherto enjoyed by foreigners in Chosen should cease to have force. Foreigners, as a matter of fact, are no losers by the abolition of the consular jurisdiction for, not only do they now enjoy the privilege of travelling, residing, and trading in any part of Korea, but they are relieved from certain disadvantages inherent in the old régime, as, for instance, in appellate cases the necessity of travelling to Shanghai for Anglo-Americans, and to Saigon for Frenchmen. And the standard of the administration of justice in Chosen will not fall behind that ruling in Japan proper. That the Japanese government has met the foreign governments with a very liberal spirit is shown by the fact that, in order to prevent

financial and economic disturbance, the old customs tariff is to be retained for a period of ten years, and further by the concession the Japanese government has made to the foreign owners of lands or mines in Korea in not subjecting them to the conditions and restrictions of the foreign land ownership law or of the mining law at present in force in Japan.

PRESENT POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT GENERAL OF CHOSEN

It now only remains for us to see the policy pursued at the present time by the government general of Chosen, for upon it rests the happiness of the new subjects of the mikado. "The fundamental policy of the government," said the present governor general at a gubernatorial meeting held at Tokyo on April 15, 1911, "is to give the people of Chosen the means of livelihood, to ensure the security of their lives and property, and to enable them to enjoy the blessing of an enlightened age." "The essential point," he further emphasized, "is that through eradication of the distinction between Japanese and Koreans the weal of the greater nation will be promoted, and the foundation of the State be even more solidified." Were Koreans as different from Japanese in race and past civilization as Filipinos are in these respects from their American rulers, or Egyptians and Hindus from the English, annexation might still have taken place, but not certainly in the spirit that actuates both Japanese Government and people. What is aimed at is complete amalgamation, so that "the two peoples whose countries are in close proximity, whose interests are identical, and who are bound together with brotherly feelings, should amalgamate and form one body." Whatever may be the ethnological origin of Koreans and Japanese, it is a plain fact that the intermingling of blood has produced such similar types of the human species in both lands that one often finds it difficult to discover any distinction between the two, when the conventionalities of dress and coiffure are made the same. Though language is dissimilar, the literature is not so. Chinese literature is our common

heritage, and with it came our common ancient civilization. This identity of race, literature and past culture, between Koreans and Japanese, places the annexation of Korea in an entirely different category from that of Madagascar by France, or Hawaii by the United States. The great stress is, therefore, laid to obliterate the distinction between the two peoples, and to make the Koreans as good and loyal subjects of the emperor as the Japanese themselves. The newly created Korean nobles are accorded the same treatment at the Tokyo court as their Japanese confrères. Koreans who have received sufficient education are employed in the civil as well as in the military services. Unruly Japanese are strictly enjoined to behave well toward their common nationals.

Nor are the Koreans slow to respond to this call to brotherly union. On the occasion of the emperor's birthday, his new subjects shout "banzai" as lustily as their brethren across the sea. But no better proof of the good feeling of the Koreans toward their new rulers can be afforded than the increase in the amount of taxes paid, and the expedition with which they were collected. In spite of the remission of taxes in arrears and a 5 per cent reduction of the land tax for the financial year of 1910-1911, the state revenue as well as the income of the local fund for the six months ending March, 1911, showed an increase in the aggregate of 938,000 yen as compared with the taxes collected during the corresponding period of the previous year.

Whatever the present pace in the work of amalgamation may be, there is, however, an element of history to be reckoned with. For, the long period of separate historical development has differentiated the characteristics, temperament, traditions and customs of two peoples. Moreover, centuries of misrule in Korea have created a great gulf between the intellectual and moral qualities of Koreans and Japanese. It is, therefore, only through the agencies of time and history that the two peoples can be completely amalgamated. "In view of certain differences existing in the manners and customs of both peoples," says Mr. Komatsu, chief of the bureau for foreign affairs in Chosen, "it would be inexpedient

to transplant to Chosen *en bloc* the legislative and administrative institutions in vogue in Japan proper." The legislative and judicial systems adopted in Chosen are, consequently, modelled after those in operation in Formosa. While all the ordinary rights and privileges of Japanese citizens are accorded to Koreans, they are denied the enjoyment of certain constitutional and legal rights, as, for instance, the eligibility for the franchise, and the privilege of serving as soldiers.

With the exception of the task of assimilation, which was made possible by annexation, other essential points of the policy adopted by the government general are either the enlargement of the work begun under the residency general or its completion. As these points have already been explained and exemplified, they need not detain us long. Taking a leaf from the history of other successful colonial endeavors, great importance is attached to the development of the means of communication and transportation. For these purposes the diet in the session of 1910 passed a measure for raising a public loan amounting to 56,000,000 yen. Of this loan 10,000,000 is to be devoted to the improvement of highways, while 37,000,000 is to be used for the construction of 174 miles of the Honan Railway, and 136 miles of the Seoul-Wonsan Railway, both to be completed within six years. The Seoul-Fusan and the Seoul-New Wiji Railways are also undergoing improvement in order to perfect the connecting service with the South Manchurian Railway. A plan for the improvement of Fusan, Chemulpo, and Chinnampo harbors has also been drawn up, at an estimated cost of 8,270,000 yen. At the same time postal, telegraphic, and telephone services are being steadily improved.

As to the educational policy, the governor general, in a speech delivered before the meeting of the Chosen provincial governors on July 1, 1911, said:

The guiding principle ought hereafter to be fixed upon the motto that through the cultivation of useful knowledge and a healthy morality should the Koreans be equipped with the capacity and character to become worthy of being subjects of the emperor of Japan. In conformity with that principle the machinery

for primary education should first of all be completed, and at the same time prominence given to industrial education, and finally provisions made for professional education so that one and all might have a respectable career.

The government general of Chosen has for some time been a target for the severe criticisms of the Japanese press for its repression of the public voice in Korea. Not only have the native papers often been suspended for the criticisms they ventured upon the government, but even some of the Japanese papers have been frequently prohibited by the press censor to enter the ports of Korea. There was doubtless good cause for the rigid enforcement of the press regulations at the time of annexation, when the preservation of order and peace was of prime necessity; but it is at least open to doubt whether the continuation of such a repressive measure for any length of time after the annexation, when quiet reigned in the land, was justifiable. The governor general himself has assured the world in many of his utterances that "the spirit of peace and acquiescence pervades the entire length and breadth of the peninsula." It is to be sincerely wished that the government general of Chosen will not turn its back upon the enlightened and liberal policy of Prince Ito, who, thoroughly conversant with the current of thought of the world, and always ready to pay due respect to its opinion, had secured its confidence and good wishes.

The annexation of Korea has imposed upon the Japanese treasury an extraordinary outlay of 30,000,000 yen, beside the need of supplying the annual deficit of the Korean exchequer. The Chosen budget for 1910-1911 totalled 48,740,000 yen in addition to about 7,830,000 yen for army expenditure, and 860,000 yen for navy expenditure, altogether aggregating to 57,420,000 yen. Moreover, 56,000,000 yen are to be spent as already stated for the undertaking of public enterprises in Chosen. These burdens are not light upon the Japanese nation. The cost is, however, small when we consider that the annexation has forever solved the Korean problem and, by eliminating a fruitful source of disturbance from the Far East, one more step has

been taken to ensure lasting peace in the Orient. There are those who may be inclined to doubt the wisdom of Japan in abandoning her invulnerable insular position, and entering upon the career of a continental power with all the consequent dangers and burdens, but for Japan there was no other alternative. She had to face her new responsibilities and face them with firm determination. The future of the new continental power depends upon the energy, the patriotism, and the integrity of the two peoples now forever united.

THE FUTURE OF THE JAPANESE IN HAWAII

THINGS PROBLEMATIC, THINGS PROBABLE, THINGS POTENTIAL

*By Theodore Richards, M.A., Managing Editor of "The Friend,"
Honolulu*

BRIEF HISTORY

It was in 1868 that the first shipload of Japanese was brought to Hawaii to supply labor for the plantations and a large number of this body was subsequently returned so that in 1882 there was said to be only fifteen Japanese on the plantations in a total number of over 10,000 laborers. In 1884 there were nearly 1000 brought on one vessel, including 159 women and 108 children. It was at this time that the formal application was made to the Japanese government by the Hawaiian Sugar interest backed by the Hawaiian government to supply labor for plantation purposes. The agreement entered into gave the Japanese government an ample hold upon the Hawaiian government for the care of its subjects. An opportunity to make money in a foreign country and return with a competency, proved so popular in Japan, that 28,000 men applied for passage in the year 1886. Before 1896 the Japanese government interested itself directly in this immigration policy, passing a law in that year safeguarding the immigrant and his family in Japan by requiring a certain surety and then sprang up surety corporations which were practically emigrant companies. These have been undertaking the whole matter of emigration ever since, receiving transportation money from both the Hawaiian planters and from the expectant Japanese laborers as well,—due to the competition for opportunities to go. The maximum of Japanese on Hawaiian plantations was in 1904 about 32,000, which constituted about 70 per cent of the entire labor on the plantations. This was also about the

number in 1908 from which number there has been a fall to 28,000 in 1910. There has been no assisted immigration from Japan since about 1908.

As to total Japanese population in Hawaii at census periods it was in 1896, 22,000, in 1900, 56,000, in 1910, nearly 80,000. The discrepancy between these two sets of figures, making due allowance for women and children, leaves room for a goodly number of Japanese men employed in other than plantation work, such as is enumerated in the *Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor* under the head of Agricultural Pursuits, Professional Service, Domestic and Personal Service, Trade and Transportation and Manufacturing and Mechanical Pursuits.

In the matter of sex, there was in the early times a very great disparity, but as Dr. Clark has shown in his recent report to the Bureau of Labor, conditions are very much more nearly normal among the Japanese under twenty-one years of age, there being roughly, 55 per cent males and 45 per cent females the last year, while for the entire Japanese population it is still under normal, about seventy males to thirty females. This increase in females will account also for the very great increase in children during the past decade among the Japanese, an increase so great that one-quarter of the entire Japanese population is native born and it is conservatively estimated that in another census period fully one-half of the Japanese population will be native born. As the entire adult immigrant class of Japanese came to Hawaii in the prime of life, the death rate has been very slight so that the natural increase in this one race in ten years was nearly 16,000 notwithstanding that at the time of the last Governor's report more adult Japanese had left the country than had come.

An interesting fact that bears upon the Oriental situation on the mainland, is that between the years of 1902 and 1905 about 19,000 Orientals had left Hawaii for the American mainland and this number was very largely Japanese.

It must be admitted that in general, the effect of plantation life upon the Japanese in Hawaii has not been beneficial to them in matters of morals and manners. Their expecta-

tion of a speedy return to their own homes has made them content with very poor quarters in many cases, and they have shown little disposition to improve them even when plantation managers would have been willing to assist them. It has been a great surprise and shock to their countrymen to find how indifferent the laborers on the plantations had become to the ordinary amenities of life in marked contrast to their former habits in Japan. This was natural enough: they were in Hawaii to make money and then to go home and enjoy it as speedily as possible. It should be said in this connection, however, that efforts originating in the Hawaiian Board of Missions have resulted in a greater pride in appearances, as shown by the planting of trees and the beautifying of rooms and quarters. This movement has been cordially seconded by plantation managements.

The wages of the ordinary laborer have varied somewhat, but the present rate is fairly suggestive of what has been the ordinary income. On a twenty-six working days basis, with a maximum pay of \$18 (plus bonus) \$15 is the average income, considering the fact that very few work the full twenty-six days. Disregarding bonuses and contract possibilities, which offers the chance of earning considerable higher than the amount quoted, it constitutes (according to Dr. Clark's statistics) about the average income of the mass of Japanese laborers. This estimate of average wages is thought by competent sugar men to be too low. At any rate, it is clear that the laborer's indisposition to work for full time, is the only bar to a very material increase of his wage. Out of this, it is figured roughly that it costs \$7 for board per month and an exhibit furnished by the "Higher Wage" champions in the case of the late strike showed that other expenses brought the total up to about \$12.50 for the average man, leaving a very small margin for net income. It has been shown in the report of the commissioner of labor that although the wages have advanced in the last five years a matter of 11.1 per cent the increase in cost of living has also risen 12.9 per cent.

It is claimed by the friends of the Japanese and generally conceded that the calls upon them are many and varied.

The support of their own religious worship, especially as in the case of the Buddhists, as well as the support of schools in which Japanese is taught, not to speak of amusements, make insistent claims upon the wage earner.

As to the character of their labor, furnishing as they have over 50 per cent of the whole, it must be conceded that they have constituted the very back-bone of the plantations and a large element in the success of sugar. It is probable that a majority of the plantation managers if asked for a comparison would state their preference for the Chinese field hand. This is due to the persistence, patience and docility of the latter. It is unquestionably true, too, that the sugar planters have become apprehensive of the control by one nationality of the labor market, particularly as the growing consciousness of national as well as local importance is noticeable in the Japanese.

It will be noted, however, that the number of the children of school age has increased until they are over 25 per cent of the entire number of school children and it is the present boast of the board of public instruction that school facilities are now furnished at Hawaii for all children who wish an education. This includes practically all of the Japanese children, who are intensely eager to avail themselves of educational facilities.

As to religious life of the Japanese, they can be said to be affiliated very largely with the Buddhists. It has been the apparent purpose of the Buddhist priests on the Islands to make the temples and shrines centers of Japanese national thought and sentiment. The principal sects which are represented in the Islands have been largely influential in building up day-schools where the vernacular is taught. There is a strong tendency now among the Japanese to make all their schools non-sectarian, toward which policy the Christians are lending their increasing influence. Through the leadership of three influential American Christian bodies, there are powerful centers of Christian activity on all the Islands and a number of strong churches.

It will be observed that in the above résumé of things as they are, no tables are directly used to support statements.

The writer, remembering the relation of "statistics" to "lies" (in that famous aphorism—"there are lies,—damn lies and statistics") makes his "statistics" likewise climactic. They will be found at the end of this paper.

While discussing "things as they are," the very briefest comparison of race and labor questions on the coast and in the Islands may be in point. Only the most salient and significant points of divergence are here raised. In the first place, it is here claimed that the Japanese population in Hawaii nearly equals that on the American mainland. As to race feeling, there might be said to be almost none in Hawaii as against very extreme sensitiveness on the western coast. One reason for this lies in the fact that the Japanese people in Hawaii came almost exclusively to engage in unskilled labor in which they displaced no American labor. It must be admitted, however, that in the last three years, skilled American labor has been displaced by Oriental labor, though the net number effected has been very much less in proportion. (One cannot but feel a pang of natural regret, however, at pathetic instances of American skilled labor in the cities now no longer able to compete with Oriental rivals, largely on account of different scales of living. This feeling is quite separated from one's fear that his own turn might come next.) The second difference between the conditions on the coast and Hawaii lies in the fact that as yet in America there has been no time for any appreciable number of children of the "antagonistic races" to grow up together. In Hawaii it has been shown beyond peradventure that a distinction of caste and race feeling is far less likely to exist where there is an intermingling of the children of different races. This is our *major proposition*; and the proudest of Hawaii's boasts is that she is the "Melting Pot" of the nations.

THINGS PROBLEMATIC

As to the future of the Japanese in Hawaii, one can safely call a number of things problematic and risk no reputation. Many of the brightest men on the Islands have been anxiously considering this Oriental question for years, as well as

have statesmen on our own mainland. They but raise their shoulders and elevate their eyebrows, as we too are doing in this portion of the paper.

1. What will be their relations to the sugar industry?

This depends on so many elements that a discussion of various contingencies must precede any attempt to answer the question.

2. Will the first generation of labor return to Japan in any numbers?

Judging from the past one would say off-hand, "Why, certainly." But when one considers that a return to the Islands again is not nearly as easy (if possible at all), as it was, you have a question more doubtful. Assuming that there will be no further federal legislation concerning immigration to the mainland and some of these questions would be easier. Minus any further legislation, we might assume still greater departure on the part of the Japanese to the American mainland, where industrial opportunities have been most attractive. With legislation,—such for instance as is pending,—the door seems shut.

3. Again, will the Japanese on the plantations strike as they did in 1909, developing a highly involved economic state on the plantations?

This, too, seems to depend somewhat on the question of further legislation, for it might be argued that if things remain as they are, they (the Japanese) have had sufficient bitter lesson in their late strike to show them that it is difficult for labor to keep up with the tremendous expense of the strike against a wealthy and well-organized industry. If, however, legislation makes it difficult for new labor from Europe or other sources to come, then arises perhaps a splendid opportunity for the Japanese to control the labor market.

The Dillingham Bill (Most Problematic)

A Senate bill likely to be passed in some form at the next session of Congress is of vital moment to Hawaii and the Japanese. It provides for the admission of no immigrants save those generally capable of becoming citizens of the

United States. Among such, it provides for a strict educational qualification for all immigrants, but it expressly excepts Hawaii. If the bill passes as it is, the present bureau of immigration in Hawaii (provided for by the last legislature) would be enabled to proceed in its program of bringing in immigrants from southern Europe. This would reduce the national balance of power of the Japanese labor in Hawaii. However, it is doubtful if the bill could pass in its present state. Considerable opposition will doubtless develop on the ground that Hawaii doesn't need to be removed from the provisions applying to other national territory. It is clear that if the exception favoring Hawaii is removed and the bill passes otherwise, the plantations must look for their labor from the sources now at their disposal, it being clearly conceded that so-called "white labor" neither could nor would compete with the present unskilled labor on the plantations. That means a very great increase in cost for labor up to a point where it might be of doubtful value to run some of the plantations on the present system.

Tariff Legislation (Always Problematic)

Attention has been recently called by writers on Hawaiian affairs to the fact that a large part of the sugar industry there is based on the \$27 to \$34 a ton protection for Hawaiian sugars. Should the tariff on Cuban and other foreign sugars be removed, it is certain that a number of our plantations could not exist at the normal price of sugar. This would effect the occupation of a great many of the Japanese and their continuance in the Islands may be said to depend somewhat on the tariff on sugar.

A Change in the Political Status of Hawaii (A contingency—though perhaps not imminent)

Some have dreamed that a sort of colonial status is the way out of the dilemma. The *Star* (one of Hawaii's ablest journals) in one of its leading editorials argues that in the event of the passage of the Dillingham bill, the only way our community could subsist, based as it is on the sugar industry,

would be by a reduction to a sort of commission government. The *Advertiser* (another able daily) at about the same time, looking at the probable increase of the Japanese in the Islands as a menace to our political future, arrives at the same conclusion, which the editor views with apprehension rather than a thing to be desired.

Intermarriage

Intermarriage between the various races represented in Hawaii has been very considerable except between the Japanese and other races. That has been very rare, but it appears to be very much less improbable in the coming days, in view of the fact (before referred to) that the race differences are very much less among children who have grown up together. This is a very fascinating problem upon which of course there are no data. Analogous to the possibility in this line, however, is the fact that one of the finest race blends known is that of the Chinese and Hawaiian, which has already reached a very considerable proportion of the entire population in Hawaii. The result of this race mixture is most strikingly attractive from every point of view.

The Effect of Our Warlike Preparations (This is problematic as far as actual war is concerned, but among the "things probable" in the realm of unfriendliness)

The immense sums of money that the United States is spending in Hawaii ostensibly for defense cannot have any but unpleasant effect upon the Japanese population in Hawaii as well as in Japan. The menace of this fortification, contemplating in a shadowy way European aggression as well as that of Asia, is clearly addressed toward Japan, and apart from the sentiment of the situation, it would appear to the "lay" mind as though the expenditure was an enormous national waste. In part support of this fact it should be said that this expensive outlay is made on territory where there are an overwhelmingly greater number of Japanese aliens than of United States citizens. The writer has recently headed a small brochure on this subject "A

Million for Defense to Partly Offset the Twenty Millions of Offense." In this paper it was his purpose to show that extensive systems of forts and mines against Japan would be far more effectively replaced by a friendly appeal to them on educational and social lines.

Surely the above are little else than a bewildering network of uncertainties and yet we dare venture into the realm of

THINGS PROBABLE

It must be premised that this most presumptuous part of the paper is based on the occurrence of no catastrophic changes such as war, or other violent interference with economic conditions.

It seems probable that the major part of the present Japanese population will remain in Hawaii. Editor Sheba, one of the most influential Japanese in Honolulu, predicts that should the Dillingham bill pass, the Japanese will return to their own country for patriotic reasons. We feel like conceding that a few might, but there is overwhelming presumption in favor of the probability that most of them will stay. The reasons are mostly economic,—they are:

a. They have always been able to make more money in Hawaii than they could make at home and notwithstanding the fact that the cost of living has increased in Hawaii, it can be equally said to have increased in Japan. It is a matter of general information that poverty among the agricultural classes in Japan has been extreme, due partly to the depressing effect of continued war tax.

b. The chances for their children are notably better, seeing that the common school education lifts them out of the probability of field labor. This will be discussed later. But even at plantation wages, their children would be better off in most cases than in Japan.

c. They would fear the inability to return if they went back to Japan, seeing that the Japanese government is jealously guarding its emigration to Hawaii and the rest of America, by reason of the happy issue of the late treaty between Japan and America. Japan evidently feels it a

matter of honor to protect the United States in view of the fact that no demands were made on her by the late treaty discriminating against Japanese immigration.

2. Now, too, it seems probable that Japanese children will increase even faster than the normal increase of the territory. There seems to be difference of opinion on that point. Dr. Clark takes this position, of which Governor Frear seems somewhat doubtful as is another writer of statistics in a daily paper. We feel like agreeing, with Dr. Clark, though it must be admitted that the last decade and its records shows an increase of children, perhaps largely due to the youthfulness of the women who have come to Hawaii in the child-bearing period. Then, too, there is the fact that the Japanese population has not been depleted as rapidly by a high death rate as will ultimately take place when they have been long enough in the territory to grow old. However, the most significant element in the problem is that there is more likelihood of marriage in the future where there is so nearly a normal ratio of males to females among them as the last census shows.

3. It is highly probable that the children will qualify for citizenship. The fact that the registry of birth certificates reached the number of 3475 in one year (1909 and 1910) is significant. Other figures do not seem to be available, but the fact that 13,000 Japanese males are under twenty-one years of age and of that number the greater part are native born, shows that the Japanese element in our population capable of voting will very largely increase. This, in face of the fact that at present there are only thirteen registered Japanese voters in a total of fifty-three male citizens of voting age.

4. Concerning their effect on the schools, in view of their increasing proportion, it is readily granted that they will probably change its "complexion." Here is no color of the skin referred to, but we concede that the schools will not be "American" in certain senses. For instance, they will not be "American" as the Chicago schools are "American" with their tremendous population of Germans, Irish, Swedish, Polish and other Slavs. They will not be "American"

as the New York schools with the surprising influx of children from southern Europe and the steady increase of the Jews. And certainly, they will not be "American" after the fashion of the wealthy suburbs of either Boston or New York. Some writers, notably the able representative of the Bureau of Labor in the Islands, have feared total Orientalizing of the schools. This to our mind seems totally improbable, even were it as fearsome as it appears to be to many.

Reasons in Believing that American Traditions will Persist in Our Hawaiian Public Schools

a. The mixture of other nationalities is so great as to offset in part at least, the influence of the Japanese in the schools.

b. There is an intense zeal, amounting almost to a passion on the part of the Japanese, to learn the English language. This is probably due largely to commercial reasons, but fairly reflects the average Japanese's ambition to excel in things that other foreigners excel in.

c. They are equally ambitious to conform to American ways and dress, insomuch that the Kimona is fast disappearing from the Japanese school child, especially in the cities.

d. They have been trained in their homeland to a respect for American institutions and have been brought up to a genuine regard for the traditional friendship between the peoples.

e. While intense patriotism to their imperial government has existed and will doubtless continue, it is likely only to be modified by an American loyalty so to make them a connecting link between the two countries.

A Labor Probability

5. It is inconceivable that the next generation will to any degree supply the places of their parents (for the women have labored with the men in the lighter field work) as unskilled labor on the sugar plantations. It is conceded (and the proposed bill has brought out many statements of the fact) that only illiterate labor can be secured for

field work, *under the present plantation system*—only ignorant labor will remain at it. In other words, there are chances for frugal individuals of any race to do better for themselves off the plantations at the present rates. On the assumption that it is impossible and undesirable for any part of the United States to keep any portion of the population ignorant, it is clear that ignorant cheap labor is doomed in Hawaii as it is doomed everywhere else in the world where enlightenment enters. It is equally clear that the sugar industry to endure must eventually reorganize. It is hoped that this change may be a gradual one in view of the large claim to recognition which the capitalists have in Hawaii,—who at large risk and with more than ordinary business skill have encountered commercial problems of great magnitude, reclaiming large areas of land and tying up large sums of money in the sugar business.

6. It is very probable that there will be much greater investment on the part of the Japanese in Island homes. Notwithstanding the fact that they pay less taxes than any other of the principal nationalities and have the smallest deposit in the savings banks—all this must decidedly change. Since they have considered this country as a mere temporary working place wherein to amass their money (which they have always sent back to Japan), the slimness of their local deposits is readily accounted for as well also as their very slight real estate holdings.

THINGS POTENTIAL

Here is undoubtedly the crux of this paper. With a desire to present constructive criticism upon possibilities of racial blending in the world's most perfect point of contact, the limits which need be placed upon a spiritualized imagination are only those suggested by common sense. It must be very clear to anyone who has followed the writer in the foregoing pages, that he regards Hawaii as the highly privileged leader in the great silent change in the thought of mankind which promises to rob the world of its most pregnant source of strife.

In a keen article in the *American Magazine*, Ray Stannard Baker regards Hawaii as furnishing a spectacle for economic investigation concerning labor and lands—and it may be he finds it interesting from other points of view as his article proceeds in succeeding issues of the magazines. Even admitting, for argument, that economic conditions determine world policies and international intercourse, yet we hold that the most potent influence might be claimed to be race prejudice in its effect on past as well as future history. We refer in this article to Hawaii as a “mixing-pot of the nations.” We might as appropriately have called it the “Race’s Experiment Garden.” We have registered the hope that the Japanese element in our population may be an important link between two races which are commonly thought to be absolutely antagonistic. We believe most heartily that there is no necessary and indissoluble bar to affiliation and fraternity between the so-called “white” and “yellow” race. Despite very able and even passionate articles on the part of learned writers to the effect that amalgamation or assimilation of the peoples of the two races is impossible, we contend that to abandon such a hope would mean to throw over the finest aspirations of humanity and the strongest claims of religion.

Speaking of the “white race.” What is the “white race?” Notwithstanding the very common and fluent use of the term, it apparently has no real legal status. It should be reaffirmed at this time that the Supreme Court of the United States has never made any ruling as to what the “white race” may consist of. The United States Circuit Court of Massachusetts finds the question most perplexing and it would appear that at various times almost every race including the Chinese and Japanese have been referred to as “white.” Indeed, the decision above referred to in the Massachusetts court admits certain Armenians to naturalization, defining the term “white” as including “All persons not otherwise classified.” It isn’t out of the range of probability that with sufficient national pressure, the term “white” may be big enough to include the Japanese on questions of naturalization as on all other points. Until that

time comes, however, the whole American continent is palpitating between one of two positions. First, and naturally perhaps, is that of the Western Coast, which is probably represented best in that startlingly convincing article of Chester H. Rowell of the *Fresno Republican*, California, who sounds this note of warning:

"The Pacific Coast is the frontier of the white man's world, the culmination of the western migration, which is the white man's whole history. It will remain the frontier so long as we guard it as such; no longer."

In answer to this viewpoint, we ask the question,—“Is it physically possible very much longer to so regard this western frontier?” The answer seems as evident,—“Only at the point of the bayonet.” Please God, this barbaric barrier need but a little longer be raised anywhere—even admitting that we are strong enough to raise it effectually in this instance.

But why is it desirable to maintain such a barrier by force of arms? It will be immediately conceded that many heart-breaking instances of hardship to individuals must take place in the merging of peoples and in the changes of economic front. But if the “whites” cannot survive in any solidarity in this coming merger, why should we attempt the impossible? Even to the evolutionist accustomed to draw his cold comfort out of the impersonal, dispassionate march of events, it must seem idle to put up frail human barriers. “Let the best race come and we will meet the shock,”—might well be his cry,—fairly sure, too, that the change must be a gradual one. But to the Christian philosopher the argument is plainer. Assuming a program following upon the lines of the Christian Book, there is but one ultimate outcome, namely, the final triumph of the Prince of Peace. If we pin our faith to His program,—His program as outlined in the Book upon which He set His seal of approval,—the coming fraternity of people completely overlooks their race or color or habitat. Ay, this program seems to include all of His subjects as none other than “Gentiles” whose rank but approximates that of the famous Bible race, alike the heroes of the past and of the future.

It is admitted that any talk of fraternity based on mere sentimentality, is a poor thing. *It will cost us very much in Hawaii* to prove that such a thing as brotherhood is even workable, but postulating the dominance in Hawaii of such a sentiment as can be called "Christian," there is reasonable hope of teaching the world that race prejudice is no better than any other prejudice,—that it may be merely meaner and deadlier. The very basis of Christianity demands the absolute admission of this proposition,—namely that humanity was endowed with the capabilities of brotherhood. And the Man, who was God, leads the way to its consummation and expects the aid of His followers.

A FEW OF THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY IN BRINGING THIS TO PASS

1. As far as the Japanese are concerned it means first, higher wages on the plantations and better houses for the present. It is clear that no adequate wage has yet been given to labor, even though prices paid for sugar should drop very much lower than they have been of late. While admitting that plantation managements have made wonderful strides in the improvements in the housing of their labor, and admitting even that labor is better housed and paid than under any similar conditions in the world, (which the writer firmly believes) there is yet room for improvement.

2. There should be opportunity afforded for ownership of land in connection with the sugar industry, or, as a partial substitute for this—the most desirable status,—profit sharing. This has been in operation on some of the plantations with some success. The laborers have probably failed to take up the opportunities offered in this line, fearing the ordinary risk of the crop falling short. In general, where there is no capital, there is much timidity concerning risks.

Of course, it is admitted that this change in the status of the sugar industry must be gradual, or capital (the proverbial goose that lays the golden egg) will suffer. It is neither fair nor economically wise that capital should be endangered

by sudden and radical changes. No attempt will be made in view of the limitations of this paper, to specify details of a land, or profit-sharing policy. Our sugar men are well able to cope with this problem, when they want to do so.

3. Another element in bringing about this fusion of people will be the educative one. Whereas the territory officers have made big efforts to accommodate all the children and the claim has been hitherto recorded that all desiring school privileges can have them, still it must be frankly admitted that the accommodations are very inadequate and the appropriations are altogether too small both for school buildings and teachers. Certain private schools, notably the Mid-Pacific Institute have gone into special efforts to meet the need of the ambitious company of Oriental boys and girls. They will want more than an ordinary elementary school training and they ought to have it. Nay, some of us are determined that they will have it,—the best that the Islands can afford. And we hope to bind them to us by ties of friendship which no shock of war or industrial cataclysm can disturb. Already in a peace movement which is known on two continents, five of the brightest students of Japan are seated among their Island born brethren, getting the best inspiration that American school life can give them. It is expected and urged that other attempts of this kind will be fostered.

4. In view of what has been said in the foregoing paragraphs, not much further comment need be made as to the religious possibilities in the Islands. A prominent business man of the western coast once said to the writer that he didn't know much about missions, but if he were to invest money in missionary projects concerning Japan and China, he would do it in Hawaii. His point was that when a people have severed themselves from old environment and have come to a new country with open minds to see and take in the best which that new country can afford, they are in far better position to drink in the religious truths which that country has to offer. A prominent religious leader is said to have exclaimed on the floor of a great assembly, "If you cannot bring the Chinese and Japanese to a personal loyalty

to the Lord Christ in Hawaii, it is perfectly futile to send missionaries to China and Japan." Ay, the burden upon the Christian citizenship of Hawaii is enormous and if it fails, which God forbid, its failure is abysmic. The future looks bright for a new order of things in Hawaii.

The data for much of the above historical sketch as well as many of the tables that follow come from *Bulletins of the Bureau of Labor*.

POPULATION AT CENSUS PERIODS FROM 1853 TO 1910, BY RACE
 [The data for population from 1853 to 1896, inclusive, have been taken from the Hawaiian Annual for 1901, and those for 1900 and 1910 from the records of the Census.]

RACE	Number								
	1853	1866	1873	1878	1884	1890	1896	1900	1910
Hawaiian.....	70,036	57,125	49,044	44,088	40,014	34,436	31,019	29,799	26,041
Part-Hawaiian.....	983	1,640	1,487	3,420	4,218	6,186	8,485	7,857	12,506
Foreign-born Chinese.....	364	1,206	1,938	5,916	17,937	15,301	19,382	21,746	21,674
Foreign-born Japanese.....					116	12,360	22,329	56,230	79,674
All other.....	1,755	2,988	4,428	4,561	118,293	921,707	27,805	38,369	52,014
Total.....	73,138	62,959	56,897	57,985	80,578	89,990	109,020	154,001	191,909

RACE	Per cent								
	1853	1866	1873	1878	1884	1890	1896	1900	1910
Hawaiian.....	95.76	90.73	86.20	76.03	49.66	38.27	28.45	19.35	13.57
Part-Hawaiian.....	1.34	2.60	2.61	5.90	5.24	6.87	7.78	5.10	6.52
Foreign-born Chinese.....	0.50	1.92	3.41	10.20	22.26	17.00	17.78	14.12	11.29
Foreign-born Japanese.....					0.14	13.74	20.48	36.51	41.52
All other.....	2.40	4.75	7.78	7.87	22.70	24.12	25.51	24.92	27.10
Total.....	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

These figures are necessary to make the totals given, but they do not agree with details as found in the Hawaiian Annual.

Bureau of Labor

ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES OF ORIENTALS, AT HONOLULU, FROM JUNE 14, 1900, TO JUNE 30, 1910

	JAPANESE				CHINESE			
	Male	Female	Children	Total	Male	Female	Children	Total
Arrivals.....	61,026	15,875	520	77,421	3,363	155	62	3,590
Departures.....	57,966	11,204	6,016	75,186	11,679	1,003	1,236	13,918
Net loss or gain by mi- gration.....	3,060	4,671	-5,496	2,235	-8,316	-848	-1,174	-10,338
Net loss or gain by census.....				18,548				-4,064
Difference.....				16,313				5,274

Government's Report, 1910

NUMBER AND PER CENT OF PLANTATION EMPLOYEES OF EACH NATIONALITY, 1901, 1902, 1903, 1904, 1905, 1906, 1907, 1908, 1909, 1910

NATIONALITY	Number									
	1901	1902	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	
American.....										
European:										
Portuguese.....	2,417	2,669	2,876	3,194	3,286	3,394	3,807	3,826	3,906	
Spanish.....						583	750	637	515	
Russian.....										
Other.....									457	
Hawaiian.....	1,470	1,493	1,312	455	467	544	428	396		
Porto Rican.....	2,095	2,036	2,066	1,711	1,604	1,356	1,309	1,454	1,339	
Oriental:				2,029	2,017	1,878	1,989	2,024	1,869	
Chinese.....	4,976	3,937	3,778	3,938	3,684	3,248	2,916	3,561	2,761	
Japanese.....	27,537	31,029	32,331	28,030	26,218	30,110	32,771	26,875	28,106	
Korean.....			2,435	4,895	3,615	2,638	2,125	2,229	1,752	
Filipino.....							141	86	2,269	
All other.....	1,092	1,078	83	45	18	75	140	10	316	
Total.....	39,587	42,242	45,860	44,951	41,524	44,447	46,918	41,702	43,917	

NUMBER AND PER CENT OF PLANTATION EMPLOYEES OF EACH NATIONALITY, 1901, 1902, 1904, 1905, 1906, 1907, 1908, 1909, 1910—Continued

NATIONALITY	Per cent									
	1901	1902	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	
American.....										
European:			1.1	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.5	1.4	
Portuguese.....	6.1	6.3	6.3	7.1	7.9	7.6	8.1	9.2	8.9	
Spanish.....						1.3	1.6	1.5	1.2	
Russian.....									1.0	
Other.....										
Hawaiian.....	3.7	3.5	2.9	3.8	3.8	3.1	2.8	3.5	3.0	
Porto Rican.....	5.3	4.8	4.5	4.5	4.8	4.2	4.2	4.9	4.3	
Oriental:										
Chinese.....	12.6	9.3	8.2	8.8	8.8	7.3	6.2	8.5	6.3	
Japanese.....	69.6	73.5	70.5	62.4	63.1	67.8	69.9	64.4	64.0	
Korean.....			5.3	10.9	8.7	5.9	4.5	5.3	4.0	
Filipino.....							0.3	0.2	5.2	
All other.....	2.7	2.6	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.7	
Total.....	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	

Bureau of Labor

Bureau of Labor

NUMBER OF TAXPAYERS, ETC., IN HAWAII OF THE PRINCIPAL NATIONALITIES FROM WHICH ASSISTED IMMIGRANTS HAVE COME, 1909

NATIONALITY	PROPERTY TAX			INCOME TAX		
	Number of taxpayers	Amount of tax	Assessed value of property	Number of taxpayers	Amount of tax	Amount of annual income
Portuguese...	1,794	\$24,451.41	\$2,451,141	139	\$1,473	\$73,671
Chinese	2,252	33,258.01	3,325,801	168	1,847	88,532
Japanese	2,515	17,481.79	1,748,179	134	2,002	97,930
Total	6,561	75,191.21	7,525,121	441	5,322	260,133

NUMBER, PER CENT, AND AVERAGE DAILY WAGE OF SKILLED HANDS ON A HAWAIIAN SUGAR PLANTATION WHERE CITIZEN LABOR IS BEING SUBSTITUTED FOR ORIENTAL IN SKILLED POSITIONS 1908 TO 1910, BY RACE

RACE OF SKILLED HANDS ON A CERTAIN PLANTATION	1908			1909			1910		
	Number	Per cent	Average daily wage	Number	Per cent	Average daily wage	Number	Per cent	Average daily wage
Caucasian ¹ .	7	11.11	\$4.75	7	10.14	\$4.85	7	10.94	\$5.03
Portuguese.	6	9.53	1.65	8	11.60	1.58	17	26.56	1.44
Hawaiian...	1	1.59	2.02	1	1.45	2.02	6	9.375	1.55
Chinese							6	9.375	1.19
Japanese...	49	77.77	1.15	53	76.81	1.13	28	43.75	1.19
Total.....	63	100.00	1.61	69	100.00	1.57	64	100.00	1.71

¹ Except Portuguese.

NUMBER, PER CENT, AVERAGE DAILY WAGE OF SKILLED HANDS ON HAWAIIAN SUGAR PLANTATIONS, 1902, 1905, AND 1910, BY RACE

RACE OF SKILLED HANDS	1902			1905			1910		
	Number	Per cent	Average daily wage	Number	Per cent	Average daily wage	Number	Per cent	Average daily wage
Caucasian.....	352	18.3	\$4.22	322	14.6	\$4.38	346	13.7	\$3.85
Hawaiian and Part Hawaiian	160	8.3	1.80	163	7.4	1.68	138	5.5	1.56
Portuguese.....	230	11.9	1.69	286	13.0	1.61	309	12.2	1.49
Chinese.....	111	5.8	1.22	155	7.1	1.06	151	6.0	1.27
Japanese.....	1,075	55.7	1.06	1,272	57.9	0.97	1,580	62.6	1.05
Total.....	1,928	100.0	1.78	2,198	100.0	1.61	2,524	100.0	1.53

¹ Including 2 West Indian Negroes and 1 New Zealander.

² Including 3 Filipinos and 1 South Sea Islander.

³ Including 2 Filipinos.

⁴ Including 7 Filipinos and 1 Guam Islander.

⁵ Including 8 Koreans.

This table shows that in skilled occupations the proportion of orientals has risen and the average rate of wages has fallen during the past five years. The latter is contrary to what has occurred in other classes of plantation work, as shown in the two preceding tables. The increasing employment of Oriental in skilled positions has not only lowered the average wage of all workers of this class, but also the average wage of each non-Asiatic race considered separately.

A Honomu laborer writes thus, showing his monthly balance sheet, which appeared in the *Nippu Jiji*, December 4, 1908:

The average number of days worked in a month is 21, taking the average of the past eight years. This will give, at the rate of \$18 per month of 26 working days, a sum of \$14.60.

The total average monthly expenditure foots up to \$12.50, leaving only \$2.10.

The items of expenditure are as follows:

Board.....	\$7.00
Laundry.....	.75
Tobacco, paper, and matches.....	1.00
Bath.....	.25
Rain coat.....	.55
Rain-coat oil.....	.15
Oil.....	.15
Contributions.....	.25
Shoes and socks.....	.60
Stamps and stationery.....	.30
Send-off money, etc.....	.25
Hat.....	.08
Hair cutting.....	.25
Working suits.....	.75
<hr/>	
Total.....	\$12.50
Net income per month.....	\$2.10

YEARS	HAWAIIAN	PART- HAWAIIAN	AMERICAN	EUROPEAN	PORTUGUESE	JAPANESE	CHINESE	PORTO RICAN	KOREAN	OTHERS	TOTAL
1900	4,977	2,631	699	232	320	3,809	1,352	1,239	229	15,537
1901	4,903	2,869	812	240	337	4,124	1,993	1,385	260	17,519
1902	5,076	2,934	796	215	333	4,335	2,341	1,499	260	18,382
1903	4,883	3,018	799	217	295	4,243	2,521	1,554	337	18,415
1904	4,983	3,287	931	226	252	4,448	3,313	1,875	285	20,017
1905	4,943	3,430	1,025	268	298	4,683	3,869	2,087	636	21,644
1906	4,906	3,500	1,009	187	273	4,437	4,547	2,197	161	281	21,890
1907	4,658	3,546	937	220	295	4,537	5,035	2,548	210	733	23,087
1908	4,575	3,548	930	219	243	4,537	5,513	2,596	224	705	23,445
1909	4,608	3,681	972	173	276	4,696	6,415	2,830	180	620	24,889
1910	4,381	3,842	1,076	163	266	4,662	7,078	2,855	260	582	25,537
1911	4,196	3,738	1,034	155	264	4,699	7,907	3,005	283	657	26,122

¹ The figures for 1900-1902, and 1904-1907 are as of December 31; for 1903, as of June 30; and for 1908-1911, as of June 30 for public schools and December 31 for the preceding year for private schools.

PERCENTAGES OF RACES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS

RACES	PERCENTAGE OF ENROLLMENT			RACES	PERCENTAGE OF ENROLLMENT		
	Public Schools, June, 1911	Private Schools, Dec., 1910	All Schools		Public Schools, June, 1911	Private Schools, Dec., 1910	All schools
Hawaiian.....	12.90	3.17	16.07	Japanese.....	26.42	2.70	29.12
Part-Hawaiian...	9.97	4.34	14.31	Chinese.....	8.87	2.63	11.50
American.....	1.67	2.29	3.96	Porto Rican.....	1.69	0.16	1.85
British.....	0.35	0.24	0.59	Korean.....	0.68	0.40	1.08
German.....	0.61	0.40	1.01	Others.....	2.14	0.38	2.52
Portuguese.....	13.56	4.43	17.99	Total.....	78.86	21.14	100.00

An official report.

JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS AS AFFECT- ING THE CONTROL OF THE PACIFIC

*By Edwin Maxey, D.C.L., LL.D. Professor of Public Law
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For centuries the great question in the diplomatic world has been the balance of power in Europe. The wit of the greatest statesmen has been exerted to devise plans for retaining it; alliances have been formed upon the basis of it; wars have been fought to restore it; considerations of race and religion have been sacrificed upon its altar; colonial questions, and, to a large degree, commercial questions were considered with reference to their bearing upon it. In short, it was the pivot upon which the diplomacy of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries revolved. As a corollary to this, the Atlantic, and the control thereof, has been a factor of prime importance in the political and commercial life of the powers holding the center of the stage during those centuries.

But with the close of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century the horizon of world politics widens. New forces appear and new characters have come upon the stage. The phrase "balance of power in Europe" is no longer an adequate title for the drama of world diplomacy. While the law governing world politics has not changed, and everything still gravitates toward the center, the center has shifted. The Pacific and not the Atlantic is the center of the stage on which the drama of twentieth century politics will be played. However imperfectly Europe may realize this, it is nevertheless the fact.

Though the United States, during its early history, has, by reason of owing its origin to European settlement, had its attention centered on the Atlantic, it early began to realize that the Pacific ought not to be neglected. Scarcely

had the war of the Revolution been fought to a successful issue before American merchants fitted out vessels to sail the Pacific in the direct trade with the Far East. As early as 1784, the *Empress of China*, an American vessel, was plying between New York and Canton, China. By 1787, we had an American consul, Samuel Shaw, at Canton. In writing of our trade relations with China, he says, in a letter to Jay, January, 1787: "On the whole, it must be a satisfactory consideration to every American, that his country can carry on its commerce with China under advantages, if not in many respects superior, yet in all cases equal, to those possessed by other people." Within the next two years, the *Eleanor*, the *Fair American*, the *Grace* and the *Columbia* had entered into competition for the "infant and lucrative China trade." The trade between the American coasts and China soon grew in importance and up to 1814 was almost entirely carried by American vessels. It was during this quarter century that the Americans established commercial relations with the Marquesas, Charlotte and Sandwich Islands. They had also become active competitors in the whale fisheries of the Pacific.

By 1812, our interests in the Pacific were of sufficient importance to attract governmental attention, and in that year, President Madison commissioned Edward Fanning as commander of an expedition of discovery and placed at his disposal the ships *Volunteer* and *Hope*. The war prevented the sailing of the expedition. In the same year Captain Porter in command of the *Essex*, the first American warship to sail the Pacific, received orders to cruise in the South Seas, where he captured two and a half million dollars worth of British property and 360 British seamen, took possession of and fortified Madison Island.

During this period of activity of American interests on the Pacific, the United States purchased Louisiana, and the expedition of Lewis and Clarke, backed by the expansionist spirit of the American pioneers, had extended our possessions to the Pacific coast. This acquisition of territory was a guarantee that henceforward the United States would be one of the powers to whom the control of the Pacific would

be a matter of vital concern—a concern which was intensified by the acquisition of California and Alaska. How far this anxiety to secure territory on the shores of the Pacific was due to a conscious appreciation of its importance and how far to a natural instinct to expand, matters not for our present purposes.

The discovery of gold in California served to advertise the importance of our Pacific coast and paved the way for an effort to open trade relations with Japan. To quote the language of President Fillmore in his letter conveyed to the Emperor of Japan by Commodore Perry, "The United States of America reach from ocean to ocean and our territory of Oregon and the state of California lie directly opposite the domain of Your Imperial Majesty. Our steamships can go from California to Japan in 18 days. Our great state of California produces about sixty million dollars in gold every year. . . . Japan is also a rich and fertile country and produces many valuable articles. Your Imperial Majesty's subjects are skilled in many of the arts. I am desirous that our two countries should trade with each other for the benefit of both Japan and the United States."

Upon this basis of mutual benefits the trade and diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan were established and upon this basis of reciprocal benefits they have always rested. It is entirely within the facts to say that from the very beginning our relations have squared with the highest standards of ethics. No one who has studied the text or the workings of the Townsend Harris treaties will say that there is any trace of an attempt to overreach or drive a hard bargain at the expense of a less fortunate neighbor. The commerce which they provided for between the two countries was not disadvantageous to Japan from an economic standpoint, nor were the trade relations thus established ever used by the United States as a means for securing political control of any portion of the Japanese Empire. Instead of attempting to make any part of it a sphere of American interests, we have sought to make the whole empire a sphere of American ideas. That we have

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succeeded measurably in this is attested by the fact that everywhere the Japanese are known as the Yankees of the Far East.

But are the friendly relations which have existed thus far between the two great powers on the Pacific merely temporary, or may we reasonably expect them to be permanent? In other words, is there a sufficient basis for an enduring friendship between them? Or, is there such a clash of interests as to overcome the traditional friendship?

True, there is not between the United States and Japan, as between the United States and England, a community of blood, language, and religion. There are not these ties to unite the two nations. Yet these are not the only bonds by which nations may be held together. While they are by no means unimportant, it is entirely within the facts to say that they are becoming less important. It is but little over a century since the political policies of a State were controlled very largely by its religious beliefs. If the monarch were Catholic, he chose his allies from among Catholic countries, and, if Protestant, from among Protestant countries. Today England has among its allies: Catholics, Buddhists and Mohammedans. The fact that the Sultan is the head of the Mohammedan religion has not prevented England from championing his cause against Russia. While the United States has from the standpoint of religion little in common with Russia, China or Japan, it has always pursued a policy of friendship toward them, however hostile certain of its individual citizens may have been toward the religions of those countries. The waning power of the church over the state is shown in the triumph of separation in France and the majority in the House of Commons in favor of disestablishment in England. Except in a few fanatical countries, foreign policies are not now determined by religious beliefs and there is nothing to indicate a likelihood of a change in this respect.

The prejudices due to blood are far less strong than they once were and are constantly weakening. The old feeling which divided all into Greeks and barbarians has not entirely disappeared and probably never will, but like all other prej-

udices and provincialisms it does not flourish in the atmosphere of modern scientific thought. Such prejudices rest mainly upon ignorance. Hence, it is fair to suppose that, in the future as in the past, improvements in the means of transportation and of communicating intelligence will, by enabling the peoples of different parts of the world and of different races to understand each other better, cause a decrease in racial prejudices.

A difference in language is not so great a barrier as it once was. The rapid increase in international trade is forcing each nation to learn more of the language as well as of the customs and industries of the other. The more important writings in each language are either translated into the others or furnish the inspiration for treatises in the others embodying substantially the same ideas. Thus the thoughts which determine national and international action are to a greater and greater extent becoming the common property of all nations, in spite of the differences in language.

While the lack of these bonds has been growing less important, the bond due to a community of interests has been growing stronger. Though commercial advantage is not the sole factor in determining national policies, it is nevertheless an important factor. That friendship between the United States and Japan is a decided commercial advantage to both can readily be concluded from a reference to the facts. One of the great facts of recent decades is the unprecedented growth in international trade. And nowhere has this increase been more marked than in the trade between the United States and Japan. According to the Statistical Abstract, the value of the exports from the United States to Japan in 1865 was \$41,913. From this insignificant sum the trade has grown until but forty years later the exports are valued at \$51,719,183. During the same period the value of imports has increased from \$285,176 to \$51,821,629. After allowing for the effect of war, this growth is certainly marvelous. Between 1895 and 1905 the exports from the United States to Japan increased in value from \$4,634,717 to \$51,719,683 and the imports from \$23,790,202 to \$51,821,629. Thus during a single decade our exports to Japan

trade

increased over 1000 per cent and our imports over 100 per cent. Our imports now amount to \$70,392,722.

That this growth has not been due to accident, or a series of accidents, will become evident by an inquiry into the causes which underly it. The geographical location of the countries is such as to make trade between them easy. In this respect the United States has a decided advantage over the countries of Europe. The route across the Pacific is shorter, safer and hence cheaper than the Suez or Cape of Good Hope routes. The control of the Pacific route is in the hands of the United States, by reason of its possession of the coaling stations and ports of call. When this trade is developed to the proportions which it must from the nature of the case attain, the significance of our possession of the string of islands between our coast and that of Asia will be appreciated by many who seem as yet to have no conception of it. The course of history has been determined largely by the possession of trade routes.

The difference in the commodities produced in the two countries is such as to make the United States and Japan trade allies, i.e., to make them seek to promote rather than to place obstacles in the way of trade with each other. To appreciate the truth of this we have but to glance at the staple products of the two countries. Japan produces raw silk cheaply and though the United States has attempted it, the attempts have availed us nothing, except to show that either our soil or climate, or both, are not adapted to the industry. We are therefore importing about 90 per cent of the raw silk exported from Japan and making it into fabrics, instead of doing as we once did—purchasing those fabrics from Europe, and paying for them with the products of our farms. We still pay for them with the products of our farms, but it is now simply the raw material that we pay for, and give to our own factories the opportunity of performing the processes which enhance its value, instead of paying for having the same done in European factories.

Tea is another staple of Japanese production which has never been raised profitably in the United States. So far as can be seen, American tea will remain a negligible

quantity in the commerce of the world. It is therefore not at all surprising that the United States should take three-fourths of the tea exported by Japan.

There are certain classes of works of art which the United States imports from Japan. These also are not and for a long time will not be produced in the United States. The artistic temperament and abilities of a people are something which does not change rapidly. The whims of fashion may be ephemeral, but the ability to produce and the desire for artistic creations are far more constant.

As Japan is the available source from which the United States secures and will continue to secure the above classes of goods, there are certain other classes for the supply of which Japan looks and under normal conditions will look to the United States. Perhaps the most important of these is raw cotton. Cut off the supply of this staple and immediately one of the great industries of Japan is at a standstill. And such is the industrial organization of today that one industry cannot suffer without causing a considerable demoralization in all other industries. During the period of hand industries the makers of iron would be affected but slightly by a shut down among the makers of cloth. Each operative depended very largely upon his own capital. But under the factory system of today, let one industry be brought suddenly to a standstill and several of the banks that are furnishing money to manufacturers in that industry and others are forced to contract their loans and the stringency is felt all along the line. This is the mildest form which it can take. Not infrequently the shock causes several banks to break and confidence is so shaken that a financial panic results, and from the depressing, if not demoralizing, effects of financial panics no industry is exempt.

This dependence upon the United States of one of the great industries of Japan is a stronger guarantee of peace between the two nations than most of us appreciate. Japan is far too conservative a nation to lightly enter upon a war with the United States, knowing as she does that the consequences of such a war would be a suspension, if not destruction, of one of her industries thereby threatening her whole

industrial and financial organization. The danger of such losses and privations is too great a risk to run, except in self-defense. The mere prospect of enhanced military glory is not likely to appeal to Japan as being a commodity worth purchasing at such a price.

While the dependence of Japan upon the United States is less marked in other respects, there are nevertheless a number of commodities for which she is to a great degree dependent upon us. Most of the flour used in Japan is imported from the United States. Though there are other countries that produce flour, there are none of them that can compete successfully with the United States in the Japanese market. To be suddenly cut off from the American supply would therefore put the Japanese at a disadvantage with respect to this one of the necessities of life.

What is true of flour is equally true of kerosene. Nearly all of the kerosene used in Japan comes from the United States. As yet the product of the Russian oil fields does not seem to have found its way into the Japanese market. This may be due to the fact that the freight rates over the Trans-Siberian railway are not sufficiently low to enable the Russian shipper to compete with his American rival.

In locomotives, railway rails, and railway equipment in general, the United States is easily first in the list of competitors for Japanese contracts. This is due in part to our greater promptness in filling orders because of our resort to standard types and making hundreds according to the same pattern instead of waiting until an order is received and then drafting the plan according to which the locomotives, etc., in that order will be made, as is the custom in most European shops. Now that Japan has resolved to build the railroads which are indispensable to the development of Corea and southern Manchuria, her dependence upon the United States has in this respect increased very materially. Scarcely less pronounced is her dependence upon us for meat, structural iron, and machinery.

Among the marked tendencies of the last century has been the increasing influence of commercial considerations in determining the foreign policies of nations. Nor is there

any convincing evidence that this tendency has reached its height. When we consider this in connection with the commercial relations of the two countries, we have an excellent basis for the conclusion that, in the future as in the past, the United States and Japan will continue to coöperate with each other instead of foolishly casting aside the mutual advantages to be gained from a policy of friendly coöperation dictated by their geographical location and natural resources.

There is another force which cannot be left out of account, and that is the force of traditions. The United States is the first of the great nations of modern times with which Japan entered into diplomatic relations. From the opening of Japan by Commodore Perry, to the present day, the diplomatic relations of Japan with the United States have been of the most friendly character. Japan has never dis-trusted the motives of the United States, but on the contrary has always looked to it for friendly advice and guidance. She has paid us the compliment of sending hundreds of her brightest youths to be educated in our institutions, of sending commissions to study our industrial organization, of celebrating the anniversary of the landing of Commodore Perry and erecting a monument to his memory, and of bringing to a close at our suggestion a war in which she was uniformly victorious. Nor has Japan forgotten that in her struggle for fair commercial treatment at the hands of western nations and for ridding herself of the hateful handicap of consular jurisdiction, she received most valuable assistance from the United States. The confidence begotten of these years of close friendship and helpfulness is not to be shaken by the first gust of breezy criticism or by restrictions which are economically advantageous to Japan. Traditions, however friendly, may not be sufficient to outweigh national interests, but when reinforced by them they constitute a force which is difficult to overcome. They at least make it easy to explain away minor differences, and that is all that is necessary in order that the friendly relations between the United States and Japan may continue to bless both nations by enabling them to realize their own possi-

bilities and to exercise a wholesome influence for international peace.

But Japan and the United States are not the only first class powers having territory bordering on the Pacific and to whom the control of this highway of commerce is a matter of importance. In this list we find England, France, Germany and Russia. It is therefore fitting that we inquire to what extent the dominant position now held by the United States and Japan may in the future be challenged by any of those powers. And in this inquiry we will not assume the rôle of prophet and attempt to say what distant ages may bring forth, but will rather confine ourselves to the more practical task of diagnosing the situation with reference to the present and reasonably near future.

A decade ago, the position of Russia as an aspirant for power on the Pacific occasioned no small amount of anxiety. The situation was not only acute but threatening. Yet such is not now the case. The battle of Tsushima has made it clear that for a generation at least Russia will not be a formidable power on the Pacific. By this it is not meant that Russia will be a negligible factor in deciding political and commercial questions pertaining to the Pacific, but merely that she will not within a generation be in a position to dictate the rules of the road or to insist that any considerable portion of the Pacific be recognized as a sphere of Russian interest. To put it in more classic phrase, she will not be in a position to insist that all the Pacific shall be divided into three parts of which Russia shall have one.

The German emperor, whose habit it is in great crises to voice the aspirations and dictate the policy of his empire, has already waived the rights of Germany as a contender for supremacy in the Pacific by appropriating for himself the title of "Admiral of the Atlantic." But apart from this act which furnishes convincing evidence of a spirit of self-abnegation so characteristic of the man, Germany is at present too intimately bound up in the meshes of European politics to make it wise for her to launch any campaign for the annexation of the Pacific.

France is even less prepared than Germany to jeopardize

her European position for a possible increase of her influence in the Orient. For a generation, at least, her energies will be needed in developing and consolidating her North African empire. The successful completion of the task she has undertaken in Africa, which must needs take time, is too vital to her position and prestige in Europe to permit of her seeking other worlds to conquer. There is therefore no reason to apprehend that, within the near future, France will be a disturbing factor or will interfere seriously with the present equilibrium of forces in the Pacific.

England is a far less influential power on the Pacific than she was twenty years ago. At that time her commercial influence and naval power as well as her prestige in diplomacy were everywhere recognized and gave her the position of premier among the powers on the Pacific. But in the late eighties and early nineties she began to ask herself whether or not this influence was worth as much as it was costing and was likely to cost her. In other words she began to doubt whether or not "the game was worth the candle." By the time this period of doubt ended, her primacy was gone. Power rarely survives a period of such masterful inactivity. The situation, viewed in the light of the history of the past twenty years, warrants the conclusion that England has voluntarily withdrawn herself from the list of powers contending for the mastery of the Pacific. Nor is she likely to re-enter the lists, the abandonment of her naval base at Esquimalt indicates that she does not intend to question the supremacy of the United States and Japan.

I have refrained from mentioning China in this list, because although she is a power on the Pacific, she is not a first class power, nor is it certain that she ever will be. China has not yet passed through that stage in political evolution through which every state must pass in order to have its status as a first class power assured. The fundamental difficulty in China is that the people of one part do not appreciate sufficiently the fact that they have anything in common with the people in another part. Without this sense of unity, patriotism is impossible, the power to act in concert is impossible—and without the power to act in

concert, national achievement is handicapped to such an extent that it must suffer by comparison with that of nations not so handicapped. If the present revolution brings China to a consciousness of itself, wakes the Chinese people and gets them to see that they have a community of interests, China will become a great factor in world politics and her location will make her one of the leading powers on the Pacific. But it is not at all probable that China will in the near future be able to challenge the position of primacy now held by Japan and the United States.

But can the United States and Japan continue this joint tenancy? Can each of these treatyless allies brook equality or must there be a clash for the purpose of determining which shall yield supremacy to the other? In our judgment, such a clash is neither wise nor necessary, nor is it desired by either. There is honor enough and room enough for both. There is likewise work enough to enable the energies of both to find expression in constructive rather than in destructive operations. The character of work to be done is by no means such as to render coöperation disadvantageous. Each needs the products of the other's industry and neither can afford to spend its substance in crippling the other. Viewed from a selfish standpoint, each should rejoice at the legitimate success of the other, for in proportion as each becomes prosperous, in that proportion is its friendship valuable to the other. Japan has need of all her material energies in developing her industries, both at home and in her possessions, in strengthening the finances of her empire, in raising the standard of living of the artisan and laborer so as to bring the comforts of life to the home of the toiler. The United States likewise can find ample outlet for her surplus energies in developing her outlying possessions, cultivating the new fields of trade which the Panama Canal will be sure to open, and in solving the problems of government raised by the reorganization of her industries, by the change from rural to urban life and by the influx of the immigrant.

The only apples of discord suggested, even by those bent upon having a war, are the possession of the Philippines and

the immigration of Japanese laborers into the United States. The latter of these has been settled by treaty in a manner satisfactory to both parties and the conditions brought about by this treaty are such that the question is not likely to be reopened. *Requiescat in pacem.*

As for the possession of the Philippines, there is nothing in it hostile to the interests or aspirations of Japan. Japan has never aspired to the acquisition of territory in the tropics. What she needs is territory which will furnish an overflow ground for her surplus population and territory in the torrid zone will not do this. Furthermore, there is but one condition under which seizure of the Philippines by Japan would be of any use to her, and that is the possession by Japan of a navy superior to that of the United States. And of this the Japanese finances will not permit. Whatever else one may think of the Japanese, no one who has studied their character at all considers them a visionary people. And none but a visionary people would sacrifice their most vital interests to chase after a will-o'-the-wisp which could place but "a barren sceptre in their grasp."

In the language of the *Jiji*, which is the London Times of Japan: "As for our country, she has maintained toward America the traditional friendship that is peculiar and apart. Our relations have been exceedingly deep rooted."

Alike reassuring are the words of Count Hayashi, the leading diplomat of Japan: "In this world there are those who try to raise waves on a flat of ground by noising abroad a thing which, as Japanese we cannot even see in our dreams, such as a Japanese-American war." As evidence that this is a sincere expression of the Japanese mind we would cite that, in her treaty of alliance with Great Britain, Japan has agreed to a provision excepting the United States from the list of nations against whom Japan may invoke the aid of her ally in case of war. And although this exception was made in contemplation of the ratification of the general treaty of arbitration between the United States and Great Britain, it is admitted by the leading statesmen of Japan that the exception will hold even though ratification fail.

If, then, the United States possesses nothing which bars

the way to the realization by Japan of her national ideals and Japan possesses nothing half so valuable to the United States as her good-will, and apparently nothing of which we could deprive her except at the price of our self-respect, it is manifest that their interests lie in the direction of peace rather than war. Nor is there any excuse for allowing other nations to artfully stir up discord between them, for which work there is no disposition save by one or two. And in these cases it requires no political seer to discover the motive. Hence to suppose that such transparent deception would succeed requires either a sublime ignorance of human nature or a sublime distrust of the sanity of nations.

If the pending treaties between the United States on the one hand and England and France on the other are ratified, a similar treaty of general arbitration between the United States and Japan would have an excellent moral effect and all true lovers of peace could well rejoice at its ratification. But whether such a treaty is ratified or not, the surest guarantee of peace between Japan and the United States is that neither nation wants war. Given this condition of mind and there are no differences which cannot be harmonized without an appeal to the sword. It is a guarantee of peace regardless of parchments. The utility of the Japanese and American fleets on the Pacific consists therefore not in watching with envious eye the growth of each other or the progress of the nation to which it belongs, but rather in preventing any intruders from disturbing the balance of power in the Pacific.

1-2-1900

JAPAN, AMERICA, AND THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

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The question of foreign influence upon the Chinese is more easily defined in the case of Japan than in that of any other outside nation. All through Chinese history, art and architecture, since the Middle Ages of Europe, is traced and scattered the impression and work of foreign men and ideas. From the Nestorians to the Italian legate at Peking, from Friar John and Rubriques to Marco Paolo; from the Italian, Belgian and French missionaries of the sixteenth century to the envoys of the powers and the modern traders, missionaries, physicians and educators; comes a curious patch-work of foreign and western influence curiously recognized and known by the Chinese. But Japan's definite and forcible impression upon China dates only from the Boxer war or later and is not ten years old.

When I first went to China, in 1900, I lodged for a time in the Provincial College of Chihli, at Paotingfu. I was a guest of the chancellor, who had a curiosity to know what was the place occupied by the Japanese among the allies in China. He said that the college several years previous to that time, had a Japanese student who made a very good impression by his work in the Chinese classics, but that he had been entrusted with 400 taels of the college funds, with which to buy printing paper in Japan, had taken the money, departed for his native land to make the purchase, had never returned, and had neither forwarded the paper nor accounted for the money. He was under the impression that the Japanese had borrowed their prestige from their western associates and slipped into China under the foreign mantle. Although the so-called Japan-China war had intervened, this was a fair sample of the

knowledge possessed among Chinese respecting the Japanese, and it may be said that in 1900 Japan was, to the Chinese, merely a country that had taken everything from China, except modern ideas, and warfare, and given nothing in return.

As beneficiaries of Chinese civilization, the Japanese have an intercourse with China extensive in its history. Japan's travelers, pilgrims, geographers, warriors and traders, however, appear to have left no great impression upon the Chinese, and in the light of China's revolutionary present situation, may be passed over. China took all too little account of the Japan-China war of 1894-1896, and in fact, began to realize Japan's importance only through the reputation which Japan had in the West. Japan's modern appearance on the continent of Asia came first in Korea, where she made a modern treaty in accordance with western practice (her first on her own initiative), in the seventies. What we call civilized diplomatic relations between Japan and China, and the establishment of legations by China and Japan in their two capitals, was brought about largely by an American missionary, Dr. Davie Bethune McCartee. Japan was only established on the mainland through events growing out of the conflict of foreign interests in Korea; and in Fukien, opposite Formosa, which she took from China by the Japan-China war, and it was only after 1900 that the Japanese may be said to have fully established themselves in all the treaty ports. At the end of the first decade of the century, Japanese were in the majority among foreigners at every treaty port and treaty mart north of Chefoo. At Tien Tsin their colony grew at the rate of 200 annually. An interesting exchange of official inquiry took place between Russia and Japan in 1910 respecting their subjects in the Chinese treaty marts on the Siberian frontier, that shows Japanese colonization to have become a political question of considerable acuteness. The complications of the Russo-Japanese question led Russia to ask Japan why she had sent a consul to Aigun on the Amur River. Japan replied that it was because she had 250 subjects there. She retorted by asking Russia why

Russia had sent a consul to Chientao on the Korean frontier. Russia could only reply that it was because she had 4 subjects there (including the consul). All this is a part of the expansion of Japan expressed in various words and phrases but best comprehended in the term, Greater Japan.

A corresponding apprehension in the Chinese, at Japan's expansion in this particular, has been expressed in almost innumerable protests on the part of China to Japanese expansion in Manchuria after the Russo-Japanese war, and in my observation and recollection reached a noteworthy stage, when in 1908, China complained of, and was alarmed by, Japanese military surveys in the region of the Great Wall, and in Mongolia. It was at this time that the government in Peking began to feel the full force of reform ideas among students returning from foreign lands, and in masses from Japan, and the late empress-dowager, coincident with the question of the education of Chinese in America, under the scheme by which America restored her share of the Boxer indemnity, stated that China must send fewer young men to Japan, because those going to Japan largely became revolutionaries.

There are no satisfactory statistics respecting Japanese origins in the Chinese revolution, nor any so far as I know, that are not misleading. But it will give some idea to state that perhaps 20,000 Chinese reformers and students have gotten their ideas for revolution in Japan. As disturbers of the Chinese system and of the central government at Peking, they have been to the front in China since 1903, when the empress-dowager had one of them, Shen Chin, beaten to death with a stave in the imperial prison beside the palace gates. They have grown to be the master revolutionists of China. Their unsuspected power of organization if not of agitation, coupled with the support of the gentry especially in Hunan, have made China into something remarkably new altogether.

The progressive movement in China embracing both the republicans and monarchists is a movement of Chinese enlightened by all western countries, but the facts are that the foremost revolutionaries in the rebellion of September

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and November, 1911, and in the incidents where force and violence leading up to it, have been employed, come from the Chinese revolutionary and reform school in Japan. I recall a plot by Chinese students returned from Japan to assassinate the empress-dowager. It came intimately before my observation, because I had occasion to persuade a student friend, who had been educated in another land, to stay out of this particular conspiracy. Japan's influence over the Chinese student has been inevitable, and it is no derogation of the Japanese to say that influences developed on their shores have manifested themselves in revolution on the Asian continent, in political conspiracy, arson, assassination, murder and other crimes. These are the accompaniments of revolution assignable primarily to the leaven of western ideas. Certain chapters in the history of Japan on the continent have inspired Japan's critics to attribute to her certain responsibilities for this rebellion in China which they are doubtless not prepared to prove. There is nothing to show that Japanese have in China violated their right of sanctuary, as was done in Korea when the Korean queen was murdered. The rebellion in China, mainly due to the endeavors of reformers and revolutionaries, who had been to Japan, and whose organizations for revolution were developed there, furnishes records of events in the setting up of the so-called Republic of China that are quite clear. In Szechuan, the largest and wealthiest province of China where the rebellion opened, a large percentage of the members of the provincial assembly were students returned from Japan and one of them Pu Tien-chun their leader was president of the Assembly. No other assembly in China was more free in its criticisms of the imperial authorities. In constitutional matters it had a struggle with the viceroy and won. It espoused the grievances and causes of the revolutionaries in Hunan and Hupeh provinces who executed the main revolt at Wuchang, and its leaders organized the Anti-Foreign-Loan Society bringing about the first rebellious outbreak.

Rebellion found its first strong soil in Hunan which had long had the name of being the most incorrigible and anti-

foreign province of China, for ten years suspected of connection with important revolutionary outbreaks of which the destruction of a railway carriage by a bomb and wounding of several high officials at Peking, 1905, and the assassination of the Governor of Anhui province in 1907 were most noteworthy. Yang Tu a Japan-schooled Hunanese was then the leader of the younger or reform party whose agitation among the Chinese students in Japan (where anarchy had already established itself) caused the so-called "strong man of China" Yuan Shih-kai, to offer him office in order to arrest his revolutionary work, or control it. He attached himself to Yuan Shih-kai only after the rebellion was successful.

Hunan and Hupeh provinces furnish almost the whole history of the rise of the rebellion. Their reformers opposed the government's policy of central ownership of railways and industrial development of China by the employment of foreign capital. This opposition held up the famous "Hukang Loan" for the building of a trunk line railway in three directions out of Hankow. The gentry of Hunan who have always been the most powerful of the gentry class in China, convinced by the foreign or Japanized young men of their province took the responsible headship of this opposition and the outbreak of the rebellion, the most important rebellion from the foreign standpoint that China has ever had, resulted. It is of greater consequence to China than the mere change of dynasty and to a degree is a monument to the Chinese revolutionaries schooled in Japan.

The place of Japan in China's revolution now and the place which Japan will have on the continent of Asia hereafter, finds its definite, comprehensive explanation in the history of the question (since the signing of the Portsmouth treaty) of Manchuria, a word in which all discussion of the affairs of the nations in Eastern Asia ends. Japan's place in the affairs of Eastern Asia must be immense, as all can conceive. What is it?

I have already called attention to the fact that rebellion broke out in the industrial region that is the center of

foreign European and American loan operations due to revolutionaries largely of the Japanese school. Japan is not a capitalistic nation but a military one that leans upon opportunity. Her field since the Russo-Japanese war has been that of chance and fortunate opportunity out of which she has made empire. And now revolution has favored her policy and interests in this particular that rebellion has come in the center of the interests of the capitalistic powers, her antagonists, disconcerting them and absorbing their attention, while she is free with her right of military pacification in her own sphere in China to protect and promote her own interests and policies. I believe these have never been fairly nor with any degree of accuracy or completeness defined. They are as follows:

Two great railways traverse Manchuria, one the whole distance east and west, the other nearly the whole length north and south, both together forming a matrix and conveying Russian and Japanese territorial sovereignty to all Manchuria's vital parts. When the Portsmouth treaty was signed in New Hampshire, it became the immediate business of Japan and Russia, between whom these railways were divided, to keep apart. With their usual alertness the Japanese were foremost in this problem. Before Komura left the United States for Japan, Marquis Ito jumped to the solution of this problem by giving Edward H. Harriman, the American financier and promoter, a tentative agreement for lease to American financiers of Japan's railway in Manchuria, taken from Russia. This would have placed America between Russia and Japan. It would have solved, in a manner, the question of non-entanglement with Russia, so far as Japan was concerned. Ito believed Japan could not hold her Manchurian territories; he thought Japan was moving beyond her depth.

Immediately after the exchange of this tentative agreement, Komura arrived in Tokio and from thence date two Japans, the passing one that of Ito, the other that of Komura. Komura said Japan must expand on the continent in China, and this expansion had sufficient political basis only in the rights which Japan had acquired from

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Russia by coming into possession of a share of her railways in Manchuria. Japan could not turn her railway over to others, she must cling to all she had acquired in order to share all the rights and advantages enjoyed by Russia; Russia must be supported and made to cling to all she held and had claimed in Manchuria, and on the Chinese frontier, so as to give a basis for Japan's continental expansion. Japan thereupon abandoned the Ito-Harriman agreement and found in her Manchurian railway a tie and not a breach with Russia. The reasons are as follows:

In the hour of Komura's diplomatic defeat at Portsmouth respecting a war indemnity, which the people of Japan demanded as a condition of peace, he secured the insertion in the secret minutes of the Peace treaty, the obligation, on the part of Russia (as a part of the transfer of the railway) to communicate to Japan upon ratification of the treaty, all agreements which she had with China, respecting Manchuria. When the transfer of these agreements took place, it was found that the contract for the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway signed in 1896, contained a clause known as "Article VI" which gave to Russia the sole and exclusive right of administration in the railway zone. Komura saw, as well as did a majority of the emperor's advisers, that if this article could be appropriated for effect on the Japanese railways, and recognized by Russia, it was in effect a division of sovereignty among China, Russia, and Japan, in Manchuria. This fact, joined to the fact that Russia's special frontier trade rights were capable of similar extension so as to benefit Japan, gave to Japan her present "Plan of State" upon which Greater Japan rests. Japan now had new statesmen who saw that Russia and Japan possessed and could maintain a special position in northern China, perhaps in spite of all opposition. Japan's problem now was to bring about a written tie between Russia and Japan as against a separation which the ideas and policy of Ito involved. Japan passed, in her policy, to the Komura or so-called Katsura or war party, which was, in fact, nothing more than a Greater Japan party, whose program necessitated peace.

It took four years for Komura to bring about an entente and agreement with Russia which, after many vicissitudes, was obtained July 4, 1910, when Japan's aim was secured by a compact to maintain the status quo in Manchuria, which no power has yet essayed directly to disturb. The story of this four years is one of diplomatic pursuit of Russia by Japan, and is one of the most curiously interesting in the annals of diplomacy. Its details are too numerous to give here. Suffice to say that Russia evaded Japan's pursuit until forced by circumstances to accept the terms of the situation as viewed by Japan. There is one aspect of this, in the main subterranean, struggle between Japan and Russia which deserves to be noted here. Russia learned of the Ito-Harriman agreement, and essayed to imitate Ito's success in getting American finance into Manchuria. She offered her own railway in Wall Street, and failed at much expense to her pride. Russia's evasion of Japan in this issue was due to fear of the consequences of the Japanese invasion of northern Manchuria, and her diplomatic action showed that she was sparring for time.

It was not long before Japan then discovered Russia's intentions respecting the Russian railway in Manchuria, which clearly were in effect the annulment of "Article VI" by transfer of her railway to a country that would interpret its provisions favorably to Chinese sovereignty, thus preventing any wholesale exercise of Japanese sovereignty in Manchuria, and the wholesale extension of Japanese settlement there. The success of Russia's intention was the greatest blow which Russia could direct at Japan's "Plan of State." In consequence Japan did everything to prevent it. In 1908, after repeated failures to open negotiations with Russia on the subject, Japan sent Baron Goto to St. Petersburg, and another officer to Harbin, with a view to opening negotiations. Russia refused to be engaged. Japan tried in 1909, through her ambassador, Motono, to bring the matter up again at St. Petersburg and failed. Russia's situation from that point on was one of acute embarrassment. Japan invoked the complicated and almost omniscient weapons of the doctrine of equa

rights against Russia, and succeeded in pushing Japanese commerce and communications to the Amur River by way of its Manchurian tributaries. Russia was literally forced along by Japan. At the same time, Russia employed every means to dispose of her railway, and what Russia would do in this respect was in 1908-09 a burning question in Tokio. Fearful that Russia would give up the principle of administration in the railway zone, which, at that time, became an issue with all the powers, Japan sent Marquis Ito to Russian Manchuria to meet the Russian minister of finance, Kokovtseff (later the Russian premier). This is a strange story. Ito was assassinated before he had introduced at Harbin the object of his mission. Ito was opposed to expansion until Japan could recuperate from the effects of the war with Russia. Almost to the last as is well known he denied that Japan would annex Korea, believing that his advice and that of his associates, would prevail with the emperor. He was now a changed statesman. Japan had a new spirit, and he was on an errand for his late opponents. This is the great story of Ito's last days and of his assassination. He became a martyr. It was strangely fitting, strange as life itself, that he should, after being defeated in his own plan of state, lend a hand to that of his political adversaries and lose his life in behalf of their policies.

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direction
of his effort*

Ito's death saved Russia from one more embarrassment, and events followed that further delayed the inevitable rapprochement and compact with Japan. America was observing this drama, and, unable to promote singly the policies of these two contending powers, devised a plan to meet general necessities in Manchuria; not only of China and Russia, but of what she considered the best interests of Japan. This was the famous "neutralization proposal." The government at Washington proposed the purchase and neutralization of both the Japanese and Russian railways, by the powers. This proposal forced Russia to face the issue of a division of sovereignty in Manchuria, which was now so complicated by the formal representations and opposition of the United States, Great Britain, France and

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Germany that Russia was isolated, and seeing no friendly hand held out to her but that of Japan, she accepted it. Fearing the consequences of abandoning "Article VI," and expecting more from its permanency under the Japanese, she signed with Japan, on July 4, 1910, as already stated, an agreement to maintain it and Japan thus established what she had set out to establish, the corner-stone of her empire in China.

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Much paper has been written over by Japan and all the great European powers, setting up the principle of equal rights and the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China. It has been often said that these papers, called alliances and treaties, are the guarantee of these principles. But that is not the case. These papers so extensively written over are in a state of progressive cancellation and have become so contradictory that governments like our own now depend upon a reiteration of statement in the form of communiques, interpretations and other exchanges of correspondence after the drawing up of each new "entente," "agreement" or "convention," to determine where the parties to these numerous written papers stand on the questions of equal right and Chinese integrity and sovereignty. And the great fact brought out by the revolution is a special position which Japan has made for herself, both territorially and diplomatically, within the borders of the Chinese Empire.

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Previous to 1909 the United States government was so negligent of eastern Asia that it was not in possession of the facts. It was so far behind the situation that it had to employ heroic means in behalf of its great principles there. "Article VI" had been exchanged by Russia to Japan at Portsmouth under its nose. When the government at Washington in 1909 started in to rebuild the "open door" structure of John Hay it didn't have that now famous article. It was only when it pressed Russia on the question of administration at Harbin in Manchuria where Russia had created a local Russian government on Chinese soil, that Russia gave to America that article. That was in 1909-1910, thirteen years after it was written. America

then put forward the "neutralization proposal"—a very great measure which it was better that it made and lost than that it should never have made.

These things altogether are the anatomy of the war scare in the Pacific and that almost entirely are the causes of the peace movement in its present aspect. A proper understanding of these things which to the general reader appear more technical than physical nevertheless are more important than any propaganda such as the peace movement for obviating war in the Pacific because familiarity with physical and diplomatic geography in eastern Asia will give confidence while peace propaganda is an opiate that will bring terror when the actual trial between facts occurs. Peace or war is neither here nor there. | The idea that Americans know the things with which they deal and can settle them is an infinitely greater idea than the idea of peace. ||

The great bulking of Japan in the forefront of the Chinese revolution, in its various rôles and aspects, has led to a lot of thinking on the part of the western powers and notably of the United States government. And it is not to be marveled at that Japan's enemies have attributed to her the precipitation of rebellion in China, and aggressive aims and intentions. This subject is one in which time must have way, for few serious students of such great affairs would venture now to speculate upon it. I only wish to say that, to anyone acquainted with the nature of the machinery of a nation's expansion, and especially of the nature of the machinery of Japanese expansion which her statesmen themselves cannot control, the situation has almost every possibility. Japan must be, and I take it for granted that she is, leagues ahead of other nations in appreciation of, and interest in, the Chinese revolution and its responsibilities and opportunities. She has set firmly up the principle of a division of sovereignty in the Chinese Empire. With fine contempt she went to war to demolish it when it was merely a Russian assumption. She then set it up again not as a Japanese assumption, or a Russian-Japanese assumption, but by a Russo-Japanese compact contained in a preliminary exchange of notes and

in a formal convention. Any Japanese may well pause at his country's responsibilities on the Asian continent and the possibilities to which it is heir and to which it is bound.

The subject is one of great magnitude, and I have reached the limits in the discussion which I have intended. If it seems necessary in order to dispose of the subject to show the latest phase of its concern to us as Americans, I would say that now, when all issues between nations in Eastern Asia appear to have been thrown into the melting pot, America has been placed in a splendid position in China by the able diplomacy and enterprise of its government. Singular as it may seem the two countries of the United States and Japan at the opening of the revolutionary change in that ancient nation, aside from the special interests of Japan in China, actually occupy a common platform and position in eastern Asia respecting China's struggle to restore order and unity. It is because of the necessity of peace to Japan. There is in the situation resulting from this necessity the possibility at least for some time of a closer understanding and relation between the United States and Japan respecting China, certainly so if one or more outside powers do not precipitate military occupation of some part of China and Japan remains content to allow her continental interests to be developed by the natural course of events.

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